DUTTA, J.: This is a petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India for issue of an appropri­ate writ. The petitioner is the management of the Socklatinga Tea Estate belonging in Socklatinga Tea Company Limited (hereinafter called the Company). The case relates to the dismissal of a doctor of the company namely Dr. J. N. Baruah (opposite party No. 3). The case was taken up by (he workmen of the Socklatinga Tea Estate repre­sented by the Assam Chah Karmacharj Sangha, Dibrugarh (opposite party No. 2). The facts that are relevant for our purpose are as follows: Dr. J. N. Baruah was appointed as a Medical Officer in the Socklatinga Tea Estate and he was working there as such since 27-4-53. The petitioner alleged that he was inefficient and negligent in his duty and had to be warned several times. On 16-2-59 the Company issued a notice en the Doctor to show cause why action should not be Jaken against him for dereliction of duty and gross misconduct. Thereafter a formal proceeding was' drawn up against him and he was dismissed from service on 20-2-59. The Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha took up the case of the doctor and a con­ciliation proceeding was held, but it failed. Thereafter the dispute was referred to Sri M. K. Barkataki, Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Assam on the following points :- (a) Whether the management of Socklatinga T. E. were justified in dismissing Dr. J. N. Baruah from service ? (b) If not, is he entitled to reinstatement or any other relief in lieu thereof? (2) In the meantime Sri M- K. Barkataki retired from service and in his place Sri B. C. Dutta was appointed as the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court and Sri Dutta took up the case for adjudica­tion of the dispute between the parties. No fresh notification was issued by the Government referr­ing the dispute to Sri B. C. Dutta or transferring the matter to him for adjudication. Sri B. C. Dutta gave his award on 20-10-60 and this was published in the Assam Gazette on 30-11-60. He came to the conclusion that the Company was not justified in dismissing Dr. J. N. Baruah and he set aside their orders accordingly. He went on to say that normally the Doctor should have been reinstated, but in the interest of 1he industry he preferred that compensation should be paid. He came to the conclusion that the Company was not justified in dismissing Dr. J. N. Baruah and he set aside their orders accordingly. He went on to say that normally the Doctor should have been reinstated, but in the interest of 1he industry he preferred that compensation should be paid. He held that Dr. Baruah was entitled to be treated to have been in service up to the date of the award and should be paid all his pay and allowances up to that date and one month's con­solidated pay as notice pay and 15 days' average pay per year of completed service as the retrench­ment compensation and fifteen days' pay per year of completed service as compensation for the un­justified and premature termination of his service. The present petition is directed against this award. (3) The learned counsel for the Company, Sri Goswami, has made two submissions. Firstly he contends that Sri B. C. Dutta had no jurisdic­tion to take up the cage as it was neither referred nor transferred to him- His second submission is-that the grant of retrenchment compensation was illegal- As regards the first contention, it is neces­sary to refer to certain notifications by which the Labour Court in this State was constituted. The notification constituting a Labour Court with Sri M. K. Barkataki as the Presiding Officer is dated the 8th May, 1957 and is as fellows: "No. GLR. .119/57/8. - In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947), the Governor of Assam is pleased to constitute a Labour Court for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the Second Schedule of the said Act. The Governor of Assam is also pleased to appoint Shri M. K. Barkataki, retired Registrar, Assam High Court, Gauhati, as Presiding Officer of the said Court, with effect from the date he takes over charge of his duties. The headquarters of the Presiding Officer will be at Gauhati." (4) The notification referring the case to the Labour Court is dated the 15th July, 1959 and is as follows: "No. G. L. JR. 351/59/7. The headquarters of the Presiding Officer will be at Gauhati." (4) The notification referring the case to the Labour Court is dated the 15th July, 1959 and is as follows: "No. G. L. JR. 351/59/7. - Whereas an industrial dispute has arisen in the matter specified in the Schedule below between: (1) The workmen of the Socklatinga Tea Estate represented by Assam Chah Karmachari Sangria, Dibrugarh and (2) The management of Socklatinga Tea Estate, P. O- Gatonga, belonging to Socklatinga Tea Co. Ltd., 62 Cross Street, Calcutta-7. And whereas it is considered expedient by the Government of Assam to refer the said dispute for adjudication to a Labour Court constituted under Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 1947). Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers con­ferred by clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Act XIV of 11947), as amended, the Governor of Assam is pleased to refer the said dispute to Shri M- K. Barkataki, Retired Registrar, Assam High Court, Gauhati, who has been appointed as Presiding Officer of the Labour Court under the provision of the said Act SCHEDULE. 1- (a) Whether the management of Socklatinga Tea Estate, were justified in dismissing Dr. J. N. Barua, from service? (b) If not, is he entitled to reinstatement or any ether relief in lieu thereof?" (5) The notification appointing Sri B- C- Dutta, as the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court is dated 28th June, 1960 and is as follows: "No. GLR. 12/60/18. - The Governor of Assam is pleased to re-employ Shri B. C. Dutta, Retired Registrar, Assam High Court and District Judge and to appoint him as Presiding Officer, Labour Court for a period of one year, with effect from the date he takes over charge." (6) Mr. Goswami points out that under S. 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, .1947. (hereinafter call­ed the Act) an appropriate Government may cons­titute one or more Labour Courts for the adjudica­tion of industrial disputes in a State. He further points out that the notification dated the .8th May, 11957 by which Sri M. K. Barkatajd was appointed as the Presiding Officer did not mention any period (or which the Labour Court was constituted. (hereinafter call­ed the Act) an appropriate Government may cons­titute one or more Labour Courts for the adjudica­tion of industrial disputes in a State. He further points out that the notification dated the .8th May, 11957 by which Sri M. K. Barkatajd was appointed as the Presiding Officer did not mention any period (or which the Labour Court was constituted. As such, that Labour Court did not come to an end by efflux of time- The notification dated the 28th June, I960 appointing Sri B. C. Dutta, as the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court does not say that Sri Dutta was appointed in place of Sri M- K. Barkataki. Sri Goswamij therefore, submits that by the notification dated the 8th May, 1957 one Labour Court was constituted with Sri M. K. Barkataki as the Presiding Officer and by the noti­fication dated the 28th June, 1960 another Labour Court was constituted with Sri B. C. Dutta, as the Presiding Officer. Therefore, the case which was referred to Sri Barkataki could not be taken up by Sri B- C- Dutta unless the Government under Sec- 33-B of the Act withdrew the proceedings from Sri Barkataki and transferred the same to Sri Dutta for disposal or a fresh reference was made. The Government took no such action and hence it is contended that Sri B- C- Dutta had no jurisdiction to make the award. We are, however, unable to accept this contention. It will appear from Sec. 7 of the Act that 'he Government can constitute a Labour .Court and appoint a Presiding Officer to it. The Labour Court so constituted may be a Standing Labour J Court and such a Court does not come to an end; on the cessation of service of any Presiding Officer When the service of the Presiding Officer ceases and a vacancy occurs, the Government may appoint another Presiding Officer to that Labour Court under Sec. 8 of the Act. From the above notifications it is quite clear that no separate Labour Court was constituted when Sri B. C. Dutta was appointed as the Presiding Officer. He was apparently appointed under Sec. 8 of the Act when Sri M- K. Barkataki retired. The first notification viz., dated 8-5-57 was for two purposes. From the above notifications it is quite clear that no separate Labour Court was constituted when Sri B. C. Dutta was appointed as the Presiding Officer. He was apparently appointed under Sec. 8 of the Act when Sri M- K. Barkataki retired. The first notification viz., dated 8-5-57 was for two purposes. The Labour Court was constituted by it and the Presid­ing Officer was appointed- By the notification dated 28-6-60, no new Labour Court was consti­tuted but only 8rj B. C- Dutta was appointed as the Presiding Officer Of the Labour Court As a mat­ter of fact, this is admitted by the petitioner itself when it said in paragraph 7 of the petition that Sri M- K. Barkataki relired from service and in his place Sri B- C- Dutta was appointed as the Presid­ing Officer. Therefore, the case falls within the ambit of Section 8 of the Act and Sri B- C- Dutta as the successor of Sri M. K. Barkataki in the office of the Presiding Officer of Labour Court was quite competent to dispose of the proceeding which was pending before that Labour Court. (7) Mr. Goswami has cited a decision of the Supreme Court in Minerva Mills Ltd., Bangalore V. Workers of the Minerva Mills, AIR .1953 SC 505. In this case ;t was held that the Government had