JUDGMENT K.S. Hegde, J.- These are appeals under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code. They relate to one incident. It is alleged that the respondents decoyed one Ningappa on the night of 12th December, 1958 to Cholenahalli village and there they murdered and robbed him. The charge of murder was tried by he learned Additional Sessions Judge, Mysore, Camp Hassan, in Hassan Sessions Case No. 4 of 1959, and the respondents acquitted as per the judgment dated 15th April, 1959. Criminal Appeal No. 207 of 1959 is directed against the said decision. After the acquittal of the respondents in H.S.C. No. 4 of 1959, the respondents were tried for the offence under section 392, Indian Penal Code by the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Mysore, Camp Hassan, with the aid of a Jury in Hassan Sessions Case No. 5 of 1959. In that case the Jury returned a verdict of ‘not guilty’. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the verdict of the Jury and acquitted the respondents In Criminal Appeal No. 318 of 1959, the legality as well as the correctness of the order in H.S.C. No. 5 of 1959 is assailed. We shall first take up Criminal Appeal No. 207 of 1959. Briefly stated the prosecution case is as follows: The deceased Ningappa was an agriculturist as well as a trader; he and his wife Lakshmi (P.W.9) lived with his parents in Sathenahalli village in Channarayapatna Taluk; the deceased used to purchase cocoanuts in the Shandy as well as in weekly fairs held in places near about Channaraya patna for the purpose of his trade; he used to take loans now and then from Chikalingegowda (P.W.17); the second respondent (Gowdiah alias Gowdappa alias Lingappa also belongs to that village and he was well acquainted with the deceased; the first respondent (Dyavegowda) is a resident of Bekka village and a friend of R-2. It is said that on the afternoon of Friday the 12th December, 1958, R-2 came to the house of the deceased and informed him that some cocoanuts were available in Nimbahalli; thereupon the deceased took with him Rs. 100 which he had: from there the deceased went to the house of P.W.17 and borrowed from him Rs.1,000. Nothing is known about the movements of the deceased and R-2 on Friday the 12th after:he deceased left the house of P.W.17. 100 which he had: from there the deceased went to the house of P.W.17 and borrowed from him Rs.1,000. Nothing is known about the movements of the deceased and R-2 on Friday the 12th after:he deceased left the house of P.W.17. P.W.17 says that the deceased met him on Saturday that 13th December in the Shandy at Channarayapatna where he returned to him the loan of Rs. 1,000 saying that the transaction at Nimbahalli had fallen through. He further says that later at about 4 p. m. on the same day the deceased again approached him and asked him to give Rs.1,000, as he (the deceased) wanted to purchase cocoanuts in Bekka; but he (P.W.17) told him that the money in question had already been sent home through his son. Then we have the evidence of P.W.21 (Dodde Gowda), the brother-in-law of the deceased who says that the deceased borrowed from him Rs. 50 for the purpose of purchasing cocoanuts at Bekka. He also says that at about night fall on that day, the deceased met him again and borrowed a further sum of Rs.10; at that time R-1 was. with him; he advised the deceased not to go to Bekka at so late an hour; but R-1 assured him that R-2 was also accompanying them and hence there was no fear. Shortly thereafter the deceased and the respondents were seen by P.W.13 (Ningappa and P.W.14 (Chaluvegowda) going together on two bicycles on the Channarayapatna-Shravanabelagola road. At that time the deceased was sitting on the carrier of the bicycle ridden by R-1; R-1 was going on a separate bicycle. At about 9-30 on the same night P.W.17 saw the respondents with their bicycles in the “Circle” opposite the Channarayapatna Taluk Office. P.W.17 says that he questioned the respondents as to the whereabouts of the deceased. They told him that he had gone “then only”. The deceased did not return home either on Saturday or on Sunday. On Monday morning Dyavegowda (P.W.15) a school boy while on his way from his native village to the school at Bekka, chanced to see some vultures near the Bore or the stretch of pasture land lying between the Cholenahalli and Bekka; being curious to know what they were about, proceeded to the scene and there noticed a dead body. On Monday morning Dyavegowda (P.W.15) a school boy while on his way from his native village to the school at Bekka, chanced to see some vultures near the Bore or the stretch of pasture land lying between the Cholenahalli and Bekka; being curious to know what they were about, proceeded to the scene and there noticed a dead body. He passed on that information to the Shanbogue at Bekka, who in turn informed P.W.4 (Thimmegowda-Cholenahalli Patel). Thereafter P.W.4 sent Exhibit P-3 the First Information report to the Police Station at Channarayapatna. He also sent a Kulwadi to keep a watch over the dead body. The Police came to the scene on that night; the Sub-Inspector came there of the early morning of Tuesday; he was followed by the Inspector of Police on that afternoon. The dead body was identified to be that of the deceased Ningappa. The services of P.W.2 (Dr. Rama Rao) was requisitioned to the spot for post mortem examination. The Doctor noticed an extensive cut on the neck of the deceased cutting all the structures of the next down to the spinal column. He opined that the deceased died as a result of violence used against him and the injury in question could have been caused by cutting with a sharp cutting weapon like a sickle. The clothes of the deceased were fully stained with blood Respondents were arrested on Tuesday afternoon Evidence was adduced to show that R-1's clothes (Nos. 10 to 12) were bloodstained at the time of his arrest and therefore they were seized by the investigating officer. It is further alleged that in pursuance of R-1's statements M.O.13 (a siekle) was recovered from a dried up halla. It is also alleged that the finger ring or the deceased was found tied to the waist thread of F.-1. The further case of the prosecution is that on the information given by R-2, his bloodstained clothes (M.Os.14 and 15) were recovered from the house of his father-in-law; the ear-rings of the deceased (M.O.17) was recovered from Ganeshachar (P.W.11) a goldsmith to whom R-2 had sold them; P.W.22 (Mallegowda) to whom R-2 had paid a sum of Rs. 100 after the occurrence was also traced. On the basis of the above evidence, the respondents were challanged for the offences mentioned earlier. The evidence against the respondents is entirely circumstantial. 