Judgment :- 1. The Executive Authority, Vyttila Panchayat has filed this appeal against the order of acquittal passed by the 2nd Class Magistrate, Ernakulam in C. C. 5722/59 acquitting the accused who had been prosecuted for an offence under S.104 (I) read with S.80, 85 and 97 [1] of the T. C. Panchayat Act II of 1950 read with Bye-laws 1 and 8 framed under S.80 of the Act. 2. Under S.80 of the Panchayat Act the Panchayat may, with the previous approval of the Director, notify that no place within the limits of the Panchayat area shall be used for, any of the purposes which in the opinion of Government are likely to be offensive or dangerous to human life or health or property, without a licence from the Executive Authority and except in accordance with the conditions specified therein. Government have by notification duly published, specified the items which in their opinion are likely to be offensive or dangerous to human life or health or property. In column 2 of the schedule given in the notification, using a place for lime manufacture requires licence under S.80 of the Panchayat Act. 3. Vyttila Panchayat has published Bye-laws and Bye-law No.1 says that no place within the Panchayat area shall be used for any one or more of the purposes mentioned in the table of licence fees appended, without a licence from the Executive Authority of the Panchayat or member or officer authorised by him. Therefore there cannot be any dispute that any place for the manufacture of lime requires a licence. 4. S.104 [1] provides that, whoever [a] contravenes any of the provisions of this Act specified in the first and second columns of Schedule I or, [b] contravenes any rule or order made under any of the provisions so specified etc., will be liable to a fine specified in that behalf in the fourth column of the said schedule. Schedule I & S.104[1] provides punishment for the violation of the conditions specified in S.80 of the Act. Therefore a person who fails to take out a licence under S.80 provided under S.80 of the Act would be liable under S.104 [1] of the Act. 5. It is amply proved that there is a lime kiln in the field lying on the eastern side of the Mannanathuparambu situated within the panchayat limits. Therefore a person who fails to take out a licence under S.80 provided under S.80 of the Act would be liable under S.104 [1] of the Act. 5. It is amply proved that there is a lime kiln in the field lying on the eastern side of the Mannanathuparambu situated within the panchayat limits. It is admitted that a lime kiln had been constructed by the accused. In para 6 of the judgment the learned Magistrate has discussed the question whether the accused did really manufacture lime and has found on the evidence that the accused had worked the kiln on 21-10-59, 26-10-59 and 6-11-59 as alleged by the prosecution. This finding has not been challenged by the learned counsel for the defence. 6. Ext P-1 is an application dated 3-9-59 sent by the accused. According to the prosecution it cannot be taken as a valid application for a licence. It is pointed out that the Bye-laws provide that an application for licence shall be made in writing to the Executive Authority in the prescribed printed form, along with the licence fee prescribed for, as per the table of licence fee annexed. But it is pointed out by the learned counsel for the accused that in the trial court they had proceeded on the basis that it was a valid application form and that the court has observed that there is no evidence that any prescribed form is necessary and that Ext-P1 must be taken to be an application in the proper form. 7. The trial court acquitted the accused on the ground that no order was issued on Ext-P1 application within 30 days as enjoined under S.83 (12). The relevant portion of S.83 (12) is in the following terms: "save as otherwise specially provided in this Act, if orders on an application for licence or permission are not communicated to the applicant within thirty days after the receipt of the application by the Executive Authority, the application shall be deemed to have been allowed for the year or for such less period as is mentioned in the application and subject to the law, and rules all conditions ordinarily imposed." In this case Ext-P1 application was submitted on 3-9-59 and no orders were admittedly communicated to the applicant within 30 days after the receipt of the application by the Executive Authority. 8. 8. The date of occurrence in this case is 21-10-59 and the argument is that as there has been a failure on the part of the Panchayat to communicate to the applicant within thirty days after the receipt of this application it must be deemed that the application had been allowed for the period from which it was made and as such no offence is committed. The learned counsel for the Panchayat argues, that this provision refers only to renewals. On carefully going through S.83 (12), I find that it is not so. As far as renewals are concerned it has been specifically stated that an applicant for the renewal of a licence shall be entitled to act until he has been communicated any orders to the contrary. But as far as the 1st application for a licence or permission is concerned a restriction has been placed that such a person cannot act until the expiry of 30 days. A distinction has been drawn between renewals and first licence, that in cases of renewals the applicant need not wait, but can continue as if he has been given a licence, but in the case of first application he cannot do so until he has waited for 30 days, within which time the Panchayat is to give some order on this application. It need not be a final order; even any interim order stating that the application is being considered might satisfy the provisions of the section. 9. It was also argued on behalf of the Panchayat that there is the general prohibition that no place could be used for any of the prohibited purposes without a licence and therefore in the face of this express prohibition the provision contained in S.83 (12) will not apply. A similar argument was raised in the case in Muruga Konar v. The Madurai Municipality through its Commissioner (1954 (2) MLJ. A similar argument was raised in the case in Muruga Konar v. The Madurai Municipality through its Commissioner (1954 (2) MLJ. 217) where Krishnaswami Nayudu, J., has observed as follows: "It is however urged on behalf of the municipality that S.269 of the Act prohibits any person without a licence from carrying on a trade of a butcher and in the face of such an express prohibition clause (ii) of S.321 would not apply and since the provision which deemed that an application has been allowed consequent on the non-receipt of a reply within thirty days of the receipt of the application is qualified by the following clauses, namely, "save as otherwise specially provided in this Act", it is urged that S.269 is the special provision which excludes the application of the clause granting this privilege. I am unable to accept this argument for the reason that the specific provision that is contemplated is a specific provision to the contrary. A specific provision contrary to what is laid down under clause (ii) must be found somewhere in the Act to take away a case from the application of that sub-clause. It is not suggested that there is any such provision to the contrary except the general provisions relating to the granting of licences and prohibition of trade without such licences." I am in respectful agreement with this view. 10. The further question that arises is whether the application Ext. P-1 can be considered as a proper application for licence under the Act and the Bye-law 2 framed under the Act. This aspect of the case has not been considered by the court below. It is therefore necessary that the order of acquittal should be set aside and a retrial ordered. The parties may adduce whatever further evidence they deem necessary regarding the validity of the application. In the result, I allow the appeal, set aside the order of acquittal and order that a retrial be held by the District Magistrate or by any other competent Magistrate subordinate to him. Allowed.