JUDGMENT C.A. Vaidialingam, J. 1. O.P. No. 1575 of 1960 is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing an order passed by the second respondent, granting a licence to run a cinema, namely, Ext. P-4, dated 20th December 1960 in favour of the third respondent. 2. The main attack made against this order of the second respondent, namely, the Municipal Commissioner of Palghat, by Mr. V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel for the writ petitioner, is that there has been no proper exercise of the discretion vested in the second respondent under the provisions of the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1958, Act 32 of 1958, or in any event the exercise of that discretion is mala fide and perverse in the circumstances of this case. 3. The circumstances leading to the filing of this writ petition as could be gathered from the various averments contained in the original petition may be briefly stated. The petitioner avers that there is a public reading room and library within the Palghat Municipal area known as the Victoria Reading Room and Balambal Library, which is stated to be an endowment or public trust for the benefit of the local reading public. Then the petitioner gives the origin of this reading room and ultimately states that in 1950 there was a gift made by one Shri T. G. Sesha Iyer of about 3,000 books to the institution in memory of his deceased wife and as such the library itself was named as Balambal Library. 4. The petitioner further claims that this institution is a public charitable institution founded for the sole purpose of affording the facilities of a public reading room and library for the public of Palghat. The petitioner further avers that the said institution is at present managed by a committee registered under the Societies Registration Act, and according to the petitioner that committee has no legal right to be in management of the institution, which has to be really under the control of the District Educational Officer under the Madras Public Libraries Rules, 1950. 5. The petitioner further avers that the managing committee of this institution has been utilising the building and the site appurtenant to it for purposes totally unconnected with the original grant and as such they have committed a breach of trust. 5. The petitioner further avers that the managing committee of this institution has been utilising the building and the site appurtenant to it for purposes totally unconnected with the original grant and as such they have committed a breach of trust. The petitioner, in particular avers, that quite recently the said committee leased a portion of the endowment site to the third respondent for the purpose of constructing and running a temporary cinema theatre and it is also stated that actually the third respondent has put up a temporary thatched shed quite adjacent to the reading room. 6. The petitioner further states that the third respondent applied for and obtained a licence for running Municipal cinema from the second respondent, namely, the Municipal Council Commissioner, Palghat, under the Kerala Cinema (Regulation) Act, 1958 under Ext. P-4. According to the petitioner, that licence has been granted in spite of very strong protests from the members of the reading room, the local government authorities as also the neighbouring public. As illustrative of those protests, the petitioner refers to a petition, dated 29th August 1960, submitted by Shri T. K. Ramaswami Iyer, an advocate residing nearby, evidenced by Ext. P-5. He also refers to a communication sent by the petitioner himself, namely, Ext. P-6. It is also the case of the petitioner that District Educational Officer protested against such user of the premises under Ext. P-7. 7. According to the petitioner, the new temporary cinema is situated in a thickly populated residential area and is situated only about 100 yards from the Government Hospital Buildings and, therefore, according to the petitioner, the District Medical Officer also protested against the grant of licence in favour of the third respondent. But none of these representations, according to the petitioner, had any effect on the licensing authority and notwithstanding these protests the second respondent has granted the licence to the third respondent under Ext.P-4 and the third respondent also has started running the cinema show from 20th October I960. 8. But none of these representations, according to the petitioner, had any effect on the licensing authority and notwithstanding these protests the second respondent has granted the licence to the third respondent under Ext.P-4 and the third respondent also has started running the cinema show from 20th October I960. 8. The petitioner again avers that apart from the terrible nuisance caused by the loudspeaker to the neighbouring residents, and the Hospital, the cinema signifies practically the closing down of the reading room and the library in question and the petitioner further states: "It is the evening hours that is usually utilised by the reading public and during such hours the cinema's loud-speaker is simply blasting into the interior of the reading room and library." 9. The petitioner further avers that the second respondent is exercising quasi-judicial powers as licensing authority functioning under the provisions of the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 32 of 1958 and in particular it is alleged: "The action of the 2nd respondent in granting the licence is mala fide and is in violation of the restrictions imposed by law under section 5 of the Statute and Rules 54 and 55 of the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1958."� After referring to the provisions of section 5 (1) of the Act, the petitioner further states that the licensing authority has completely ignored the interests of the public in this case and the unsuitability of the place has also been ignored. The petitioner avers that an old and established public library and reading room has practically to close down. It is also mentioned that there are already three permanent theatres and one temporary theatre in the Palghat town and therefore there is no further necessity to have another cinema in that area. 10. The petitioner further states that the shed in which the cinema is situated is constructed mainly of inflammable materials and its close proximity to a public institution like the reading room is a matter of public danger. Finally the petitioner states that there has been no exercise of discretion at all or in the alternative there has been a male fide or perverse exercise of power by the second respondent in granting a licence to the third respondent. 11. Therefore, the substantial grounds of attack regarding the grant of licence in favour of the third respondent are those contained in paragraphs 12, 13 and 15 of the affidavit. 