100 after the occurrence was also traced. On the basis of the above evidence, the respondents were challanged for the offences mentioned earlier. The evidence against the respondents is entirely circumstantial. Therefore it is necessary to analyse the several circumstances and find out how far each one of the circumstance alleged is fully established and whether the proved circumstances conclusively bring home the offences against the respondents. In doing so, we have to bear in mind the limitations attached to an appeal against acquittal. It is now well-settled that in an appeal against an order of acquittal (not against the verdict of a Jury), the power of this Court to review the evidence afresh is as extensive as its power in an appeal against a conviction. It is equally well-settled that if two reasonable views on the evidence adduced are possible, the view that had commended itself to the trial Court should be accepted as the trial Court had the benefit of seeing the witnesses in the box; further, the presumption of innocence of the accused gets strengthened by an order of acquittal passed in his favour and hence there must be good reasons for disturbing that finding. But if the trial Court has misdirected itself either on questions of law or in appreciating the evidence before it and thus arrived at conclusions which are wholly unreasonable and unsupportable, then it is the duty of this Court to interfere with the verdict under appeal. Now we shall proceed to consider the evidence bearing in mind these veil-settled principles relating to appeals against acquittals. It is alleged that the ‘murder‘was committed for gain. The prosecution case is that R-2 was a close associate of the deceased and that he used to assist the deceased in his trade; on Friday the 12th December, 1958, he went to the house of the deceased and informed him that cocoanuts were available at Nimbahalli; hence the deceased took with him Rs. 100 which he had; thereafter he borrowed a sum of Rs. 1,000 from P.W.17 and went with R-2 for purchasing cocoanuts. On this point we have the evidence of P.W.7 (Kalamma), the mother of the deceased, P.W.9 (Lakshmi), the wife of the deceased and P.W.17 (Chikkalinge Gowda). There are no good reasons to doubt the testimony of these witnesses. 100 which he had; thereafter he borrowed a sum of Rs. 1,000 from P.W.17 and went with R-2 for purchasing cocoanuts. On this point we have the evidence of P.W.7 (Kalamma), the mother of the deceased, P.W.9 (Lakshmi), the wife of the deceased and P.W.17 (Chikkalinge Gowda). There are no good reasons to doubt the testimony of these witnesses. The trial Court, in our opinion, unnecessarily troubled itself with the question as to the true nature of the assistance that was being rendered by R-2 to the deceased in his trade. It is nobody's case that R-2 was a partner of the deceased. All that is said is that he was helping the deceased in purchasing cocoanuts. We do not know whether the deceased was paying any remuneration to R-2 for that work. But from the mere fact that there is no positive evidence to show the nature of the understanding, if any, between R-2 and the the deceased, there is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of P.Ws.7 and 9 when they say that R-2 was often helping the deceased in his trade. For our purpose all that is necessary to consider in whether R-2 took the deceased from his house on Friday the 12th December, 1958, telling him that cocoanuts were available at Nimbahalli. P.Ws.7 and 9 have no reason to falsely depose against R-2. Further their evidence is corroborated by P.W.17 who says that on that Friday at about 4 p.m. the deceased borrowed from him a sum of Rs.1,000 saying that he wanted that money to purchase cocoanuts at Nimbahalli. P.W.17 is an absolutely disinterested witness. Nothing is elicited from him to show that he had any enmity either with R-1 or R-2. According to him, the deceased was borrowing from him monies now and then for the purpose of his trade. A suggestion is made on behalf of the prosecution that when the respondents murdered the deceased, they were under the impression that the deceased had a large sum of money with him being unaware of the fact that the deceased had returned the sum of Rs. 1,000 borrowed on the previous day, to P.W.17 on the morning of Saturday the 13th. There is no evidence on record to show that either of the respondents knew that the deceased had borrowed a sum of Rs.1,000 from P.W.17. 1,000 borrowed on the previous day, to P.W.17 on the morning of Saturday the 13th. There is no evidence on record to show that either of the respondents knew that the deceased had borrowed a sum of Rs.1,000 from P.W.17. But the possibility of R-2 knowing that fact cannot be ruled out. At any rate, the motive part of the prosecution case is not of much assistance in the present case. The prosecution case has to stand or fall on the other circumstantial evidence pressed before us. According to the prosecution, the deceased was murdered by the respondent some time between 7 and 9-30 p.m. on the night of Saturday the 13th December, 1958. To establish this case, the prosecution has pressed into service various circumstances. A large volume of evidence has been placed before the Court to show the association of the respondents with the deceased from the morning of the 13th till about: 7 p.m. on that date. Evidence is also placed before the Court to show that the clothes of the respondents seized by the Police after the occurrence were found to be stained with human blood. Lastly, evidence was adduced to show that onthe information given by the respondents incriminating articles were recovered. There is no dispute that the dead body of the deceased Ningappa was found on the stretch of pasture land lying between Cholenahalli and Bekka villages. The place where the dead body was found was an uninhabited place. P.W.2 (Dr. L.K. Rama Rao) who conducted the post mortem Examination says that the deceased had sustained three cut injuries; injury No. 1 was a deep cut incised wound over the front and sides of the neck, cutting all the structures of the neck down to the spinal column. According to P.W.2 that was the fatal injury. The Doctor opines that the injury in question could have been caused by a sickle. From the evidence adduced, it is seen that the ear-rings and the finger-rings of the deceased were missing. Hence it is reasonable to presume that the deceased was killed and robbed at the place where his dead body was found and the assailants of the deceased must have used a sharp cutting weapon in the commission of the crime. We now proceed to consider the evidence bearing on the association of the respondents with the deceased on Saturday the 13th. We now proceed to consider the evidence