ORDER N.M. Golvalkar, J.—By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the petitioners pray for issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 27-10-1960 by the Registrar of Public Trusts, Narsimhapur, in Revenue Case No 1 of H. B 113 (i) of 1960-61 which in turn seeks to give effect to the order dated 3-1-1956 by the Registrar of Public Trusts, Hoshangabad, in Revenue Case No. 120/XXXIII-9 of 53-54 whereby the latter found the temple of Shri Deo Laxminarayanji at mouza Singhpur (hereinafter called "the temple") and certain agricultural lands in mouza Singhpur and Bilkhedi to be of Public Trust. They have also prayed for issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Registrar of Public Trusts, Narsimhapur, to hold an inquiry as per requirements of Section 5 of the M. P. Public Trusts Act (I of 1951) (hereinafter called "the Act") and to abstain from giving effect to the orders impugned. 2. The two orders by two separate Registrars came to be passed as on 3-1-1956, Narsimhapur was a Tahsil within the Hoshangabad district and the Registrar at Hoshangabad had jurisdiction. But subsequently by the time second order came to be passed Narsimhapur had come to be constituted a district and hance the Registrar appointed for this view district was alone competent to deal with the subject. He came to deal further with the subject as it was discovered that the initial order dated 3-1-1956 was not given effect to an required by Section 7 of the Act by making necessary entries in the register. He therefore, passed the order dated 27-10-1960 when moved by Shaligram (respondent No. 3 before us). The petitioners had opposed that petition challenging his jurisdiction to implement the old order and claiming a fresh inquiry. But their contentions were repelled and hence this petition. 3. The petitioners have raised two contentions in support of their petition. Firstly, it is contended that the order passed by the Registrar of Public Trusts, Hoshangabad, was bad in law inasmuch as he made no inquiry as required by Section 5 of the Act and the findings otherwise were manifestly erroneous; and secondly, his order was no longer effective after the constitution of Narsimhapur as an independent district and the Registrar at Narsimhapur could not in recognition of the same proceed to implement it. He should have dealt with the subject-matter afresh. 4. As to the second contention we may at once say that the submissions made in support of it have not impressed us at all. The Collector Narsimhapur as Registrar of Public Trusts within his district would have to be treated as successor of the Registrar of Public Trusts at Hoshangabad so far as the Trusts and trust property situate within the district of Narsimhapur after its constitution as a district. As such a successor, the Registrar of Public Trusts, Narsimhapur gets jurisdiction over the trust property over which hitherto before the Registrar, Hoshangabad exercised jurisdiction. We see, therefore, no difficulty in repelling the contention raised before us as to the jurisdiction of the Registrar at Naisimhapur to deal with the matter. 5. As to the first contention with respect to the inquiry required to be made, there appears to be some force. Though it cannot be urged that no inquiry was made was very perfunctory. Since the whole scheme of the Act as also the nature and extent of inquiry to be made under it before assuming jurisdiction to order registration of any Public Trust under it has already been examined and indicated by this Court on two occassions in the past (vide M. P. No. 521 of 1954 decided on 18-10-1955 and M. P. 495 of 54 decided on 6-4-1956). We may usefully quote the observations made on the third occasion in the case of Smt. Sunderbai vs. The Deputy Commissioner, Hoshangabad and others M. P. No. 455 of 1955 decided on 30-9-1957. Incidentally here it may be mentioned that the order that was impugned in the case was by the same Deputy Commissioner who has happened to pass the order in the instant case only a few months thereafter. Naturally, therefore, there is no wonder that he continued to hold the same certain ideas about the nature of inquiry contemplated under the Act which are reflected in the order in the instant case. Their Lordships constituting the Division Bench of this Court, after quoting Section 6 of the Act, have observed;- ''It seems from a plain reading of this section that the Registrar is required not only to find whether the trust is a public trust but also to record his findings on all the matters mentioned above. The Registrar in this case has done nothing of the kind. The Registrar in this case has done nothing of the kind. He has just recorded a single finding that there is a public trust, and that therefore these persons should have applied for its registration, and that not having done so they are liable to punishment. We think that on its face the procedure adopted by the Registrar and his delegate, the Sub Divisional Officer, was clearly against the directions of the Act. It was incumbent on either of them, if not both, to have issued a public notice to all persons interested in the trust, to have held an inquiry into all the matters mentioned u/s 5, and to have recorded findings thereon. We say that the provisions of Sections 5 and 6 cannot be read as merely directory and that they must be regarded as mandatory because of certain remedies which are open to an aggrieved party after these findings are given." If, therefore, the order in the instant case is examined in the light of the aforesaid observations it will be manifestly clear that the Registrar at Hoshangabad has acted in clear violation of the prescribed method of action rendering his order unsustainable. Just