JUDGMENT : G.C. Das, J. - This appeal was filed by Defendants 2 to 5 against the concurrent judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Puri decreeing the Plaintiff's suit. Plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of title and confirmation of possession as well as for an injunction against the State and the other Defendants from interfering with his possession in respect of 5.753 acres of land in plot No. 212 situated in mouza Mahalo within the Khurdha Khasmahal. Plaintiff's whole case was that he got the disputed land by lease granted by the Collector of Puri on August 2, 1951, and ever since the date of the lease he was in possession of the said lands and had acquired occupancy right therein as a settled raiyat of the village. Certain objections to the lease were filed by the Defendants on the allegation that the suit lands were communal lands and the same were negatived by the Collector. There was an appeal preferred against this decision to the Board of Revenue who set aside the order of the Collector. Accordingly a cloud was thrown on the title of the Plaintiff to the suit lands and he was constrained to file the present suit. 2. The State was added as a party-Defendant. Both the State and the contesting Defendants filed separate written statements, but their objections in essence were the same. Thus, the defence was that the suit land had been recorded as a 'Danda' in the settlement papers and was being used as a communal land. The State through the Collector granted a lease of the land to the Plaintiff in contravention of the provisions of Orissa Act I of 1948 (The Orissa Communal Forest and Private Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1948. It was further contended that there was no due publication of the Istahar and the Board of Revenue had rightly set aside the lease and directed a fresh istahar. 3. The learned Munsif who heard the suit at the first instance granted all the reliefs claimed by the Plaintiff, and decreed the suit holding that the suit-land was not a communal land within the meaning of Act I of 1948. He further held that the grant of lease by the Collector was not void or illegal. 3. The learned Munsif who heard the suit at the first instance granted all the reliefs claimed by the Plaintiff, and decreed the suit holding that the suit-land was not a communal land within the meaning of Act I of 1948. He further held that the grant of lease by the Collector was not void or illegal. With regard to the appeal to the Board of Revenue, he was of opinion that the Defendants had no right of appeal to the Board of Revenue against the order of the Collector, and accordingly the order of the Board of Revenue setting aside the lease and directing publication of the fresh Istahar was void. The Plaintiff being a settled raiyat of the village had acquired the right of occupancy in respect of the suit-lands u/s 24(1) of the Orissa Tenancy Act. Against this judgment, the 1st. Defendant the State of Orissa, did not prefer any appeal. Accordingly as far as the State is concerned, this judgment had become final. It is only Defendants 2 to 5 who carried an appeal and the learned Subordinate Judge of Puri who eventually heard the appeal, came to the conclusion that the Collector of Puri had the right to grant the lease in favour of the Plaintiff and that it is not hit by the provisions of Central Act XXIII of 1863. He concurred with the finding of the trial judge that the suit-lands were not 'communal' lands, and the Defendants 2 to 6 not being the inhabitants of the suit-lands would conceivably be set apart for the common use of the villagers. In other words, he confirmed the decision of the learned Munsif that the suit lands could not be deemed to be 'communal land.' He further held that the Defendants 2 to 6 had no locus standi to claim the suit lands as communal lands, and accordingly dismissed the appeal. 4. On behalf of the Appellant three contentions were raised before this Court: (i) The Board of Revenue had jurisdiction-to cancel the lease granted by the Collector; (2) The proclamation for the lease being only for 15 days, it contravenes the provisions of Central Act XXIII of 1863, and accordingly, the lease is invalid; and (3) The lease itself also contravenes the provisions of Section 251 of the Orissa Tenancy Act; hence it is void. 5. 5. In order to appreciate the points raised by learned Counsel on behalf of the Appellant, it would be better to give the facts in a little more detail. The Plaintiff filed his application for lease on May 10, 1950, as per Ext. A. The istahar was issued on June 22, 1950, as borne out by Ext. 1 and the lease was granted on August, 2, 1951. An objection for the first time was taken on Jauuary, 31, 1952. Plaintiff's simple case was that he had taken the lease from the Collector of Puri and was in possession of the disputed lands by paying the rent regularly; and he being a settled raiyat of the village, had acquired the right of occupancy to the said lands. The defence was four-fold; (1) The suit-lands are not waste-lands; (2) The suit-lands are communal lands and hence the Collector had no jurisdiction; (3) No Istahar was at all published; and (4) The lease was rightly set aside by the Board of Revenue on April 2, 1953, who had jurisdiction to set aside any order of the Collector. 