Judgment MAHAPATRA, J. 1. The appellants brought a suit on the 7th of January, 1950, for a declaration that they had perpetual mukarrari interest in the property in suit described in Schedule 1 of the plaint, and that they were entitled to get the property which was in the custody of the Sub-divisional Officer, Barh, after the same was attached under Sec. 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The property involved in the suit was 16.35 acres in village Berna Gossain Nath, Pargana Pillich, thana Buktiarpur in the district of Patna. 2. The plaintiffs are the members of a Hindu joint family governed by the Mitakshara School of which the plaintiff No. 1 is the karta. One Baldeogir was impleaded originally as defendant No. 6, but he was expunged by an order of the Court at the instance of the plaintiffs on the 10th of January, 1951; so also another defendant No. 8, Mt. Deolagan Devi, was expunged. No relief was sought particularly against defendant No. 7. We are thus left with defendants 1 to 5 who were parties to a proceeding under S. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, as against the plaintiff. The plaintiffs case was that Baldeogir was the absolute owner of the rent free lands in khata Nos. 135 to 138 of village Berna Gossain Math. He was a devotee of God Shiva but the properties were his own and he treated them as such like his predecessors-in-interest. The deity installed in the Math premises was a private one. Neither the defendants nor any member of the village public had any concern with the suit rent free lands or the management and worship of the deify. By a registered deed of settlement dated the 3rd June, 1947, the suit lands were settled with the plaintiffs for a consideration of Rs. 23,000/-at an annual rental of Rs. 16/- besides cess, and the plaintiffs came in possession of the same. They replaced the tiled roof in a portion of the Math premises by a pucca roof and were performing the necessary puja of the deity. A part of the consideration (Rs. 15,850/-) for the settlement was paid in cash before the sub-registrar and the balance was paid to the different usufructuary mortgagees from Baldeogir for redemption of those mortgages. They replaced the tiled roof in a portion of the Math premises by a pucca roof and were performing the necessary puja of the deity. A part of the consideration (Rs. 15,850/-) for the settlement was paid in cash before the sub-registrar and the balance was paid to the different usufructuary mortgagees from Baldeogir for redemption of those mortgages. The defendants wanted to take the settlement but having failed in their efforts, began to create dispute with the plaintiffs with a view to forcing them to leave the possession. At their instance, a proceeding under Sec. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, was initiated against the plaintiffs, and the orders were made absolute against the defendants on the 10th February 1947, the plaintiffs possession being recognised. The defendants again made a similar attempt by filing a complaint against the plaintiffs through one Parmeshwar Gir, but that failed by the orders passed on the 30th of December, 1947. They, however, initiated another proceeding under Sec. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, which was later converted to one under Sec. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, and the suit properties came under attachment. The trying Magistrate attached the properties under S. 146, Criminal Procedure Code, by his orders passed on the 1st June, 1949. To get the properties released from that attachment, the present suit was filed. The plaintiffs denied that the defendants had any title or any right over the properties, or that they ever managed or possessed that. 3. Defendants 1 to 5 filed a joint written statement and pleaded, besides limitation and defect of parties, that the suit lands formed a. public endowment having been dedicated to Lord Shiva (Shri Shri Bichitra Nathji Maharaj) by the landlords of the village, and that Baldecgir, like his predecessors-in-interest was a mere shebait. Neither the property nor its income were ever treated as private property by any of the Goassains. The origin of the endowment was shrouded in antiquity, but the property from generation to generation was treated as the property of the deity. As Baldeogir began to misconduct himself and misappropriate the property about the year 1348 Fasli, the Hindu public of the village Berna elected the defendants as members of a committee to supervise and manage the property in 1350 Fasli. The committee tried to reform Baldeogir but they failed. As Baldeogir began to misconduct himself and misappropriate the property about the year 1348 Fasli, the Hindu public of the village Berna elected the defendants as members of a committee to supervise and manage the property in 1350 Fasli. The committee tried to reform Baldeogir but they failed. However, Baldeogir left the