as he happened to pass order in the case referred to above he has just recorded a single finding that there is a public trust with respect to the temple and the agricultural properties at Singhpur and Bilkhedi. The learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 drew our attention to the various order sheets relating to the proceedings before the Registrar and his delegate, the Additional Deputy Commissioner, to show that since the petitioners had declared that they did not want to lead any evidence and had admitted the existence of a trust, there was no necessity for the Registrar to draw up an elaborate order. Our attention was particularly drawn to the order sheet dated 11-5-1955 (Annuxure R-1) in the proceedings before the Additional Deputy Commissioner who was directed to enquire and report wherein the admission of the petitioners in this Court has been recorded. We have perused the same and it is no admission at all as could be of any real avail. This is how the order sheet reads:- "11-5-1955:-Shri N. R. Singh with applicant Shri R. S. Verma with Narayanprasad, Rewaram, Damodarprasad, Madhoprasad and Premnarain also present. We have perused the same and it is no admission at all as could be of any real avail. This is how the order sheet reads:- "11-5-1955:-Shri N. R. Singh with applicant Shri R. S. Verma with Narayanprasad, Rewaram, Damodarprasad, Madhoprasad and Premnarain also present. All agree that the temple's property may be registered under the Public Trusts Act. They however request that the properties should be verified. Narayanprasad claims that the lands at Salaiya belongs to him personally. Parties request time to file complete list of properties of the temple, after verification supported by affidavit requested by parties. C. F. 14-6-1955". It will be apparent that what they appear to have agreed to was "that the temple's property may be registered". Nevertheless they had made it clear that what those properties were had to be verified. Then from the other order sheets it is clear that the Additional Deputy Commissioner submitted his report to the Deputy Commissioner who was the Registrar. What that report was has not been exhibited before us. True, the Deputy Commissioner heard the parties on receipt of that report but what attention he himself paid to the materials on record is apparent from his order. It appears that presumably he simply toed the line of the Additional Deputy Commissioner. The petitioners on the next date of hearing on 14-6-1955 before the Additional Deputy Commissioner had filed a statement claiming the property as also the temple as their personal family property and had relied on several documentary evidence in support. If their claim was not acceptable to respondent No. 3, who had initiated the proceedings, he ought to have led his evidence. But he did not do it. Any way the Deputy Commissioner ought to have considered the documentary evidence on record before recording his final finding. He adopted the easy path of least resistance by declaring it to be unnecessary to consider it and proceeded to record his findings on his own interpretation merely of the entries in the Muafi Register. This is where the inquiry gravely falls short of the requirements of the Act as has been clearly pointed out by this Court in the case of Smt. Sunderbai (supra). This infirmity itself is sufficient to render the order void and ineffective and liable to be quashed. 6. This is where the inquiry gravely falls short of the requirements of the Act as has been clearly pointed out by this Court in the case of Smt. Sunderbai (supra). This infirmity itself is sufficient to render the order void and ineffective and liable to be quashed. 6. But apart from the aforesaid infirmity, there is another manifest error of law vitiating the finding recorded by the Registrar, Hoshangabad (Deputy Commissioner. Hoshangabad). He has wholly misconstrued the entry in the Muafi Register pertaining to Singhpur property. He had to construe it along with the sanad (original grant) which was filed before him. In our opinion the correct interpretation of the grant, as evidenced by the sanad as also by the entries in the Muafi Register, is that the land in Singhpur was given to Bholeswami only with a burden upon him to utilise its income for the upkeep and maintenance of the temple and the Deity installed there n, and he was to hold the land revenue free so long as the temple existed. There could be no other meaning in law. Had it been a grant to the Deity or to the temple and merely had been placed in possession of Bholeswami, there would have been a stipulation for its reversion to the grantor on the temple ceasing to exist. A similar question as to the correct interpretation of similar clause had arisen in this Court in the case of Kamalnarayan Ramsaranlal vs. Ramkishorilal and another 1958 JLJ 289 . It was held there by their Lordships constituting the Division Bench that the property did not stand endowed to the temple but was the personal property of the holder only subject to the burden on it for the upkeep and maintenance of the temple. It is not necessary to repeat their reasons for such an interpretation. In respectful agreement with those views we feel no hesitation in holding that the Singhpur property was not granted to the temple or the Deity therein but is Bholeswami personally who was only enjoined to utilise its income exclusively for its upkeep and maintenance. The interpretation put upon the entries in the Muafi Register was manifestly wrong in law and being an error apparent on the face of record could be and has to be corrected in exercise of our special jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The interpretation put