MEHROTRA, C. J. : . A preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of the respondents to the maintainability oil the present appeal. (2) The Sub divisional Officer. Barpeta, by his notification dated the 22nd December 1959 invited sealed tenders for settlement of the Fishery No. 23 Chilochi Group of the Barpeta Town for the years 1960-61, 1981-62 and 1962-63. A number of per­sons gave their tenders. Sri Radha Mohan Pathak gave his tender for Rs- 31,005/- and Upendra Patowary gave his tender for Rs. 33,000/-. By his order dated the 5th February 1960 with the advice of the Advisory Board the Subdivisions! Officer sent the name of Upendra Patowary for approval to the Commissioner of Plains Division. The Commissioner refused to accept the proposal and ordered resale of the fishery. This order was set aside by the High Court. The matter went to the Commissioner for consideration of the settlement made by the Sub divisional Officer on comparative merits of the tenderers. Ultimately the Commissioner of Plains Division on the 3rd September 1960 accepted the proposal of the Sub divisional Officer for settlement with Radha Mohan Pathak. Against this order Upendra Patowary preferr­ed an appeal to the High Court under the provi­sions of Rule 11 of the .Fishery Rules read with S- 147 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regula­tion. The appeal was numbered as Revenue Ap­peal No- 91(M)/60 and came up for hearing be­fore Deka J., as he then was. By his order dated the 8th November 1960 this appeal was allowed. The present appeal has been filed purporting to be under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment of .the single Judge of this Court dated the 8th November 1960- As there was some doubt whether leave was necessary or not the appellant withdrew his application for leave and the appeal was allowed to proceed subject to the right of the respondents to raise a preliminary objection at the time of the hearing. This order was passed by this Bench on 4th July 1961 and the present appeal has come up for hearing before us. (3) The contention of the respondents is that the present appeal is not maintainable. Mainly three points have been raised. This order was passed by this Bench on 4th July 1961 and the present appeal has come up for hearing before us. (3) The contention of the respondents is that the present appeal is not maintainable. Mainly three points have been raised. Firstly it is urged that clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Cal­cutta High Court which gives right of appeal to a Bench against the judgment of the single Judge of this .Court, is not attracted to the Revenue Appeals. The High Court exercises in hearing revenue appeals a special jurisdiction. It is not a civil jurisdiction or a jurisdiction which the High Court exercises as a court possessing general juris­diction. Secondly it is urged that the Assam Legislature has passed an Act creating a Board of Revenue. The appellate, and revisional power exercised by the High Court in revenue matters has been taken away by the said Act from the High Court and the Act vests it in the Board °i Revenue. The Act is called 'The Assam Board of Revenue Act, 1959 (Assam Act VIII of I960).' After the passing of this Act the High Court has ceased to have any jurisdiction over revenue matters. The present appeal therefore, cannot be heard and disposed of by the High Court. Thirdly it was contended that an application for special leave against the judgment of the single Judge of this Court was filed before the Supreme Court which was rejected. The present appeal therefore, is not maintainable. (4) Regarding the third point raised by the counsel for the respondent it is sufficient to point out that that is a point which deals with the merits of the appeal arid if we accept the contention of the respondent on the other two points, the third question does not arise. If we reject the preli­minary objection, the question whether the deci­sion by the Supreme Court bars the hearing of the present appeal on principles of res-judicata, will have to be considered at the time of the hearing of the appeal. 1 therefore propose first to deal with the first two submissions made by the res­pondents. (5) In order to appreciate .the first point rai­sed by the respondent it may be necessary to refer to the history or the circumstances under which the Assam High Court was invested with the powers to exercise appellate and revisional juris­diction in revenue matters. 1 therefore propose first to deal with the first two submissions made by the res­pondents. (5) In order to appreciate .the first point rai­sed by the respondent it may be necessary to refer to the history or the circumstances under which the Assam High Court was invested with the powers to exercise appellate and revisional juris­diction in revenue matters. Section 296 of the Government of India Act 1935 before its adapta­tion was as follows :- "296 (1) No member of the Federal or a Pro­vincial Legislature shall be a member of any tri­bunal in British India having jurisdiction to enter­tain appeals or revise decisions in revenue cases- (2) If in any Province any such jurisdiction as aforesaid was, immediately before the commence­ment of Part III of this Act, vested in the Local Government, the Governor shall constitute a tribunal^ consisting of such person or persons as he, exercising his individual judgment, may think tit to exercise the same jurisdiction until other provi­sion in that behalf is made by Act of the Provin­cial Legislature". I have quoted above only the relevant portions of the section. The Assam Revenue Tribunal Act, 1946 (Assam Act II of 1946) was passed and under that Act the Provincial Government was given power to constitute a Tribunal to be called the Assam Revenue Tribunal consisting of a President and two members. The Act provided that the services of the members will be for five years. Sections 5 and 6 of the Act define the function of the Tribunal. (6) In the year 1948 the Assam Revenue Tri­bunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 (Assam Act IV of 1948) was enacted. Under section 3 of the said Act the Assam High Court was empowered to exercise such jurisdiction to entertain appeals and revise decisions in revenue cases as was vested in the State Government immediately before the first / day of April 1937 under any law for the time being in force. The word 'State' has been subs­tituted by Adaptation Order 1950 for 'Provincial' in the section. The word 'State' has been subs­tituted by Adaptation Order 1950 for 'Provincial' in the section. Clause (2) of the said section pro­vides that in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision the Assam High Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain appeals and revise decisions in all revenue cases arising under the provisions of the enactments specified in Schedule A in which such jurisdiction was vested in the State Government immediately before the first day of April 1937. In the schedule A item No. 1 is the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation 1886 (I of 1886). In the second column of Sche­dule A item 6 mentions appeals and revision under rules for the time being in force made under the Regulation. The Assam Fishery Rule No. 11 under which also the present appeal before the single Bench was filed was made under the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. Section 4 of this Act lays down that the Assam High Court shall have and will exercise all the powers which the State Government or the Revenue Tribunal as the case may he had or could, have exercised in the cases in which jurisdiction has been conferred on the Assam high Court by Sec. 3(l), (2) and (4). Section 5 lays down that no appeal or revision shall lie against any order passed by the Assam High Court in the exercise of its powers in appeal or revision under this Act. By section 7 the Assam Revenue Tribunal constituted under the Act of 1946 was abolished and it also provides for the pending cases before the Tribunal. (7) In the year 1886 the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation was enacted by the Governor-General-in-Council in accordance with the provi­sion of section 1 of the Government of India Act 1870. Under this section the Chief Commissioner had power to propose to tile Governor-General-in-Council drafts of any regulations for peace and good government of any part of the territories under its administration to which the Secretary of State for India might, by resolution in Council, declare the section to be applicable. By a procla­mation of 1874 some districts of Assam were form­ed into Chief Commissionership of Assam and thus the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation came in­to existence in 1886. (8) We are not concerned with the subse­quent amendments to these Regulations. By a procla­mation of 1874 some districts of Assam were form­ed into Chief Commissionership of Assam and thus the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation came in­to existence in 1886. (8) We are not concerned with the subse­quent amendments to these Regulations. It is suf­ficient to point out that the Regulations are still' in force and the revenue cases are dealt with in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation. Section 147(a) of this Regulation provides that ap­peals shall lie to the Tribunal appointed under S- 296 of the Government of India Act, 1935, from any original or appellate order passed by a Commissioner and clause (b) provides for an appeal to the said Tribunal from any order Original or appellate passed by a Deputy Commissioner of a district. The words "Tribunal appointed under S. 296 of the Government of India Act, 1935" were substituted for the words "Chief Commissioner" by the Adaptation Order 1937. The Go­vernment of India Act 1935 thus authorised the Governor to constitute the Tribunal to exercise ap­pellate jurisdiction that was immediately before the commencement of the Act being exercised by 'the Provincial Government and the Governor's Tribunal was to exercise such jurisdiction until the Provincial Legislature made other provisions with regard thereto. (9) By the Act of 1946 the Assam Legislature made other provisions for the exercise of the final appellate powers by the tribunal constituted by the Provincial Government in exercise of the powers conferred on it by S. 3 of that Act and jurisdic­tion was conferred on the Tribunal to entertain ap­peals and revise decisions in all revenue cases aris­ing under the provisions of the nine enactments specified in the schedule thereto. (10) The High Court of Assam was establish­ed on April 5, 1948, and by the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 the powers and jurisdiction exercised by the Revenue Tribunal was transferred to the Assam High Court. The Assam High Court had authority to ex­ercise the appellate and revisional jurisdiction in all revenue decisions as was vested in the Provin­cial Government before April 1, 1937. The Assam High Court had authority to ex­ercise the appellate and revisional jurisdiction in all revenue decisions as was vested in the Provin­cial Government before April 1, 1937. Apart from section 3 (1) and (2) of the Act of 1948 the Assam High Court was not an appellate authority having jurisdiction to entertain appeals and revise deci­sions in all revenue cases arising under the provi­sions of the enactments specified in Schedule A to the Act and it was this Act which constituted the Assam High Court as the appellate authority for exercising such jurisdiction and this it has done by simply stating that the Assam High Court shall' exercise such jurisdiction to entertain appeals and to revise decisions as WHS possessed by the Provin­cial Government for the purposes of exercising the appellate and revisional jurisdiction in the revenue matters which vested in the Provincial Government and, in the Tribunal constituted by it. The Legis­lature in the year 1948 constituted the High Court as the Tribunal. I have referred to this history to show that the power exercised by the Assam High Court under the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act 1948 is a special jurisdiction and not as a High Court established under the Act of 1948-The powers possessed by the Provincial Govern­ment or the Tribunal created by it were only transferred to the Assam High Court and for the purposes of exercising appellate and revisional jurisdiction in revenue cases the High Court was constituted in place of the Revenue Tribunal. (11) The next question which arises for con­sideration is whether in these circumstances paragraph 15 of the Letters Patent of the Calcutta High Court will be attracted to a revenue appeal heard and decided by a single Judge of this High Court- Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides as follows :- "And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal from the judgment not be­ing a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect o£ a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court and not being an order made in the exer­cise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sen­tence or order passed or made in the exercise of Ithe power of superintendence under the provi­sions of section 107 of the Government of India Act or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act made on or after the first day of February one thousand nine hundred and twenty nine in the exercise of appellate juris­diction in respect of a decree or order made in the, exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the judgment dec­lares, that the case is a fit one for appeal, but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to Us, Our heirs or successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided". (12) It is contended by Dr. Medhi, for the appellant that the words of clause 15 of the Letters Patent are wide enough to cover the case of all appeals decided by the single Judge of the High Court. (12) It is contended by Dr. Medhi, for the appellant that the words of clause 15 of the Letters Patent are wide enough to cover the case of all appeals decided by the single Judge of the High Court. His contention is that once the appeal comes to the High Court through whatever chan­nel it may be, it is for the High Court to regulate its own procedure and the appeal in the High Court becomes subject to all the rules of proce­dure framed by the High Court and are to be regu­lated by the provisions of such rules and its char­ters. He has also contended that under Article 225 of the Constitution of India the High Court will exercise all the powers which it possessed at the time of .the coming in force of this Constitution. This Article preserves the powers of the High Court and the powers of the High Court to make rules of court and to regulate the sittings of the court This Article is subject to the provisions of this Constitution and to the provisions of any law of the appropriate Legislature. The reference to Article 225 of the Constitu­tion thus to my mind, does not give any support to his submission. The reference to Article 225 of the Constitu­tion thus to my mind, does not give any support to his submission. In the first place as I have pointed out, this Article is subject to the provisions of any law made by the appropriate legislature "and in this connection we will have to examine the effect of the Assam Board of Revenue Act, 1959 (Assam Act VIII of I960') on the powers of the High Court, and secondly this Article only preser­ves the existing powers and before this Article is attracted, we will have to decide what is the exist­ing powers of the High Court contained in clause j 15 of the Letters Patent, This article does not in | any way affect the scope and ambit of clause 15 of the Letters Patent- Whatever way be the generality of the expression used in clause 15, having regard to the scheme of the clause and powers conferred on the High Court under this charter and the appellate jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under the provisions of this clause, to my mind, this clause will not be attracted in cases where the High Court has been vested with a special appellate jurisdiction such as the revenue matters in which the High Court exercises only the powers exercised by the Provincial Government or the Tribunal created by it. (13) At this stage it will be convenient to refer to a number of authorities cited by Dr. Medhi in support of his contention. He has referred to a decision of the House of Lords in the case of 'National Telephone Co. Ltd., v. Postmaster- General' 1913 A. C. 546. He has particularly refer­red .to the following passage at page 552 of the report :- ''When a question is stated to be referred to an established Court without more, it in my opinion, imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach and also that any general right of appeal from its decisions likewise attaches". It was held in that case that the reference to the Commission under the Telegraph (Arbitration) Act, 1909. was a reference to them as a Court of record and not as arbitrators, and that an appeal lay from their decision on a point of law to the Court of Appeal. It was held in that case that the reference to the Commission under the Telegraph (Arbitration) Act, 1909. was a reference to them as a Court of record and not as arbitrators, and that an appeal lay from their decision on a point of law to the Court of Appeal. If the' High Court is seized of an appeal under its ordinary jurisdiction, no matter through what channel the appeal comes to it, all the rules which apply to ordinary appeals will attach to it. That decision was based on the finding that a reference to the Commissioner was a court of re­cord and not as arbitrators. (14) The next case referred to is 'Secretary of State v. Chellikani Rama Rao, MR 1916 P. C. 21. That was a case where an appeal was preferred t° the District Court against a decision of the Forest Settlement Officer under Sec. 10(2) cf the Mad­ras Forest Act and it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that as the District Court heard the appeal as one of the ordinary courts of the country, the provisions of .the Civil P. C. will apply to the orders and decrees passed by the District Court- At page 23 of the report, rejecting the argument of the counsel for the appellant that all further proceedings in courts in India or by way of appeal were incompetent as they were in­cluded by .the terms of that statute, their Lordships laid down that "when proceedings of this character reached the District Court, that Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, orders, and decrees the ordinary rules of the Civil Proce­dure Code apply". The emphasis on this para­graph is on the words "of this character"-. The character of the appeal before the District Court is a matter which was decisive <-f the fact whether the District Court heard the appeal as an ordinary Court of the country or it exercises any special jurisdiction. The argument of Dr. Medhi is that the character of the proceedings before the High Court is of no material importance in determining the question of an appeal from the decision of the single Judge to a Bench. For this contention no support can be taken from the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council referred to above. The argument of Dr. Medhi is that the character of the proceedings before the High Court is of no material importance in determining the question of an appeal from the decision of the single Judge to a Bench. For this contention no support can be taken from the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council referred to above. On the other hand their Lordships have emphasised that the 'Proceedings of this character' must be deemed to, be held before the District Court as an ordinary court of the country. Their Lordships have considered the provisions of the Forest Act in order to determine the nature of the proceedings before the District Court. (15) The next case is 'Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin', AIR 1934 PC 81- That was a case where the appeal was filed before the District Judge under the Provincial Insolvency Act and their Lord­ships held that as the District Judge heard the appeal as an ordinary court of the country, the procedure, orders and decrees of that court will be governed by the ordinary rules of the Civil Pro­cedure Code- The argument was that any deci­sion by the District Judge under Sec. 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act was final except that an appeal lay to the High Court under limited cir­cumstances laid down in Sec. 75(2)- No further appeal was provided and thus no appeal lay to the Privy Council. This contention was repelled-Reliance was placed on the case to which I have already referred to earlier. From the nature of the proceedings before the District Judge it was held by their Lordships that the District Judge heard the case as an ordinary .court °f the country and no special jurisdiction was conferred on the District Judge. (16) The next case is Hem Singh v- Basant Das, AIR 1936 PC 93. That was a case which arose out of the proceedings under the Punjab Sikh Gurdwaras Act. It was contended that no special appeal lay to their Lordships of the Privy Council. (16) The next case is Hem Singh v- Basant Das, AIR 1936 PC 93. That was a case which arose out of the proceedings under the Punjab Sikh Gurdwaras Act. It was contended that no special appeal lay to their Lordships of the Privy Council. Not disputing the principles laid down by the "House of Lords" in the case reported in (1913) A. C. 546, it was contended before their Lordships of the Privy Council on the examination of the Punjab Sikh Gurdwaras Act that the case did not come within that general principle and that having regard to the provisions of the Act the Tribunal was exercising a special jurisdiction and that the right of appeal to the High Court gave to the High Court a special jurisdiction and as the decree of the High Court was not made in the course of its ordinary juris­diction, the provisions of sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code did not apply and no further appeal could be filed before the Privy Council. This contention was rejected. After examining the provisions of the Act, their Lord­ships came to the conclusion that the High Court in dealing with the appeal arising out of the said Act would not be exercising a special jurisdiction. At page 95 of the report their Lordships have observed that - ''The provision that appeals from the tribunal are to be heard by a Division Court and not by a single Judge does not in their Lordships' opinion indicate that the High Court in dealing with such matters would be exercising a special jurisdiction; nor should any such inference be drawn from the provisions of S. 37 which is consistent with the view that the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court by S. 34 is intended to .include the new subject-matter as part of the ordinary appel­late jurisdiction of the High Court". The decision of their Lordships is thus based on the conclusion that the High Court was not invested with any special jurisdiction; nor the conclusion that only an additional subject matter was added to the ordinary appellate jurisdiction of the High Court was negatived by the provisions of the Act. The decision of their Lordships is thus based on the conclusion that the High Court was not invested with any special jurisdiction; nor the conclusion that only an additional subject matter was added to the ordinary appellate jurisdiction of the High Court was negatived by the provisions of the Act. This case therefore, does not support the conten­tion of the appellant that if and when the appeal is heard by a single Judge in the exercise of any special jurisdiction conferred on the High Court, the provisions of Paragraph 15 of the Letters Pa­tent will be attracted. (17) Strong reliance has been placed on the case of 'National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd. AIR 1953 SC 357 . That case arose out of the Trade Marks Act. The Registrar of Trade Marks had refused to register the trade mark. An appeal was filed to the Bom­bay High Court. Shah J. who heard the appeal allowed it. From the judgment of Shah J. an appeal was preferred under Letters Patent. The High Court of Bombay reversed the judgment of Shah J. and restored the order of the Registrar of Trade Marks and the point which was canvassed before the Supreme Court was whether the deci­sion of Shah J. was subject to appeal under clause 15 Of tile Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court and secondly whether he was justified in interfer­ing with the discretion exercised by the Registrar in refusing registration of the trade marks. Dealing with the first point their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent from the decision of Shah J. to a Bench lay. It could not be doub­ted that the decision of Shah J. was in form within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. That being so, as formulated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, only two further questions had to be considered - (1) whether the provisions of clause 15 could be attracted to an appeal prefer­red to the High Court under section 76 of the Trade Marks Act and (2) whether the clause would have no application in a case where the form could not be said to have been delivered pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act. Dealing with the first point thus formulated above their Lordships observed as follows at page 359: "The Trade Marks Act does not provide or lay down any procedure for the future conduct or career of that appeal in the High Court, indeed