village with his concubine for Machhardiha and since then he had no interest left in the suit properties of the deity; nor was he in possession of the same. The defendants denied the genuineness, validity and passing of consideration of the deed of settlement registered in favour of the plaintiffs. They also denied plaintiffs possession at any time or any repair done by them to the roof. The plaintiffs, according to them, wanted to take forcible possession of the lands and came with people armed with lathis and damaged the temple, which led to an information to the police on the 19th of November, 1947, and a proceeding under S. 144, Criminal Procedure Code, which was summarily made absolute against the defendants on the 10th of December, 1947, notwithstanding the fact that the case had been fixed for showing cause to the 14th of December, 1947. They pleaded that Baldeogir had no right to alienate any property, much less the Math, the ghairmazrua-am and the kasht lands by way of a permanent settlement, in favour of the plaintiffs. They denied plaintiffs title and possession and asserted that they having been elected by the local public were entitled to manage the affairs of the Math, for the benefit of which, the endowment had been created. 4. On these pleadings, six issues were framed. The trial court negatived the plea of defect of parties and non-maintainability of the suit for want of notice under Order 1, Rule 8, Civil Procedure Code. The last issue was in the general form about any relief to which the plaintiffs were entitled. The main issues were Nos. 3, 4 and 5 which read as follows : "3. Is the property in suit private property of the defendants 2nd party? If the plaintiffs have acquired any title to the suit land on the basis of Patta dated 3-6-47? Was the patta dated 3-6-47 executed for legal necessity?" 5. The trial court found that the properties in suit were endowed properties belonging to the Math and/or the deity installed therein. If the plaintiffs have acquired any title to the suit land on the basis of Patta dated 3-6-47? Was the patta dated 3-6-47 executed for legal necessity?" 5. The trial court found that the properties in suit were endowed properties belonging to the Math and/or the deity installed therein. The plaintiffs did not acquire any title to the suit lands on the basis of the Patta executed in their favour. That document was not for legal necessity and was void. While discussing issue No. 6, the court below found that the entire story that there was a public meeting or that a committee consisting of the defendants was formed in that meeting was a myth. The defendants did not acquire any title to the properties; nor have they right to possess the same. Thus neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants had title to the property or the right to possess it. It was, however, found that the plaintiffs had dismantled the old roof and constructed a new one on which the name of plaintiff No. 1 was inscribed. The evidence, according to the trial Judge, disclosed that the plaintiffs had got possession to a portion of the Math and the Samadhi. In the opinion of the court below, such possession of the plaintiffs was not to be respected as they had no title. It was, therefore, held that neither of the parties had the right to possession. Accordingly, the plaintiffs suit was dismissed. There was an observation that till such time when a Mahanth is duly installed or a board is formed for the administration of the property in conformity with the scheme prepared and approved by the competent authority, the property should remain in custodia legis. Against this, the present appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants did not contest before us the findings that the property in question was a public religious endowment, and that the plaintiffs did not acquire any title under the Patta dated the 3rd June, 1947. Against this, the present appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants did not contest before us the findings that the property in question was a public religious endowment, and that the plaintiffs did not acquire any title under the Patta dated the 3rd June, 1947. His main contention was that in view of the clear finding that the plaintiffs were in possession of a portion of the suit property, particularly the Math premises, and that there was evidence about their possession of the suit lands, the court should have held that the plaintiffs were entitled to possession, and the property should have been released from attachment under Sec. 146, Criminal Procedure Code. A possessory title was good enough, according to him, to get a decree in a suit of this nature. When the defendants, who were opposite parties to the plaintiffs in the proceeding under Sec. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, were found to have neither title nor possession, the only course left for the Court was to decree the right of possession in favour of the plaintiffs. He pointed out that besides positive evidence about plaintiffs possession the probability was very strong in its support. Not only the plaintiffs paid Rs. 15850/- before the sub-registrar but also redeemed one usufructuary mortgage bond on payment of Rs. 2,500 on the 18th June, 1948, another two mortgages on the 24th June, 1947, one for Rs. 2,500/- and another for Rs. 500/-. He also redeemed other two, one for Rs. 600/- on the 22nd June, 1947, and another for Rs. 152 on the 19th June, 1948. Payment of such huge amounts would not have been possible if the plaintiffs were not put in possession of the properties. Secondly, the crop that was grown in 1947 was harvested by the plaintiffs as proved in this case. Next years crop in 1948 was also grown by them, and before they were ready for harvest, proceedings under S. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, were started in that respect on the 24th November, 1948, on receipt of a police report. These proceedings terminated in the order of attachment under Sec. 146, Criminal Procedure Code on the 1st June, 1949. Next years crop in 1948 was also grown by them, and before they were ready for harvest, proceedings under S. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, were started in that respect on the 24th November, 1948, on receipt of a police report. These proceedings terminated in the order of attachment under Sec. 146, Criminal Procedure Code on the 1st June, 1949. Thus, it was urged, the plaintiffs right from the date the mukarrari patta was executed on the 3rd of June, 1947, came in possession of the suit property and retained the same till attachment was made under S. 145. A person in possession is entitled to retain his possession under S. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, and if the Magistrate could have been satisfied about the plaintiffs possession on the date or within two months previous to the date of the initial order under Sec. 145, that possession could have been declared and the plaintiffs would have been allowed to remain in such possession till evicted in due course of law. The defendants having no title cannot defeat the plaintiffs possession. The trial court, it was contended, failed to notice the legal implication of the plaintiffs possession, independent of their title. 7. The counter argument from the defendants-respondents was that a suit brought after an attachment under Sec. 146, Criminal Procedure Code, has to be for declaration of ones title, and on proof of that title alone, one can be put in possession of the property after its release from attachment. Title in such cases cannot be of the nature of possessory title alone. What could be enough in a proceeding under S. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, for the success of one of the parties there, would not be so in a suit, after orders passed under S. 145 (6) or S. 146, Criminal Procedure Code. Learned counsel referred to the difference in wordings in S. 145 (4) and S. 146, and pointed out that in the former section, it is stated that the Magistrate shall, without reference to the merits of claim of any of such parties to a right to possess the subject of dispute, decide the question whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of the order before mentioned, in such possession of the said subject. The Magistrate is not required to deal with the title but to see the actual possession of the parties before him. Section 146 (before the 1955 amendment) provided that if the Magistrate decided that none of the parties was in such possession or if he was unable to satisfy himself as to which of them was in possession of the subject of dispute, he would attach the lands, and that attachment would continue till a competent Court determined the rights of the parties thereto or the person entitled to possession thereof. It was contended that the distinction in the language implies that after attachment under S. 148, a competent Court was required to determine the title of the contesting parties. "Person" entitled to possession, it was argued, referred to persons other than those who were parties in the proceeding under S. 145. There is no doubt that if an unsuccessful party in a case under S. 145 conies to the Civil Court for declaration of his title and proves the same, he will be entitled to lift the attachment under section 146 or to evict the other party which might have been put in possession under S. 145(6) and take possession himself. But if a successful (an unsuccessful(?)) party chooses not to have a declaration about his title or fails to establish the same but proves that, as a matter of fact, he was in actual physical possession of the subject of dispute at the time of initiation of the proceeding under Sec. 145, will he not be entitled to possession after the Civil Court decides in his favour only in regard to possession on the relevant date? Both sections 145 and 146 