JUDGMENT :- Ten persons, including the three appellants, (1) Dadulla, (2) Govind Prasad alias Kalloo, and (3) Laxmi Prasad, were prosecuted for offence of murder of one Jageshwar Prasad. The committing magistrate discharged 7 of these 10 persons. He committed only these three appellants to the Court of Sessions, and that too only on charge for offence under Section 201, Indian Penal Code. All these three appellants have been convicted of that offence. Each of them has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for five years. 2. The deceased Jageshwar Prasad was missing from his village Offri, Police Station House, Maihar, from the morning of 21-10-1959. Reports in that respect were made to the police on 23-10-1959 and 24-10-1959. He remained untraced. On 25-10-1959, the appellant Dadulla made a report (Ex. P-1) at the police station house, Maihar, containing certain information how Jageshwar Prasad had met his death, and where his dead body was. It was stated in this Ex. P-1 that the dead body of Jageshwar Prasad, after weighing it with stones, had been thrown in the river Bakawali. An offence of murder was registered. 3. The dead body of Jageshwar Prasad, weighed with stones, was recovered from under water from a certain spot in the river Bakawali. According to the prosecution, the three appellants had made separate statements about throwing the dead body in the river Bakawali, and each had separately pointed out the same spot from where the dead body was later recovered. 4. The post mortem examination on the dead body of Jageshwar Prasad revealed two bruised areas, 6" x 6" and 6" x 5", respectively on the back and on the chest, accompanied by fractures of the ribs. The left lung was found punctured due to fracture of the ribs. There was also a fracture of the left angle of mandible. Death was due to shock and haemorrhage. 5. As stated earlier, the prosecution had alleged that the dead body was discovered as a result of information given separately by each of the appellants, and as a result of each of them separately pointing out the spot, where the dead body was. 6. These three appellants had denied having made any statement regarding where the dead body was, or having pointed out any spot as the place where the dead body had been thrown in the river. 7. 6. These three appellants had denied having made any statement regarding where the dead body was, or having pointed out any spot as the place where the dead body had been thrown in the river. 7. The trial Court found that these three appellants had separately made statements about throwing the dead body in the river and had separately pointed out a particular spot from where the dead body had been recovered from under water. The contention of the defence that it was only the statement made first regarding the whereabouts of the dead body that would be admissible under Section 27, Evidence Act, and that the subsequent statements made by the other two appellants would not be admissible, was overruled relying on State Govt. M. P. v. Chhotelal Mohanlal, (S) AIR 1955 Nag 71. 8. It was not disputed at the hearing of this appeal that Jageshwar Prasad had met a homicidal death. If the appellants threw his dead body into the river, after weighing it with stones, then they would be guilty of offence under section 201, Indian Penal Code, irrespective of whosoever had caused the death of Jageshwar Prasad. 9. The conviction of the appellants is, as stated earlier, based on the finding that each of the three appellants had separately made statement giving information where the dead body was, and each of them had pointed out the same spot from where the dead body was recovered. The learned counsel for the appellants cited case law in support of his contention that once the police knew where a particular incriminating object (the dead body of Jageshwar Prasad in this particular case) was, as a result of information given by any one of several accused, the subsequent information on the same point given by the other accused persons, would not be admissible under Section 27, Evidence Act, as that information would not be relating to fact discovered, and about the contention that 'fact discovered' contemplated by Section 27, Evidence Act, would also cover psychological facts, such as, knowledge where a particular incriminating object was, and need not be confined to actual production of that object from a particular place. It is not necessary to discuss this case law, since, in my opinion, it has not been satisfactorily established, in this particular case, what exactly was the information given by each of these appellants. 10. It is not necessary to discuss this case law, since, in my opinion, it has not been satisfactorily established, in this particular case, what exactly was the information given by each of these appellants. 