JUDGMENT : H.R. KRISHNAN, J. 1. This is an application by Dulhanmal s/o Hiranand a displaced person who claims for the time being to be in occupation of a house that belongs to opposite party No. 1, and had been requisitioned by the Collector in 1950 and allotted to opposite party No. 2 also a displaced person. The latter has, however, been ordered by the Collector as the competent authority under Section 3(1)(a) (ii) of the Madhya Bharat Public Premises Eviction and Recovery of Rent Act (No. 27 of 1951) to vacate the premises for failure to pay the rent. He is no more in possession, and the Petitioner was found in the house. So, he has been ordered as an "unauthorised person", under Section 3(1)(b) of the Act to vacate in. On his failure, the Collector as competent authority, was himself to take steps to get him evicted from the premises; but that has been stayed pending the disposal of the present petition. The Petitioner himself wanted the Collector to give him a hearing on his claim to be entitled to possession by virtue of some arrangement he had made with the allottee in 1956, about six years after the allotment, which admittedly is not one with the authority or approval of the competent authority, or the Collector-acting as such who made the original allotment in 1950. 2. In this Court, the Petitioner's prayer is that it should be decided that the Collector as competent authority has no real power to take action under the Madhya Bharat Public Premises Eviction and Recovery of Rent. Act or under any other special law. Further, even if the Act were applicable and the competent authority legally empowered to act under Section 3, this Court, it is prayed, should declare that section itself invalid as ultra vires of Article 14, on the ground of discrimination between different owners, and Article 19 as imposing unreasonable restrictions on the owning of property the mere possession of the premises being property of a kind. 3. 3. The questions for consideration are, first, whether at all the Petitioner should be heard on merits of his application; in other words, whether he is acting bona fide and has divulged a prima facie case that if his grievance of the absence of a hearing is removed, and he is heard by the Collector, prima facie there are indications that he will get some relief; secondly, on the merits, these premises continuing under the acquisition made in 1950 under Section 14 of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan, Madhya Bharat (Act 19 of 1950), are really public premises for the purpose of the Act (27 of 1951) thirdly, whether Section 3-in particular Section 3(1)(b) of the Act-is ultra vires of the Constitution, on one or the other of the two grounds alleged by the Petitioner. The owner opposite party No. 1 has contested as he is anxious to reap the practical benefit of the order against the allottee. 4. The facts necessary for our purpose are practically common ground. About the identity of the premises and the ownership of the opposite party No. 1, there is no controversy. The house was requisitioned by the Collector on 25-9-1950 under the Sthan Niyantran of 1950 and was allotted to the opposite party No. 2 the rent payable being Rs. 7/- p. m. Ever since the allotment, there were complaints by the original owner that the allottee had been defaulting; from time to time there were applications by him to the Collector to that effect. It is apros of one of such applications that the Collector has ordered the allottee to vacate. 5. While this was going on, the Petitioner another Sindhi displaced person-appeared on the scene and at all events, was in possession of the home when the Collector's order on the allottee was to take effect, the latter having retired into the back ground. The Petitioner's own story is that after January 1956, there were certain transactions between him and the allottee by virtue of which he was entitled to be in possession in spite of the order. Admittedly, the Collector or the competent authority under the Requisition of Immoveable Property Act (35 of 1954) had not in any manner authorized or directed the allotment of the house to, or the possession over it by, the Petitioner. So, he was an unauthorised person. Admittedly, the Collector or the competent authority under the Requisition of Immoveable Property Act (35 of 1954) had not in any manner authorized or directed the allotment of the house to, or the possession over it by, the Petitioner. So, he was an unauthorised person. The Collector ordered him under Section 3 (1) (b) of the Act, to vacate the premises. At this stage, the Petitioner came up to this Court and the steps to be taken by the Collector had been stayed. The Petitioner has mentioned both Articles 226 and 227; but the latter has in any event, no application. The Collector has acted as provided in the Act. The Petitioner's own case is that the Act itself has no application, and in any way, the-operative provision is ultra vires the Constitution. So, this is to be treated as a case under Article 226 only. 6. The wording of Article 226 of the Constitution is so wide as to justify the interference by the High Court with every order of whatsoever nature made by any authority or tribunal and investigation by it of the vires of any act of any legislature