JUDGMENT T.C. Shrivastava, J.—This second appeal has been filed by the State Government against the concurring judgments of the Courts below decreeing the claim of the respondent for possession in respect of the suit lands. 2. The respondent Ramrijhawan was the proprietor of the village Bitkuli, Tahsil Bemetara and District Durg, where the lands in suit lie. After the proprietary rights in the village vested in the State Government, the lands in suit were settled with the respondent u/s 40 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 (No. 1 of 1951) - hereinafter referred to as the Abolition Act-by the Deputy Commissioner Land Reforms Bemetara; on 18. 1. 1953/6-3.1923. Subsequently; a Nistar Officer was appointed to make enquiries regarding the customary rights existing in the village and he passed an order on 3-9 1954 declaring that the suit land vested in the State and thus set aside the previous order of the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms. The respondent, therefore, filed the present suit for cancellation of the order passed by the Nistar Officer, on the gorund that it was without jurisdiction, and also for a declaration that he held the lands in occupancy rights. 3. The Courts below have held that the order of the Nistar Officer was without jurisdiction. They, however, did not consieer it necessary to grant any declaration to the respondent regarding his status as occupancy tenant, but have cancelled the order of the Nistar Officer as illegal and void. 4. The first question which arises in this appeal is whether the Nistar Officer had jurisdiction to cancel the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms, on 18-1-1953/6-3-1953 settling the lands with the respondent u/s 40 of the Abolition Act. An attempt was made by Shri H. L. Khaskalam, Government Advocate, for the State to support the order u/s 48. He contended that the Nistar Officer acted under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of that Section in reserving the lands for grazing of cattle. In the first place, no such order reserving the lands for grazing purposes has been passed. What the Nistar Officer has actually done is to order correction of the annual papers of the village removing the name of the respondent and directing the lands to be recorded in the name of the State Government. In the first place, no such order reserving the lands for grazing purposes has been passed. What the Nistar Officer has actually done is to order correction of the annual papers of the village removing the name of the respondent and directing the lands to be recorded in the name of the State Government. The reasons given in the order are that the entries in the khasra showing that the respondent was cultivating the lands in 1950-51 were false and the lands could not therefore be settled u/s 40 of the Abolition Act. Obviusly the Nistar Officer was not acting u/s 48. If the lands in the village reserved for grazing are found to be insuffisient, it is still open to the Deputy Commissioner to Act under that Section and declare the suit lnds, which are held by the proprietor u/s 40, as reserved for grazing. In that case, compensation will have to be paid to the proprietor under sub-section (2) of Section 48. Shri Khatkalam points out that as the lands were never brought under cultivation, the compensation would be nil and therefore the order should be considered to have been validly passed by the Nistar Officer. This contention cannot be accepted. It is different that a nominal amount may be fixed for compensation, as nothing had been spent by the proprietor; but the procedure indicated by Section 48 of the abolition Act will have to be followed before the lands could be reserved for pasturage. It will have to be first declared, after due, enquiry that the lands reserved for pasturage in the village are insufficient and secondly that the necessary lands cannot be found from the area vesting in the State and situate within the limits of the village. It is after this that the area settled with the proprietor u/s 40 can be reserved for pasturage. The question for giving compensation will then have to be determined. I am clear that the action of the Nistar Officer cannot be supported u/s 48 of the Abolition Act. 5. When once an order had been passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms the Nistar Officer had no power to set it aside. It has been held in Balkishan Vs. M. P. State AIR 1956 Nag. I am clear that the action of the Nistar Officer cannot be supported u/s 48 of the Abolition Act. 5. When once an order had been passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms the Nistar Officer had no power to set it aside. It has been held in Balkishan Vs. M. P. State AIR 1956 Nag. 219 F. B. that the Nistar Officer has no power to set aside an order passed by the Deputy Commissioner u/s 40 of the Abolition Act. The only remedy of the Government, in such a case, is to go up in appeal u/s 84 of the Abolition Act against the order of the Deputy Commissioner. 6. Shri Khaskalam tried to distinguish Balkishan's case (supra) from the facts of the present case on the ground that the necessary facts to support the application of Section 40 existed in that case, while they do not exist in the present case. It is true that in the present case, the Courts below have found that the respondent did not bring the lands under cultivation after the agricultural year 1948-49 as required by Section 40 of the Abolition Act. However, the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms, had accepted the entries in the khasra on the point and had then held that the necessary conditions for settling the lands with the respondent existed. Accordingly, he acted under that Section. Even assuming that the order of the Deputy Commissioner can be said to be the order of a Tribunal, it appears to me that he had jurisdiction in this case to determine the necessary facts. His finding that the lands were brought under cultivation after 1948-49 was based on the entries in the village records which are presumed to be correct. The finding was thus reasonable and based on adequate material. This is not a case in which there was total lack of jurisdiction. At the most, it would be a case where an error of fact has been committed in deciding a question which was within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Under these circumstances; a civil Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the decision of the Deputy Commissioner. 7. There is another way of looking at the order of the Deputy Commissioner. The State being the proprietor of all the lands, the Deputy Commissioner has full right to grant occupancy rights on any lands in the village. Under these circumstances; a civil Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the decision of the Deputy Commissioner. 7. There is another way of looking at the order of the Deputy Commissioner. The State being the proprietor of all the lands, the Deputy Commissioner has full right to grant occupancy rights on any lands in the village. Section 40 of the Abolition Act does not restrict the powers of the Deputy Commissioner in any way, The real intention of Section 40 is to create a right in favour of the subject; and if it can be proved that the lands were brought under cultivation after 1948 49, the exproprietor has a right to have them settled. The Deputy Commissioner may, however, settle any lands with the exproprietor or any other person in exercise of the wider powers which vest in the State. 8. In any case, the order of the Nistar Officer was without jurisdiction and the Courts below did not commit any error in setting it aside. The effect is that the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms: continues to have force. I do not agree with the learned Government Advocate that the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Land Reforms, can be set aside on the ground that he determined the basic facts wrongly. 9. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed