JUDGMENT M.S. Menon, J. 1. This is an appeal by the State against the decision of the District Court of Trivandrum in O.S. No. 223 of 1124. The suit which has been decreed sought the recovery of a sum of B. Rs. 21.330/ collected from the plaintiff by way of customs duty under the a provisions of the Travancore Sea Customs Act, 1088, on the ground that the said levy was unauthorised and illegal. The plaint also claimed interest at 6% per annum on the said amount from the date of payment 911947 and the costs of the suit. 2. The bills of entry concerned are Ext. I dated 25111946 and Ext. II dated 17121946. Both the bills relate to coriander seeds imported from Ceylon, the former to a consignment of 1,450 bags, and the latter to a consignment of 1,500 bags. 3. By a notice dated 111947 the Excise Inspector of Sea Customs, Trivandrum, called upon the plaintiff to pay an import duty of B. Rs. 22,680/ on the imports covered by Exts. I and II. Ext. K dated 511947 is the reply of the plaintiff denying his liability to pay the duty demanded by the Excise Inspector. In that reply he invoked a notification of the Government of Travancore dated 711946 under the Travancore Sea Customs Act, 1088, and the Travancore Land Customs Act, 1091, and said: "I am not liable to pay any import duty for the said two consignments of coriander exported from the Port of Colombo and imported into the Port of Trivandrum as the said consignments comprised of coriander seeds which were purely British Indian produce." By Ext. XI, a communication dated 711947, the Excise Inspector affirmed the liability but reduced the duty demanded from B. Rs. 22,680/ to B. Rs. 21,330/, and threatened coercive process in the event of non payment. 4. The plaintiff appealed to the Excise Commissioner, Trivandrum, by Ext. VIII dated 8-1-1947, and paid the duty under protest as stated in Ext. J dated 9-1-1947. Ext. J states the grounds of 'protest' as follows: "1. I am not liable to pay any import duty at all. 2. The amount demanded as duty, namely B. Rs. 21,330/ is far in excess of what would actually be due even if duty were payable at all." 5. Ext. XII dated 2461947 is the order of the Excise Commissioner on Ext. VIII. I am not liable to pay any import duty at all. 2. The amount demanded as duty, namely B. Rs. 21,330/ is far in excess of what would actually be due even if duty were payable at all." 5. Ext. XII dated 2461947 is the order of the Excise Commissioner on Ext. VIII. It says: "Government have decided that dutiable goods of British Indian origin are exempt from duty in Travancore only if they are imported from British India. The consignments of coriander in question were imported into the State from Ceylon. The petitioner is therefore not eligible for the refund of duty already paid by him." The plaintiff then moved the Government by a petition dated 171947. That petition was rejected by Ext. I dated 30-1-1948. The Government said: "The petitioner is informed that Government do not see their way to interfere with the orders of the Excise Commissioner in the matter and that his appeal is accordingly disallowed." 6. The plaintiff sought a review of Ext. I. The Government rejected that petition by Ext. M. dated 761949. They informed him that they do not see their way to grant his request. 7. That the coriander seeds were of British Indian origin is established by the evidence in this case. Pw. 6, for example, the Director of Food Supplies, Colombo, who issued the export licences, is specific on the point. 8. As a matter of fact the Department does not seem to have had a contention to the effect that the goods were not of British Indian origin. The only contention was that though the goods were of British Indian origin they were still liable to duty as they were imported into Travancore not directly from British India but indirectly through another territory like Ceylon. The validity of this contention depends upon the interpretation to be placed on the notification invoked by the plaintiff. The only contention was that though the goods were of British Indian origin they were still liable to duty as they were imported into Travancore not directly from British India but indirectly through another territory like Ceylon. The validity of this contention depends upon the interpretation to be placed on the notification invoked by the plaintiff. The relevant portion of the notification reads as fallows: "No customs duties shall be levied on- (1) goods imported by land, sea or backwater into Travancore being the produce or manufacture of British India or of the territories of Cochin State; (2) goods which are not the produce or manufacture of British India or the territories of the Cochin State which shall have already paid duty in British India or the Cochin State; (3) Coimbatore or other British Indian produce passing through the Travancore backwaters to British Cochin or to the Cochin State, and the produce of the Cochin State directly proceeding through Travancore to British Cochin or to some other parts of the Cochin State itself. Proviso- The above rules do not apply to tobacco (raw and manufactured), salt, opium and spirits which should pay import duties as under, whether they are imported direct from foreign countries or from or through British India, or the Cochin State:- (a) Tobacco as per item Nos. 24 to 24 (3) B of the Import Tariff. (b) Salt Do Nos. 25 (1) and 25 (2) Do. (c) Opium can be imported only by Government or its contractor, after paying duty to the British Indian Government. (d) Spirits as per items Nos. 22 (2) to 22 (6A) of the Import Tariff." 