bearing on the association of the respondents with the deceased on Saturday the 13th. We have no evidence before us to show the movements of the deceased on the evening and night of Friday the 12th. Saturday the 13th was a Shandy day at Channarayapatna. There is evidence to show that the deceased and the respondents were in Channarayapatna on that day. P.W.17 says that the deceased met him at the Shandy at about 10 or 11 a.m. and returned to him the sum of Rs.1,000 which he had borrowed on the previous day saying that the transaction at Nimbahalli did not come through. He also says that em the same day at about 3-30 or 4 p.m. the deceased again met him and v anted back the sum of Rs.1,000 for purchasing cocoanuts at Bekks; but he could not advance that amount as he had already sent back the amount home through his son. We also have it from him that on that day he had seen the deceased moving about with the respondents in Channarayapatna Town. P.W.19 (Mohamed Hussain) says that on Saturday the 13th the deceased sold him some cocoanuts at about 1 p.m. and at that time R-2 was with the deceased. We have the evidence of P.W.21 (Dodde Gowds), brother-in-law of the deceased to show that at about 3 p.m. on that Saturday the deceased met him in the Shandy; at that time R-1 (Dyave Gowda) was with him; the deceased told him that he had only Rs. 90 with hi 11 and that he wanted Rs.50 more to purchase cocoanuts at Bekka; he (P.W.21) gave him a sum of Rs.50; later that evening at lamp lighting time, the deceased again borrowed a sum of Rs.10 from him; at that time also R-1 was with him he (P.W.21) advised the deceased that it was not desirable to go to Bekka at night; then R-1 assured him that R-2 was also accompanying them and therefore there was no trouble. Then we have the evidence of P.W.12 (Mohamed Hofizulla) the Cycle Shop-keeper at Channarayapatna, who says that at about 5 p.m. on that day R-2 went and asked him to give on hire 2 cycles one with a dynamo light attached and the other with a carrier; just at that time no cycle with a dynamo light was available and therefore he asked R-2 to come sometime later; R-2 vent to himagain at about 5-30 p.m. accompanied by R-1 and another man whom he (P.W. 12) did not know; two cycles one with a dynamo light and another with a carrier were given to R-2; the cycles in question were returned to him at about 9-30 on that night. He says, he entered the transaction in Exhibit P-7, a note book maintained by him. The next link in the prosecution case is the evidence of P.W.13 (Ningappae) and his brother-in-law P.W.14 (Chaluvegowda). According to their evidence P.W.13 had purchased a pair of bulls at the shandy on the Saturday in question; on that night they took those bulls to the house of P.W.13's mother-in-law (mother of P.W.14) at Sathenahally; when they were going on the bund of the Janivara tank, respondents and the deceased happened to pass that way; respondents were seated on cycles and the deceased was sitting on the carrier of the cycle ridden by R-1; R-2 was going behind them on a separate cycle which had a dynamo light; it was dark then; P.W.13 asked R-2 as to where they were going; he told him that they were going to Bekka to purchase cocoanuts. The evidence of P.W.13 is fully corroborated by the evidence of P.W.14. Then we come back to the evidence of P.W.17, who says that on the night in question at about 9-30 p.m., when he was returning from the cinema show with P.W.18 (Shiva Gowda), he saw the respondents leading two cycles at the ‘Circle“ near the Police Station; be asked them where the deceased was; they told him that “he went then only”. The evidence of P.W.17 is fully corroborated by P.W.18. Their evidence gains further corroboration from the evidence of P.W.12 to which we have made reference already. Barring P.W.21 who is the brother-in-law of the deceased none of the other witnesses referred to above can be said to be interested in the prosecution. The evidence of P.W.17 is fully corroborated by P.W.18. Their evidence gains further corroboration from the evidence of P.W.12 to which we have made reference already. Barring P.W.21 who is the brother-in-law of the deceased none of the other witnesses referred to above can be said to be interested in the prosecution. It was suggested to P.W.13 that there was some quarrel between himself and R-2 some months prior to the occurrence. But that suggestion was denied by him. Not even suggestions of enmity were made to any of the other witnesses. We do not see anything unnatural in the evidence of any one of these witnesses. Their presence at the shandy is probable and the facts deposed by them are consistent with human probabilities. Therefore we see no reason to disbelieve their testimony. In our opinion, the learned trial Judge has on insufficient grounds disbelieved the testimony of P.W.7 (Kalamma), P.W.9 (Lakshmi) and P.W.21. (Dodd Gowda) He has unnecessarily made much of the fact that the failure of the deceased to come back to his house on Saturday night or at least on Sunday did not create a panic in the minds of the near relatives of the deceased. The deceased was a trader and his business some times would have required him to be away from his house for a day or two. The father, the mother and the wife of the deceased deposed that ordinarily the deceased used to return to his house on nights. But there were occasions when he stayed out as seen from the evidence of his father. Therefore the fact that the absence of the deceased did not excite any suspicion in the minds of relatives is not a factor that could throw doubt on the testimony of the relatives of the deceased. The learned Trial Judge is not correct when he says that P.Ws.7 and 9 had stated that the deceased used to “invariably come back to the house.” What they stated was that “he used to return from Shandy on the evening itself.” In fact it has been elicited from P.W.7 that in her police statement she had stated when the deceased did not return to the house on the night of the Saturday in question she remained silent thinking that Ningappa might have stayed in some villages to have the cocoanuts un-husked. We have it from the evidence of P.W.23 (Kodi Gowda) the father of the deceased that occasionally the deceased used to stay out overnight in Channarayapatna. Till Tuesday there was no occasion for the relatives of the deceased to suspect any foul play, from the mere fact that the deceased did not return to his house either on Saturday night or on Sunday. The learned trial Judge thinks that the information given by P.W.21 on Sunday should have created an alaram in the minds of the relatives of the deceased. We do not know how the learned Sessions Judge was able to draw that inference from the evidence of