deal with possession. What would be sufficient for the successful party in such a proceeding before the Magistrate would also be enough to counteract the final orders passed either under Sec. 145 or S. 146. The only forum, after such proceedings, has been indicated to be a competent Court like the Civil Court. The alternative provision in Sec. 146 in regard to the matter of proof before a competent Court is significant. Either one having the right to the property or one entitled to possession will succeed to bring to an end the attachment under S. 146. The alternative provision in Sec. 146 in regard to the matter of proof before a competent Court is significant. Either one having the right to the property or one entitled to possession will succeed to bring to an end the attachment under S. 146. The word "person" there, is no doubt wider than the parties and would include persons who were not before the Magistrate in a case under S. 145, but that does not mean that the word "person" used there would exclude the parties. The amendment to S. 146 as made in 1955 would also throw some light on the correct interpretation of the old section. In the amended sub-section (1) of Sec. 146 it is said that when the Court is unable to decade as to which of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute, it may attach the property and draw up a statement of the facts of the case and forward the record of the proceeding to a Civil Court to decide the question whether any and which of the parties was in possession of the subject of dispute at the date of the preliminary order under Sec. 145. It is thus clear that now the Civil Court is only required to determine the question of possession and not title. The purpose of the amendment was only to provide a quicker method of disposal of the dispute under S. 145 and not to effect any change in the substance of the earlier provision. Besides, the language of S. 146, as it stood before the amendment, referred to the "right" of the parties which would include also possessory right. That is a kind of right which is recognised in law and holds good against all persons except the rightful owner. There is no reason why a person who succeeds in proving such a right in the Civil Court would not be able to get possession of the lands under attachment, if the other side has not got any better right or title or possession. 8. There is no reason why a person who succeeds in proving such a right in the Civil Court would not be able to get possession of the lands under attachment, if the other side has not got any better right or title or possession. 8. In the case of Asher v. Whitlock, (1865) 1 QB 1 it was held that the person in possession of land without other title has a devisable interest, and that the heir of his devisee can maintain ejectment against any person who has entered upon the land and cannot connect himself with some one having title or possession prior to the testator. It is well established that possession is a good title against all tha world except the person who can show a better title. By reason of his possession, such person has an interest, which can be sold or devised. In the case of Sundar v. Parbati, ILR 12 All 51 (PC) possession of an estate left by a deceased Hindu was taken by his two widows. The deceased being childless had, before his death, adopted a son, to whom, also, by will he had bequeathed his estate. The adopted son died soon after the testator. The widows wanted to partition the estate between themselves. It was held that the widows had a possessory title or interest in the estate, notwithstanding that a preferable title might exist in others through the deceased legatee, and the estate, being jointly held by them, was partible, and that either widow might maintain a suit for partition. This decision was in the year 1889 and thereafter the same view has always held the ground. 9. I might also refer here to the case of Ismail Ariff v. Mahomed Ghous, ILR 20 Cal 834 (PC). The property in question there was a waqf, and the plaintiff was in possession of the same as the purchaser. The defendant was found to have no title to that. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to a declaratory decree against the defendant as to his right and an injunction restraining him from interfering with his possession. For the purposes of the plaintiffs claiming such a decree, it was not necessary that he should negative the wakf, as to the validity of the endowment no decision being needed. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to a declaratory decree against the defendant as to his right and an injunction restraining him from interfering with his possession. For the purposes of the plaintiffs claiming such a decree, it was not necessary that he should negative the wakf, as to the validity of the endowment no decision being needed. That could not be decided either way in that suit as the parties interested were not before the Court. Thus, it appears without any doubt that a declaratory suit is maintainable at the instance of a person who is in possession but has no title. He can obtain a declaration about his right to possess and maintain his possession against all except the rightful owner, or one who can prove a better title. 