9. Clause (1) of the notification makes it clear that goods imported by land, sea or backwater into Travancore are exempt from customs duties if they are the produce or manufacture of British India or of the territories of the Cochin State. We are unable to see any justification for reading a further qualification into the provision, a qualification to the effect that it is not enough if the goods are the produce or manufacture of British India or of the Cochin State; they should also be imported directly into Travancore from British India or the Cochin State and not through some other territory as in the case before us. 10. 10. The only further contention of the learned Government Pleader is that the suit is not maintainable in view of the finality conferred by S.170 of the Travancore Sea Customs Act, 1088, which reads as follows: "Any person deeming himself aggrieved by any decision or order passed by an Officer of Customs under this Regulation, may, within two months from the date of such decision or order, appeal therefrom to the Controlling Officer of Customs. The Controlling Officer of Customs may thereupon make such further enquiry, and pass such order, as he thinks fit, confirming, altering or annulling the decision or order appealed against: Provided that no such order shall have the effect of subjecting any person to any greater penalty or rate of duty than has been adjudged against him in the original decision or order. Every order passed in appeal under this Section shall subject to the power of revision by our Government, be final." 11. The finality conferred by the section can possibly apply only to acts which are within the purview of the Act and not to actions which are not warranted by the Act or are prohibited by it. As stated by the Privy Council in AIR 1940 P. C. 105: "It is settled law that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but that such exclusion must either be explicity expressed or clearly implied. It is also, well settled that even if, jurisdiction is so excluded, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure." 12. There is a survey of the case law on the subject in AIR 1955 Mad. 187 . The result of the survey is summarised in Para.19 of that judgment. The relevant portion of the summary reads as follows: "1. Even the ordinary civil courts would have jurisdiction to entertain suits and afford relief against the acts or orders of the Customs authorities where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 2. Even the ordinary civil courts would have jurisdiction to entertain suits and afford relief against the acts or orders of the Customs authorities where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. 2. If the above were established the aggrieved party is not bound to pursue the statutory remedies provided by S.188 and 191 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, and the that he has not done so is no bar to the jurisdiction of the civil courts. 3. In our opinion it also follows that if the above were established, the right to resort to the civil courts would not be barred even if these statutory remedies were availed of for the same infirmity would attach to the final orders as would apply to the original one." 13. In the light of what is stated above we must hold that the lower court was right in its conclusion and that this appeal should be dismissed with costs. Judgment accordingly. 14. There is a memorandum of objections filed by the plaintiff. The last of the grounds therein, which alone is pressed before us, is: "The District Court should have awarded interest at 6% and the reasons given for awarding 4% interest only are not sufficient to justify the award at such a low rate." The reasons given by the lower court read as follows: "Plaintiff is entitled to interest as he was compelled to deposit the amount. But with regard to the rate of interest allowable I consider that it is enough to allow 4% interest since the duty imposed is not out of any malice but only as a result of misreading of the notification." 15. We do not see any reason why the plaintiff should not be awarded interest at the usual rate of 6% per annum and the memorandum of objections allowed to that extent. We do so.