upon the entries in the Muafi Register was manifestly wrong in law and being an error apparent on the face of record could be and has to be corrected in exercise of our special jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. We regret our inability to accede to the submissions made by the learned counsel, Shri R. K Pandey, appearing for respondent No. 3, that the interpretation put upon the entries by the Registrar, Hoshangabad, even if wrong in law would not be such an error apparent on the face of record as could be corrected by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. We may just refer to the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Ambika Mills Co. Ltd. vs. Shri S. B. Bhatt and another. Civil Appeal No. 243 of 1959 decided on 12-12-1960, on this question, which has always been agitating the minds in Courts when brought to bear on its true scope. In this case also there was the question of interpretation of certain clauses by a certain appellate authority and which interpretation was corrected by the Bombay High Court by issuing a writ of certiorari The contention raised there by the learned Attorney-General, as in the instant case before us by the learned counsel Shri R. K. Pandey, that the High Court of Bombay had exceeded its jurisdiction was repelled in the following words which may be usefully quoted:- "According to the High Court the construction placed by the appellate authority on clauses 2 and 5 of the agreement is patently and manifestly erroneous. ... ... ... On looking at the two clauses it seems to us that the conclusion is inescapable that the error committed by the appellate authority is manifest and obvious. ... ... ... Therefore, in our opinion, the error committed by the appellate authority was of such a manifest character that the High Court was justified in correcting the said error by the issue of a writ of certiorari. ... ... ... ... ... ... Therefore, in our opinion, the error committed by the appellate authority was of such a manifest character that the High Court was justified in correcting the said error by the issue of a writ of certiorari. ... ... ... In our opinion, therefore, the contention raised by the Attorney-General that by issuing the writ the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction is not well-founded." Thus fortified we feel no hesitation in the circumstances on record to quash the initial order dated 3-1-1956 of the Registrar of Public Trusts, Hoshangabad, as also the subsequent order dated 27-10-1960 by the Registrar of Public Trusts, Narsimhapur, giving effect to the former. 7. The learned counsel for respondent No. 3 very vehemently contended that the petitioners have come to Court very late long after the initial order, and as there is another remedy of a civil suit open to them, this Court should not invoke its writ jurisdiction. As regards delay, it has to be borne in mind that the initial order dated 3-1-1956, without being carried into effect as required by Section 7 of the Act, remains inconsequential. It is only when it is given effect to in the manner laid down by the Act that the person aggrieved got a cause of action for the suit. Since in the instant case it was not implemented till the Registrar of Public Trusts at Narsimhapur was moved and he passed the order dated 27-10-1960 deciding to implement the initial order, there could be no steps by the petitioners before There is thus no delay as such on their part as would enable us to reject their petition in limine. As to the other contention, undoubtedly it is always discretionary with this Court to exercise its writ jurisdiction when another remedy, equally efficacious is available to the party coming to this Court for issuance of any writ. But when the error as in the instant case, on the part of the inferior tribunal is so manifest and patent, the High Court will be fully justified in stepping in to correct the same instead of directing the party aggrieved to go the proverbically tortuous way of a regular suit to have it corrected. In our opinion refusal on our part to interfere in the circumstances of this case would be improper failure to exercise our jurisdiction. In our opinion refusal on our part to interfere in the circumstances of this case would be improper failure to exercise our jurisdiction. The impugned orders having come to be passed, in utter disregard to the requirements of the provisions of the Act, as pointed out by this Court in Smt. Sunderbai's case (supra) and by refusing to consider the documentary evidence on record, has to be quashed and we feel that this is a fit case where we should exercise our special jurisdiction. The existence of a public trust and properties thereof being a sine cua non, the Registrar of Public Trusts could not proceed to exercise jurisdiction with respect to it without first determining its existing in the manner laid down by the Act or by wrongly determining the same. [See Ram Saroop Dasji Vs. S.P. Sahi, Special Officer-in-charge of The Hindu Religious Trusts and Others, ], 8. In the result, therefore, we quash both the orders dated 3-1-1956 and 27-10-1960 and direct that the Registrar of the Public Trusts, Narsimhapur, shall enquire into all the matters stipulated in Section 5 of the Act and give his findings thereon having regard to the law laid down by this Court in the case or Smt. Sunderbai (supra) as also in the case of Kamalnarayan (supra). We may also draw his attention to the legal position laid down as to when a trust is a public or private in the case of Deoki Nandan Vs. Murlidhar, . 9. In the circumstances, however, we make no order for costs of the proceedings in this Court. The outstanding security amount shall be refunded to the petitioners.