11. Therefore, the substantial grounds of attack regarding the grant of licence in favour of the third respondent are those contained in paragraphs 12, 13 and 15 of the affidavit. 12. In these circumstances the petitioner seeks to have the order granting a licence, namely, Ext. P-4, cancelled and quashed. 13. The petitioner claims to be an interested party competent to file the writ petition on the ground that apart from being a citizen residing within the Municipal area of Palghat, is also a life member of the Victoria Reading Room and Balambal Library and a beneficiary of that trust. He also claims to have taken very keen interest in the activities of this institution for the past many years. 14. This application is opposed by the third respondent. It is a matter of regret that though the two statutory authorities, namely, the Palghat Municipal Council and the Municipal Commissioner, Palghat, have been made parties as respondents 1 and 2, no assistance has been forthcoming from those authorities in the disposal of these matters. 15. Therefore, the order under attack has been supported by the third respondent, in whose favour the licence has been issued. 16. The third respondent denies the various statements alleged in the affidavit filed by the petitioner. The third respondent states that subsequent to the grant of a licence in his favour there were certain appeals filed against that order and the Municipal Council also cancelled those orders and the further orders of the Municipal Council themselves have been interfered with and cancelled by a later order of the District Collector, Palghat. Therefore, it is mentioned that the present application to quash an order, which has practically ceased to exist or which has worked itself out, is not maintainable. 17. On the merits, the third respondent has stated that the licensing authority in this case has considered the various objections that were placed before it by the appropriate authorities including the persons mentioned in the affidavit of the petitioner and after a consideration of all those objections and representations the licensing authority was satisfied that the conditions imposed by the Act and the rules have been substantially complied with and it is after coming to such a satisfaction that the licence under attack, namely, Ext. P-4, has been granted. P-4, has been granted. The third respondent further refers to a suit stated to have been filed by this writ petitioner in 1954 to restrain the office-bearers of the library from allowing games to be played in the reading room and for certain other incidental reliefs. The third respondent further states that no objection was filed by any member of the club to the grant of licence in his favour on the ground that the cinema is causing or is likely to cause a nuisance. He refers to a resolution passed by the general body of this library to grant a licence in favour of the third respondent for running a cinema show. He also relies upon a resolution allowing a lease of a part of the property to the third respondent for the purpose of putting up a cinema theatre. 18. The third respondent further avers that the representations of the District Educational Officer, and the District Medical Officer were all considered by the licensing authority and the file of the Commissioner, Palghat Municipality, if perused will clearly show that all those objections were considered and most of the persons who filed these objections were satisfied in view of certain directions given by the Commissioner to the licensee. It is also mentioned that the views of the Health Officer were also obtained before the grant of the licence and in particular the objections of Sri Ramaswami Iyer are dealt with by the third respondent and it is also stated that the latter required only a thatti to be constructed on the northern side for the purpose of ensuring privacy and according to that desire the third respondent claims that the boundary wall on the northern side of Sri Ramaswami Iyer compound was also raised at his expense. 19. The third respondent states that the grant of a licence in his favour is neither malafide nor perverse and is perfectly in accordance with the provisions of the statute. 20. Then regarding the allegation that the construction is made of inflammable materials so as to violate the provisions of rules 54 and 55 of Kerala Cinema Regulation Rules, it is stated that the Electrical Inspector has granted the necessary certificate after satisfying himself regarding the suitability of the enclosure. It is also mentioned that this aspect also has been adverted to by the Commissioner Council before granting the licence. 21. It is also mentioned that this aspect also has been adverted to by the Commissioner Council before granting the licence. 21. In particular the third respondent states in paragraph 7 of his counter-affidavit that: I understand that the petitioner has not been taking a keen interest the activities of the club after the suit filed by him was dismissed in 1955. He does not even visit the club. Then a reference is made to a resolution stated to have been passed by the Palghat Municipal Council resolving that this writ petition need not be defended by the Commissioner and that resolution has been passed, according to the third respondent, to see that the relevant records are not placed before this Court. Therefore, the third respondent feels apprehensive that the relevant records may not also be made available to this Court. 22. As the main attack made by Mr. V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel for the petitioner, was that there has been no proper exercise of discretion by the licensing authority, namely the Commissioner, or in any even that there has been a mala fide or perverse exercise of such jurisdiction ignoring or not having any regard to the various representations stated to have been made by various individuals and authorities, I felt that it is necessary to have some materials collected from the official file and placed before me in the form of affidavits. That became all the more necessary because of the attitude adopted by the Municipal Council as well as the Commissioner in this case of not giving any assistance in these proceedings. 23. According to my directions, after a perusal of the files made available to this Court, both sides have filed fairly elaborate additional affidavits dealing with the various materials as gathered by them from the Commissioner file. I will advert to them a little later. 24. The relevant provision of the statute is section 5 of the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1958. Before I advert to section 5, I will refer to section 3 of the Act which prohibits the exhibition by means of a cinemato graph by any person elsewhere than in a place licensed under this, Act or otherwise than in compliance with the conditions and restrictions imposed by such licence. 25. Section 5 of the Act refers to restrictions of powers of the licensing authority. 25. Section 5 of the Act refers to restrictions of powers of the licensing authority. Sub-section (1) of section 5 is to the effect that. "The licensing authority shall in deciding whether to grant or refuse a licence, hive regard to." the various matters mentioned in clauses (a) to (f). Clause (a) is to the effect that regard is to be had to the interest of the public generally; clause (b) is regarding the status and previous experience of the applicant; clause (c) refers to the suitability of the place where the cinematograph exhibitions are proposed to be given; clause (d) again relates to the adequacy of existing places for the exhibition of cinematograph films m the locality; clause (e) refers to the benefit to any particular locality or localities to be afforded by the opening of a new place of cinematograph exhibition; and clause (f) relates to certain matters which are referred to therein. 26. Sub-clause (2) of section 5 is to the effect that the licensing authority shall not grant licence unless it is satisfied about the matters mentioned in clauses (a) and (b). The proviso is to the effect that the licensing authority shall, before refusing to grant licence under this Act, give the applicant an opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action. There are certain other matters in section 5 which need not be adverted to for the present. A right is given to an aggrieved party under sub­section (7) of section 5 to challenge the orders of the licensing authority by filing an appeal to the prescribed authority mentioned therein. Sub-section (8) of section 5 again empowers the District Collector to revise an order passed in appeal under sub-section (7), either of his own motion or on the application of any party aggrieved by the order. 27. In particular the attack is that there has been no proper compliance with the provisions or section 5, sub-section (1), clauses (a) to (c) of the Act. That is, according to the learned counsel, the interest of the public generally, of the area where the cinema is sought to be established, the nearness of the proposed site to the residential area and also in particular to the reading room as such, have not been considered properly by the licensing authority. That is, according to the learned counsel, the interest of the public generally, of the area where the cinema is sought to be established, the nearness of the proposed site to the residential area and also in particular to the reading room as such, have not been considered properly by the licensing authority. Similarly, the suitability of the place where the cinematograph exhibition is proposed to be given has also not been properly considered or taken into account. The representations made by the hospital authorities, by the residents of the place as well as by the persons who are entitled to use the library have not been considered. 28. As I mentioned earlier, there are various matters now placed before me in the form of additional affidavits by both the petitioner as well as the third respondent and they relate to the several representations stated to have been filed before the Commissioner and the Collector by appropriate authorities and individuals and the manner in which they have been dealt with or disposed of by the licensing authority, namely, the second respondent. Before I consider these aspects it is desirable to consider the legal position regarding the interference in such matters by this Court under Article 226. 29. In Mulhurama Thevar v. Board of Revenue, 1959 (1) M.L.J. 289 Mr. Justice Balakrishna Iyer had to consider the correctness of the order passed by a District Collector regarding the refusal to grant a licence to run a cinema under the provisions of the Madras Cinemas (Regulation) Act (IX of 1955). The learned Judge observes at page 291 as follows: "The concluding portion of sub-section (1) of section 5 enjoins on the licensing authority a duty to take into consideration representations made by the authorities set out therein. It does not say that the authority shall not take into account representations made by any one else. In fact, to make a representation no specific authority is necessary. Any person who feels aggrieved is at liberty to make his representation. It does not say that the authority shall not take into account representations made by any one else. In fact, to make a representation no specific authority is necessary. Any person who feels aggrieved is at liberty to make his representation. It is for the authority to which the representation is addressed to decide what importance it would attach to that representation." It would be clear from the observation of the learned Judge that though there is a duty cast upon the licensing authority to consider the various representations that may be made by the authorities mentioned therein, i.e., in sub-section (1) of section 5, and should have due regard to the various matters mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 5, the learned Judge is very emphatic, if I may say so with respect, that it is for the authority to decide what importance it would attach to these representations. 30. The position is also clear that if there is a perverse exercise of authority by the subordinate tribunals in proper cases it is open to this court to interfere. But there again the position is well established that this court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the appropriate authority. Reference may be made to the decision of the learned Chief Justice sitting with Mr. Justice Ganapatia Pillai in Sri R. V. Service v. Raman and Raman (Pr.) Ltd., A.I.R. 1959 Mad. 492. Though that was a case arising under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, the learned Chief Justice observes at page 496: This court cannot substitute its own discretion in such a matter though this court would be ready to interfere with an obviously perverse exercise of such discretion. Then again, reference may also be made to another decision of the Madras High Court in A. P. Nachimuthu v. Ramaswami, A.I.R. 1957 Mad. 221. That was a matter arising under the provisions of the Madras Places of Public Resort Act, Madras Act 2 of 1888. At page 222 the learned Chief Justice observes: "In our opinion it is for the licensing authority to come to a decision on the question whether the condition laid down in the proviso is or is not satisfied in any particular case. At page 222 the learned Chief Justice observes: "In our opinion it is for the licensing authority to come to a decision on the question whether the condition laid down in the proviso is or is not satisfied in any particular case. It is for the licensing authority to decide on a consideration of the facts which are brought to its notice by the subordinate like the Tahsildar whether there is, or there is not an open space of not less than 20 yards in width." The learned Judges were considering as to whether the matters mentioned in the proviso to rule 18 (a) of the rules framed under the Madras Places of Public Resort Act, 2 of 1888, had been complied with in the case before he learned Judges and it was in that connection that she learned Judges made the observations extracted above. 31. Therefore, the position in my opinion is fairly well established, namely, that unless the petitioner is able to make out that there has been a malafide or perverse exercise of jurisdiction in this case by the second respondent, when he granted the licence under Ext. P-4, there is absolutely no scope for interference by this Court under Article 226. 32. Then the question is whether the petitioner has been able to make out the case set up by him in the affidavit in support of his application. 33. It will be seen that the particular objection that is stated to have been sent by the writ petitioner himself is as referred to in the affidavit, Ext. P-6, dated 16th October 1960. Another objection stated to have been sent up is that of Shri T. K. Ramaswami Iyer, Ext. P-5, and that was to the Collector. The third objection that I referred to by the petitioner is a communication sent by the District Educational Officer to the District Collector, Palghat, under Ext. P-7. It is worthwhile to consider the actual nature of the averments made in everyone of these objections. 34. In Ext. P-5, Shri T. K. Ramaswami Iyer refers the history of the Victoria Reading Room fairly exhaustively. This petitioner states how exactly it assumed also the name Balambal Library. Then he avers that the management of the library did not seem to have applied to for grant in respect of the library. 34. In Ext. P-5, Shri T. K. Ramaswami Iyer refers the history of the Victoria Reading Room fairly exhaustively. This petitioner states how exactly it assumed also the name Balambal Library. Then he avers that the management of the library did not seem to have applied to for grant in respect of the library. Then again, the petitioner avers that the reading room and library activities are neglected and that the books are not properly cared for and he also says that the building is used for card play and the compound for tennis and the institution which is considered to be a reading room and library is converted into a sports club as its primary and main activity. 35. The petitioner therein further states that quite recently, that is early in that month, when he filed the petition, Ext. P-5, dated 29th August 1960, the management with the consent of the present members of the club have granted a lease of the premises of the reading room used as a tennis play ground, for running a cinema on a monthly rent of Rs. 100 and according to the petitioner, this action, is illegal and a breach of trust. The petitioner further avers that the site is not the private property of the members of the club for being let out for rent for a cinema. He also states that the members should not be allowed to make profit by letting out the premises for cinema purposes. Then there are certain other matters regarding the way in which the managing committee was carrying on the administration of the reading room and library. 36. Finally, the petitioner states that the District Collector, is competent to expel the managing committee and take possession of the institution for protecting the interests of the Government and of the public and that the managing committee should be called upon to hand over the amounts collected as rent by lease of the premises for a cinema and also the other amounts they have collected. 37. Ultimately, the petitioner states that the lease of the compound for running a cinema is a high-handed action on the part of the present managing body. 37. Ultimately, the petitioner states that the lease of the compound for running a cinema is a high-handed action on the part of the present managing body. There is a further allegation that the running of the cinema will be a nuisance to the neighbours and his house and compound which are to the south of the reading room and very close to it. This is the substance of the petition sent by Shri T.K. Ramaswami Iyer under Ext. P-5, dated 19th August 1960 to the Collector of Palghat. The communication sent by the District Educational Officer to the Collector, Ext. P-7, dated 24th November 1960 is more or less on the same terms though he challenges the right of the managing committee to lease the premises for purposes of running a cinema show. 38. The present writ petitioner himself claims to have sent a petition, Ext. P-6, dated 16th October 1960. That is addressed to the Commissioner, Palghat Municipality, namely, the second respondent herein. Here again, the petitioner refers to the previous history of the Victoria Reading Room. Then he says that the lease of the Victoria Reading Room premises for constructing a cinema theatre was executed by the managing committee without knowledge or specific sanction of the Revenue Authorities and the legal departments of either the State Government or the Central Government. 39. Then the writ petitioner further states that the management of this library has not been carried on in the interests of the institution and the grant of a lease for purposes of running a cinema is quite unjust and contrary to law. 40. The writ petitioner further refers to the interested activities of the managing committee of this reading room and then finally he says that the society has no power to frame rules and regulations as it pleases without any regard to the nature of the institution and the legal position of the Victoria Reading Room is to be decided not by a vote of the majority but with reference to the records and the law governing it. Ultimately, he states that this being a matter of public interest, the municipality has to take notice of it and is bound to consult the District Collector of Palghat and also get expert legal advice before the issue of licence for exhibiting cinema shows. Ultimately, he states that this being a matter of public interest, the municipality has to take notice of it and is bound to consult the District Collector of Palghat and also get expert legal advice before the issue of licence for exhibiting cinema shows. I am only adverting to the various matters mentioned in these petitions specifically referred to by the writ petitioner to show the nature of the grievance that was being voiced by the respective parties. Barring the grievance made out by Shri T. K. Ramaswami Iyer in his petition, Ext. P-5, to the effect that he being an adjoining resident of this place he will also be inconvenienced, the writ petitioner makes no grievance of the fact that the running of a cinema show in this area is in any way a nuisance. There is one significant circumstance, namely, that the writ petitioner does not claim that he visited this institution or the reading room as he calls it and has actually experienced the nuisance that is stated to have been caused by the cinema which is admittedly now being run on these premises. 