10. Learned counsel for the respondents Wanted to say that though a declaratory suit of that nature is maintainable and possessory right is recognised in law to hold good against all but the rightful owner, yet a suit of that nature cannot be successfully laid after there is an attachment under section 146, Criminal Procedure Code. He relied upon the cases reported in Hargobind Rai v. Keshwa Prasad, 1924 Pat H.C.C. 297 : (AIR 1925 Pat 168); Dharapuram Janopakara Nidhi Ltd. v. Lakshminarayana Chettiar, AIR 1939 Mad 456 (SB); Sundaresa Iyer v. Sarvajana Sowkiabi Virdhi Nidhi Ltd., AIR 1939 Mad 853; Jurawan Singh v. Ramsarekh Singh, AIR 1933 Pat 224; Bipat Mahton v. Kulpat Mahton, AIR 1934 Pat 498; Administrator General of Bengal v. Bhagaban Chandra, 15 Cal WN 758 : Brojendra Kishore v. Bharat Chandra, 28 Cal WN 481 : (AIR 1916 Cal 751); Rao Karan Singh v. Raja Bakar Ali Khan, 9 Ind App 99 (PC) and Ramaswamy Ayyar v. Muthuswami Ayyar, ILR 30 Mad 12. Some of these cases were cited to support the contention that during the attachment under S. 146 there is no dispossession or discontinuance within the meaning of Article 142 of the Limitation Act, and a receiver remains in possession on behalf of the rightful owner, (20 Cal WN 481 : (AIR 1916 Cal 7,51), 9 Ind App 99 (PC), ILR 30 Mad 12 and AIR 1939 Mad 456 (SB).) Other cases show that a declaratory suit is maintainable and there need not be a prayer for recovery of possession, as possession is with the receiver and not with the defendant of a suit which is brought after an attachment under Sec. 146 (15 Cal WN 758). 11. In the case of AIR 1933 Pat 224, the receiver after attachment under Sec. 146, Criminal Procedure Code, had settled the land with another person. It was held that settlement would not affect prejudicially the right of the party found by the Court to be entitled to possession of the land in dispute. Similarly in the case of AIR 1934 Pat 498 a transferee from a widow brought a suit for declaration of his tide in respect of the lands, on the basis of his purchase from the widow. That suit was an outcome of the proceeding under S. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, in which the suit property was attached finally under Sec. 146. The suit was based on the claim of an absolute title, on the contention that the transfer by the widow was for legal necessity. The defendants, who had no interest in the reversion, resisted the suit. The finding of the Court was that the transfer by the widow was without legal necessity or consideration and that the plaintiff had obtained no title on that basis. When plaintiff pressed his rights on the ground of prior possession independent of title by purchase, he was repelled because such an alternative claim had not been made out in the pleading. It is manifest from this decision only, that the plaintiff could have succeeded to terminate the attachment under Sec. 146 after a finding about his possession in the Civil Court. It is manifest from this decision only, that the plaintiff could have succeeded to terminate the attachment under Sec. 146 after a finding about his possession in the Civil Court. The case of Chaturbhuj Singh v. Sarada Charan, AIR 1933 Pat 6, where it was held that the plaintiff in an action of ejectment is allowed to succeed on the strength of his prior possession only, was also referred to in that decision with approval. When possession is given to a party under Sec. 145 (6) or to a receiver under S. 146, the civil suit following that, is virtually an action in ejectment, although the payment of ad valorem court-fee on a prayer for recovery of possession is dispensed with in a suit after an attachment under S. 146, Criminal Procedure Code. When a party in the Civil Court shows his title to the land in dispute, there is no doubt that he would have possession of the property attached under section 146. The point mooted in the present case is that without proof of title, one may show that he is entitled to possession on the basis of his prior possession. None of the cases cited by the respondents refutes this view. On the other hand, both the language of Sec. 146, Criminal Procedure Code, and what was stated in AIR 1934 Pat 498 show, beyond doubt, that such a position is tenable in law. I would, therefore, hold that in the present case if the plaintiffs had made out a case of prior possession as the basis of their claim, and if they proved their possession on the date of or/and before attachment under section 145 they would be entitled to succeed. 12. Looking to the plaint, I find that the main relief sought by the plaintiffs is as follows : "It may be declared and decreed by the Court that the plaintiffs have perpetual mukarrari interest ..... in the property in suit .. 