6. Once the defence that the suit-lands are not 'wastelands' is accepted, the Central Act XXIII of 1863, that is, the Waste Lands (Claims) Act, 1863, would have no application. It may further be noted that no such defence was taken, though argued at length before this Court, by the Defendants in their written statement. The defence was with regard to the communal character of the lands. The concurrent findings of both the courts below are that the suit lands are not 'communal lands' within the meaning of Act I of 1948. With regard to the third objection that no Istahar was published, the defence of the Defendants was that the ninety days period as contemplated under Act XXIII of 1863 was not observed, and it was raised for the first time before the 1st. appellate Court. Mr. Das, argued at length that the Board of Revenue had jurisdiction to set aside the order of the Collector granting the lease in favour of the Plaintiff. As I have stated earlier, the Istahar was issued on June 22, 1950, and no objection was filed until January 31, 1952, that is, fourteen months after the sanction of the lease by the Collector. As I have stated earlier, the Istahar was issued on June 22, 1950, and no objection was filed until January 31, 1952, that is, fourteen months after the sanction of the lease by the Collector. Assuming that the suit land is communal land, there is no provision for appeal to the Board of Revenue, and accordingly the Collector's order is valid and final. The Plaintiff being a settled raiyat of the village had acquired the right of occupancy in the suit-lands since rent was being accepted by the Khasmahal Department and the relationship of landlord and tenant had been established. The Orissa Communal Forests and Private Lands (Prohibition of Alienation) Act, 1948, applies only to communal lands, and 'communal land' has been defined in clause (a) of Section 2 of the said Act, to mean, in relation to estates governed by the Madras Estate Land Act, 1908, land of the description mentioned in sub clause (a) or sub-clause (b) of clause (16) of Section 3 of that Act and in relation to cases governed by the Orissa Tenancy Act, 1913, lands recorded as gochar, rakshit or sarbasadharan in the record-of-rights or waste lands which are either expressly or impliedly set apart for the common use of the villagers whether recorded as such in the record-of-rights or not. Admittedly the disputed lands are recorded in the settlement papers as 'Danda' and are 'Nalayak Waste Lands'. Under the definition, the 'waste land' to come within the meaning of 'communal land' must be such lands which are either expressly or impliedly set apart for the common use of the villagers. There is no indication whatsoever in the settlement-papers that this land was either expressly or impliedly set apart for the common use of the villagers. It is doubtful if the Defendants are 'villagers' within the meaning of this Act. Admittedly they belong to another village, There is no 'Basti' in village Mahalo. The learned subordinate Judge had rightly come to the conclusion that the Defendants could not be construed to be 'villagers' of village Mahalo in order to claim, the communal character of the suit lands. Mr. G.K. Misra, argued that even if the disputed lands are accepted to be 'communal lands' the lease granted by the Collector is perfectly a valid lease under "Section 6 of the Act, alid is binding. Mr. G.K. Misra, argued that even if the disputed lands are accepted to be 'communal lands' the lease granted by the Collector is perfectly a valid lease under "Section 6 of the Act, alid is binding. Section 6 of Act 1 of 1948 lays down that no notification or order of the Provincial Government or the Collector under this Act shall be liable to be questioned in any Court of law. There is no provision in Act 1 of 1948 for appeal to the Board of Revenue. Hence even assuming the suit lands to be communal lands, in the absence of any express provision for appeal to the Board of Revenue, the Member Board of Revenue had no jurisdiction to cancel the order passed by the Collector. It was argued on behalf of the Appellant that the Collector under the Act is merely to accord sanction to the lease previously granted by the landlord. The disputed lands being in Khasmahal the Collector acting on behalf of the State is the landlord himself. Hence, there is no question of previous sanction as contemplated u/s 3 of the above Act. Further, the alienation of communal lands is also not hit by Central Act XXIII of 1863. Doubtless Central Act XXIII of 1863 is a general Act and the Orissa Act 1 of 1948 is a Special Act. I will advert to the very scheme of this Act later on. 7. Coming to the second branch of the argument regarding the Istahar, the finding is that the Istahar was served not for a period of ninety days, but for a period of 15 days. I will advert to the very scheme of this Act later on. 7. Coming to the second branch of the argument regarding the Istahar, the finding