in our country at the instance of any person; still, action under this article is discretionary and should be taken only if certain preliminary conditions are fulfilled. The most obvious one is that there should be no other practical or reasonably expedient course open to the Petitioner. We need not go into this in the present case. The second condition is that the Petitioner should be acting in good faith. This is only another manner of stating that the assistance under this Article is equitable and "a person seeking equity should come with clean hands". So, the Petitioner should show that he is not trying to exploit this extra-ordinary equitable jurisdiction of the High Court to serve an ulterior purpose; else, he should not be given assistance. Very often, this test of the Petitioner's good faith would also imply that he has a prima facie case; but for clarity, it is convenient to treat it as a separate condition. Very often, this test of the Petitioner's good faith would also imply that he has a prima facie case; but for clarity, it is convenient to treat it as a separate condition. This means that whenever the Petitioner complains of a particular act of commission or omission on the part of an authority, he should also indicate that in the event of the particular omission or commission being remedied, he would get some benefit to which he is entitled in all justice, and which has been withheld from him because of the said commission or omission. If, prima facie he has no case, it is purely of academic interest whether or not there has been the alleged omission or commission. 7. In this case, for example, the Petitioner's grievance is that the Collector has refused to hear him on his allegation that after 1956, that is to pay, six years after the allotment of the premises, he made an arrangement with the allottee by which he became entitled to be in possession. It is because that Section 3 does not provide for a hearing in which he can prove this, that the Petitioner challenges its vires. Whatever the merits of the Petitioner's story, it is difficult to see how a hearing on it is going to help him. He is not the allottee; he, in fact, claims to have come into the picture by the sufferance of the allottee and to be, as it were, an assignee or the holder of a secondary interest derived from the allottee without any order of authorization from the Collector or competent officer, who alone, were entitled to allot the requisitioned premises. From the Petitioner's view point, the hearing at best, can only result in his story being accepted; but as pointed out by the Collector himself in his order, even if it is accepted, he cannot become an authorised person. He will continue to be one that has not been authorised. Looked at that way also, there is no prima facie case. The Petitioner is trying only to take this Court into the different theoretical considerations, so that meanwhile he can have the advantage of a stay order, which in terms of the time element, is quite considerable and is bound to be considerable as Courts are over-worked and can dispose of such cases only after a year or two. The Petitioner is trying only to take this Court into the different theoretical considerations, so that meanwhile he can have the advantage of a stay order, which in terms of the time element, is quite considerable and is bound to be considerable as Courts are over-worked and can dispose of such cases only after a year or two. However fascinating might be the pursuit of the golden deer of theoretical problems relating to any piece of legislation, Courts should not waste their time and energy on this, unless such pursuit will lead to the removal of any particular grievance in a particular case before them. As will be presently seen in the cases cited by the Petitioner, the persons moving the Courts, claimed to be lessees either from the government itself or from the owners of the requisitioned premises from before the requisition. In such cases, the Petitioners have good faith and a prima facie case, so that, whatever the merits, it was at least worth examining the grounds raised by them. In the instant case, the position is different; this alone would justify the dismissal of the petition. I-If the Act Applies to the Present Cases' 8. Anyway, the petition having been admitted and the grounds having been heard at much length, it would be proper to record our findings on the merits as well. The first ground alleged is that these premises are not "public premises" as defined in the Act after the amendment in 1955, or which is about the same thing "Government premises" as originally defined in the Act when it was made in 1961. From this, it is argued that the Collector (the competent authority) could not have taken any action under the Act. In other words, if a person like the Petitioner is to be evicted, this can only be a regular title suit and not under any special Act like the present one. A mere reading of the definition shows that this argument of this Petitioner is fallacious. 9. In other words, if a person like the Petitioner is to be evicted, this can only be a regular title suit and not under any special Act like the present one. A mere reading of the definition shows that this argument of this Petitioner is fallacious. 