12. Looking to the plaint, I find that the main relief sought by the plaintiffs is as follows : "It may be declared and decreed by the Court that the plaintiffs have perpetual mukarrari interest ..... in the property in suit .. and that the plaintiffs are entitled to get the property under the custody of the court of the Sub-divisional Officer, Barh, after the attachment thereof together with the entire money on account of the crops and income of the aforesaid property and that defendants first party have no title to the aforesaid property." Three declarations were required (1) plaintiffs have mukarrari interest on account of their patta from Baldeo Gir (2) plaintiffs are entitled to get the property from the custody of the attaching court; and (3) the defendants have no title to the property. The last one has been given in favour of the plaintiffs by the court below. The first was negatived and the appellants did not press it. The second one was refused by the trial court as a consequence of the denial of the first declaration. The whole argument has been with reference to the second declaration. The plaint as a whole, no doubt, made out, primarily, a case of settlement in favour of the plaintiffs by Baldeo Gir, but at the same time, mention of the second declaration would not justify ruling out the alternative plea of the plaintiffs that on the ground of their prior possession they are entitled to recover possession from the custody of the attaching court. As I have pointed out before, in the case reported in AIR 1934 Pat 498 such an alternative case was not entertained because that could not be gathered from the pleadings. In this case the relief portions of the plaint show a different position. 13. The more important thing to examine is whether the plaintiffs have proved that they were in possession of the suit property on the basis of the invalid deed of settlement, after the document was executed in their favour on the 3rd of June, 1947, and that their possession continued till the 24th of November, 1948, when the first order under Sec. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, was passed or at least within two months preceding that date. No doubt, the court below has found that the defendants had no title or possession, but that would not help the plaintiffs unless they have proved their own. 14-16 (After discussion of documentary and oral evidence His Lordship proceeded.) In such circumstances, it cannot be held that the plaintiffs established their possession over the suit lands at the time of attachment under Sec. 145, Criminal Procedure Code, so as to prove their possessory right and to be declared by the Court as entitled to take possession from the Criminal Court. Whatever little act of possession they exercised at some time, long before the attachment by the Magistrate, was not free from force. Such acts, besides being of a time much earlier than the attachment, would hardly constitute the basis for a declaration of plaintiffs right to the whole of the suit property. 17. Learned counsel for the appellants stressed the fact that the defendants failed to show their possession and the finding is against them both in regard to their right and possession. That is so, but that will afford no help to the plaintiffs, on whom lay the onus to prove either their right or their prior possession. If they failed to establish that, their suit cannot succeed. For the respondents, it was contended that the suit itself was also bad for defect of parties as the deity was not impleaded. Even Baldeo Gir was expunged from the record. He referred to the cases reported in Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradhyumna Kumar Mullick, 52 Ind App 245 : (AIR 1925 PC 139) and Kanhaya Lal v. Hamid Ali, 60 Ind App 263 : (AIR 1933 PC 198 (1)) to substantiate his view. Issue No. 1 in the trial court was about defect of parties, and the defendants conceded during the trial that there was no such defect. Apart from that, the present suit is an offshoot from the criminal case under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. It will be still open to the deity or any member of the public having interest in the endowment to bring a suit for declaration of title and to oust any person who may be in possession without having a good title in his support. The suit contemplated in Sec. 146, Criminal Procedure Code is virtually one between the parties who were contestants in the Criminal Court. 18. The suit contemplated in Sec. 146, Criminal Procedure Code is virtually one between the parties who were contestants in the Criminal Court. 