41. The position is this. There are various matters admittedly referred to by the petitioner himself in the additional affidavit filed in this Court on 25th January 1961. There is also an additional counter-affidavit filed by the third respondent also. These affidavits filed by both the parties refer to the various matters that were placed before the Commissioner, namely, the second respondent and considered by him and disposed of one way or the other. In fact, the writ petitioner has dealt with everyone of the objections raised by the parties before the Commissioner and the manner in which those objections have been dealt with by the Commissioner. No doubt, the way in which those objections have been dealt with by the Commissioner may not have been to the liking of the writ petitioner. In particular, he also refers to the dismissal of his petition, dated 20th August 1960. 42. Then he also refers to very many other representations that were made by the various individuals and authorities and the manner in which they have been disposed of by the Commissioner could be gathered from the files. 43. In particular, he also refers to the dismissal of his petition, dated 20th August 1960. 42. Then he also refers to very many other representations that were made by the various individuals and authorities and the manner in which they have been disposed of by the Commissioner could be gathered from the files. 43. The third respondent has also filed a fairly elaborate additional counter-affidavit regarding the various representations that were made by the parties including Shri T. K. Ramaswami Iyer and the manner in which they have been disposed of by the executive authority. In fact, as to how exactly the various persons or individuals who had raised some objections on one ground or other were ultimately satisfied is according to the third respondent clearly seen from the manner in which those objections have been met by the Commissioner himself. The third respondent also adverts to the manner in which the executive authority had taken into consideration the objections filed by the writ petitioner and the way in which they have been disposed of and according to the third respondent the main objection of the writ petitioner seems to be that the establishment of a cinema will be a nuisance to the reading room and the managing committee has no authority to lease out a part of its property for the purpose of establishing a cinema theatre. 44. These are all aspects which have been referred to in the counter-affidavits and it is not necessary for me to consider the merits or otherwise of the various objections that have been raised and the manner in which they have been disposed of by the Commissioner. But the point is, is it possible to say, after all these materials are placed before me, that the Commissioner has acted perversely or malafide in the exercise of his discretion when he granted the licence Ext. P-4. In this connection I may refer to an affidavit filed by the Secretary of the Victoria Reading Room and Balambal Library which has been filed as Ext. R-1 by the third respondent along with his additional counter-affidavit filed in this Court on 30th January 1961. The Secretary swears to the circumstances under which the resolution came to be passed by the general body of the library for leasing a part of its property to the third respondent for the establishment of a cinema theatre. R-1 by the third respondent along with his additional counter-affidavit filed in this Court on 30th January 1961. The Secretary swears to the circumstances under which the resolution came to be passed by the general body of the library for leasing a part of its property to the third respondent for the establishment of a cinema theatre. It is also stated as to what use this library is being put to and that will be clear from some of the statements made by the Secretary of the Victoria Reading Room and Balambal Library. He says that for past nearly four years no member of the library has been using the club premises for reading purposes. He also says that no journals, magazines or newspapers are being subscribed for, for the last nearly four years. He further says that in the main hall of the club, games like cards, ping pong, chess and carroms are being played and tennis and badminton are played outside. There is a very significant statement in paragraph 3 of the affidavit of the Secretary to the effect that this writ petitioner has not at all visited the club for the last six years and he has not filed any objection to the Secretary regarding the affairs of the club so far. I am aware of the fact that the writ petitioner has filed a supplementary additional affidavit wherein he very boldly denies this statement by saying that the allegation of the Secretary that the writ petitioner has not gone to the club for the last six years is not true. On the other hand, if the statement is false, as alleged by the petitioner, it was open to him to have given facts and figures as to when exactly he had visited the institution and more especially after the cinema had become a fait accompli in October 1960. Therefore, apart from this bold denial contained in the additional reply affidavit filed by the writ petitioner, this statement made by the Secretary who should be taken to be a very responsible official of this library and reading room as it is called, for the purpose of this writ petition when there is nothing else on record to prove the contrary this statement will have to be accepted as correct. That shows the writ petitioner has nothing to do with this club and he does not even cared to know what exactly is happening in these premises and it is only quite natural for a member who has not cared to step into the club for nearly six years. That affidavit of the Secretary is sworn to on 29th January 1961. 45. Now the position is this: I am perfectly satisfied after a perusal of the various statements made in the additional affidavits of the parties that it cannot be stated that the Commissioner in this case has not taken into Account the various representations made by either the individuals or the authorities referred to by the writ petitioner. In fact, the writ petitioners additional affidavit itself clearly shows that the various representations have been taken into account and considered by the Commissioner before he issued the licence Ext. P-4. The views of the Director of Public Health, the views of the Fire Service Department, the representations made by Shri T. K. Ramaswami Iyer, the representations made by the District Educational Officer and the representations made by the petitioner himself have all been taken into account and considered by the Commissioner. As observed by Mr. Justice Balakrishna Iyer as to what weight is to be attached to these representations is exclusively a matter for the licensing authority and as observed by the learned Chief Justice in the other decision referred to by me, this Court under Article 226, cannot substitute its opinion for that of the licensing authority. Mr. V. K. K. Menon is perfectly justified in his contention as a proposition of law that it is open to this court to interfere with orders like this if it is satisfied that there has been a malafide or perverse exercise of discretion. So far as the attack made in the petition that there has been a malafide or perverse exercise of discretion by the Commissioner, I must say there are absolutely no materials placed before me from which I can come to the conclusion that this attack is justified. Nor can it be said that there has been perverse exercise of discretion by the authority. Nor can it be said that there has been perverse exercise of discretion by the authority. A Contention based on perverse exercise of discretion by an authority can be sustained only if the authority has Completely ignored the various materials or objections placed before it before coming to a decision or has failed to take into account the various representations and has come to a decision which could not be supported by the materials on record. None of these conditions in my view exist in this case and the result is the writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs of the third respondent. 46. Now coming to O. P. No. 1600 of 1960, it is a petition filed by the third respondent in O.P. No. 1575 of 1960. 47. A few facts may be stated. The writ petitioner was granted a licence to establish a cinema business under Ext. P-1. That order appears to have been taken up on appeal by respondents 3 and 4 and the Municipal Council allowed the appeal under Ext. P-2, dated 23rd December 1960. In consequence of this order, the Commissioner or the executive authority passed an order in accordance with the appellate order, namely, Ext. P-3 on 24th December 1960 cancelling the licence already issued by him under Ext. P-1. 48. The writ petitioner appears to have taken up the matter in revision to the District Collector and the latter by his order, dated 27th December 1960, Ext. P-1, cancelled the orders of the Municipal Council passed in appeal and restored the order Ext. P-1. The result of this order is that the writ petitioner obtained the licence which was originally given to him under Ext. P-1. 49. But it will be seen that respondents 3 and 4 as well as respondents 6 and 5 filed again appeals against the order granting the licence in favour of the petitioner by the Commissioner. The Municipal Council took up those appeals and by its order, dated 27th December 1960, Ext. P-5, set aside the order of the Commissioner and cancelled the licence issued in favour of the writ petitioner. In consequence of this appellate order, quite naturally the executive authority passed a fresh order as a consequential order, Ext. P-6, dated 28th December 1960 so as to conform with the order passed by the appellate authority. P-5, set aside the order of the Commissioner and cancelled the licence issued in favour of the writ petitioner. In consequence of this appellate order, quite naturally the executive authority passed a fresh order as a consequential order, Ext. P-6, dated 28th December 1960 so as to conform with the order passed by the appellate authority. The result now is that the licence issued originally by the executive authority under Ext. P-1 stands cancelled by virtue of the order passed by the Municipal Council. 50. The main contention that is urged by Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar, learned counsel for the writ petitioner, is that while disposing of the appeals by its order, dated 27th December 1960, Ext. P-5, the Municipal Council has acted contrary to the principles of natural justice in as much as the licence in favour of the petitioner was set aside without any notice to him or without giving an opportunity to contest the appeals filed by respondents 3 to 6. There is also another attack, namely, that there are absolutely no reasons given by the Municipal Council for allowing the appeals filed by respondents 3 to 6. 51. The Municipal Council, which adopted an attitude of non-co-operation in the connected writ petition has entered appearance through counsel in this writ petition and opposed the grant of the prayers, namely, for cancellation of Exts. P-5 and P-6. The stand taken by the Municipal Council in this proceeding is that the order under attack, namely, the order passed on appeals evidenced by Ext. P-5, is an administrative order pure and simple and that they should not be interfered with by this court under Article 226. 52. In particular, Shri K. Velayudhan Nair, learned counsel appearing for the Municipal Council, has also drawn my attention to the absence of any right given to a party situated like the petitioner of being heard when the appellate authority namely, the Municipal Council in this case, disposes of the appeals filed before it by aggrieved persons. Mr. Velayudhan Nair in particular referred me to section 5, sub-section (7) of the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1958, which is absolutely silent as to any notice being given when the appellate authority disposes of the appeals by virtue of powers conferred on it under the said sub-clause. 53. This contention of Mr. Mr. Velayudhan Nair in particular referred me to section 5, sub-section (7) of the Kerala Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1958, which is absolutely silent as to any notice being given when the appellate authority disposes of the appeals by virtue of powers conferred on it under the said sub-clause. 53. This contention of Mr. Velayudhan Nair on behalf of the Municipal Council has also been supported by Shri V. K. K. Menon, learned counsel appearing for one of the respondents, namely, the third respondent in this writ petition. 54. That the writ petitioner was neither given an opportunity of being heard nor that notice was issued to him as to why the order of the executive authority should not be cancelled is beyond controversy. Admittedly, the Municipal Council did not give any opportunity to the writ petitioner before it cancelled the order in his favour already passed under Ext. P-1 by the executive authority. 55. In this connection, certain provisions of the enactment should be adverted to. Section 4 prescribes the licensing authority having power to grant licences under this Act. Section 3 also prohibits every person from giving an exhibition by means of cinematograph except in a place licensed under the Act or otherwise than in compliance with the conditions and restrictions imposed by such licence. 56. The proviso to sub-section (2) of section 5 is to the effect that the licensing authority is bound to give an opportunity to an applicant for showing cause against action before refusing to grant a licence under the Act. Then again, there is a right of appeal given to a person aggrieved under sub-section (7) of section 5. Sub-section (8) of section 5 empowers the District Collector to revise the order passed on appeal under sub-section (7) either of his own motion or on the application of any party aggrieved by the order. There is a proviso to the effect that no order shall be revised under sub-section (8) without giving an opportunity to show cause to the party who may be affected by the order. 57. In fact, Mr. There is a proviso to the effect that no order shall be revised under sub-section (8) without giving an opportunity to show cause to the party who may be affected by the order. 57. In fact, Mr. Velayudhan Nair, learned counsel for the Municipal Council, very strongly relied upon this proviso to sub-section (8) of section 5 and the absence of any such provision in sub-section (7) to show that when the Municipal Council disposed of an appeal under sub­section (7) there is no duty cast upon it either to issue notice to the writ petitioner or to have his representations heard notwithstanding the fact that the appellate order may ultimately be one passed against the interests of the writ petitioner. The question is how far this contention can be accepted. 58. Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar, learned counsel for the writ petitioner, urged that the whole scheme of the enactment itself will show that before a person can have a right to exhibit a cinema in a particular place he must obtain a licence. In fact, he referred to section 3 where there is a positive prohibition against persons exhibiting cinemas except in accordance with the conditions and restrictions imposed by the licence or otherwise than in a place licensed under the Act. Then Mr. Gopalan Nambiar also referred to section 5 of the Act to show that before deciding to grant or refuse a permit the licensing authority was bound to adhere to the various matters mentioned therein. In particular, Mr. Gopalan Nambiar also referred to the provisions of clause (2) of sub-section (1) of section 5 where representations made by persons already giving cinematograph exhibition are also entitled to be properly considered. 59. Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar also urged that the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 5 casts a duty upon the licensing authority to give an opportunity to an applicant to show cause against the proposed action before refusing the grant of a licence under the Act. 60. The absence of any provision in sub-section (7) casting a duty on the appellate authority to give an opportunity to the writ petitioner, according to Mr. 60. The absence of any provision in sub-section (7) casting a duty on the appellate authority to give an opportunity to the writ petitioner, according to Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar, is of no consideration because the original authority can refuse to grant a licence only after giving an opportunity to the applicant and it stands to reason that when once a party has been given a licence and that is the subject of an attack before the appellate authority, the latter was bound in accordance with the principles of natural justice to give an opportunity to the person who has already been given a licence, and who was entitled to carry on the business by virtue of that licence before that licence was cancelled to the prejudice of a particular party. Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar also urged that the whole scheme of the enactment of this Act itself will show that the various authorities constituted under this Act were performing quasi judicial functions. Therefore, there was a duty cast upon them to conform to the principles of natural justice, one essential condition of which is to give an opportunity to a party before a right which has already been given to him is taken away. 61. Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar contended that even if it is considered to be an administrative order for any reason, even administrative tribunals situated like the Municipal Council in this case when it interferes with the right which has already been conferred under the statute by any authority in favour of the writ petitioner is bound to conform to the principles of natural justice. 62. Mr. Velayudhan Nair referred me to the principles laid down by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 722 and Radheshyam v. State of M. P., A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 107 about the tribunals functioning either as administrative tribunals or as quasi judicial tribunals. So far as the principles are concerned, in my opinion, there cannot be any controversy as such; but the question is whether having due regard to these principles the authorities who function under this enactment can be stated to be discharging quasi judicial functions. In my opinion, the contention of Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar in this respect has to be accepted. In my opinion, the contention of Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar in this respect has to be accepted. It will be seen that the right to carry on a cinema show in a particular place has been obtained only under the provisions of this Act. As I mentioned earlier, section 3 itself prohibits a person carrying on or giving an exhibition by means of cinematograph except under the conditions mentioned therein, i.e., on obtaining a licence in respect of the place and he is bound to carry on that activity in accordance with the conditions and restrictions imposed by such licence. 