P.W.21. The deposition of P.W.21 on this point is as follows: “At about 10 or 11 a.m. on Sunday, I went to Ningappa's house. He was not there, but I met his mother, P.W.7. I asked her if Ningappa had returned and she said he did not. Then she asked me about him and I told him that he had borrowed Rs. 60 from me saying that he want d that amount to purchase cocoanuts at Bekka and that he and the two accused had gone for the same After that I returned to my village.” This information by itself was wholly insufficient to give rise to any panic in the mind of P.W.7. There is no doubt that the evidence of P.W.23 shows that he searched for the deceased on the Monday following the Saturday on which the deceased left the house, in the neighbouring villages of Devikere, Soppinahalli, Aresomanahalli and Somalapur; but yet he did not try to contact R-2 and make enquiries with him even though he knew that on Saturday night the deceased had left Channarayapatna in the company of R-2. No explanation is forthcoming as to why he did nottry to enquire with R-2 on that day. But it must be noted that the witness was not specifically asked about it. It is not unlikely that P.W.23 had given an exaggerated version. The bereaved father is likely to have over painted the picture. But his evidence has no bearing on any of the relevant circumstances that come up for consideration. The learned Trial Judge has not distinguished facts which are important from those which are subsidiary. He has allowed himself to be clouded by materials which are essentially irrelevant. The bereaved father is likely to have over painted the picture. But his evidence has no bearing on any of the relevant circumstances that come up for consideration. The learned Trial Judge has not distinguished facts which are important from those which are subsidiary. He has allowed himself to be clouded by materials which are essentially irrelevant. From the evidence on record we are inclined to think that no one suspected any foul play till information was reached about the discovery of the dead body of the deceased. The learned Sessions Judge's criticism of the evidence of P.W.12 (Mohamed Hafizulla P.W.13 (Lingappa) P.W.14 (Chaluve Gowda) P.W.17 (Chikkalinge Gowdea) P.W.18 (Shiva Gowda) P.W.19 (Mohamed Hussain) and P.W.21 (Dodde Gowda) appears to us to be a special pleading. Dealing with the evidence of P.Ws.17 and 18. the learned trial Judge observes in paragraph 14 of his judgment: “According to Chikkalinga Gowda (P.W.17) and Shivegowda (P.W.18), at about 9-30 that night (Saturday night) on their coming out of the cinema house, they met the two accused leading their bicycles in the “Circle” at Channarayapatna. It is worthwhile to pause for a moment here and describe this setting. There is a cluster of five electric lights to the post in the centre of the “Circle”. There are also said to be other lights along the street at this place. Nearby is the Taluk Kutcheri and the Police Station. A few yards away is the cinema house, and 9-30 p.m. is precisely the time when the first show gets over and quite a number of people pass via the “Circle”. It is clear therefore that ordinarily a murderer with fresh bloodstains on his clothes, would shun public gaze in so great a blaze. Two other points need be noted here. The first is that according to the Police Sub-Inspector (P.W.29): “For one coming from Shravanabelagola to Channarayapatna, it is not necessary to go up to the “circle”, for near the toll gate, there is a road leading to the Fort. This is a shorter way than the one by the circle-the Channarayapatna bazar is also accessible from the toll-gate viz Fort. ‘‘If therefore the accused wanted to return the cycles after the gruesome murder, they had both a short and a less dangerous way. This is a shorter way than the one by the circle-the Channarayapatna bazar is also accessible from the toll-gate viz Fort. ‘‘If therefore the accused wanted to return the cycles after the gruesome murder, they had both a short and a less dangerous way. Assuming that their minds were somewhat clouded and unknowingly landed themselves in the “Circle”, one would expect them to realise their folly, jump on their cycle and quickly disappear from the scene. It is unthinkable that they would leisurely go that way, leading their bicycles. Assuming again that they were present there, it is rot clear why Chikkalingegowda (P.W.17) and Shivegowda (P.W.18) did not notice the bloodstains on their clothes.” We have earlier mentioned that both P.Ws.17 and 18 are not shown to be interested witnesses. Therefore before disbelieving their evidence good reasons are necessary. It is not always possible to visualise why a particular individual or individual:; react in a particular manner. The respondents might not have been conscious of the fact that they had blood-stains on their clothes. The blood stains discovered are not shown to be big patches. Why they went through the “Circle” is a matter best known to them. That fact by itself is insufficient to improbabilise the evidence given, by the witnesses. At that time P.Ws.17 and 18 had no reason to suspect any foul play. They would not have scrutinised the dresses of the respondents. Oftentimes it depends upon the powers of observations of a particular individual to notice anything amiss in the clothes of other persons. The witnesses saw the respondents just for a few seconds and that too when they were passing before them at a distance of about 20 feet or so. Therefore there is nothing surprising if they are not able to speak about the bloodstains found on the clothes of the respondents. The learned trial Judge dealing with the evidence of P.W.12 repeats his criticism noticed while dealing with the evidence of P.Ws. 17 and 18 which we have already considered. The learned Trial Judge discredits the evidence afforded by Exhibit P-7 a note book maintained by P.W.12 on the ground that the entries therein are random in character. It was not a regularly maintained account book. The essential question for decision is whether to believe the evidence of P.W.12 or not. 17 and 18 which we have already considered. The learned Trial Judge discredits the evidence afforded by Exhibit P-7 a note book maintained by P.W.12 on the ground that the entries therein are random in character. It was not a regularly maintained account book. The essential question for decision is whether to believe the evidence of P.W.12 or not. If his evidence is otherwise believable the fact that Exhibit P-7 is not a regularly maintained account book is of little consequence. On the other hand if his evidence does not carry conviction. Exhibit P-7 can contribute very little in support of his evidence. Exhibit P-7 is a note book maintained by a cycle shop keeper just