Order:- This Civil Revision Petition arises from an order of the learned District Judge of East Tanjore at Nagapattinam in O.S. No. 19 of 1959 directing the plaintiff to value the relief relating to item 1 of plaint A Schedule under section 30 of the Court-fees Act on the basis of the market value of the property and pay the deficit Court-fee. The suit is one for a declaration that the plaintiff and the defendant are the joint trustees of a certain family private trust entitled to be in joint possession and management of the trust and its properties and for certain consequential reliefs. The material clause in respect of item 1, is contained in clause (c) of the prayer paragraph of the plaint. It is as follows: “That the plaintiff is entitled to reside in the house item No. 1 herein described in the schedule of the properties as such trustee.” According to the plaintiff, one Subramaniam Chetty who had no issue created a trust in respect of the suit properties and under the deed of trust he and the defendant, his natural brother, would be entitled to be in joint possession of the trust properties and administer the same. Paragraph 3 of the plaint sets out the provisions of the will which created the trust. Paragraph 4 states that the testator also provided that the descendants of the plaintiff’s father should live in item 1 from generation to generation. It is clear from the plaint taken as a whole that the right to be in possession of the property was only in the plaintiff’s capacity of a trustee. If the averments in the plaint were to be accepted, it would show that item 1 would also form part of the trust. The mere fact that the trustees are allowed to be in occupation of one of the items of the trust properties cannot make that the item is not trust property. A provision made for the purpose of the trust, to enable the trustees to reside and to manage the trust cannot take the property out of the trust properties and vest it in the trustees as owners. A provision made for the purpose of the trust, to enable the trustees to reside and to manage the trust cannot take the property out of the trust properties and vest it in the trustees as owners. From the plaint it is clear that the case of the plaintiff is that item No. 1 formed part of the trust properties and that in his capacity as trustee, he wanted joint possession of the property along with the other trustee, viz., the defendant. In his order, dated 12th August, 1960, the learned District Judge stated that according to the plaint, item 1 was not stated to be dedicated to the suit trust but that the parties should he held in possession of the same from generation to generation meaning thereby that ownership of the property was vested in them. I am unable to understand where from the learned District Judge got the impression that the plaint stated that item 1 was distinct from the other trust properties. As I stated earlier the definite case in the plaint was that item 1 formed part of the trust and that the trustees should be in occupation of the same in their capacity as such. The plaintiff originally valued the plaint under section 28 of the Court-fees Act and paid a Court-fee of Rs. 200. The learned District Judge did not accept that valuation as correct. By his order, dated 12th August, 1960, he held that section 28 of the Court-fees Act would not apply to the case and directed the plaintiff to revalue the plaint in regard to item 1 of the plaint schedule properties with reference to prayer (c) to which I have made reference earlier. Thereupon the plaintiff valued item 1 in accordance with the provisions of section 25 (d) of the Court-fees Act, 1955 in a sum of Rs. 500 and paid the requisite Court-fee. The learned District Judge was not prepared to accept it as correct. By his order dated 30th August, 1960, he held that section 25 (d) would not apply to the case which in his opinion should be governed by the provisions of section 30. He has therefore directed the plaintiff to value item 1 in accordance with its market value and pay the Court-fee thereon. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this Civil Revision Petition by the plaintiff. He has therefore directed the plaintiff to value item 1 in accordance with its market value and pay the Court-fee thereon. It is the correctness of this order that is challenged in this Civil Revision Petition by the plaintiff. A reading of the plaint will show two things. (1) That all the properties in the suit are trust properties; and (2) that the plaintiff is a joint trustee along with the defendant and he seeks a declaration and joint possession only in that capacity. There is no mention anywhere in the plaint of the plaintiff being entitled to possession in any capacity other than that of a trustee or to exclusive possession independent of the joint trustee. The question then arises, what is that provision in the Court-fees Act which would apply to the present case. The learned District Judge has held that section 30 would govern the case. In my opinion that provision cannot apply, as the suits contemplated under that provision are suits for exclusive possession and not joint possession. Section 38 which speaks of valuation of reliefs as to joint possession will not also apply to the present case, that being confined to cases where joint possession is sought as substantive relief and not as in this case as a consequential one. Mr. Ramanujam, appearing for the learned Government Pleader, has contended that section 25 (a) would apply. That provision relates to cases where the prayer is for a declaration and possession of the property to which the declaration relates. The possession contemplated under clause (a) would be exclusive possession. But that is not what the plaintiff seeks in the instant case. It is only joint possession that he seeks by way of consequential relief. In other words, what he seeks is to walk into the property without obliging the defendant to walk out of it. The relief thus sought does not involve the ejectment or eviction of the defendant. In my opinion clause (a) of section 25 can be restricted only to cases where the possession sought would be one involving an eviction of the person in possession. That provision therefore cannot apply to a case like the present where the kind of possession sought allows the defendant to continue in occupation. In my opinion clause (a) of section 25 can be restricted only to cases where the possession sought would be one involving an eviction of the person in possession. That provision therefore cannot apply to a case like the present where the kind of possession sought allows the defendant to continue in occupation. As there is no other provision in the Act which will apply to a case where joint possession is sought as a consequential relief, section 25, clause (d), which is the residuary clause, would govern the case. It would follow that the valuation adopted by the plaintiff under section 25 (d) is the proper one and that the order of the learned District Judge is incorrect. That order is set aside and the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. There will be no order as to costs. R.M. ----- Petition allowed.