9. The premises were originally requisitioned under Section 14 of the Sthan Niyantaran Vidhan of 1950 which runs thus:- The Collector can, for the purposes of rehabilitation of displaced persons, or for residence of public servants, or for public utility requisition any house or part of a house which is vacant and can fix a provisional rent for the same; but the owner will be entitled to the rent so fixed. ... The allotment was by name to opposite party No. 2, and is by the very nature of the case, not assignable by him to others. In 1954, a new Act for the purposes of requisitioning immoveable property for purposes of the State was enacted (35 of 1954). Whereas under the earlier Act, it was the Collector who could requisition the premises or other immoveable property, under this Act, it would be a "competent authority" to be appointed by "government by notification in the gazette. The new act repealed Section 14 of the Sthan Niyantaran Vidhan, but the repealing section itself provides that property already requisitioned before the commencement of the new Act should continue to be dealt with, under the provisions of the said Act of 1950. 10. In the meantime, the Madhya Bharat Government Premises Eviction and Recovery of Rent Act of 1951 had been enacted. In 1955, it was amended. For the words "government premises", the words "public premises" were substituted and they were now defined as: premises belonging to, or taken on lease, or requisitioned by government, or requisitioned by the competent authority under Act 35 of 1954. Competent authority was defined as the authority to do so appointed in this behalf by the government and actually in the Mandsaur District, it has throughout been the Collector. In the Districts of Gwalior and Indore, there were different authorities but even there, after 1954 (Vide Home Department Notification No. 5322/VIII/BR-547/53 dated 24th July 1954) it was the Collector. Competent authority was defined as the authority to do so appointed in this behalf by the government and actually in the Mandsaur District, it has throughout been the Collector. In the Districts of Gwalior and Indore, there were different authorities but even there, after 1954 (Vide Home Department Notification No. 5322/VIII/BR-547/53 dated 24th July 1954) it was the Collector. The words "unauthorised occupation" were not defined in 1951, and in 1955 there was only an amplification, necessitated by the decision of the Bombay High Court in regard to a similar provision (in K.K. Verma v. Union of India, AIR 1954 Bom 358 ). Thus, "unauthorised" would mean to be one who is unauthorised in the usual grammatical sense of the word, that is, a person without the authority of the Government as owner or the lessee or requisitioned (for whom the property had been requisitioned) or of the Collector or the competent authority who as the agent of government has actually passed the order of requisition or allotment. 11. The premises in question had been requisitioned by the Collector; in the proper sense, it became the requisitioned property (not of the Collector who was only the agent and could not own it), of government which can in this regard be described as a quasi-lessee or requisitioned. Even the premises requisitioned by the "competent authority under Act 35 of 1954, are those really requisitioned by government and in this sense, there is overlapping, and once the requisitioning by government is mentioned, the last item is superfluous. In fact, after the enactment of the Act 35 of 1954, the only agency through which Government could requisition immoveable property was the Competent authority. This superfluity notwithstanding, these premises become properly requisitioned by Government, the third category, the two others being respectively those owned, and those leased by it. Looking at it in another manner, Section 22 of the Act 35 of 1954 has the effect of making the Collector "the competent authority" in regard to the requisitions made before the commencement of the Act. But because of the inclusion of property requisitioned by Government, it is unnecessary to go at any length into this aspect of the matter. 12. But because of the inclusion of property requisitioned by Government, it is unnecessary to go at any length into this aspect of the matter. 12. Once these are public premises, Section 3 of the Act enables the competent authority who, in this case, is no other than the Collector himself to take appropriate action in three different sets of circumstances. First, where the allottee sublets without permission of Government or of the competent authority; and secondly, where he has not paid the rent, or has contravened any condition of the allotment. 