to aid his memory. The criticism of the learned Sessions Judge about the evidence of P.Ws.13 and 14 appears to us to be very flimsy. Their evidence has been disbelieved on the ground that they did not tell the police that their bulls shied and therefore they looked behind. Evidently the learned trial Judge did not bear in mind the nature of the records maintained under section 162 , Criminal Procedure Code and section 164, Criminal Procedure Code. The shying of the bullocks was not a matter of importance to be stated to the police. It was just one of the minor incidents to which no one would have attached any importance. For no good reasons the learned trial Judge disbelieved P.Ws.13 and 14 when they deposed that R-1 was known to them by sight for some time prior to the occurrence. On a reading of the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge we are left with an impression that the learned Sessions Judge was straining himself unnecessarily to discredit the evidence of prosecution witnesses. He even went to the extent of saying: “if accused No. 2 came riding on a cycle with a dynamo light surely, the light would be shed away from him and not on him. In other words it was not possible for P.W.13 to know who was the person who came riding on the cycle fitted with a dynomo light.” The evidence of P.Ws.13 and 14 is to the effect that P.W.13 did talk to R-2 at the time when they passed by their side. The learned Trial Judge's criticism of the evidence of P.W.19 (Mohamed Hussain) appears to us as unsound. The learned Trial Judge's criticism of the evidence of P.W.19 (Mohamed Hussain) appears to us as unsound. So is his criticism as regards the evidence of P.W.21. The learned Sessions Judge's view about human conduct and re-actions does not appear to us to fit in with facts of life. We shall now proceed to consider the events that took place after the discovery of the dead body of the deceased. According to the prosecution R-1 was produced before the Investigating Officer on the afternoon of the 16th; at that time he was wearing M.Os. 10 to 12; on examination they were found to be stained with human blood; hence they were seized. It is further stated that R-1 took out the ring M.O.7 from his ‘ Udidara ‘(waist thread) and produced the same before the Investigating Officer. Further we are told that on the information given by R-1 a sickle (M.O.13) kept hidden in a dried halla was recovered. These facts are spoken to by the Investigating Officer (P.W.30) and by the panch witnesses P.W.24 (Nagapps) and P.W.26 (Shiva Gowda). Both P.Ws.24 and 26 appear to be respectable witnesses. Nothing was suggested to them to show that they were giving false evidence. In fact their evidence has not been seriously challenged in cross-examination. M.O.7 the ring has been identified by P.Ws.7 and 9 as the ring belonging to the deceased which he was wearing when he went with R-2 on the Friday referred to above. The evidence of P.Ws.7, and 9 in this respect is corroborated by P.W.10 (Kalachari) who claims to have made it for the deceased. The learned trial Judge has accepted the evidence of P.Ws.7, 9 and 10 on this point and has come to the conclusion that the said ring belonged to the deceased. R-1 admits the possession of the ring in question. But he claims that ring as his own. To prove that fact he has examined D.W.1 (Mallappa) who claims to have presented that ring to him (R-1) at the time of his marriage. This evidence has been disbelieved by the trial Court for very good reasons and the same has not been commended for our acceptance by the learned Counsel for the defence. To prove that fact he has examined D.W.1 (Mallappa) who claims to have presented that ring to him (R-1) at the time of his marriage. This evidence has been disbelieved by the trial Court for very good reasons and the same has not been commended for our acceptance by the learned Counsel for the defence. But the Court below did not believe the prosecution evidence that M.O.7 the ring was kept hidden in the udidara of R-1 and the same was produced by R-1 after giving a statement. The criticism of the learned Sessions Judge on this point is as follows: “It is also the prosecution case that when accused No. 1 was arrested and brought before the Police Inspector (P.W.30), he made a statement that he would produce a finger ring (M.O.7) which he had kept tied to his udidara or waist thread, and in pursuance of that statement, produced the finger ring (M.O.7). Now, it is clear that a statement is admissible under section 37 of the Evidence Act if it has led to the discovery of an article produced. Here, however, we have the evidence of Constable Narasimhaiah (P.W.27) who apprehended accused No.1 that “when he was produced before the Inspector his person was searched’ and if his person was searched, surely, the ring (M.O.7) must have been found. Any statement made by accused No.1 after the discovery of this ring would not, therefore, be admissible under section 27 of the Evidence Act. (See Nari Santa v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1945 Pat. 161. I may also observe that if the two accused were acting in concert and accused No. 2 had sold the earrings which are said to have come to his share accused No.1 would also have tried to keep step with him or at least secret it away rather than carry it about with him. In the circumstances, it seems more probable that the ring (M.O.7) was found in accused No.1's house and not on his person.” In some respects the learned Sessions Judge is factually incorrect. All that P.W. 27 stated is: “When accused No. I was produced before the Inspector, his person was examined.” (and ‘not searched’). The examination of the person of R-1 must have been for the purpose of finding out whether there were any injuries on his person. All that P.W. 27 stated is: “When accused No. I was produced before the Inspector, his person was examined.” (and ‘not searched’). The examination of the person of R-1 must have been for the purpose of finding out whether there were any injuries on his person. At any rate, even if his person had been searched it does not by itself show that they would have found out the ring which was in the udidara of R-1. If it was the case of R-1 that the ring in question had been noticed by any of the Police Officers, even before he made any statement before the panchas, it was a matter to be elicited from the witnesses. Their cross-examination did not proceed on those lines. The learned Sessions Judge has imagined many things in this case. We are equally unable to accept the reasoning of the. learned Sessions Judge when he says that when two persons act in concert in robbing a person they would equally keep steps in disposing of the stolen property. Judges