63. Then again, section 5 also contemplates the authority having due regard to the various matters mentioned therein and also considering the various representations and objections that may be made before him by the party and in my opinion, there is considerable significance in the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 5. It casts a duty on the licensing authority to give an opportunity to an applicant before refusing to grant a licence under thin Act. When there is a duty cast upon the first authority in this case, namely, the licensing authority, to give an opportunity to an applicant like the petitioner before it refuses a licence, in my opinion, it stands to reason that there must be equally a duty cast upon the appellate authority also of giving an opportunity to the writ petitioner to show cause in case the right that has already been conferred on him by another authority is sought to be taken away, no doubt, at the instance of other persons. The circumstance that there is no provision made casting a duty on that appellate authority to issue notice or give an opportunity to the party sought to be affected is, in my opinion, of no consequence. The scheme of the Act clearly shows that the appellate authority also functions as a quasi judicial tribunal considering the correctness or otherwise of an order passed by one of the other authorities constituted under the various provisions of the Act. 64. Along with it must be taken the other provision under which the District Collector is given a right to revise an order and provision is made to give an opportunity to the party who may be affected by the order. 64. Along with it must be taken the other provision under which the District Collector is given a right to revise an order and provision is made to give an opportunity to the party who may be affected by the order. Taking all these matters into account, in my opinion, the result of this discussion is that even the appellate authority functioning under section 5, sub-section (7), functions as a quasi judicial tribunal and as such it is bound to conform to the principles of natural justice, namely, to give an opportunity to persons situated like the petitioner, before an adverse order is passed. It need not necessarily be a personal hearing but there must be an opportunity given to the parties situated like the petitioner before an adverse order is passed in appeals filed by other parties. 65. Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar has referred me to certain decisions of this Court under the provisions of the Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act under notice was to be issued when final orders were passed but there was no provision for such notice during interlocutory stage. Notwithstanding such absence this Court held that even in those circumstances when adverse orders are passed the principles of natural justice do require that those authorities must give notice to persons sought to be affected by that order. As illustrative of that principle I can only refer to the decision of my Lord the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Madhavan Nair in Manavedan v. Commissioner of H. R. and C. E. (Admn.), I.L.R. 1960 Kerala 1259 and another decision of the same Banch quite recently in A. S. No. 276 of 1960. 66. In this it will be seen that the appellate authority, namely, the Municipal Council, when it passed the order under attack, namely, Ext. P-5, admittedly has not given any opportunity to the writ petitioner for placing his objections to the appeals that are stated to have been filed by respondents 3 to 6. 67. Mr. Velayudhan Nair has urged that the reasons or the grounds which prompted that appellate authority to reverse the order of the Commissioner have been more or less stated in the counter-affidavit filed by the Municipal Council in this case and therefore they may be taken into account to consider whether any interference is called for by this Court. On the other hand, Mr. On the other hand, Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar, learned counsel for the writ petitioner, has urged that a reading of Ext. P-5 will clearly show that the appeals have been disposed of without in any way adverting to the various matters that have been taken into account by the Commissioner. I am not inclined to express any opinion on this aspect of the matter, more especially in the view that I take, namely, that this writ petition will have to be allowed and the orders, Ext. P-5 and Ext. P-6, will have to be quashed with liberty to the Municipal Council to take up those appeals and dispose them of according to law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment after giving the writ petitioner an opportunity to show cause against the appeals filed by respondents 3 to 6. As to the maintainability of some of the appeals stated to have been filed by the respondents, here again I express no opinion. Those are all aspects which have to be considered by |hr Municipal Council when these appeals are taken up for reconsideration. 68. Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar has also urged that the order suffers from lack of any reasons being given in support of this decision. He also referred to a decision of this Court in Joseph v. Superintendent of Police Offices, Kottayam and others, 1960 K.L.J. 1358 to the effect that even in those circumstances the appellate authority was bound to give reasons for the conclusion. These are all aspects which I dare say will be considered by the Municipal Council when the matters come up before. 69. Mr. V. P. Gopalan Nambiar finally urged that I no useful purpose will be served by the appeals being directed to be reheard by the Municipal Council in this case, especially in view of the attitude adopted by it in the counter-affidavit filed in this Court. 70. I am not very much impressed with this contention of the learned counsel. The fact that the appellate authority, namely, the Municipal Council functioning under the statute has disposed of the appeals at one stage without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard is not by itself a sufficient circumstance for not giving an opportunity to that statutory body to once again properly function under the provisions of the Act. 71. The fact that the appellate authority, namely, the Municipal Council functioning under the statute has disposed of the appeals at one stage without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard is not by itself a sufficient circumstance for not giving an opportunity to that statutory body to once again properly function under the provisions of the Act. 71. In the result, the orders, Exts. P-5 and P-6 are set aside and quashed and under Article 227 of the Constitution, I further direct the Municipal Council to take up all the appeals that may have been filed before it against the order granting a licence in favour of the petitioner and dispose them of according to law and in the light of directions and observations contained in this judgment after giving the writ petitioner an opportunity to show cause in respect of these appeals. 72. Learned counsel appearing on all sides desire that these appeals should be taken up and disposed of as expeditiously as possible. 73. Parties will bear their own costs in these proceedings.