S. 77 of the Act provides that the High Court can if it likes make rules in the matter. Obviously after the appeal had reached the High Court it has to be determined according to the rules of practice and procedure of that Court and in accordance with the • provisions of the charter under which that Court is constituted and which confers on it power in respect to the method and manner of exercising that jurisdiction". After this passage Mahajan J. has referred to the decision of the House of Lords in the case of 1913 A. C- 546 (ibid) and after laying down that the facts of those cases are different, he has held that the High Court being seized as such of the .appel­late jurisdiction conferred by S. 76 it has to exer­cise that jurisdiction in the same manner as it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction and when such jurisdiction is exercised by a single Judge, his judgment becomes subject to appeal under clause -15 of the Letters Patent there being nothing to the contrary in the Trade Marks Act. His Lordship then passes on to consider the other submission that the judgment of Shah J. cannot be said to be in pursuance of section 108 of the Government of India Act. The reasoning advanced in support of the contention that .the decision of Shah, J. could not be said to be in pursuance of the provisions of section 108 of the Government of India Act was not accepted by their Lordships. Section 108 of. The reasoning advanced in support of the contention that .the decision of Shah, J. could not be said to be in pursuance of the provisions of section 108 of the Government of India Act was not accepted by their Lordships. Section 108 of. the Government of India Act provided that "each High Court may by its own rules provide as it thinks fit for the exercise, by one or more Judges, or by division courts constituted by two or more Judges of the High Court, of the original and appellate jurisdiction vested in the Court" and the; argument was that this applies only to the powers which vested in the High Court at the time of the coming in force of section 108 of the Government of India Act and not in respect of the appellate jurisdiction which may come to the High Court by a subsequent legislation. This contention wag not accepted. In support of this contention reference was made to a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Indian Electric Works v. Registrar of Trade Marks' AIR 1947 Cal. 49 and Mahajan J. has examined the reasoning of that Calcutta case and has come to the conclusion that they were erroneous. At page 362 dealing with the reasons given by the Calcutta High Court in distinguishing the case under the Trade Marks Act from the case which came before their Lordships of the Privy Council under the Gurdwara Act, it has been ob­served as follows: "This reasoning in our opinion is faulty on a number of grounds. * * * The rights created by the Trade Marks Act are civil rights for the protection of persons carrying on trade under marks which have acquired reputation. The sta­tute creates the Registrar a tribunal for safeguard­ing these rights and for giving effect to the rights created by the Act, and the High Court as such without more has been given appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of this tribunal. It is not easy to understand on what grounds it can be said that the High Court while exercising this appellate jurisdiction has to exercise it in a manner different from its other appellate jurisdiction. It seems to us that this is merely an addition of a new subject matter of appeal to the appellate jurisdiction al­ready exercised by the High Court". It seems to us that this is merely an addition of a new subject matter of appeal to the appellate jurisdiction al­ready exercised by the High Court". This passage clearly shows that the decision in this case was based °n the finding that under the Trade Marks Act no special appellate jurisdiction was created. It was only an addition of a new subject matter of appeal to the appellate jurisdic­tion already exercised by the High Court. This case to my mind, also does not support Dr. Medhi's broad contention that in every case where the appeal comes to the High Court a decision of a single Judge is appeal able to a Bench irrespective of the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in respect of such appeals. Particu­larly he has referred to, the following passage at page 362 :- "The words 'pursuant to S. 108 of the Govern­ment of India Act 1915' occurring in clause 15 of the Letters Patent do not in any way restrict the scope of the right of appeal conferred by that clause to appeals that come to the High Court un­der its appellate jurisdiction under clause 16 of the Letters Patent only. On the other hand we think that these rules have application to all ap­pellate jurisdiction exercised by that Court whether existing or conferred upon it by subsequent legis­lation". From this passage it is argued that their Lordships have held in very wide terms that a right of ap­peal from a decision of the single Judge to a Bench of the High Court under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is not restricted to the appellate jurisdic­tion conferred under clause 16 of the Letters Pat­ent but to all appellate jurisdiction exercised by that court whether existing or conferred upon it by subsequent legislation. These observations have got to be read in the context in which they were made. Their Lordships were dealing with the contention that the order of Shah J. could not be said to be in pursuance of S. 108- In that connection their Lordships have held that the decision of a single Judge will be pursuant to the provisions of S. 108 of the Government of India Act, no matter whether the power was exercised under any existing law or is conferred by any subsequent legislation. This passage does not support the submission of Dr. This passage does not support the submission of Dr. Medhi that irrespective of the nature of the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in hearing the appeal, the provisions of clause 15 of the Let­ters Patent will be attracted. That being so^ the only question which arises for consideration is, whether, having regard to the provisions of the Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act 1948 it can be said that the High Court is exercising a special appellate jurisdiction or when the power was conferred on the High Court to hear