should not give room for comment that they have allowed their imagination to run riot. To repeat ourselves we have to primarily consider whether there are any good reasons to reject the evidence placed before the Court. The learned trial Judge has also disbelieved the recovery of M.Os. 10 to 12 from the person of R-1. The reasons given by him for so doing are as follows: “Now, if Ningappa was murdered on Saturday night, it seems unlikely that he would keep the blood-stained clothes and be found wearing them as many as three days later. I note further that if the clothes were on accused No. 1's person when they were attached, the persons in whose presence that was done would have been able to tell how a change of clothes was managed. No body seems able to tell this. All this leads one to think that the clothes (M.Os.10 to 12) were not attached from accused No.1's person and if that is so, there is nothing to show from where also they were got and to whom they belonged.” Here again the statement of facts made by the learned Sessions Judge does not appear to be accurate. All this leads one to think that the clothes (M.Os.10 to 12) were not attached from accused No.1's person and if that is so, there is nothing to show from where also they were got and to whom they belonged.” Here again the statement of facts made by the learned Sessions Judge does not appear to be accurate. P.W. 24 stated: “When the bloodstained clothes worn by accused No.1 were attached someone present here, gave him a dothi and a towel, but I do not now remember who that person is.” To the same effect is the evidence of P.W.26. The investigating Officer (P.W.30) was not cross examined on that point at all. It is not shown that the blood-stains found on those clothes were very prominent. It is also not known whether R-1 himself was aware of the blood-stains. There may be various reasons tor R-1 to continue to wear M.Os.10 to 12. The real question tor decision is whether we have any good reasons to disbelieve the evidence of P.Ws.24, 26 and 30. It their evidence has to be rejected solely on the ground of improbability, then the improbability should be lit large on the face of their evidence. To attempt to isolate a particular fact from the surrounding circumstances and to discuss the logical inference may be useful mental exercise. But it is wholly out of place in any judicial decision. Judge's experience of life is undoubtedly an important factor in evaluating the evidence placed before him. But he must Judge the actions and re-actions of the accused and witnesses before him from their standards. In our judgment the evidence of P.Ws. 24, 26 and 30 relating to the recovery of M.Os.7, 10 to 12 and 13 has been rejected by the trial Court on wholly insufficient grounds. The evidence of P.Ws.24, 26 and 30 shows that when R-2 was produced before P.W.30 on the afternoon of the 16th, he (R-2) made a statement before them and thereafter led them to his father-in-law's house and from there produced the clothes, M.Os.14 and 15, which were found to be stained with human blood. The evidence of P.Ws.24, 26 and 30 shows that when R-2 was produced before P.W.30 on the afternoon of the 16th, he (R-2) made a statement before them and thereafter led them to his father-in-law's house and from there produced the clothes, M.Os.14 and 15, which were found to be stained with human blood. This evidence was disbelieved by the trial Court with the following observations: “Now assuming that accused No. 2 made such a statement, and the police and the panchayatdars went to his father-in-law's house to recover those clothes, one would expect them to go inside the house and see things for themselves. It is, certainly odd to find that the Police and the panchayatdars summoned for the purpose, should have been waiting outside the house, while accused No.2 went inside and brought the clothes out. This raises a reasonable doubt as to whether the offending articles were really in the possession of accused No.2”. It is difficult to follow this criticism. It is well known that many criminals, particularly those that are not hardened, are likely to be in a state of abject surrender when they are caught. At that stage they are likely to be in a mood to give out the truth. It is only as time passes, their feelings get established and they try to fight or their lives or liberty as the case may be. This is the experience of criminologists P.W.30, an experienced officer, was likely to have been well aware of the fact that at that moment R-2 had completely surrendered himself to his fate and there was no likelihood of his playing double game. Further, there is no material from which we could conclude that there was any possibility for R-2 to escape from the hands of the Police. We do not think that there is any merit in the above noticed criticism of the learned Sessions Judge. The prosecution evidence further shows that in pursuance of his statement, R-2 took the Investigating Officer and the panch witnesses to P.W.11 (Ganesh Achari) a goldsmith at Channarayapatna from whom M.O.17, a pair of ear-rings were recovered. P.W.11 says that those ear-rings were sold to him by R-2 on the Sunday preceding the Thursday on which they were seized from him, which mean; that it was sold to him on 14th December, 1938. P.W.11 says that those ear-rings were sold to him by R-2 on the Sunday preceding the Thursday on which they were seized from him, which mean; that it was sold to him on 14th December, 1938. R-2 admits this transaction but claims that M.C. 17 belongs to him. To prove that fact he examined his mother D.W. 3 (Ningamma). The Court below disbelieved the case of R-2 on this point. M.O. 17 has been identified by P.Ws.7 and 9 as the ear-rings, the deceased was usually wearing and which were on his person on the Friday preceding the occurrence when he left the house. P.W.10 (Kalachari) says that he made those ear-rings for the deceased. To summarise, it is fully established that R-1 and the deceased were together at Channarayapatna shandy on Saturday the 13th, they were seen by P.Ws.13 and 14 going together on bicycles towards the scene of occurrence; the injuries on the person of the deceased showed that they must have been caused by 1 sharp cutting instrument like a sickle; on the information given by R-1, a sickle was found buried in a dried up halla; R-1's clothes were bloodstained at the time of his arrest; no explanation is forthcoming for those bloodstains; R-1 produced M.O.7 the ring belonging to the deceased and which was on his person at the time of his murder. All these circumstances, when cumulatively taken are sufficient to hold R-1 (Dyavegowda) guilty of murdering the deceased. See Wastim Khan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 400. R-2 is proved to have taken the deceased on Friday the 12th December, 1953 from his house for the purpose of purchasing cocoanuts; he was found in the company of the deceased at Channarayapatna on Saturday the 13th; he was seen by P.Ws.13 and 14 going along with the deceased and R-1 towards the scene of occurrence on the night of the 13th; on the information given by him (R-2) M.Os.14 and 15, two clothes stained with human blood were recovered; M.O.17 the ear-rings belonging to the deceased were recovered from P.W.11 on the information given by R-2; M.O.17 had been sold by R-2 to P.W.11 on Sunday the 14th. Further R-2 is proved to have paid to P.W.22 a sum of Rs.100 on Sunday following the Saturday on which day the deceased was likely to have been murdered. Further R-2 is proved to have paid to P.W.22 a sum of Rs.100 on Sunday following the Saturday on which day the deceased was likely to have been murdered. From the prosecution evidence it is seen that the deceased must have had Rs.100 at the time of the occurrence. These circumstances in our view conclusively establish that R-2 was one of the murderers of the deceased. From the proved circumstances, the only reasonable inference is that R-1 (Dyavegowda) and R-2 (Gowdaiah alias Gowdappa alias Ningappa) acted in concert. Hence both of them are liable to be convicted under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. In our opinion several of the conclusions arrived at by the lower Court b order on perversity. But before closing this case, it is necessary to consider some new contentions advanced in this Court by Sri E.S. Venkataramaiah, the learned counsel for the respondents. Sri E.S. Venkataramaiah, contends that the medical evidence in this case negatives the prosecution case that the deceased must have been murdered some time prior to 9 p.m. on 13th December, 1958 and therefore it is unsafe to place any reliance on the testimony of the witnesses who speak to the association of the respondents with the deceased on Saturday the 13th. P.W.2 (Dr. L.K. Rama Rao) conducted autopsy of the dead body of the deceased at about 12-30 p.m. on 16th December, 1958, He says that at the time of his examination, there was slight rigor mortis present on the dead body. He opined that the death of the deceased must have occurred about 48 to 72 hours before the commencement of the post mortem examination. In the course of his cross-examination, it was elicited from him that under the condition in which the body was, rigor mortis could have continued for about 72 hours after death. Hence the medical evidence adduced in this case is in no way inconsistent with the prosecution case. But the Doctor very rightly admitted that he could not be definite as to the time of the death of the deceased. In the very nature of things his opinion on the point could only be at best approximate. But he opined that very probably the death would not have occurred less than 48 hours before the post mortem examination commenced. In the very nature of things his opinion on the point could only be at best approximate. But he opined that very probably the death would not have occurred less than 48 hours before the post mortem examination commenced. Sri E.S. Venkataramaiah, challenges the correctness of the opinion given by P.W.2 He has cited some passages from Medical Text Books to show that the existence on rigor mortis as observed by P.W.2 is indicative of the fact that death must have occurred within 48 hours or less before the commencement of the post mortem examination, which means that the deceased must have been murdered some time after the noon of Sunday the 14th. It would be hazardous to draw any precise inference about the time of the death on the basis of the appearance or disappearance of rigor mortis in a dead body. Taylor in his Medical Jurisprudence, 10th Edition, Vol. I, at page 190, stated: “Speaking in general terms, rigor mortis lasts for from sixteen to twenty-four hours in sound, muscular subjects; it may last much longer, from twenty-four to thirty-six hours, and exceptionally it may continue for fourteen days or even longer.” During winter season, especially in a frost, it is slow in disappearing. In the instant case, the death had occurred during winter season and we can take judicial notice of the fact that the place where the deceased was found murdered would; be quite cold during winter. Numerous other factors contribute for the continuance of rigor mortis. P.W.2 who had before him all the relevant materials had opined that death must have occurred between 48 to 72 hours before he commenced the post mortem examination. We see no justification for discarding his opinion. It was next urged that the stomach of the deceased contained semi-digested fried grams and therefore we must rule out the prosecution case that the deceased must have been murdered at the time mentioned by the prosecution. We see no force in this contention. Another contention advanced by Sri E.S. Venkataramaiah is that the decision in Hassan Sessions Case No. 5 of 1959 i.e., in the “robbery” case, so long as the same is not set aside, operates as res judicata in respect of the evidence relating to the recovery of the stolen property. We see no force in this contention. Another contention advanced by Sri E.S. Venkataramaiah is that the decision in Hassan Sessions Case No. 5 of 1959 i.e., in the “robbery” case, so long as the same is not set aside, operates as res judicata in respect of the evidence relating to the recovery of the stolen property. Before considering this contention, it is convenient to consider Criminal Appeal No. 318 of 1959 which is directed against the verdict of the Jury in H.S.C. No. 5 of 1959. H.S.C. No. 5 of 1959 was taken up for trial after the respondents were acquitted in H.S.C.No. 4 of 1959. This related to the charge of ‘robbery’ which had to be tried with the aid of a Jury. The learned Sessions Judge in his charge to the Jury repeatedly told the Jury to bear in mind the fact that the accused in that case had been acquitted of the murder charge. Quite likely the learned Counsel for the defence must have rubbed into the Jurymen the findings of the learned Sessions Judge in H.S.C. 4 of 1959. In H.S.C. No. 4 of 1959 as noticed earlier the bulk of the prosecution evidence had been disbelieved. In that situation it is not surprising that the Jury returned a verdict of ‘not guilty’. In view of the finding arrived at earlier, it goes without saying that we do not agree with the verdict of the Jury on merits. But, as in our opinion, the respondents are liable to be convicted under section 302 Indian Penal Code, we have not thought it necessary to examine the legality of the verdict of the Jury. We think that it is wholly