18. Another contention by learned counsel was that in view of the evidence that Baldeo Gir left the Math and the village and went away to his original home in 1945, he had no interest left in him in respect of the suit property to put the plaintiffs in its possession or to execute a patta in his favour. The settlement was a void transaction and that finding remains unchallenged. Whether Baldeo Gir ceased to be a Mahanth and had voluntarily relinquished the office, of shebait by his departure from the Math before the impugned transaction in favour of the plaintiffs, cannot be conclusively discerned from the evidence. The defendants case was that his departure was the result of the protest of the village committee against his immoral character and mismanagement. But the existence of the committee itself having not been proved, as found by the trial court, its consequence resulting in the departure of the Mahanth can hardly be believed. Even if a shebait remains outside, it does not amount to a voluntary relinquishment of shebaitship. We have already found from the chaukidari receipts that Baldeo Gir was paying the tax for the Math house till the plaintiffs took the burden upon themselves in 1947. The respondents referred to a deed of settlement, Exhibit F-1, dated the 2nd June, 1948, where a woman by name Muneshwari Devi was described as a concubine of Baldeo Gir, resident of village Machhardiha and Exhibit F, a deed of sale dated the 15th June, 1948, executed in favour of Baldeo Gir described as a son of Narain Gir of the same village, and Exhibit F-3, another deed of settlement dated the 31st May, 1948, executed in favour of Baldeo Gir described in the same manner. At the most, these documents show, if Baldeo Gir described there is the same person as in this suit, that in 1948, more than a year after the plaintiffs alleged possession, he (Mahanth Baldeo Gir) acted in a manner to show that he had no more connection with the Math or with the office of the shebait. At the most, these documents show, if Baldeo Gir described there is the same person as in this suit, that in 1948, more than a year after the plaintiffs alleged possession, he (Mahanth Baldeo Gir) acted in a manner to show that he had no more connection with the Math or with the office of the shebait. The deed of settlement was in respect of the Math, the deity and the lands, and, therefore, if it was intended by the parties to take effect, the settlor would naturally treat himself as completely devoid of interest he transferred to the settlee. Nane of these documents of Exhibits F series would show that Baldeo Gir had left the Math in 1945, or at any time prior to the 3rd of June, 1947. Some witnesses on the plaintiffs side gave evidence that Baldeo Gir of our suit was not the same as described in these documents. Whatever that may be, Exhibits F series do not establish voluntary relinquishment in 1945. But that question is of no material importance in the present case in view of the finding that the plaintiffs did not obtain any title or possession over the suit land. 19. It was further argued by the respondents that by the act, evidenced by the transfer under Exhibit 5, as done by Baldeo Gir, he has forfeited his rights as a shebait and the endowment will revert to the founders heirs, some of the defendants being such heirs. In the written statement defendants 1 to 5 stated that none of the founders, meaning their heirs, was impleaded in the suit. Learned counsels attempt, with reference to the evidence and Exhibit Q, a village note prepared in 1908 and the khewat Exhibit A of the same year to prove that, at least Motilal Singh, defendant No. 2, was an heir of the founder, can be of no avail. The village note, Exhibit Q, shows that the present landlords had acquired the proprietary right in the village long before the survey settlement. The original tauzi was 150 and it belonged to Surujmal Singh and Bramhadut Singh. Their shares were sold many years ago to some persons, and the present proprietors are owners since that time. It was the original proprietors who had created the endowment. The original tauzi was 150 and it belonged to Surujmal Singh and Bramhadut Singh. Their shares were sold many years ago to some persons, and the present proprietors are owners since that time. It was the original proprietors who had created the endowment. Thus the present maliks being only purchasers cannot be said to be the heirs of the founders of the endowment. In any case, in view of the categorical denial of any of the founders heirs being party to the present suit in the written statement, the contention of reversion of the endowment to one of the defendants cannot be entertained, particularly in absence of any issue or clear evidence on that aspect. That course will remain open to the heirs of the founders in a properly constituted suit against Mahanth Baldeo Gir. 20. On account of the plaintiffs failure to prove either their title or their possession, they can have no relief. The decree dismissing the plaintiffs suit is therefore confirmed. The appeal is dismissed but there will be no order for costs, in the circumstances of the case. 21. TARKESHWAR NATH 22. I agree.Appeal dismissed