JUDGMENT 1. Alleging that they were entitled to be maintained out of the disputed properties, the petitioners, as plaintiffs, instituted a suit against the opposite party No. 1, claiming declaration of a charge for maintenance on the disputed properties and recovery of maintenance due. Since the petitioners were not possessed of sufficient means to enable them to pay the fee prescribed by law for the plaint in the suit, they filed an application, on June 11, 1955, for permission to sue as paupers. The application was allowed, the petitioners were permitted to sue in forma pauperis and the suit was registered, on February 25, 156, as Title Suit No. 48 of 1955. 2. In the meantime, the opposite party No. 1 had transferred or purported to transfer his share in the following plots, out of the disputed properties, to the several persons as herein- (a) Two tanks on plots No. 8234 and 8249 were transferred to opposite party No. 4 bys Kobala (Ex. A1) on August 12, 1953. (b) Plot No. 8506 was transferred to Opposite Party No. 12 by Kobala (Ext. AII) on September 29, 1955. (c) Plot No. 8312 was sold to Opposite Party No. 3 by Kobala Ex. A on November 18, 1955. (d) Plot No. 8838 was sold to Opposite Party No. 8 and 9 by Kobala Ex. A (2) on January 4, 1956. It further transpired that sometime in the year 1360 B. S. (1953-54) there was a partition amongst opposite party No. 1 and his co-sharers. As a result thereof opposite party No. 16 got plot No. 8841 and a share in plot No. 8847, Opposite Party No. 9 got plot No. 8494 and a share in plot No. 8847 and Opposite Party No. 14 got plot No. 8844. It also transpired that plot No. 8825 was allotted to one Dharani Majumder on partition and from him Opposite Party No. 10 purchased. So far as plot No. 8824 is concerned the tenancy right therein appears to have been purchased by Opposite Party No. 10 and his-co-sharers on November 5, 1956. 3. The pauper suit was decreed in favour of the petitioners on May 5, 1956 and they obtained the declaration and the decree for money as prayed for. In execution of the decree the petitioners auction-purchased the disputed plots of land. When they went to take possession they were resisted by Opposite Party Nos. 3. The pauper suit was decreed in favour of the petitioners on May 5, 1956 and they obtained the declaration and the decree for money as prayed for. In execution of the decree the petitioners auction-purchased the disputed plots of land. When they went to take possession they were resisted by Opposite Party Nos. 2 to 17. On the allegation that such resistance was offered by the aforementioned parties on behalf of the judgment-debtor Opposite Party No. 1, the petitioners filed an application under the provision of Order 21, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, complaining to the executing court of such resistance. The executing court below started an investigation and came to the conclusion that plots No. 8234, 8249, 8506, 8312 and 8838 had been transferred by the Opposite Party No. 1 during the time when the petitioners' application for permission to sue as paupers was pending and was being investigated: as such the court below held that the aforesaid transfers were not hit by the provision of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and the purchasers of the plots aforementioned were in possession in their own right and not on behalf of the judgment-debtor Opposite Party No. 1. The court below further found that plots Nos. 8494, 8825, 8841, 8844 and 8847 had been allotted to the co-sharers of the Opposite Party No. 1 on partition in the year 1360 B. S. (1953-54) and in those properties the Opposite Party No. 1 no longer had the interest which was sought to be attached by the petitioners. Lastly, the court below held that in the tenancy in Plot No. 8824, conveyed to Opposite Party No. 10 and his brother, the Opposite Party No. 1 had no interest and the same was not liable to be attached in execution of the decree. 4. Save and except as to the aforementioned plots, the court below allowed the application on contest against opposite Party No. 3, 4, 8 to 12, 14 and the propriety of the aforesaid order is being disputed before us at the instance of the petitioners. 4. Save and except as to the aforementioned plots, the court below allowed the application on contest against opposite Party No. 3, 4, 8 to 12, 14 and the propriety of the aforesaid order is being disputed before us at the instance of the petitioners. It was contended before us that the suit for maintenance, being Title Suit No. 48 of 1955, must be deemed to be pending from the date of the presentation of the application for permission to sue as pauper and not merely from the date when the application was allowed and the suit was registered. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with transfers of property pendente lite and providing that, "the properly cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order, made therein", has an Explanation attached to it which we set out below :- "explanation-For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or' has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force. " 5. It is well known that when an application for leave to sue as a pauper is granted, the date on which the on to be the date on which the pauper suit was instituted for the purposes or limitation and not the date when the application is numbered and registered as a suit. This is what may be gathered from the Explanation to section 3 of the limitation Act. The question for our consideration is whether the date of the presentation of the application shall be deemed to be the starting point of pendency of the suit within the meaning of the Explanation to section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 6. The point seems to be covered by two decisions-one reported in (1) I. L. R. 30 All. The point seems to be covered by two decisions-one reported in (1) I. L. R. 30 All. 95 (Ambika Protap Singh v. Dwarka Prasad), which was a case under the unamended section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and the other reported in (2) A. I. R. 1936 Mad. 853 (Maddukuri Peda Jogarao v. Yenugu Chinnayya), a case under the amended section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the former case their lordships of the Allahabad High Court held: - "Mr. Sundar Lal on behalf of the respondent contended that the section of the Act in question has no application. His argument was that until the application of the defendant appellant for leave to sue in forma pauperis has been granted, that is, on 12th May. 1894, there was no suit pending within the meaning of that section, and he relied upon S. 410, Civil P.C. which declares that, when an application to sue in forma pauperis is granted, and has been numbered and registered, it shall then be deemed the plaint in the suit, and pending at the dale of the execution of the mortgage inasmuch as the application for leave to sue had not at that lime been numbered and registered. We cannot agree with him in this contention. It appears to us that so soon as the defendant filed his application for leave to sue there was a contentious suit, or at any rate a contentious proceeding and pending within the meaning of the section, and it is clear that the suit or proceeding was at the time being actively prosecuted. In this connation we may cite the ruling of their Lordships of the Privy Council in 29 All. 339, to the effect that where a suit is contentious in its origin and nature, it is not necessary that the summons should have been served in the suit, in order to make it contentious within the meaning of S. 52. Mr. Choudri relied upon the explanation to S. 4, Limitation Act. as supporting his proposition that the suit is instituted in the case of a pauper when the application for leave to sue as a pauper is filed. This section, no doubt, gives support to his argument but we think that there is no need to fall back upon it in view of the clear and specific language of S. 52, T. P. Act. This section, no doubt, gives support to his argument but we think that there is no need to fall back upon it in view of the clear and specific language of S. 52, T. P. Act. " In the latter case Pandrang Row, J. observed:- "the policy which underlies s. 52 is clear, viz., that, once litigation has been launched, any transfer subsequent thereto must be subject to the result of that litigation. Bearing this in mind there is no reason in my opinion to make any distinction between suits filed by well-to-do persons and those filed by paupers; for it cannot be said that the legislature intended to subject a pauper plaintiff to a disability from which a well-to-do litigant would be exempt. The law prescribes a certain procedure to be adopted by a pauper litigant who desires to file a suit and this procedure requires the filing of an application which, if the pauperism is established, is to be treated as a plaint, and the filing of the application has to be treated as the filing of the suit itself for purposes of limitation. There is no reason to make any distinction in the case of suits filed by paupers relating to immoveable property between the application for leave to sue as a pauper and the plaint itself. The two are to be deemed one and the same when the application for leave is granted. " 7. A suit filed in forma pauperis is not, however, the only instance where the date of the actual filing of the suit relates back to an earlier date. If a plaint is filed with insufficient court-fee and the court does not forthwith reject the plaint but recovers the deficit court-fee within a time fixed by it, any alienation made between the filing of the plaint with deficit court-fee and the date of recovery of the full court-fee payable thereon is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. This will appear from the decision in (3) A. I. R. 1943 Bom 27 (Shivshankarappa v. Shivappa. 8. It may be that the above consideration will not apply when an application to sue as pauper is rejected, as was observed by Vivian Bose and Puranik JJ. in (4) A. I. R. 1938 Nag. 30 (Sahandra Bai v. Sri Deo Radhaballav Jee. 8. It may be that the above consideration will not apply when an application to sue as pauper is rejected, as was observed by Vivian Bose and Puranik JJ. in (4) A. I. R. 1938 Nag. 30 (Sahandra Bai v. Sri Deo Radhaballav Jee. With that aspect of the point, however, we are not concerned in this Rule and we need not go further into the point. With the Allahabad and Madras decisions aforementioned we respectfully agree in so far as they go. We hold that the court below was in error in coming to the conclusion that transfers made by the opposite Party No. 1, during the period of the pendency of the application for permission to sue as pauper, were not hit by the doctrine of lis pendens as in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. That part of the judgment we set aside and direct the court below to make appropriate order under Order 21, Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure, after treating the aforementioned transfers as not binding on the decree-holder petitioners. No other point was urged in this Rule and we affirm the order of the Court below in all other respects. This Rule is made absolute to the extent indicated above without any order as to cost.