superfluous at this stage. It was highly indiscreet on the part of the State to have pressed the trial of the charge under section 392, Indian Penal Code, in view of the acquittal of the respondents under the “murder” charge. The learned Public Prosecutor should have prayed for the postponement of the trial till the disposal of the appeal against acquittal. In the alternative, he should have withdrawn the charge. If the respondents’ acquittal under section 302 Indian Penal Code was set aside, then the “robbery” charge would have become purposeless. If their acquittal under the murder charge stood then the ‘robbery’ charge would have become useless. In the alternative, he should have withdrawn the charge. If the respondents’ acquittal under section 302 Indian Penal Code was set aside, then the “robbery” charge would have become purposeless. If their acquittal under the murder charge stood then the ‘robbery’ charge would have become useless. In either case, there was no justification to go on with the second trial. Things have been allowed to go on in a vicious circle. Acquittal under the murder charge was pressed into service to persuade the Jury to return a verdict of “not guilty” under the “robbery” charge. Now the verdict of the Jury is flourished before us in support of the contention that bulk of the evidence in the “murder” case is hit by rule of res judicata. In this connection reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Pritam Singh & another v. The State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 415 wherein their Lordships held that: “The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent Court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence. To that it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication. The maxim res judicata pro veritate accipitur is no less applicable to criminal than to civil proceedings. Thus an acquittal of an accused in a trial under section 19(f), Arms Act, is tantamount to a finding that the prosecution had failed to establish the possession of certain revolver by the accused as alleged. The possession of that revolver was a fact in issue which had to be established by the prosecution before he could be convicted of the offence under section 19(f). That fact was found against the prosecution and could not be proved against the accused in the subsequent proceedings between the Crown and him, under a charge of murder. The evidence against him in the latter proceedings would have to be considered regardless of the evidence of recovery of the revolver from him.” (As summarised in the headnote. (d)). His Lordship Bhagwati, J., who spoke for the Court followed the dictum laid down by Lord MacDermott in Sambasivan v. Public Prosecutor, Federal of Malaya, L.R. 1950 A.C. 458 (a). The evidence against him in the latter proceedings would have to be considered regardless of the evidence of recovery of the revolver from him.” (As summarised in the headnote. (d)). His Lordship Bhagwati, J., who spoke for the Court followed the dictum laid down by Lord MacDermott in Sambasivan v. Public Prosecutor, Federal of Malaya, L.R. 1950 A.C. 458 (a). We do not think that the rule laid down in Pritam Singh's case1, has application to the facts of the present case. In Criminal Appeal No. 207 of 1959 we are considering the correctness of the decision in H.S.C. No. 4 of 1959. When that decision was rendered, the robbery charge had not been tried. The verdict of the jury was rendered long alter that decision. To the extent we know of, neither principles nor authority supports the contention of Sri Venkataramaiah that any decision rendered during the course of the pendency of an appeal against acquittal could bar the consideration of the appeal on merits. In applying the principle of res-judicata to civil cases, the relevant point of time is the date of the decisions of the trial Court and the same rule, in our view, must apply to criminal cases. What we are considering an effect is whether the decision of the learned Sessions Judge, Mysore, in H.S.C. No. 4 of 1959 was correct on the date it was given. In so doing we have to ordinarily take into consideration the state of affairs as they stood on the date of the decision was given. Subsequent events some times may have to be taken into consideration. But they bring in different principles of law. There is no justification to mix up those principles with the principles of res judicata canvassed before us. Further in the instant case on merits we have come to the conclusion that the verdict of the Jury is incorrect. If we do not disturb the finding of the Jury, as we have decided not to, it is because in the first place it is unnecessary to do so in view of our decision in Criminal Appeal No. 207 of 1959; secondly because the legal requirements in considering the verdict of a Jury materially differ from those that are apposite when we consider a decision of a Judge. We would like to make it clear that we should not be understood to say that having come to the conclusion that the decision if the learned trial Judge in the “murder” case is wholly erroneous, which decision, in our opinion has greatly influenced the verdict of the Jury, it is not competent for us to set aside the verdict of the Jury solely on that ground. Suffice it to say that we have not gone into that aspect. In the result, we allow Criminal Appeal, No. 207 of 1959 and convict both the respondents under section 302, Indian Penal Code. We dismiss Criminal Appeal No. 318 of 1959. This leaves us with the question of sentence to be imposed on the respondents. The question of sentence in this case has given us a great deal of trouble. The crime for which the respondents are convicted is a very heinous one and ordinarily we should not have hesitated to inflict on them the extreme penalty of the law. But we cannot ignore the fact that the learned Sessions Judge had acquitted them on the charge of “murder” and that was followed up by the verdict of “not guilty” by the Jury; the respondents were at large ever since the date of the decision in H.S.C. No. 5 of 1959. We ordered their arrest during the hearing of this appeal. Both of them are young men. R-2 appears to be the only child of his mother hiving a young wife and a young child. We are conscious of the fact that none of these circumstances individually taken can be considered as sufficient to impose the essen sentence but cumulatively they leave a different impression in our mind. We have come to the conclusion but not without hesitation, that the ends of justice will be met if each of the respondents is sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. We order accordingly. S.V.S.-----Crl. A. Mo. 207 of 1959 allowed and Crl. A. Mo. 318 of 1959 dismissed.