such appeals it was only an addition of a new subject matter to the existing right of the High Court to hear ap­peals. In this connection reference may also be made to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Coun­cil in the case of Rangoon Botatoung Co. Ltd v-Collector, Rangoon 39 Ind App 197 (PC). This was a case where the appeal went to the Chief Court of Burma against an award given in the Land Acquisition proceedings and the question arose whether any further appeal lay to their Lordships of the Privy Council against the decision of the Chief Court. It was held that it was a special jurisdiction exercised by the Chief Court and no further appeal lay to their Lordships of the Privy Council. At page 201 of the report their Lord­ships observed as follows: ''Their Lordships cannot accept the argument Or suggestion that when once the claimant is ad­mitted to the High Court he has all the rights of an ordinary suitor, including the right to carry an award made in an arbitration as to the value of land taken for public purposes up to this Board as if it were .a decree of the High Court made in the course of its ordinary jurisdiction". (18) The matter came up before the Madras High Court in the case of 'Manavkraman Tirumalpad v. Collector of the Nilgiris' ILR 41 Mad 943. (AIR 1919 Mad 626). An appeal was filed to the High Court under the Land Acquisition Act against the award given by the District Judge. Against the decision of the single Judge an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent was filed before a Bench and the question arose whether such an appeal was maintainable. (AIR 1919 Mad 626). An appeal was filed to the High Court under the Land Acquisition Act against the award given by the District Judge. Against the decision of the single Judge an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent was filed before a Bench and the question arose whether such an appeal was maintainable. It was held that the deci­sion of the High Court in a land ac4uisition appeal is not a 'judgment' within clause 15 of the Letters Patent so as to enable a party to file a further appeal to the High Court under that article. One of the arguments advanced was that under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act an appeal from the award of the District Court of Coimbatore lay to the High Court and the order .of the High Court was a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. This contention was rejected. (19) In the case of Special Officer, Sal-sette Building Sites v. Dossabhai Bezonji Motivalla' ILR 37 Bom 506 it was held that an appeal does not lie to His Majesty's Privy Council from the decision of the High Court on appeal under sec­tion 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. An applica­tion was made for leave to appeal to the Privy Council against a decision of the High Court on ap­peal under S. 54 of the Land Acquisition Act and the application was rejected on the ground that no such appeal lay. One of the contentions was that the appeal to the Privy Council was filed under clause 39 of the Letters Patent. Batchelor J- who delivered the judgment observed that it would be equally erroneous to regard such an award as a final judgment or order within the meaning of clause 39 of the Letters Patent. For the Letters Patent, like the Code, make provision for appeals from such judgments, decrees and orders as are passed by the court in the exercise of its usual civil jurisdiction; and they cannot be invoked to sustain an appeal from a determination which must be regarded as a mere award by a final arbitrator under a Special Act, which does not confer any such right of appeal. (20) In the case of 'Hanskumar Kishanchand v. Union of India' 1959 SCR 1177 : ( AIR 1958 SC 947 ), the matter came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. (20) In the case of 'Hanskumar Kishanchand v. Union of India' 1959 SCR 1177 : ( AIR 1958 SC 947 ), the matter came up for consideration before the Supreme Court. Two appeals were preferred against the decision of the Nagpur High Court in an appeal under Sec. 19 (1) (f) of the Defence of India Act, 1939, modifying an award of compensation made under S. 19 (1) (f) of the Act in respect of certain premises requisitioned by the Government under rule 75 (A) of the Rules framed under the Act and the question for consi­deration was whether any appeal lay to the Sup­reme Court against the decision of the Nagpur High Court under sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code. After the review of the various authorities it was held by the Supreme Court that no appeal lay. The Bombay decision which I have referred to earlier was examined by their Lordships of the Privy Council in 'Special Officer, Salsette Building Sites v. Dossabhai J3ezan-ji Motiwala' 17 Cal W- N. 421 (PC). The law was summarised by the Supreme Court at page 1186 (of SCR): (at p. 951 of AIR) as follows: 'The law as laid down in the above authori­ties may thus be summed up : It is not every decision given by a Court that could be said to be a judgment, decree or order within the provi­sions of the Code of Civil Procedure or the Letters Patent. Whether it is so or not will depend on whether the proceeding in which it was given came before the Court in its normal civil jurisdic­tion, or de hors it as a persona designate". (21) In all these oases the principle laid clown is that in order to determine the nature of the decision given by the High Court the nature of the proceedings before the Tribunal against whose judgment the appeal lay to the High Court will have to be considered. Cases where their Lord­ships of the Privy Council and the Supreme Court held that an appeal lay to the Privy Council and that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent applied, were cases where the reference was made to the District Court as an ordinary court of civil jurisdiction and an appeal against the decision of the District Court lay to the High Court. In such circumstan­ces the decision of the High Court was also a deci­sion in the exercise of its ordinary civil jurisdiction & clause 15 of the Letters Patent was attracted. But in cases where the original tribunal dealt wife the matter in the exercise of its special jurisdiction end not as a court even though an appeal lay to the High Court, the decision of the High Court could not be regarded as one given in the exercise of its ordinary civil jurisdiction so as to attract the