Kailasam, J.- The plaintiffs filed this suit against the Union of India represented by General Managers of B.B. and C.I.,G.I.P. and Southern Railways for recovery of Rs. 1,453-13-6 as compensation for the damage done to six bales of cotton cloth consigned by the Surat Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills, Ltd., to the plaintiffs. The Surat Cotton and Spinning Mills, Ltd. consigned six bales of cotton cloth on 25th August, 1950 to the plaintiffs. When the bales reached Madras they were found wet and thereupon delivery was taken on 21st September, 1950, in the presence of the Railway Inspector who made an endorsement to the effect that all the six bales were found damaged by water on all sides. Water had penetrated far into the bales and wettage could be felt on the gunny covering. Packing was gunny covering with brown paper packing inside. The plaintiffs took delivery on 21st September, 1950 in the expectation that the compensation of Rs. 1,453-13-6 which was fixed as damages to the goods would be paid by the railway authorities. There was correspondence between the plaintiffs and the railway company and by a letter, dated 26th December, 1950, the railway company rejected the claim for compensation on the ground that the bales were not packed with waterproof material and there was no misconduct on the part of the railway servants. The plaintiffs filed the suit on 19th December, 1951. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the packing by the mills was as per the rules of the railway and that the plaintiffs are entitled to relief. It also found that the railway was guilty of recklessness and carelessness in performance of its duty. The trial Court held that the suit was within time under Articles 30 and 31 because the plaintiffs were entitled to the benefit of the period during which time the matter was in correspondence with the railway company. On appeal, the Additional Judge, City Civil Court, confirmed the finding of the trial Court that the bales were in sound condition and the damage was caused owing to the carelessness and misconduct on the part of the railway servants. Against the decision of the Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, the railway company has preferred this appeal. On appeal, the Additional Judge, City Civil Court, confirmed the finding of the trial Court that the bales were in sound condition and the damage was caused owing to the carelessness and misconduct on the part of the railway servants. Against the decision of the Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras, the railway company has preferred this appeal. When this appeal came up before Jagadisan, J., he found that the question is one of frequent occurrence and as a substantial question of law was involved and as there was conflict of judicial opinion, placed it before my Lord the Chief Justice for directions to post the case before a Division Bench and in pursuance of the order of my Lord the Chief Justice this case is posted before us. Both the Courts have come to the conclusion that when the goods were despatched they were properly packed and the damage was due to the carelessness and misconduct on the part of the railway servants. We are in complete agreement with the findings of fact and the learned counsel for the railways did not attempt to dispute the finding. The only contention which the learned counsel raised was that the suit is barred by limitation. He contended that the goods were in a damaged condition and open delivery was given by the Railway Inspector to the plaintiffs on 21st September, 1950 after noting the details of damage. The plaintiffs were therefore fully aware of the loss or injury to the goods on 21st September, 1950. The suit was filed on 19th December, 1951 and therefore excluding the time taken for notice the suit ought to have been filed on 21st November, 1951 and therefore it is out of time. The learned counsel for the railway contended that Article 30 provides for a suit against a carrier for compensation for losing or injuring the goods and the period of limitation is one year from the time when the loss or injury occurs. He submits that the loss to the goods occurred before 21st September, 1950 when the plaintiffs became aware of the injury to the goods and in any event the period of limitation will start from 21st September, 1950. We feel the contention is sound and has to be accepted. The damaged bales were delivered to the plaintiffs on 21st September, 1950. We feel the contention is sound and has to be accepted. The damaged bales were delivered to the plaintiffs on 21st September, 1950. Therefore, this case is not one of non-delivery or delay in delivery of goods so as to attract Article 31 of the Limitation Act but comes clearly under Article 30 which provides for compensation for loss or injury to goods. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that Article 30 has to be interpreted in the light of decisions interpreting Article 31 and that therefore the starting point of limitation will be the date of final intimation by the railway that the goods are lost. The learned -counsel submitted that when period of limitation is computed from the date of final intimation by the railway authorities in the case of loss of goods, the same condition may be applied to ‘injury to goods’ which also forms part of Article 30. We are unable to agree with this contention. Whether the word non-delivery in Article 31 will include loss or not, does not help the present discussion. In this case there is no question of non-delivery. The damaged goods were in fact delivered to the respondents. Article 30 is the Article that provides for injury to goods and as the defendant has taken delivery of the goods it will not amount to non-delivery and as such cannot be governed by Article 31. The question is whether the period of limitation can be held to start from the date on which the railway company finally repudiates its claim as has been held in the case of Article 31. We feel that the decisions under Article 31 have no application in a case in which the goods were damaged and the damaged goods were taken delivery of by the consignee. The Article mentions that the time begins to run from the date when the loss or injury occurs. Reading this along with column 1 which mentions that the suit against a carrier for compensation for losing or injuring goods should be filed within one year, the injury referred to in column 3 can only refer to injury to goods mentioned in column 1. Therefore the period of limitation will commence from the date of injury to the goods. Reading this along with column 1 which mentions that the suit against a carrier for compensation for losing or injuring goods should be filed within one year, the injury referred to in column 3 can only refer to injury to goods mentioned in column 1. Therefore the period of limitation will commence from the date of injury to the goods. There may be cases in which the injury to the goods might have been caused on a particular date but neither the railway company nor the consignee would have been aware of the injury. The goods may be damaged in transit and by mistake sent to a wrong destination. In such cases the railway themselves may not know when actually the goods were injured and in answer to enquiries by the consignee the railway may be informing the consignee that the matter is under consideration. In some cases the railway may come to know that the goods were injured after considerable time and again may take some more time in informing the consignees. In such cases it cannot be said that the period of limitation would begin from the date when the goods were actually injured, for if it were so, if the railway company or the consignee comes to know of the damage more than one year after the actual damage to the goods a suit by the consignee will be barred by limitation and we are of opinion this result would not have been contemplated by the Legislature. In our view the limitation will begin to run under Article 30 only on the date on which the consignee was informed of the injury to the goods. In this case the consignee did take open delivery of the goods on 21st September, 1950 and therefore he was fully aware of the damage to the goods and the limitation would in any event start running from 21st September, 1950. The learned counsel for the railway referred to the decision in Rahim Sahib v. Agent, S.I. Railway1. In that case the goods were received at Tiruppur Railway Station on 18th August, 1944, and on unloading it was found that some bundles were completely wet and other bundles loose. The Claims Inspector examined the goods and issued a certificate on 9th September, 1944 and damages were claimed on 9th January, 1945. The Railway Administration repudiated the claim on 22nd January, 1945. The Claims Inspector examined the goods and issued a certificate on 9th September, 1944 and damages were claimed on 9th January, 1945. The Railway Administration repudiated the claim on 22nd January, 1945. After some correspondence the final reply was sent by the Commercial Superintendent on 4th July, 1945 that they maintain the repudiation for reasons already stated in their letter of 22nd January, 1945. The suit was instituted on 4th July, 1946. Krishnaswamy Naidu, J., observes that the entire correspondence shows that the claim was made only for damage to the goods and consequent loss and not for non-delivery and Article 30 alone would therefore apply. Regarding the starting point of limitation His Lordship found that the liability arose as early as 22nd January, 1945, when the Railway Administration originally repudiated the claim and that the Administration’s letter stating that the matter was under enquiry would not take away the effect of repudiation in Exhibit A-4 and that the final letter of repudiation of 4th July, 1945, cannot be relied on as the date on which the limitation would start to run. We respectfully agree with the learned Judge that the Article that is applicable in the case is Article 30. But we are unable to agree with the view of the learned Judge that the starting point of limitation will be the date on which the Railway Administration repudiated the consignees claim on 22nd January, 1945. In cases falling under Article 30, as observed by us already, the time will start to run from the date on which the consignee became aware of the injury to the goods. The learned counsel for the appellants also referred to the decision in East Indian Railway and others v. Gopilal Sharma2. Henderson, J., held that the time does not run from the date of plaintiffs’ knowledge and that there is ample authority for the proposition that the time begins to run from the date when the injury was actually caused and that the burden of proving when the injury was caused rests upon the carrier. Later he observed that the delivery of the goods took place on 6th August, and therefore there cannot be any doubt that the injury took place not later than this date. Later he observed that the delivery of the goods took place on 6th August, and therefore there cannot be any doubt that the injury took place not later than this date. We respectfully agree with the learned Judge when he observes that the burden of proving when the injury was caused rests upon the carrier but we would qualify the learned Judge’s proposition that the time begins to run from the date when the injury was actually caused by holding that the time will begin to run from the date when the consignee became aware of the injury. The next case cited by the learned counsel for the railways is the decision in Union of India v. Gujerat Tobacco Co.1. Their Lordships held that under Article 30 the onus to prove date of loss or injury mentioned in column 3 of the Article is on the railway concerned. It is unnecessary to refer to the decisions of other High Courts referred to by the learned counsel for the railways. We hold that the suit that was filed on 19th December, 1951 is clearly barred by limitation under Article 30. The appeal is therefore allowed. As we have found the railway guilty of negligence we are not awarding costs. Each party will bear his own costs throughout. R.M. ----- Appeal allowed.