ORDER:- This is an application for a writ of mandamus by the petitioner who was a temporary peon in the Claims Department of the Manipur Administration for quashing the order of the Extra Assistant Commissioner (Claims) Manipur dated 8-9-1954, terminating the service of the petitioner and another order of the same Officer dated 29-3-1954 suspending the petitioner from service and for directing the respondents, namely, the Government of India, the Chief Commissioner Manipur and the Finance Secretary, Manipur Administration to reinstate the petitioner to a post similar to the post he was holding under the Manipur Administration. 2. The petitioner was appointed as a temporary peon on 1-3-1952 for a period of one month in the first instance by Annexure-A/1 dated 4-3-1952. This temporary service was extended by subsequent orders like Annexures-A/2, A/3, A/4, A/5 etc. until first March, 1954. By Annexure-A/5 dated 26-9-1953, his service was extended for a period of one month from 1-3-1953 or till the date of completion of compensation work whichever was earlier. All the orders of extension of service were passed by the Chief Commissioner. On 5-4-1954, there was another order Annexure-A/6 also issued by the Chief Commissioner by which, the petitioners service was extended upto 26-3-1954 in anticipation of the sanction of the Government of India. Beyond that period there is no order of the Manipur Administration extending the petitioners service. 3. It would appear, however, that the petitioner was allowed to continue to work as peon by the E.A.C. (Claims), Manipur in anticipation of the sanction, by the Manipur Administration. While he was thus working, there was a criminal case against him - No.24(3)54 of the Imphal Police Station under section 161, I.P.C. on a charge of corruption. So on 29-3-1954, the E.A.C. (Claims) passed the order Annexure-A/8, suspending the petitioner from service with immediate effect. This order of the E.A.C. is now sought to be quashed in this writ. It was after this suspension order that the order, Annexure-A/6 dated 5-4-1954 was passed extending the petitioners service from 1-3-1954 to 26-3-1954. Thus the position was that on 29-3-1954 when the petitioner was suspended by the E.A.C. (Claims), the petitioner had really no post as peon, though on account of the fact that the order of extension upto 26-3-1954 came in only later, he was allowed to do the duties of a peon by the E.A.C. (Claims) upto 29-3-1954. Thus the position was that on 29-3-1954 when the petitioner was suspended by the E.A.C. (Claims), the petitioner had really no post as peon, though on account of the fact that the order of extension upto 26-3-1954 came in only later, he was allowed to do the duties of a peon by the E.A.C. (Claims) upto 29-3-1954. Subsequently, on 8-9-1954, the formal order, Annexure-A/7 was passed by the Chief Commissioner, evidently after the sanction of the Government of India was obtained, stating that the petitioners service should be terminated on 26-3-1954. The petitioner wants this order of the Chief Commissioner also to be quashed in this writ. 4. It would appear that there were 3 criminal cases against the petitioner of corruption and he was tried in the Court of the Special Judge, Manipur, in Criminal Trial Nos.3, 19 and 21 of 1956. But it happened that the petitioner was acquitted in the 3 cases on 6-5-1959. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the petition Annexure-A/9 on 18-5-1959 to the Chief Commissioner pointing out that he has been acquitted and requesting that he may be appointed as peon in one of the Offices of the Administration. It would appear that the Finance Secretary, Manipur Administration circularised to all the Heads of Departments by Annexure-A/10 dated 9-9-1959 recommending the appointment of the petitioner in any vacancy in any of the Departments at the earliest opportunity. But no Departmental head has so far taken the petitioner in service as a peon. 5. The petitioner has, therefore, come forward with this writ application on 9-5-1960 for the reliefs as stated above. The arguments advanced in support of the petitioner are as follows: It is stated that in the case of a temporary servant, Rule (2) of the Central Civil Services Temporary Service Rules, 1949 provides for one months notice for terminating the service and no such notice was given to the petitioner and hence it was stated that the order is in violation of the rules. Secondly, it is stated that the order of termination of service following the order of suspension was passed on account of the criminal cases pending against the petitioner and that such termination of service amounted to the petitioners dismissal or removal from service, that such dismissal or removal without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to defend himself was in violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution and that in any case, the petitioner having been acquitted in Criminal Cases, the very basis for the order of dismissal or removal has been taken away and hence the petitioner should be re-instated. It was next contended that if the order of termination was invalid, the order of suspension should also be vacated and the petitioner should be allowed to continue in service. 6. In order to explain the delay of more than six years after Annexure-A/6 in coming forward with this petition, the petitioner has stated that he was waiting for the disposal of the criminal cases against him in the bona fide belief that the order of termination was connected with the criminal cases against him and that after his acquittal in the criminal cases he has been making several representations to the Chief Commissioner praying for his re-instatement, but that he was forced to file this petition as his representations did not yield any result. 7. I am not satisfied with the reasons given by the petitioner for the delay of more than six years in filing this application. The suspension order of the petitioner was passed on 29-3-1954 and the order extending his service only upto 26-3-1954 was passed on 5-4-1954 and even the later formal order terminating his service with effect from 26-3-1954 was passed on 8-9-1954. He is questioning the said orders now on the ground that the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949 have been violated and that the termination of his service amounted to dismissal or removal and he should have been given an opportunity to show cause against the same. This objection ought to have been raised at the earliest opportunity and not six years later. If the petitioner succeeds and he is ordered to be re-instated, the effect will be that he will have to be paid all the salary for the six years without the Government having the benefit of his services. This cannot be permitted. This objection ought to have been raised at the earliest opportunity and not six years later. If the petitioner succeeds and he is ordered to be re-instated, the effect will be that he will have to be paid all the salary for the six years without the Government having the benefit of his services. This cannot be permitted. The fact of his acquittal in the criminal cases against him will not give him any fresh cause of action for filing this writ application, because his services were not terminated on account of any conviction in a criminal case. Thus, the petitioner had no right to wait until his acquittal in the criminal cases. 8. Even after the disposal of the criminal case in May, 1959, the petitioner has delayed filing this petition by one year which time he says was spent in making representations to the Chief Commissioner. The petitioner relies on the decision, Gopi Nath Wali v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, AIR 1958 J. and K. 11 (FB), in which it has been held that the petitioner has been making representations to the Government to redress his grievance, but has been unsuccessful and in those circumstances, the delay of a year and a half cannot be considered to be fatal to the petition and that in the absence of a plea that on account of the delay the State has been prejudiced in any manner, mere delay cannot be considered a bar to the entertainment of the petition. In our present case, the petitioners representation was only to appoint him as a Chaprassi in any Office under the Administration. He did not claim that after his acquittal in the Criminal Case, he was entitled to be re-instated. It was at best a plea of mercy. Representations of that nature cannot be accepted as saving the delay in filing an application of this kind. The question in such cases is not only whether the opposite party has been prejudiced by the delay, but whether the petitioner has been vigilant in enforcing his rights. If a party has not been diligent in a matter of this kind, a High Court exercising its prerogative rights under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere in the matter. It has to be accepted that there has been gross delay by the petitioner and that for this reason alone this petition should fail. If a party has not been diligent in a matter of this kind, a High Court exercising its prerogative rights under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere in the matter. It has to be accepted that there has been gross delay by the petitioner and that for this reason alone this petition should fail. 9. Even on the merits, I am afraid, the petitioner has no case. He refers to the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1949, and states that he was entitled to one months notice when terminating his appointment. But he is clearly mistaken. When a temporary servant is appointed for a fixed term, his appointment comes to an end at the end of the term and no such notice of one month would be necessary to him. It is only in a case where the temporary service is for an indefinite period, that the question of notice of one month would come in. In our present case, the petitioners temporary service was extended only upto 26-3-1954 and beyond that period he had no post and so no question of notice at all arises. 10. Again, it is seen from the orders Annexure-A/6 and Annexure-A/7 that it was a case of mere termination of service which did not amount to dismissal or removal from service and hence Article 311(2) of the Constitution will have no application at all. Even though, as pointed out in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 by the Supreme Court, Article 311(2) will apply to temporary Civil servant also, it will not be of any avail to a temporary servant where it is a case of mere termination of service and not of dismissal or removal. It is clear from Annexure-A/10 that the Manipur Administration has not treated the termination of service of the petitioner as amounting to dismissal or removal as the Administration has written to all Departmental Heads to entertain the petitioner in service when a vacancy arises. Thus, the termination of service has not entailed any penal consequences and hence it cannot be treated as amounting to dismissal or removal. There has thus been no violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 11. Thus, the termination of service has not entailed any penal consequences and hence it cannot be treated as amounting to dismissal or removal. There has thus been no violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 11. It was, however, pointed out for the petitioner that he was actually working as a peon in the Claims Office even on 29-3-1954, even though subsequently an order was passed on 5-4-1954 extending his service only upto 26-3-1954 and that this fact was clear because the order of suspension Annexure-A/8 was made by the Extra Assistant Commissioner (Claims) on 29-3-1954 and that therefore the argument of the respondent that his service was terminated on 26-3-1954 should not be accepted. The respondents have pointed out that on 29-3-1954, the E.A.C. (Claims) had no right to order the suspension of the petitioner and that the said order was invalid, as the petitioner did not have a post in the Administration on 29-3-1954. This argument of the respondents has to be accepted. Evidently, the petitioner was allowed to work as peon in the Claims Office after 1-3-1954 in anticipation of the sanction of the post by the Manipur Administration. Unless therefore the Manipur Administration subsequently sanctioned the post; the petitioner has no claim at all to say that he had a post in the Manipur Administration. At best, he can only say that he had worked as peon and that he should be paid for the services rendered by him for the period that he had worked. Thus, in this case he can at best say that he must be paid upto the time when he was suspended from service by the E.A.C. We are not concerned with such a claim in the present petition. We are concerned with the question whether the petitioner had a right to hold the post when his services were terminated on 26-3-1954. Unless he establishes that he had a right to the post, it cannot be said that the termination of his service entailed any evil consequences. The petitioner cannot be heard to say that he had a right to hold the post on the date when the order of suspension was passed against him. His services as a temporary servant were extended only upto 26-3-1954 and after that, he has no claim of any kind against the Manipur Administration. The petitioner cannot be heard to say that he had a right to hold the post on the date when the order of suspension was passed against him. His services as a temporary servant were extended only upto 26-3-1954 and after that, he has no claim of any kind against the Manipur Administration. That being so, an application of the present kind is totally infructuous. 12. The petition fails and it is accordingly dismissed with the costs of the respondents. Advocates fee Rs.100/-. Petition dismissed.