ORDER Shivdayal, J.—The petitioner was elected a Councillor of the Dabra Municipality in the general election held in 1955 and was also elected its Vice-President. In the next general election held on July 19, 1959, he was again elected a Councillor and subsequently the Vice President. The Inspector General of Municipalities removed him as a Councillor (vide his order dated August 24, 1960) and further debarred him from being a Councillor for the next four years. 2. The Dabra Municipality is a first class Municipality constituted under the M. B. Municipalities Act of 1954 (hereinafter called the Act) 3. Section 16 (1) (a) of the Act runs as follows:- The Government in case of City Municipality and the Inspector General Municipalities in the case of other Municipalities may at anytime remove any elected or selected councillor if his continuance as a Councillor is not in the opinion of the Government, desirable in the interests of the public or the municipality 4. The removal of the petitioner is based on two charges which I shall reproduce and discuss at the proper place. 5. In this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution several points have been raised by the petitioner challenging the validity of the order of his removal. 6. It is first contended that since the petitioner was a Vice-President he could be removed only u/s 24 of the Act which provides that a President or a Vice-President shall be removable from his office as such by the Council by a resolution passed to that effect by 2/3rd majority of the total number of Councillors. It is urged that the power is exclusively vested in the Council, and the Government or the Inspector General of Municipalities cannot exercise the powers u/s 16 of the Act in respect of a Vice-President. This contention, in my judgment is wholly without substance. Section 24 provides for the removal of a President or a Vice President as such. In the present case the petitioner has not been removed from the office of the Vice-President, although it may necessarily entail his removal as a Councillor. I am unable to appreciate the argument that a Councillor cannot be removed u/s 16 just because he also happens to be the Vice-President. In the present case the petitioner has not been removed from the office of the Vice-President, although it may necessarily entail his removal as a Councillor. I am unable to appreciate the argument that a Councillor cannot be removed u/s 16 just because he also happens to be the Vice-President. It seems clear to me that Section 24 comes into paly only when a Councillor is to be removed from the office of the President or the Vide-President as such. President or Vice-President, but not as a Councillor. There can be a number of grounds including failure to discharge their respective functions and duties enumerated in Sections 21 and 22 of the Act, for which the Council may by its resolution remove the President or the Vice-President from his office, and if the resolution is carried out he will be removed from that office. But, notwithstanding such removal he will continue to be a Councillor. There may be a case where it may become necessary to remove him from the office of the President or Vice-President but not from his Councillorship. It is in such a case that Section 24 is attracted. To put it differently, the removal of a President or a Vice-President does not by itself remove him from the council as its Councillor. 7. It is then urged by Shri Mishra that no reasonable opportunity was given to the petitioner as is required u/s 16 of the Act. Relying on Khem Chand Vs. The Union of India (UOI )and Others, , the learned counsel challenges the validity of the impunged order on the ground that no personal hearing was given to him after the recording of the evidence. From the facts stated by the learned Government Advocate this contention appears to be misconceived. After the recording of the evidence the petitioner was served with a notice dated April 23, 1960, (marked R-11 filed with the return) calling upon the petitioner to appear in the office of the Inspector General of Municipalities on May 9, 1960. The Government Advocate has shown to us from the original papers, the note recorded by the Inspector General Municipalities on the above mentioned date from which it is clear that not only a personal hearing was given but also the Inspector General Municipalities took down the gist of the points raised before him. This contention must also be rejected. 8. The Government Advocate has shown to us from the original papers, the note recorded by the Inspector General Municipalities on the above mentioned date from which it is clear that not only a personal hearing was given but also the Inspector General Municipalities took down the gist of the points raised before him. This contention must also be rejected. 8. Then it is maintained for the petitioner that the procedure laid down in Section 206 of the Act should have been imperatively followed before an action was taken against the petitioner and since this was not done the action u/s 16 was ultra vires. I see no relevance of Section 206 of this case. That Section only empowers the Government to order an enquiry into any matter concerning the municipal administration of any municipality or any matter with respect to which its sanction, approval or consent is required under the Act. The provision is obvioualy an enabling one; it vests the Government with certain powers. It cannot be read as to cast any duty on the Government to hold an inquiry. This is clear from the word 'may'. This Section being wholly inapplicable to this case, it is unnecessary to consider the meaning of the expression "sanction, approval or consent" in regard to which both sides addressed us at some length and Shri Mishra argued that the sanction required u/s 16 (1) (a) was in reality" approval or consent" as used in Section 206. 