10. The first intimation that the police got regarding where the missing Jageshwar Prasad was, was the report made by the appellant Dadulla. That report would not be substantive evidence. Only that part of that report, which would be covered by section 27, Evidence Act, would be read as evidence. But, before that can be done, it has to be established that the statement containing the information covered by section 27, Evidence Act, was actually given by the appellant Dadulla. On that point, there is only the evidence of Laxmi Prasad Head Constable (P. W. 12), who does not state anything about what Dadulla had then said. 11. Srinivas (P. W. 13), Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, accompanied by the Circle Inspector of Police, had gone to the village to investigate, and had questioned the three appellants. He does not say what the three appellants actually stated. All that he says is : 12. This hardly gives any idea of what was actually stated by any of the three appellants. It has been often pointed out by this Court that the documents, memoranda of what accused said and covered by section 27, Evidence Act, are not by themselves substantive evidence. It is what the witness deposes in Court as having been said by an accused, when giving information leading to discovery of a fact, that is evidence. The memorandum of a statement prepared is only for refreshing memory of the witness who has drawn it at that time, or of the attesting witness in whose presence that information was given. In Bhagirath v. State of M. P. AIR 1959 Madh. Pra. 17 it was pointed out : "There seems to be a general impression among the subordinate Courts and the Public Prosecutors that lists of discoveries or memoranda or panchanamas exhibited in criminal cases are themselves evidence. This is an erroneous view of the law. These lists or memoranda or panchanamas can only be used by persons who signed them or prepared them to refresh their memory within the meaning of section 159 of the Evidence Act. This is an erroneous view of the law. These lists or memoranda or panchanamas can only be used by persons who signed them or prepared them to refresh their memory within the meaning of section 159 of the Evidence Act. Whatever statement is attributed to an accused person in police custody giving information leading to the discovery must be proved by witnesses like any other fact. The evidence relating to the preparation of a panchnama or a list of discovery or a memorandum shown not be allowed to depend on the ingenuity of a police officer who may or may not like to write the statement in the exact words of the accused." I am in respectful agreement with these observations. It will thus be seen that the evidence of Shrinivas (P. W. 13) does not help the prosecution in establishing that any of the appellants gave information which led to discovery. 13. The other witnesses, who are examined to prove the statements said to have been made by the appellants, and leading to discovery, are Balkaran (P. W. 2) and Ayodhya Prasad (P. W. 4). This is what Balkaran (P. W. 2) has said on that point :- All that is established by this evidence of Balkaran is that the appellants offered to point out the spot where the dead body had been thrown. That does not connect the appellants with the authorship of the disposal of the dead body. The learned counsel for the State also conceded that the evidence of these two witnesses did not establish that the appellants had any hand in the disposal of the dead body. 14. Ayodhya Prasad (P. W. 4) has stated :- The statement of the appellant Dadulia, deposed to by the witness does not mean that it was Dadulia, who had put the dead body at the spot, which would be pointed out by him. Ayodhpa Prasad does not say what exactly the other two appellants had stated. His version in that respect was :- 15. The pointing out of a particular spot by the three appellants, from where, later on, the dead body of Jageshwar Prasad was recovered, does not advance the case for the prosecution for proving the guilt for offence under section 201, Indian Penal Code. His version in that respect was :- 15. The pointing out of a particular spot by the three appellants, from where, later on, the dead body of Jageshwar Prasad was recovered, does not advance the case for the prosecution for proving the guilt for offence under section 201, Indian Penal Code. The conduct of the appellants in pointing out the spot, where the dead body was, would show, at the most, that they had knowledge that a dead body was lying under water at that place. That knowledge could be acquired in various ways. By 25-10-1959, four days had elapsed after the dead body was under water. It would be in a state of decomposition and emanating foul smell. The appellants might have seen persons disposing of the dead body in the water. Hence, that conduct of the appellants does not clinch the matter. In this connection, the observations of the Supreme Court in Ramkishan v. State of Bombay, (S) AIR 1955 SC 104 are pertinent. They are :- "The evidence of the police officer would no doubt go to show that the accused knew of the existence of the fact discovered in consequence of information given by him. But that would not necessarily show his direct connection with the offence. It would merely be a link in the chain of evidence which taken along with other pieces of evidence might go to establish his connection therewith. This circumstance would therefore be quite innocuous..." 16. It would, thus, be seen that all that the prosecution has established is that the three appellants pointed out a certain spot in the river Bakawali, from where the dead body of Jagashwar Prasad was recovered. Without any further evidence, that is not sufficient to hold that the dead body was thrown there by these three appellants. This was conceded by the learned counsel for the State. 17. As there is no evidence to connect the appellants with the offence with which they are charged, I would allow this appeal. The appeal is, accordingly, allowed, the convictions and sentences of the three appellants, Dadulla, Govind Prasad alias Kalloo and Laxmi Prasad, are set aside, and they are acquitted.