JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - Second Appeal No. 31 of 1959 was dismissed for default on 7-11-1960. The Petitioner filed M.J.C. No. 40 of 1960 for restoration of the appeal. The said M.J.C. was allowed 27-4-1961, and the appeal was directed to be restored to file, on condition that the Petitioner would pay Rs. 50/- as costs to the opposite parties within one week after reopening of the summer vacation. The Court reopened after summer vacation on 19-6-1961. The Petitioner did not pay the costs within the time stipulated, and so the order of restoration of the appeal, which was conditional on payment of costs, stood vacated. The present petition, purporting to be one under Sections 151 and 148 and Order 47, Rule 1, CPC has been filed for restoration of the appeal. 2. The Petitioner's case is that as he had ascertained with respect to earlier gazette publications, the High Court was to reopen after summer vacation on 20-6-1961, and living in a muffassil area he was not aware of the subsequent order of he High Court reducing the summer vacation by one week from the closing end; that on 28-6-1961 he came to Cuttack with money to his lawyer and here he heard that the Court had already opened 9 days back and that the peremptory order that the appeal should stand dismissed, if no payment was made in time, had become absolute. 3. It is a fact that the summer vacation, which has initially been announced to extend up to 25-6-1961, was subsequently modified, and so the Petitioner's case that he was misled, appears to be a bonafide one. 4. The contention of Mr. Rao however is that no petition u/s 151, CPC is maintainable in the present case, since the petition for restoration of the appeal ultimately standing dismissed, the Petitioner had a right in appeal under Order 43, Rule 1, Clause (t). Amongst others, Mr. Rao relied on a full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Doma Choudhary and Others Vs. Ram Naresh Lal and Others. The said case refers to dismissal of a petition in default for restoration of a suit dismissed for default. Amongst others, Mr. Rao relied on a full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Doma Choudhary and Others Vs. Ram Naresh Lal and Others. The said case refers to dismissal of a petition in default for restoration of a suit dismissed for default. Their Lordships held that whether the restoration petition was dismissed on merit or in default made no difference, and an appeal was maintainable in either case under Order 43, Rule 1 Clause (c), and they observed: Further, in the absence of some special circumstances which amount to abuse of the process of the Court, it cannot grant a relief in exercise of its inherent power when the ends of justice can be served by another remedy provided by the Code which is available to the party concerned. The mere fact that the procedure for following the other remedy (filing an appeal) is longer or more costly will not entitle the Court to disregard this rule because its order will not be necessary either in the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court...Thus in the absence of special circumstances, a court has no jurisdiction, in the exercise of its inherent power, to set aside the dismissal for default of an application under Order 9, Rule 9 and to restore it. The ends of justice would be served if the applicant follows the remedy by way of appeal. Since-under Clause (t) of Order 43, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure, it is provided that an appeal shall lie from an order of refusal under Rule 19 of Order 41 to re-admit an appeal. Mr. Rao's contention is that the present petition is not maintainable. It would be unnecessary to discuss, for purposes of the present case, whether an appeal lies or a petition u/s 151 is maintainable, when a petition for restoration of a suit dismissed for default is also dismissed for default. In the present case, the order, under which the petition for restoration of the appeal was ultimately dismissed, is an order passed in Second Appeal, and so, Clause (t) of Order 43, Rule 1, which makes an order of the first appellate court under Rule 19 of Order 41 appealable does not in terms apply to it. Under Order 42, CPC the rules of Order 41 shall apply, so far as may be, to appeals from appellate decrees. Under Order 42, CPC the rules of Order 41 shall apply, so far as may be, to appeals from appellate decrees. Clause (t) of Order 43, Rule 1 refers specifically to orders of appellate court under Order 41, that is, orders passed in first appeal, and Order 42 does not make any reference to Order 43 as applying to the second appellate court. Apart from that, neither under Sections 109 and 110, CPC nor under Article 133 of the Constitution, an appeal could lie from the said order of dismissal of the restoration petition, to the Supreme Court. An order dismissing the restoration petition in the Second Appeal is therefore not appealable. So, the contention of Mr. Rao that there is an alternative remedy provided in law so as to make the operation of Section 151 inapplicable has no foundation. 5. I may profitably refer in this connection to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das. (1961) 1 S.C.D. 264. The said decision deals with a case in which the first appeal in respect of a suit was allowed by the High Court and the suit was decreed subject to condition that the Plaintiff paid the excess court fee payable in the suit and in the first appeal within a prescribed time limit, failing which the suit had been directed to and dismissed. Their Lordships observed: The High Court was not powerless to enlarge the time even though it had peremptorily fixed the period for payment. Section 148, in terms, allowed extension of time, eve if the original period fixed had expired, and Section 149 was equally liberal ... An order extending time for payment, though passed after the expiry of the time fixed, could opera the from the date on which the time fixed expired. The procedural orders though peremptory (conditional decrees apart) are, in essence, in terroem, so that dilatory litigants might put themselves in order and avoid delay. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. Sections 148, 149 and 151 clothed the High Court with ample power to do justice to a litigant if sufficient cause was made out for extension. 6. In the circumstances, this petition is allowed. They do not, however, completely estop a Court from taking note of events and circumstances which happen within the time fixed. Sections 148, 149 and 151 clothed the High Court with ample power to do justice to a litigant if sufficient cause was made out for extension. 6. In the circumstances, this petition is allowed. Time is extended by one week from the date of the present order for payment of the amount previously fixed, and if this payment is made in time, the appeal be restored to file without further reference to the Bench. No costs for the present petition. Petition allowed. Final Result : Allowed