is that the Istahar was served not for a period of ninety days, but for a period of 15 days. Section 1 of the Central Act XXIII of the 1863 lays down that when any claim shall be preferred to any waste land proposed to be sold, or otherwise dealt with, on account of Government, or when any objection shall be taken to the sale or other disposition of such land, the Collector of the district in which such lands is situate, or other officer performing the duties of a Collector of Land Revenue in such district by whatever name his office is designated, shall, if the claim or objection be preferred within the period mentioned in the advertisement to be issued for the sale or other disposition of such land, which period shall not be less than three months, proceed to make an enquiry into the Claim or objections. True it is that the period for the Istahar under the provisions of Section 1 has been fixed for three months. This objection, however, was not raised before the courts below in the shape in which it is being argued before this Court. It is not the case of Defendants 2 to 6 that they had no knowledge of these Istahars, and as such they could not file any objection, and their case has been prejudiced thereby. It may at best amount to an irregularity committed by the Collector and cannot affect the title, if any, of the Plaintiff. There is no penal clause attached to this section. Supposing no notice is given for a period of not less than ninety days, the Act does not lay down anywhere as to its consequences. All that the Act lays down is that the claimant is entitled to compensation provided he had the interest in the land, but not to get back the land which has been leased out. As I have stated earlier, objections were taken fourteen months after service of the lstahar. The Supreme Court while deciding the mandatory or directory character of a certain provision has dealt with the subject of non-existence of consequences in a similar statute. Mr. As I have stated earlier, objections were taken fourteen months after service of the lstahar. The Supreme Court while deciding the mandatory or directory character of a certain provision has dealt with the subject of non-existence of consequences in a similar statute. Mr. Misra referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case State of U.P. Vs. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava. In that case their Lordships were concerned with clause (3) of Article 320 of the Constitution. Clause (3) of Article 320 is to the following effect: The Union Public Service Commission or the State Public Service Commission, as the case may be, shall be consulted. In this connection, their Lordships referred with approval to the well-known passage from Crawford on 'Statutory Construction' which is as follows: The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intention of the Legislature and not upon the language in which the intention is clothed. The meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other. Act XXIII of 1863 was enacted to provide for the adjudication of claims to waste lands. The preamble to that Act is that whereas it is expedient to make special provision for the speedy adjudication of claims which may be preferred to waste lands proposed to be sold, or otherwise dealt with, on account of Government, and of objections taken to the sale or other disposition of such lands. The preamble to that Act is that whereas it is expedient to make special provision for the speedy adjudication of claims which may be preferred to waste lands proposed to be sold, or otherwise dealt with, on account of Government, and of objections taken to the sale or other disposition of such lands. Section 5 deals with the delivery to claimant of copy of order of rejection or of sale and it lays down that if the Collector or other officer as aforesaid shall order that the claim or objection be rejected, or that the land be sold subject to any conditional reservation, or that it be otherwise dealt with, he shall cause a copy of such order to be delivered to the claimant or objector and if such claimant or objector shall not, within one week from the delivery of such copy or within such further time as the Collector or other officer as aforesaid, for any special reason to be recorded, shall see fit to grant, give notice in writing to such Collector or other officer as aforesaid, that he intends to contest such order the order shall be final. If the claimant or objector shall within the time allowed, give such notice, the Collector or other officer as aforesaid shall immediately make a report to the superior revenue authority and shall forward with such report a copy of his order, stating fully all the circumstances of the case, and the evidence adduced in support or otherwise of the claim or objection, and such authority on the receipt of such report and after calling for any further information which it may consider necessary, may confirm, modify or reserve the order of the Collector or other officer as aforesaid. Thereafter Section 14 makes provision that no appeal shall lie from any decision or order passed under this Act, nor shall any such decision or order be open to revision. Section 19 thereafter lays down that in any case in which the land has been sold, if the court shall be of opinion that the claim of the claimant is established, the court shall not award the claimant posses ion of the land in dispute, but shall order him to receive from the Government treasury by way of compensation, a sum equal to the price at which the land was sold, in addition to the costs of suit. Thus, in any view of the matter, the claimant, even if he has an interest in the land, the land-in-suit cannot be returned to him. All that he is entitled to is compensation. 