13. The third set of circumstances arises after action has been taken under Section 3(1)(a) or (b). When the allottee is ordered to vacate, he might plant somebody else on the premises or there may be squatting by somebody, who has not been placed there by the Government or the competent authority. The very purpose of the Act would be frustrated if the competent authority is unable to remove this person at once. Accordingly, there is Section 3(1)(b) to the effect, that the unauthorised person may be noticed calling upon him to vacate the premises within 15 days. Unlike the allottee, the squatter is not entitled to appeal. Whether it is the authorised person the allottee or the unauthorised person who is ordered to vacate, his failure to obey within 15 days may be followed by the competent authority himself taking steps to evict him in the manner provided in Sub-section (2). Thus, an examination of all the statutes concerned shows that the Collector was legally empowered to pass the order on the Petitioner, and on his failure to vacate, remove him with the appropriate amount of force. His order in this regard is clear: Paragraph 1 deals with the allottee: 2. As for Dulhanmal's prayer, it really cannot be gone into in this case, because the house had been "com-maundered" on 25-9-1950 for Basant-ram and was given to him. Even though the alleged partnership deed (sajhanama) has not been proved, I find on the face of it that it is dated 12-1-1956 which shows that Dulhanmal cannot be treated as a necessary party to this, proceeding. Even though the alleged partnership deed (sajhanama) has not been proved, I find on the face of it that it is dated 12-1-1956 which shows that Dulhanmal cannot be treated as a necessary party to this, proceeding. Even if there had been some arrangement between Dulhanmal and Basantram, it has no operation in this proceeding because here the question, is whether Basantram for whom the house has been requisitioned and to whom it has been given, has, for failure to deposit the rent, rendered himself liable to be ordered to vacate. He is liable to be so ordered under Section 3(1)(a) and he alone is entitled to the notice in this regard. 3. While the objections raised by Dulhanmal" are not fit to be heard in this proceeding, still, be asserts that he is in possession of the house concerned (wah uska adhiwasi prakat karta hai). So, let notice be issued on him under Section 3(1)(b) that he should vacate the house within 15 days failing which, action will be taken under Section 3(2). This shows that for one thing, the Collector has assessed the story as propounded by the Petitioner, and found that he is an unauthorised person and, for another, he has passed the order under a section of the Act which certainly has application to this case. II -Vires of Section 3 of the Act No. 27 of 1951: 14. The main plank of the Petitioner's case is that Section 3 is ultra vires the Constitution both under Article 14 and under Article 19, the former, on the ground of discrimination as between two classes of tenants one holding under government and the other holding under private landlords under the latter Article it is the unreasonableness of the restrictions on the holding of property, the scope for discriminatory conduct on the part of the competent officer, and the absence of any prescribed quasi-judicial procedure, and as far as the unauthorised person is concerned, the absence of an appeal from the decision of the competent officer. (I) Applicability of Article 14- 15. Nearly every State as well as the Centre, have got enactments similar to this one with operative sections worded substantially alike, three of the High Courts Allahabad, Calcutta and the Punjab (Brigade Com-mandor Meerut v. Ganga Prasad. (I) Applicability of Article 14- 15. Nearly every State as well as the Centre, have got enactments similar to this one with operative sections worded substantially alike, three of the High Courts Allahabad, Calcutta and the Punjab (Brigade Com-mandor Meerut v. Ganga Prasad. AIR 1956 All 507 , Jagu singh v. M. Shokat ali, 58 Calcutta Weekly Notes 1066; Satish Chan-dar v. Delhi Improvement Truts, AIR 1958 P&H 1 , have held the corresponding section in one or other of those enactments to be ultra vires of the Constitution, the first for repugnance to Article 14 and the later two, for different reasons, for repugnance to Article 19, on the ground of unreasonableness. The High Court of Bombay AIR 1954 Bombay : (AIR 1954 Bom 348) held that a person who had been once allotted the premises and has continued to stay after the term ended, or the allotment was cancelled, would not be "an unauthorised person". This objection has been met in this Act by the explanation attached to the words "unauthorised person" in the amendment of 1955. 16. In AIR 1956 All 507 , that High Court finds- The classification sought to be made in the Act in question is not between the State on the one hand and a private individual on the other but between a private individual occupying government premises on one hand and another private individual occupying private premises on the other. Thus, the classification here sought to be made by the Act is between two private individuals one of whom happens to occupy private land and the other Government land. From this, they proceed to hold that it did not accord with the general principles laid down by the Supreme Court and was therefore improper and accordingly, the section was ultra vires of Article 14. Incidentally, they also indicate their view that the provision does not answer to the test of reasonableness of the restrictions on the owning of property, and is as such, the violation of Article 19(1)(f) as well. However, the emphasis is on Article 14, while in the judgment of the Punjab and the Calcutta High Courts, the emphasis is on Article 19. 