provisions of Sections 109 and 110, Civil Procedure Code and clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In the present case the appeal lay to the High Court under S. 147 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation against the decision of the Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioner in decid­ing the revenue matters was exercising a special jurisdiction and not the jurisdiction of a civil court or the courts established under the ordinary law. As the Deputy Commissioner himself did not exer­cise ordinary jurisdiction of a court, his decision cannot be regarded as a judgment and thus the decision of the High Court on appeal against the decision of the Deputy Commissioner can also not be regarded as a judgment, order or decree contemplated by clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In our opinion therefore, no appeal lay to a Bench against a decision of the single Judge in revenue' appeals. (22) In our opinion there is force in the second submission also made by the counsel for the res­pondent that after the coming in force of the Assam Board °t Revenue Act 1959 the jurisdiction exercis­ed by the High Court as a court of appeal in re­venue matters has been taken away and as such even if the appeal was competent, this Court can­not now hear this appeal. On the 27th March I960 the Assam Board of Revenue Act came in force. On the 27th March I960 the Assam Board of Revenue Act came in force. Section 4 of this Act lays down that the Board shall have the powers and jurisdiction to entertain appeals and revise decision in revenue cases arising under the provisions of the enact­ments as are specified in the Schedule A. Sub­section (2) of S. 4 provides that on and from the commencement of this Act, the powers and juris­diction to entertain appeals and revise decisions in revenue cases arising under the provisions of the enactments specified in sub-section (1) as was vest­ed in the Assam High Court under the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 or in the authority appointed by general or special order of the State Government referred to in the said Act shall cease and shall be transferred to the Board and on such transfer the Board shall have the power and jurisdiction to entertain ap­peals and revise decisions- The appellate power °f the High Court thus, exercised under the provi­sions of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act 1948 ceased on coming in force o£ this Act It cannot be doubted that an appeal is a con­tinuation of the suit. The Letters Patent appeal thus will be a continuation of the revenue appeal before the High Court and if the effect of the provisions of Sec. 4 is to take away the jurisdic­tion of the Assam High Court in respect of the revenue appeals, it is difficult to accept the argu­ment of the counsel for the appellant that the power to hear and decide Letters Patent appeals is still preserved. The Letters Patent appeal as I have already indicated, is only a continuation of the appeal before a single Judge and as such if the single Judge's power to entertain and decide an appeal in revenue matters has ceased under the provisions of this Act, the power of the Bench to hear and dispose of an appeal against the deci­sion of the single Judge will also cease. The whole argument of the appellant in connection with the first point was that an appellate jurisdiction was conferred on the High Court in respect of the revenue matters and clause 15 of the Letters Patent only regulated the manner of the exercise of that appellate power. The whole argument of the appellant in connection with the first point was that an appellate jurisdiction was conferred on the High Court in respect of the revenue matters and clause 15 of the Letters Patent only regulated the manner of the exercise of that appellate power. It was laid down that the appel­late jurisdiction will be exercised as if at two stages, first by the single Judge and thereafter on appeal by the Division Bench. This argument by itself supposes that the Letters Patent appeal is nothing but a manner of the exercise of the appel­late powers conferred on the High Court under the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act 1948. If that is so, once that power has ceased, it automatically follows that the power to hear and decide Letters Patent appeals in these matters also ceases- (23) The legal pursuit of a remedy, suit, appeal, and second appeal, are really but steps in a series of proceedings connected by an intrinsic unity. Dr. Medhi's contention on this behalf is two-fold. Firstly he has urged that even if the power has been taken away by the Assam Board of Revenue under the Assam Board of Revenue Act 1959, this Act cannot be given a retrospective effect and will not affect the right of appeal which accrued to the appellant prior to the coming in force of this Act. This Act will not affect the pending appeals. It is contended that the right of appeal is a vested right and any Act cannot be given retrospective effect so as to affect vested rights. No objection can be taken to this proposition of law. But the main question is how far this principle is attracted to the facts of the present case. The Assam Board of Revenue Act 1959, does not take away any right of appeal given to the appellant. It takes away the appellate and revisional jurisdiction exercised by the High Court in revenue cases by virtue of the provisions of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act 1948. For the purposes of the Revenue appeals the Assam High Court has ceased to exist as a tribunal- Reference in this connection may be made to the case of 'Canada. Cement Co. For the purposes of the Revenue appeals the Assam High Court has ceased to exist as a tribunal- Reference in this connection may be made to the case of 'Canada. Cement Co. Ltd. v. La Ville De Montreal Est' 1922 AC 249: (AIR 1921 PC 219) wherein it was held that there is no appeal from a judgment of the Cir­cuit Court for the District of Montreal sitting at Montreal in an action under Art. 5755 of the Cities' and Towns' Act (R. S. Q., 1909) for the recovery of municipal taxes. At page 254 of the report it was observed as follows: ''There is a further point also raised by the respondents .to which, in their Lordships' opinion, Ho sufficient answer has been found. By the Statutes of Quebec, 10 Geo. 5, c-79, the whole of the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure in which the provisions relating to the Circuit Court and the rights of appeal find place are declared to be replaced by other provisions, and so far as the Circuit Court is concerned the provisions as to appeal drop out. *** The statutes giving whatever right of appeal may have existed were replaced by sections which gave none, and S. 64 of the Act, which provided that matters within the competence of the Court of Review should be subject to the Court of King's Bench, must be regarded as quali­fied by .the provision that the powers of the Court of Review with regard to the "Circuit Court had been taken away, and consequently to that extent the statute 'had otherwise provided'." This case supports the contention that if the statute under which the appellate power had been conferred on the High Court itself has ceased to exist, the question of entertaining the appeal against the decision of the single Judge does not arise. (24) In the case of "Vasudeva Samiar, in re.' AIR 1929 Mad 381 a Special Bench of the Madras High Court no doubt held that the amended Letters Patent which came into force on 31st January 1928, making the judgment of a single Judge of the High Court in a second appeal appeal­ able only with the leave of the Judge, does not apply retrospectively to second appeals pending at the time of the amendment. But the following observation at page 382 of the report will be apposite: ''We must therefore hold, however reluctantly, that the institution of the suit carries with it the implication that all appeals then in force are preserved to it through the rest of its career, unless the legislature has either abolished the Court to which an appeal then lay or has expressly or by necessary intendment given the Act a retrospective effect." Dr. Medhi has referred to the case of 'Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd- v. Irving', 1905 AC 369. At page 372 the law has been enunciated as follows by the Privy Council: "As regards the general principles applicable to the case there was no controversy. On the one hand, it was not disputed that if the matter in ques­tion be a matter of procedure only, the petition is well founded. On the other hand, if it be more than a matter of procedure, if it touches a right in existence at the passing of the Act, it was conced­ed that, in accordance with a long line of authori­ties extending from the time of Lord Coke to the present day, the appellants would be entitled to succeed. The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intendment. And therefore the only question is, was the appeal to His Majesty in Council a right vested in the appellants at the date of the passing of the Act, or was it a mere matter of procedure? It seems to their Lordships that the question does not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belong­ed to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, their Lord­ships see no difference between abolishing an ap­peal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an inter­ference with existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear inten­tion to that effect is manifested''. In principle, their Lord­ships see no difference between abolishing an ap­peal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an inter­ference with existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a clear inten­tion to that effect is manifested''. This was not a case where the court hearing the ap­peal itself had been abolished- Under this Act the right to file an appeal from the decision of the Supreme Court to their Lordships of the Privy Council had been taken away and it was held that that will not affect the pending cases. In the present case as I have already indicated, the ap­pellate jurisdiction exercised by the High Court has itself been taken away. If clause 15 of the Letters Patent had been amended so as to take away the right of appeal against the decision of the single Judge to a Bench, it could not be said that the pending appeals would be affected by that "amendment or repeal of clause 15. But the facts in the present case are entirely different. Moreover two points are clear from this enunciation of law, firstly that the rule does not apply to the matters of procedure and secondly if there is a clear intendment discernible from the provisions of the Act whether explicit or implied, the Act can be given retrospective effect. The Act has clearly made a provision for the transfer of pending appeals to the Board of Revenue- That being so, it is the clear intention of the legislature to affect the pend­ing cases also. Reference may be made to the case of 'Quilter v. Mapleson' (1882) 9 QBD 672. More­over the right in a suitor to file an appeal is no doubt a vested right. But the right of the High Court to regulate its procedure in exercising its appellate jurisdiction is a matter of procedure and an Act affecting such a procedure can be given a retrospective effect. The procedure for exercising the appellate powers in revenue matters is thus to be regulated by the new Act and not by the pro­visions of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The procedure for exercising the appellate powers in revenue matters is thus to be regulated by the new Act and not by the pro­visions of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. (25) Some argument was also made that S. 4 of the Assam Board of Revenue Act 1959 only vests in the Board powers in respect of the Acts men­tioned in Schedule A- Item No. 1 of Schedule A refers to the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation but column 2 of this item only refers to appeal against the original or appellate order passed by the Deputy Commissioner under S. 147(a), and not (b) and (c). The argument is that if the present appeal wag filed under S- 147(b), the Board of Revenue will have no jurisdiction. Item No. I, column 5 of Schedule A also refers to appeal against orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner and the Sub divisional Officer under Fishery Rule 11 fram­ed under the Regulation and the Indian Fisheries Act, 1897 (IV of 1897). The present appeal has also been filed under Rule 11 of the Assam Fishery Rules read with S. 147 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation. In any view of the matter in our opinion the preliminary objection must pre­vail and the appeal is accordingly rejected as not being maintainable. (26) S- K. DUTTA, J. : I agree. Appeal rejected.