9. The petitioner challenges the validity of Section 16 (1) on the ground that it gives naked and unbridled power to the relevant authorities to turn out any Councillor. It is incontesitble that in the democratic set up an elected Councillor cannot be removed just because he is not liked by the Government. That would shake the whole basis of local Self Government. I am quite clear that Section 16(1) does not vest an unrestrained power for the removal of a Councillor. No doubt the expression 'in the opinion of" connotes a subjective test, yet that expression has always to be read in the context in which it is used and its true meaning has to be ascertained by reference to not only the language of the Section but also to the scheme of the enactment. In a democratic set up election to a public office is something significant. In a democratic set up election to a public office is something significant. An elected Councillor cannot be lightly removed just for a whim or fancy. It is impossible to attribute a contrary intention to the Legislature when it enacted Section 16 of the Act. To me it is crystal clear that the provision for taking such a drastic action as to remove a Councillor is meant only for extreme case when his continuance becomes undesirable in the interests of the general public or in the interests of the Municipality. I have already said that it is the subjective opinion of the relevant authority with which rests the decision to remove. For the purposes of this case it is unnecessary to enter into a discussion what questions would be justifiable. 10. The opinion of the Government in Section 16 (1) (a) of the Act is dependent on one of the two conditions or contingencies, Viz., (1) not desirable in the interests of the public; or (2) not desirable in the interests of the Municipality. If an order is made on grounds extraneous to these, it would be without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed (see, for instance, Municipal Committee Seoni vs. State of M. P. 1961 JLJ 771. If the appropriate authority removes a Councillor for any reason which does not fall within the purview of the expression "interests of the public" or "interests of the Municipality," the order, being without jurisdiction will be struck down. 11. One of the charges found against the petitioner is; " Also in the list of charge which was originally framed, item No. 3 was this: " It is clear from the language of the charge and particularly the words underlined by me that the peitioner was accused of having passed "an order for sale" and further that a "lower price was charged" "causing loss to the municipality". But this was misconceived. The fact of the matter was that in accordance with the opinions of the Overseer and the Chief Executive Officer, the petitioner (as the Vice-President) recommended to the council that the land be sold at Rs. 1/8/- per square yard, directing that a deposit be accepted and the matter be put up before the council for confirmation. This fact has been conceded before us by the learned Government Advocate after ascertaining it from the original record of the Dabra Municipality. 1/8/- per square yard, directing that a deposit be accepted and the matter be put up before the council for confirmation. This fact has been conceded before us by the learned Government Advocate after ascertaining it from the original record of the Dabra Municipality. In his explanation (page 16 of the Paper Book) the petitioner has stated this fact. There is a world of difference between passing an 'order' making a 'recommendation' or recording and 'opinion'. When it was made clear by the petitioner in his recommendation that the matter was to be put up before the Council for confirmation it clearly meant that his recommendation could not be given affect to and there could be no 'sale' unless and until it received the approval of the Council. Therefore, to say that because of his order, the Municipality 'incurred a loss was based on some misconception of fait and this is apparent from the record. It is not necessary for us to enter in to the question whether an erroneous recommendation, if not malafide, can be a ground for the expulsion of a councillor. There was no allegation nor even a suggestion at any stage that the petitioner was directly or indirectly interested in Rama Devi or that a lower rate was recommended for ulterior motives. This is a case where a recomendation was mistaken for an order when in fact no order was passed for the sale of the land. Thus, this ground was non-existent. 12. The other charge found against the petitioner is; " The petitioner admits that he did not pay Octroi on his motor car. In his explanation he took the following pleas: 1. Taxes on motor vehicles could be charged only under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. 2. The Dabra Municipality had no right to lawfully levy Octroi under the M. B. Municipal Act, 1954 or under the Rules framed thereunder. 3. Octroi was never charged before by the Dabra Municipality. 4. Before filing his nomination paper (in connection with the Municipal election) the petitioner had enquired from the Municipality on June 22 1959 whether any tax was outstanding against him and he received a reply in the negative. Moreover, no objection was raised at any stage of the election that any tax was outstanding against him. 4. Before filing his nomination paper (in connection with the Municipal election) the petitioner had enquired from the Municipality on June 22 1959 whether any tax was outstanding against him and he received a reply in the negative. Moreover, no objection was raised at any stage of the election that any tax was outstanding against him. As regards the fourth point the learned Government Advocate tells us that the Municipality itself was not aware of the default in paying the Octroi until it was complained of by the Congress Committee. 13. The third point was answered by the relevant authorities saying that if octroi was not charged from others that could be no ground for the petitioner not to pay octroi. This may be a complete answer in proceedings for the recovery of a tax due by a person but one pauses to think whether it can be a ground for the removal of a Councillor. However, it is again unnecessary to enter into that question in this case because the authorities did not apply their minds to the question whether octroi was legally chargeable on a motor car and there has been no decision one way or the other. 14. The M. P. Municipalities Act 1954 permits the levy of Octroi. See Section 69 (1) (b) (iv). The Dabra Municipality framed Octroi Byelaws u/s 45 of the said Act. Entry 84 allowed the Municipality to recover octroi on motors of every kind. Now the expression "motor of every kind", when it was introduced in the Octroi Byelaws, could not be intended to be read as inclusive of motor vehicles because of Section 22 of the M. B. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act (Act No. 53 of 1949), which runs as follow: - Nothwith tanding anything to the contrary in any other law for the time being in force in any part of the United State, it shall not be lawful for the Municipalities or local bodies to levy any tax or tolls in respect of any motor vehicle The obvious intendment of this Section was to protect against double taxation. This Act was in force in 1954 when the Madhya Bharat Municipalties Act was enacted and the Octrai Byelaws were framed Therefore, the expression "Motor of every kind" must be read as to exclude motor vehicles. This Act was in force in 1954 when the Madhya Bharat Municipalties Act was enacted and the Octrai Byelaws were framed Therefore, the expression "Motor of every kind" must be read as to exclude motor vehicles. To read otherwise would mean that octroi was imposed even when the Act of 19-9 prohibited it. That is the only possible interpretation based on the well known rule of harmonious construction. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court said in Raj Krushna Bose Vs. Binod Kanungo and Others, :- Whenever it is possible to do so it is the duty of the Court to construe provisions which appear to conflict so that they harmonise. If entry 84 of the Octroi Byelaws was not intended to exclude motor vehicles from its purview, it was bad and unforceable, being in direct conflict with Section 22 of the M. B. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act. That was the true legal position when the Municipal Act 1954 and the Octroi Byelaws of the Dabra Municipality were framed. And it continued to be so upto October 31, 1957. The M. B. Taxation Act was repealed when the Central Provinces and Berar Motor Vehicles Taxation Act 1947 was extended to the whole of the new State of Madhya Pradesh with effect from November 1, 1957. Section 6 of the C.P. & Berar Motor Vehicles Taxation Act reads thus:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment for the time being in force, no local authority shall, after commencement of this Act, impose or enhance a tax, toll or licence fee in respect of a motor vehicle and if any local authority has imposed such tax, toll or licence fee since before the 1st day of April 1942 and the same is still in force at the commencement of this Act any person who is liable to pay such tax, toll or licence fee to such authority shall be deemed to have paid it. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall affect the imposition, enhancement or recovery of an octroi tax levied or to be levied hereafter by any local authority or a terminal tax levied and in force on the 1st January 1937 within the local area under the jurisdiction of any local authority. Originally Sub-section (2) was not there. It was held in King Emperor vs. M. C. Saugor, 1946 NLJ. 113, that the word 'tax' in sub-section (1) included "octroi". Originally Sub-section (2) was not there. It was held in King Emperor vs. M. C. Saugor, 1946 NLJ. 113, that the word 'tax' in sub-section (1) included "octroi". After that decision sub-section. (2) was added with retrospective effect. Now, in order to apply sub-section (2), there must be octroi tax 'levied' or to be levied hereafter.' Prima facie it seems that octroi was not levied by the Dabra Municipality before 1-11-57, in view of the M. B. Motor Vehicles (Taxation) Act 1949, as discussed above. And it is no body's case that it was levied after 1-11-57. It will not be possible to say that the particular entry of the Octroi Bye-laws should be interpreted in one way upto 1-11-57 and another construction should be attached to it after that date. Repeal of one enactment cannot have the force and effect of creating a new provision in another law nor to alter the interpretation of another law. This is one side of the picture. 14. It could be argued by the other side that although the relevant entry in the Octroi Bye-laws was wide enough to cover motor vehicles as well, yet, being in conflict with Section 22 of the M. B. Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, it could not be enforced so long as the latter enactment remained in force. But as soon as that impediment was removed, the conflict ipso facto disappeared and octroi could be charged because it was authorised by the Municipalities Act. 15. All this I have said in order to demonstrate that the authorities should have applied their minds to the legal contention raised by the petitioner in his explanation. There was something to be said on both sides If after considering the legal aspect they found that octroi was not payable by the petitioner it was impossible for them to hold that the omission on the part of the petitioner to pay octroi was a ground for his removal as a Councillor. It certainly cannot be urged that a Councillor can be removed by saying that in the opinion of the Government his continuance as a Councillor is undesirable in the interests of the public because of the non-payment of a tax not legally payable. 16. It certainly cannot be urged that a Councillor can be removed by saying that in the opinion of the Government his continuance as a Councillor is undesirable in the interests of the public because of the non-payment of a tax not legally payable. 16. The learned counsel for the petitioner tried to tell us during his argument that the petitioner's removal was malafide and was aimed at curtailing the strength of the minority in the Council. This was a new plea of fact which was not taken in the petition. To raise it at the hearing was neither fair to the respondents nor fair to the Court. 17. The result of the foregoing discussion is that as regards the charge of selling the land I find that it is based on a mistake of fact in as much as a 'recommendation' was thought to be an 'order'; and, as regards the other charge, viz, omission to pay octroi, I find that the legal question involved in it excaped the attention of the authorities. It is not for this Court to state in the present proceedings its interpretation of the relevant provisions because we are not sitting as a Court of appeal. It is laid down in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. vs. Wednesbury Corporation. (1948) 1 K. B. 223: In considering whether an authority having so unlimited a power has acted unreasonably, the Court is only entitled to investigate the action of the authority with a view to seeing if it has taken into account any matters that ought not to be or disregarded or matters that ought to be taken into account. The Court cannot interfere as an appellate authority to override a decision of such an authority, but only as a judicial authority concerned to see whether it has contravened the law by acting in excess of its power. 18. The impugned order is a speaking order. It must be quashed even when if the ground is found non existent extraneous to the provision of the law. When power is vested in a statutory authority on its subjective satisfaction with reference to specified matters, if that satisfaction is stated to be based on a number of grounds or for a variety of reasons all taken together and if some out of them are found to be non-existent or irrelevant the very exercise of that power is bad. When power is vested in a statutory authority on its subjective satisfaction with reference to specified matters, if that satisfaction is stated to be based on a number of grounds or for a variety of reasons all taken together and if some out of them are found to be non-existent or irrelevant the very exercise of that power is bad. The reason behind this principle can best be stated in the words of their Lordship of the Supreme Court: That is so, because the matter being one for subjective satisfaction it must be properly based on all the reasons on which it purports to be based. If some out of them are found to be non-existent or irrelevant the Court cannot predicate what the subjective satisfaction of the said authority would have been on the exclusion of those grounds or reasons. To uphold the validity of such an order inspite of the invalidity of some of the reasons or grounds would be to substitute satisfaction of the statutory authority" (per dictum in Dwarka Dass Bhatia Vs. The State of Jammu and Kashmir, ). These observations are apposite here. In Section 16 (1) (a), it is the subjective satisfaction of the authorities. In the present case two grounds were stated for the removal of the petitioner. The ground based on an ''order for sale of land and consequent loss to the municipality" was non-existent. This by itself is sufficient to quash the impugned order. 19. Before I leave this case I must point out that Section 16 (1) (a) of the Act employs two distict expressions 'in the interests of the public'; and 'in the interest of the Municipality.' The latter expression denotes some misconduct which is derogatory to the interests of the particular Municipality of which the person in question is a Councillor. The expression 'in the interest of the public' has a specific reference to what concerns the general public Non-payment of octroi or other municipal tax, seems to have no relation to the interests of the general public. Likewise, sale of municipal land at a rate lower than the appropriate or reasonable rate occasions a loss to the Municipality, but has no nexus, in the particular context of Section 16, with the interests of the general public. If the interests of the municipality were equated with public interest, there was no need to employ two district expressions. Likewise, sale of municipal land at a rate lower than the appropriate or reasonable rate occasions a loss to the Municipality, but has no nexus, in the particular context of Section 16, with the interests of the general public. If the interests of the municipality were equated with public interest, there was no need to employ two district expressions. Neither can be treated as redundant or superfluous. 20. With these observations, this petition is allowed. A mandamus, shall go to the Inspector General of Municipalities to treat his order dated August 24, 1960, as void and in operative. However, it would be open to the authorities concerned to reconsider the case. Parties are beft to lear their own costs. Security amount shall be refunded. Khun, J. 21. I agree. Final Result : Allowed