17. However, the emphasis is on Article 14, while in the judgment of the Punjab and the Calcutta High Courts, the emphasis is on Article 19. 17. As against this, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the Division Bench ruling reported in George Solomon v. Competent Authority 1958 JLJ 594 , has held definitely that this section is not ultra vires of Article 14. It doubtless makes a differentiation between occupants of government premises and those of private houses but the State legislature was competent to classify the tenants of government premises separately from the ordinary tenants. The object of the Act is to provide speedy remedy to the competent authority to evict tenants from the government premises and keeping in view the delays that are caused in ordinary processes of law, it cannot be said that to arm that authority with such a power is unreasonable. The summary power of eviction given to the competent authority under the Act cannot, therefore, be said to contravene Article 14 of the Constitution. Whether the classification is trusted as of the tenants on the property owned by different classes of landlords, or one of the landlords themselves, is only a manner of saying. The essence of the classification is that it distinguishes between two genera of landlord tenant relationship; the one in which the land lord is the Government or as it conceivably can happen a Local Authority or a Board entrusted with the public function of providing accommodation for certain classes of the homeless, and the other, where the landlord is a private individual or a company or a cooperative society, owning and letting immoveable property as a business of profit. Certainly, Government or the Local Authority or Board will be following business methods, and the private individual or society or company to some extent, have public good in view. But the distinction is that primarily, the former aims at housing certain classes of the homeless who are genuinely needy, at rents which may be lower than those prevailing in the market and is investigating public money or pledging the taxpayer's credit for this public purpose. The latter, on the other hand, treats the property as an investment from which he expects to make a profit a perfectly legitimate attitude, but one basically different from that of the former. The latter, on the other hand, treats the property as an investment from which he expects to make a profit a perfectly legitimate attitude, but one basically different from that of the former. With all respect to the Allahabad view, it seems clear that the breach of the conditions of the lease by the former, or the squatting on its property, is a breach not merely against the owner, but also of the public good, and has the effect, for the duration of keeping out a really deserving person. Most important is the time element and the suffering inflicted on the very section of the public for whom the Government or the Board would be holding the property. In this connection, the observations of the Supreme Court in the comparable case Baburao v. Bombay Housing Board AIR 1954 SC 153 , are of interest. There, the landlord was a Housing Board, but its purpose was similar to Government's. It was exempted from the operation of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act in respect of lands and buildings belonging to or vesting in it. Other owners in that case, a Co-operative Housing Society did not have the benefit of such exemption, and challenged its constitutional propriety. The Supreme Court has ruled- This classification is based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes them from other tenants and this differentia has a rational relation to the object sought, to be achieved by the Act. I find nothing to justify an attempt to get the view of this High Court in AIR 1958 MP 330 , revised or distinguished (ii) Application of Article 10:- 18. The main line of attack by the Petitioner on the vires of this section is that even an unauthorised person is the owner of property, because, the mere possession, however (sic) is property of a kind. The allottee is of course like a lessee owning the lease. Under Article 19(1)(f), he has the fundamental right to hold this property, in other words, to stay in possession. A law that interferes with this right, should conform to the provisions of sub-article (5) and the restriction should be found to be reasonable by the High Court. The allottee is of course like a lessee owning the lease. Under Article 19(1)(f), he has the fundamental right to hold this property, in other words, to stay in possession. A law that interferes with this right, should conform to the provisions of sub-article (5) and the restriction should be found to be reasonable by the High Court. This aspect of the matter has been considered at length in the Calcutta ruling reported in 58 Calcutta Weekly Noties 1066, and, from a different angle, by the Punjab High Court in AIR 1958 P&H 1 . The Madhya Pradesh ruling already cited touches on this, and indicates its view that the provision is reasonable; but the discussion in that judgment is restricted to the operation of Article 14 only. So, the Petitioner has urged that it is still open to him to invite this Court, without making a reference, to hold that this provision is bad for repugnancy to Article 19. 