Judgment.- The only question, that was argued in these second appeals, was whether the suits out of which they arise, were barred by the provisions of section 47 of the Code of Civil Proocedure. Both the Courts below held that they were not. On that view and in the light of their findings on other questions, which do not arise now, the suits were decreed and the appeals therefrom were unsuccessful. The 1st defendant, who is common to both the suits, has come up to this Court in second appeals. The 1st defendant, on the foot of a mortgage executed by the 2nd defendant on nth December, 1942, obtained a decree against him and in execution purchased the properties involved in both the suits and which had formed the subject-matter of the hypotheca. The 1st defendant also got delivery of the suit properties. The plaintiff filed separate applications for re-delivery of the properties but by a common order, dated 27th February, 1951, they were dismissed. The present suits have been therefore brought praying to set aside the said order. The case for the plaintiffs was that the properties involved in both the suits were the self acquisitions of one S. Perumal Asari and that the 2nd defendant, who is his son, had, therefore, no right to mortgage those properties in favour of the 1st defendant. The plaintiff in O.S. No. 93 of 1951 is the daughter’s son of S. Perumal Asari and plaintiffs 1 and 2 in O.S. No. 94 of 1951 are his widow and daughter respectively. There were two other plaintiffs in the latter suit who claimed to be the alienees from S. Perumal Asari. The suits were resisted by the 1st defendant on the ground that the properties belonged to the joint family consisting of S. Perumal Asari and his son, the 2nd defendant, and that the mortgage executed in favour of the 1st defendant was for purposes binding on the family. The other defences were that the suits were barred by res judicata and, in any case, by the provisions of section 47, Civil Procedure Code. The Courts below concurrently found that the properties were the self-acquisitions of S. Perumal Asari and that the question whether they were such acquisitions was barred by res judicata. As I said, they were also of the opinion that the suits were not barred by section 47, Civil Procedure Code. The Courts below concurrently found that the properties were the self-acquisitions of S. Perumal Asari and that the question whether they were such acquisitions was barred by res judicata. As I said, they were also of the opinion that the suits were not barred by section 47, Civil Procedure Code. The plea based on that section was raised in view of the fact that in the suit by the 1st defendant to enforce the mortgage in his favour, the 2nd defendant’s father S. Perumal Asari was impleaded as a party defendant. It appears from the records. that the 1st defendant endorsed on the plaint exonerating S. Perumal Asari from the suit because he was claiming a paramount title. He was, accordingly, on the basis of the endorsement, struck off from the suit which ended in a decree only as against the 2nd defendant. The contention, on behalf of the 1st defendant was that notwithstanding that order S. Perumal Asari should be viewed as having continued as a party to the suit on the mortgage for purposes of section 47, Civil Procedure Code and that, therefore, the proper remedy of the plaintiffs who claimed title through S. Perumal Asari was to file an appeal against the said common order, dated 27th February, 1951 and not to agitate their rights by instituting the present suits. The Courts below did not accept this contention and Sri A. Sundaram Ayyar, the learned counsel for the appellant (1st defendant) in this Court, has reiterated the same contention before me. The question, whether a person, who has been exonerated from the suit, continues nevertheless to be a party defendant for the purpose of section 47, is one of substance and not of form. An order exonerating a person may be rested on more than one ground. Where a person claims in a suit on a mortgage a paramount title, and he is exonerated on that ground and the title so raised was not adjudicated in that suit, it may in law amount to removal of his name from the plaint. On the other hand, there may be other circumstances on which exoneration may be rested and it may not have the same consequence of the name of the person exonerated being struck off or removed from the suit. On the other hand, there may be other circumstances on which exoneration may be rested and it may not have the same consequence of the name of the person exonerated being struck off or removed from the suit. Though an order struck off a party, all the same the Court may on particular facts hold him to continue to be a party for certain purposes. These propositions appear to be well established by authorities of this Court. Reference may be made in Linga Aiyar v. Lakshumanan1, and Abdul Sac v. Sundara Mudaliar2. In the first of them in an earlier suit a person’s name was struck off by consent and the question with which this Court was concerned was whether, notwithstanding the form of the order, that person should be regarded as continuing as a party to the suit for the purpose of section 47, Civil Procedure Code. It was held that it was not the form that mattered but really the substance and that looking at the substance, notwithstanding the apparent tenor of the order, the party struck off did really continue as a party to the suit for the purpose of that section. In the course of that judgment, it was pointed out by reference to an earlier Full Bench decision of this Court that in the case of misjoinder of parties, the proper procedure was the one laid down by rule 10 (2) of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, namely, to strike out the party as having been improperly impleaded. Whether a party was improperly impleaded would depend upon the particular pleadings, the reliefs asked for and other relevant circumstances. In that case it was also recognised that where a party set up a paramount title in a mortgage suit to both the mortgagor and the mortgagee and had been exonerated from the suit on the ground of misjoinder, he did not remain a party to the suit for the purpose of section 47. That principle was clearly laid down in Krishnappa v. Periaswami3 , which was approved by the Full Bench in Abdul Sac v. Sundara Mudaliar2. That principle was clearly laid down in Krishnappa v. Periaswami3 , which was approved by the Full Bench in Abdul Sac v. Sundara Mudaliar2. The Full Bench quoted the following passsage from Krishnappa v. Periaswami3, with approval: “The exoneration in the present case having been on the ground of misjoinder we are of opinion that the party whose claim was not adjudicated upon does not remain a party to the suit for the purpose of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Exoneration from the suit may be due to various causes and the question whether a party remains on record for the purpose of section 47 inspite of such exoneration will depend upon the nature and scope of the order having regard to the pleadings and the reason which led to such dismissal or exoneration. To hold that in cases of misjoinder (and consequent refusal of the Court to adjudicate upon the particular matters in contest) the party whose claim was not adjudicated upon and who was exonerated remains a party to the suit would lead to the anomaly that the Court would be bound in execution proceedings to decide the very questions which it refused to determine in the suit.” What is, however, urged by Sri Sundaram Ayyar is that the rule that a person claiming a paramount title in a suit on a mortgage is an unnecessary party, and therefore has to be exonerated and his name struck off is not an absolute one but has exceptions and that one of them is a case of a member of a joint Hindu family raising a plea of paramount title. In other words, according to the learned counsel, the rule of exoneration based upon the ground of paramount title is applicable only to a case of a stranger and not to a member of a joint family who, though he may fail on the question of paramount title based upon an allegation of self-acquisition, may still have an interest in the hypotheca as such a member. In such a case, the learned counsel contends that a member of a joint Hindu family, notwithstanding the fact that he was raising a question of paramount title in a suit on a mortgage, could be regarded as a proper party. In such a case, the learned counsel contends that a member of a joint Hindu family, notwithstanding the fact that he was raising a question of paramount title in a suit on a mortgage, could be regarded as a proper party. In support of his contention, the learned counsel invited my attention to Kasi Chettiar v. Ramaswami Chettiar Firm1, This is what Varadachariar and Mockett, JJ., observed in that case: “The rule that in a mortgage action a claim by way of paramount title should be excluded is not an absolute one and a claim of self-acquisition by a member of a joint family of the mortgagor is one of the exceptions to the rule and should be tried in the interests of the auction-purchaser who may thus be enabled to know the exact situation without being put to the risk of speculation.” In that case the trial Court had declined to record a finding on the issue pertaining to the plea of a title paramount. The learned Judges did not accept that view and remanded the suit for a determination of that question and fresh disposal of the suit. In that case, the learned Judges were not concerned with the question whether, where such a member of the family of the mortgagor was, at the instance of the mortgagee, exonerated and his name struck off, he should still be regarded as continuing as a party to the suit. It seems to me that although such a member in an action on a mortgage may be permitted to raise a plea of title paramount, that does not necessarily imply that even in a case, were the mortgagee himself wanted that the member raising a plea of title paramount should be exonerated and should be struck off from the array of parties in the suit, he could still be regarded as continuing as a party to the suit for the purpose of section 47, Civil Procedure Code. As already stated, the effect of exoneration and striking off in the context of the question whether the person concerned continued to be a party to the suit, would depend upon the particular circumstances averred in the pleadings and the scope of the order. What happened in this case was this. As already stated, the effect of exoneration and striking off in the context of the question whether the person concerned continued to be a party to the suit, would depend upon the particular circumstances averred in the pleadings and the scope of the order. What happened in this case was this. The 1st defendant endorsed on the plaint in the suit to enforce the mortgage in his favour that S. Perumal Asari might be exonerated. Perumal Asari was accordingly exonerated and struck off from the suit and his plea of title paramount was not adjudicated upon. Referring to this, the 1st defendant in his written statements in the present suits stated the ground for the said endorsement to be that S. Perumal Asari was claiming a title paramount and he was, therefore, not a necessary party. The exoneration of S. Perumal Asari and the striking out his name from the record, was therefore upon the ground that he was an unnecessary party. In my opinion, the Court was justified on the basis of such an endorsement in striking out S. Perumal Asari from the array of party defendants as a person improperly impleaded within the meaning of rule 10 (2) of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Courts below viewed the scope of the order exonerating and striking off Perumal Asari as that he ceased to be a party to the suit on the mortgage, and in my opinion, they rightly did so. It was, therefore, properly held that the suits were not barred by the provisions of section 47, Civil Procedure Code. The result is, the Second Appeals fail and are dismissed with costs. No leave. R.M. --------- Appeals dismissed.