ample power to constitute a Tri­bunal for a limited time and when the life of the Tribunal came to an end by efflux of time, no ques­tion of vacancy }n the office really arose. This decision does not seem to be of any assistance in the present case. As I have pointed out above, in the present case the Labour Court that was constituted under notification No. GLR. 119/57/8 dated the 8th May; J.957 was a standing one and it did not come to an end by efflux of time. Another Supreme Court decision which has been cited was given in United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Their Workmen, AIR 1951 SC 230 . In this case it was held that where the services of one of the members of the Tribunal ceased to be available, the rest of the members by themselves had no right to act as the Tribunal without the Government reconstituting the Tribunal. The principle laid down in this case is apparently irrelevant for the purpose of the present case. (8) Mr. The principle laid down in this case is apparently irrelevant for the purpose of the present case. (8) Mr. Goswami secondly submits that the grant of a retrenchment compensation by the Labour Court was illegal. In this connection he has cited a decision of the Division Bench of this Court - Management of Suola Tea Estate v-Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Civil Rule No. 107 of 1960 (Assam) where it was held that "by enacting Section 2(oo) the Legislature has made it absolutely clear that termination of service on account of misconduct will not amount to retrenchment.'' It is, therefore, argued that retrenchment benefit which is admissible only under Section 25-F of the Act was net allowable in the present case. (9) Mr. Talukdar, appearing on behalf of the opposite parties argues that the Labour Court has absolute discretion to decide what compensation in the circumstances of each particular case should be given, and this Court in a writ petition should not interfere with that discretion. There is no doubt that in cases of wrongful .dismissal reinstatement is the usual remedy. But there may be cases I where reinstatement may be detrimental to the harmonious relationship between labour and the management and in such cases compensation may be the proper relief. But at the same time, if in granting compensation an illegality is committed on the very face of the record, there is no reason why this Court in a writ petition will not be able 'to interfere. However, in the present case although the Labour Court was not correct in giving retrenchment compensation, it could give one month's average pay for each year of com­pleted service as compensation for unjustified and premature termination of employment. But instead it gave 15 days' average pay per year of completed service as the retrenchment compensation plus 15 days' pay per year of his completed service as com­pensation for unjustified and premature termina­tion of service. So, the result is the same, i.e., the employee gets compensation to the extent of one month's pay for each completed year of ser­vice. In such circumstances, no interference is called for. This was the view taken by the Supreme Court !n Anglo-American Direct Tea Trading Co. Ltd. v- Workmen of Nahortoli Tea Estate, 1961-2 Lab LJ 625. So, the result is the same, i.e., the employee gets compensation to the extent of one month's pay for each completed year of ser­vice. In such circumstances, no interference is called for. This was the view taken by the Supreme Court !n Anglo-American Direct Tea Trading Co. Ltd. v- Workmen of Nahortoli Tea Estate, 1961-2 Lab LJ 625. In that case the" Supreme Court found that strictly speaking the grant of retrenchment compensation by the Tribunal was wrong, but there would have been no reason for interference with the order of the Tribunal had it given the same compensation for unjustified and premature termination of employment. Hence the Supreme Court refused to interfere with the compensation granted. In the present case also there was no case of any retrenchment and hence the grant of retrenchment compensation was not legal. But at the same time, as I have stated above, the Labour Court could grant the same amount under a different] heading viz., as compensation for unjustified and premature termination of employment and as such no interference with the quantum Of compensation is called for- (10) In the result, this petition has no force and it must be dismissed on merit. It may be pointed cut that the award was published on 30-1.1-60 and the writ petition was filed on 31-5-61 i.e., six months later. There is no explanation for this delay and in such circumstances, this Court would be loath to exercise its extra-ordinary powers in a writ petition. But as the petition fails on merit, we need not consider if the delay should be con­doned- The petition is dismissed with cost. Hearing fee is fixed at Rs. 100/-. (11) G. MEHROTRA C- J. : I agree. AF/J/.D.H.Z. Petition dismissed.