19. The argument advanced in this Court on behalf of the Petitioner (on lines taken in both the Punjab and the Calcutta cases) are in a sense typical. The basis is that where Government is empowered by the legislature to make an appointment for a particular purpose, the necessary qualifications should invariably be laid down in the statute, as, otherwise. Government is very likely to appoint persons who are incompetent. Secondly, the suggestion in these rulings is that whenever a functionary of Government is to weigh the pros and cons in a controversy, however simple he should be one with a judicial training; in fact, some judgments speak contemptuously of "non-judicial officers". Thirdly, every criterion of "Satisfaction" of the authority that such and such situation has arisen, is "subjective" and therefore, likely to be mistaken or abused; in effect; discretion turns cut most often to be discrimination. This danger can be guarded against or at least minimized by providing in the statute for a particular procedure which the authority exercising the quasi-judicial function must follow. Finally, it is said that human mind being imperfect, there should, in every case, be an appeal, and further that appeal should be heard by an authority and in a manner, which are considered proper for the original decision. The present provision does not answer to any these tests. Finally, it is said that human mind being imperfect, there should, in every case, be an appeal, and further that appeal should be heard by an authority and in a manner, which are considered proper for the original decision. The present provision does not answer to any these tests. No qualification is prescribed for the appointment of the competent authority; he is only to be "satisfied" without being bound by a prescribed procedure. And as for appeal, while there is an appeal to Government from orders under (1) (a) there is none from orders under (1) (b). 20. The non-applicant on the other hand, has urged that every one of these so called defects is really a reasonable provision called for by the nature of these cases, the extreme importance of prompt action, the urgency of the need of the deserving houseless, and the very simplicity of the questions of fact usually involved. Again, it might be that the number of cases will be very few and Government may have to entrust the work to some officer already discharging other functions instead of appointing full-time authority. At the same time, it will be absolutely necessary that each case will have to be decided and effect given to the decision with the utmost expedition. On merits, the data before the authority are so simple that the risk of its going wrong on facts is practically negligible, though, here as in other human affairs it cannot be eliminated to the degree of theoretical perfection. Again, the question, if a person is "unauthorised" is so simple and straightforward that an appeal is unnecessary from the finding of the authority. Here the legislature has preferred to court the theoretical risk of mistake in a very rate case, to the laying down of an elaborate time consuming procedure. Mean-wile, the needy houseless will be suffering, and the owners whose houses might have been requisitioned for a particular public purpose would be sacrificing their interest not for that of the public, but for the sake of adventurous squatters who find law's delay most profitable. 21. Mean-wile, the needy houseless will be suffering, and the owners whose houses might have been requisitioned for a particular public purpose would be sacrificing their interest not for that of the public, but for the sake of adventurous squatters who find law's delay most profitable. 21. The test of reasonableness has always to be applied with due consideration of the circumstances and the awareness of the well known fact that in matters of public administration, absolute perfection is out of the question, and there is always the risk of a provision calculated to secure justice going wrong in a rare instance. Certainly, by running the railway trains at the speed of bullock-carts, accidents, mishaps, loss of property and the like can be eliminated. On the other hand, the public would suffer the serious inconvenience of delay in the receipt of food, clothing or raw materials for the industrial establishments. That is why the law approves of the railway administration running the trains at a speed much higher than that of bullock carts, fully aware of the increased possibility of accidents, quite agreeable in the circumstances to put up with this risk in return for the benefit of quick movement. Risks are however, guarded against within the frame work of speedy locomotion. Similarly, the legislature has taken some risk in the interest of people for whom the Government or as the case may be, the Local Authority or Board is owning or has taken in lease or on requisition the premises, 22. The law enabling the Government to appoint functionaries can broadly speaking, fall into one of the two patterns. The first, where it is just a blank power letting Government to choose as well as it can, and appoint either full time functionaries subject to the rules of such appointments, or entrust the functions to officers already in service for other public functions. The second pattern is, where the statute expressly provides for the qualifications which may be educational, professional, or experience for a prescribed term in a particular capacity. In that event, there is a guarantee that persons will have the minimum qualification and will presumably not go very wrong. The second pattern is, where the statute expressly provides for the qualifications which may be educational, professional, or experience for a prescribed term in a particular capacity. In that event, there is a guarantee that persons will have the minimum qualification and will presumably not go very wrong. But even with such a provision, the choice for the Government is so wide, that in practice the guarantee if such is needed, against the appointment of incompetent persons by Government, is of little value In the first pattern, the legislature leaves the Government free to use its discretion. After all, as pointed out by the Punjab High Court, distinguishing the view taken by the Calcutta High Court. It is not correct to presume that the Government is likely to appoint unsuitable persons to be placed in such a responsible position. The presumption, if any, is to the opposite effect. As stated by the Supreme Court in Dr. N. B. Khare v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 211 - It is improper to start with such an assumption and decide the legality of Acts on that basis. Abuse of power given by a law sometimes occurs; but the validity of the law cannot be contested because of such apprehension 23. In this case, for example, the Government has appointed the Collectors of the respective districts as competent authority. Formerly, in certain special areas, the Directors of Rehabilitation had been appointed for this purpose. Certainly, the presumption that Government will appoint the best man possible in the circumstances has been justified. In any event, we cannot start doubting the legality of a statute because a Government may conceivably (sic) incompetent persons as competent authority. Nor do I find any force in the argument that the decision or satisfaction under Section 3 of this Act is a quasi judicial work and (sic) the appointment of a non-judicial officers is unreasonable. With all respect to those who divide officers into these two categories, one has only to note that a good deal of the functions discharged by the so-called non-judicial officers are quasi-judicial. With all respect to those who divide officers into these two categories, one has only to note that a good deal of the functions discharged by the so-called non-judicial officers are quasi-judicial. The controversy in all these cases is in form between the Government and the defaulting or misusing allottee or the squatting: unauthorised person; its effect is the balancing of the needs of the houseless persons who are, as it were, waiting for the allotment, and those of the persons who are just squatting without authority or having been allotted are taking undue advantage. In case the accommodation has been requisitioned, the original owner is very much concerned in seeing that the sacrifice he has made is applied to relieve genuine need. The legislature is fully justified from its view point in fearing that the handling of such matters by the so called judicial officers will lead to the endless delay and obsession with form which are only too well known in the regular law Courts. Again, the legislature might have been guided by the advisability on the one hand, of leaving Government for to appoint officers as competent authority in addition to their normal duties, and on the other, to avoid the well known feature of the so called judicial procedure, that is, endless delay and obsession with technicalities. 24. It is not quite correct to assume that the word "Satisfy" and its cognates lead to the subjective impression of the authority, while the provision for some procedure eliminates it. Whether the word used is "satisfy", (sic) "decide" or "find" come to the conclusion", the result always includes an element of subjective ness. If it is all subjective and nothing else, there is obvious danger. The best way of guarding against this is to make the "satisfaction" or "finding" or "conclusion" depend on data or conditions that have an ascertainable objective existence independent of the purely personal equation of the authority. The crucial test for reasonableness, therefore is whether the statute requires that the satisfaction is based on such data, and not whether a procedure of more or less elaborateness is imposed. In fact, a prescribed procedure does most often lead to delay and procrastination, which in the circumstances for which this Act has been made, are really fatal to the purposes of the Act. In fact, a prescribed procedure does most often lead to delay and procrastination, which in the circumstances for which this Act has been made, are really fatal to the purposes of the Act. Prescribing a procedure no doubt guards against a mistake that is theoretically possible but at the cost of promptness. Besides, where the data to be ascertained are simple, the benefits of a prescribed procedure are outweighed by the incidental inconvenience. Here we have three possible occasions in which the competent authority is to act-the first two concerning the allottee, and the third concerning a person who is not an allottee and is not therefore authorised by the officer, for each of them the required data are laid down, and they are independent of any personal equation. Therefore, the use of the word "satisfy" does not in any manner make it a case of purely subjective impression or one in which the subjective side of the impression so predominates as to promote arbitrariness. 25. The conditions or data are also simple. As far as the unauthorised person is concerned, it is about the most rudimentary issue of fact, whether the person who is squatting on or claims to be in possession of the premises is the one whom the competent authority has authorised. It conceivable that in rare cases there may be some complication but in the vast majority of cases the question can easily be decided by a person of average intelligence and education. When it concerns the allottee, either he should have failed to pay the rent which again is a simple factual issue-or he should have assigned or sublet the premises to some other person which also is by no means difficult. In the first situation, the allottee is taking advantage of the Government Sympathy and help (sic) to the detriment of the public interest, and in the other, he is passing on to a person of his choice what Government through the competent authority has done for him only on their appreciation of his difficulties; this again is an abuse of the help given by Government. The assignee or sub-tenant would be an unauthorised person proceeded against separately. The assignee or sub-tenant would be an unauthorised person proceeded against separately. But the allottee himself forfeits the help given by the Government as the very act of assigning shows that he is not in genuine need- The point to observe is that the satisfaction is linked on to a specific data or requirements which themselves are so simple that in the very vast majority of cases, the competent authority can decide it without the special means of an elaborate judicial procedure. There is an element of theoretical danger which might even materialize in a rare instance; but, for the sake of promptness in the vast majority of cases, the legislature has taken the risk. It is not for this Court to order that even this risk should be eliminated at the cost of delay, it would be just like ordering that a railway train should go like a bullock cast and thus avoid all possible accidents. 26. Finally, there is no reason why when the factual issues are so simple, when dealing with unauthorised persons, there should at all be a right of appeal. Here again, an appeal is a safeguard against wrong decision in a rare case; but it would only enable that unauthorised person to squat on the premises for some more time keeping out the more deserving homeless person. This, risk in the opinion of the legislature outweighs the advantage of having an appeal. As for the allottee there is already a provision for appeal. 27. Thus, an examination of all the aspects of the matter shows that the legislature has on the whole, provided suitable precautions against the possibility of mistake or abuse of power in the very vast majority of cases that might arise. Theoretical considerations do show that there is risk of injustice in a rare case; but this being a matter of urgency, the legislature has chosen to put up with the risk in the interest of prompt disposal and the best utilization of the premises in charge of Government for relieving; he suffering of the homeless. It is not for the Courts to impose standards of unrealizable perfection in ignorance of the time element and thereby defeat the purpose of the legislation. 28. There is another aspect of looking at the matter. It is not for the Courts to impose standards of unrealizable perfection in ignorance of the time element and thereby defeat the purpose of the legislation. 28. There is another aspect of looking at the matter. Certainly, mere possession is in one sense property; and from his view point, an unauthorised squatter can urge that this law restricts his right of holding property. But "property" in this sense is far more tenuous than property in other senses, and what may be an unreasonable restriction in regard to the latter, may not be really so in regard to the former. The allottee is also holding property of a more substantial kind than that of the squatter: and similar to that of the lessee. What may be an unreasonable restriction on the holding of fully owned property, may again not be unreasonable when it concerns the property of this kind. In general, it is not sale to lay down the same standard of reasonableness for statutes restricting the right to hold properties of these different kinds. This may also, Section 3 of the Act cannot be held to be unreasonable. Thus, in my view, considering the purpose and all the circumstances of the case, the Act as a whole, and Section 3 in particular, is not repugnant to Article 19 (1) (f) and (5) of the Constitution. 29. For the reasons set out above, I find that the application is without substance and I dismiss it. Hearing costs payable by the Petitioner to the contesting Respondents Rs. 100/- (hundred). V.R. Nevaskar, J. - I agree.