8. Coming to Orissa Tenancy Act, this was an Act to amend and consolidate certain enactments relating to the raw of landlord and tenant in the district of Cuttack, Puri and Balasore in Orissa Division. The lease as I have stated earlier was sanctioned on August 2, 1951, in favour of the Plaintiff on his application dated 10-5-1950 (Ext. A.). Ext. 5 series are the rentreceipts. Rent was first paid on January 17, 1952, which was accepted by the Collector's Office. Ext. 5 series show that subsequent rents were paid on 24-10-1952, 16-12-1953, 4-1-1955 and 31-12-1-955. Ext. 2 shows the rent was also paid on 28-11-1956. It is evident from Ext. 5 series that before the objections were filed by the Defendants on January 31, 1952, the relationship of landlord and tenant was established between the Plaintiff and the Collector, the rent having been paid on January 17, 1952. The Board of Revenue, it appears, has set aside the granting of the lease by the Collector by his order dated 2-4-1953. By that time, the Plaintiff had acquired occupancy right to the land being a settled raiyat of the village. It was argued that the provisions of Section 61 of the Orissa Tenancy Act were not attracted. Section 61 provides for reclamation of waste lands. It says no waste land may be reclaimed by a raiyat without the written consent of his landlord except where the land was before such reclamation, included in the, tenancy of the raiyat and he has acquired a right of occupancy in it. In the instant case the State is the landlord and the land is reclaimed by the Plaintiff as a raiyat from the date of his lease. The State having accepted the relet from the Plaintiff has accepted him as a tenant. Hence it is difficult for me to accept the argument advanced by Mr. Das. It was further argued that objections were filed five months after the lease. Trile it is that it amounts to laches on the part of the Defendants, but that will not entitle the Plaintiff to have a valid lease, if on the very inception of it, it is invalid. Das. It was further argued that objections were filed five months after the lease. Trile it is that it amounts to laches on the part of the Defendants, but that will not entitle the Plaintiff to have a valid lease, if on the very inception of it, it is invalid. True, the Plaintiff cannot take advantage of the Defendants' laches and the Plaintiff must prove that he has acquired a valid, title. The Plaintiff's simple case was that he had obtained a lease from the Collector who is a landlord in respect of the suit-lands and the Collector by accepting the rental before any objection was raised, has accepted him as a tenant, and he being a settled raiyat of the village he had acquired occupancy right therein. Hence the question of laches of the Defendants does not arise. The Plaintiff by virtue of his own title to the land had acquired occupancy right therein. Section 204 of the Orissa Tenancy Act makes provision for appeals. Section 238 prescribes the period of limitation as given in schedule III. According to schedule III the period of limitation is thirty days from the date of the decree or order. In other words the period of limitation for appeal to the Board of Revenue from any order of the Collector under the Orissa Tenancy Act is thirty days. Nothing has been done within that period. A similar matter came up for discussion before this Court in First Appeal No. 33/58 which was disposed of 22-8-1961. Therein my Lord the Chief Justice has held that once occupancy rights have accrued, they cannot be taken away, except in accordance with the provisions of the Orissa Tenancy Act, or by a proper acquisition of such rights on payment of due compensation under the law relating to acquisition for the time being in force Government cannot by a subsequent order purporting to review their own previous order cancel the settlement with him and direct that a portion of the disputed land should be settled with some other person. Viewed from this angle of the case, the Defendants even assuming that they have some right to the communal land cannot acquire a valid lease over the same. All that they are entitled to is compensation from the Collector. Viewed from this angle of the case, the Defendants even assuming that they have some right to the communal land cannot acquire a valid lease over the same. All that they are entitled to is compensation from the Collector. Accordingly, there does not appear to be any merit in this appeal at all; and the appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed