JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - These two Miscellaneous Second Appeals arise out of Misc. Appeals 151 and 152 of 1960 in the court of the District Judge, Cuttack, which have been disposed of in a single judgment. In T.S. No. 106 of 1957, there was compromise decree on 29-10-1959 for ejectment, for house rent and for damages against the present Appellant-judgment-debtor and the said decree was passed ex parte against the other judgment debtor. The decree-holder-Respondent filed execution case No. 67 of 1960 for ejectment, and a separate execution case No. III of 1960 for recovery of rents, damages and costs The present Appellant, but not the other judgment-debtor, filed misc. case No. 92 of 1960 in respect of execution case No. 67 of 1960, whereas both the judgment-debtors filed misc. case No. 176 of 1960 in respect of execution case No. 111 of 1960. The objection in misc case No. 92 of 1960 was that the compromise decree offended the provisions of Section 74 of the Contract Act, and as such was not executable. The objection in the subsequent misc. case was that the execution case for recovery of rents, damages and costs was not maintainable, since reliefs on those accounts could have been claimed in the earlier execution case which had been filed for ejectment only. The executing court rejected both the objection petitions. The other judgment-debtor, who was party to misc. case No. 176, did not come up in appeal. It was the present Appellant alone who came up in two separate appeals before the District Judge, and the learned District Judge, has dismissed both the appeals. 2. Before me Mr. Ray for the Appellant conceded that he did not want to challenge the findings of the courts below. But he raised a new contention, and it is that the decree, so far it related to the question of ejectment, was without jurisdiction in view of the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act of 1958, which had come into force by the time the decree was passed. 3. Section 6 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any agreement or law no tenant shall be liable to be rejected except as provided by Section 7. 3. Section 6 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act provides that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any agreement or law no tenant shall be liable to be rejected except as provided by Section 7. Section 7 of the same Act provides that it is by the Controller that an order of ejectment can be passed, and also provides the circumstances under which the same can be passed. Section 13 of the said Act provides that the order of the Controller passed u/s 7 directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house, shall be deemed to be a decree and executable as such in the civil court. The provision of Section 6 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act read with Section 7 of the Act makes it clear that after the passing of the House Rent. Control Act and during its continuance no decree for ejectment could be passed by a civil court in respect of houses which come within the purview of the house Rent Control Act. It is admitted in the present case that the suit house comes within the mischief or the House Rent Control Act. The objection on the Respondent?s side that an executing, court cannot go behind the decree and cannot refuse to execute a decree as void for want of jurisdiction, is of no substance in view of the Privy Council decision in Jnanendra Mohan v. Rabindra Nath 60 Ind App 71 to the effect that if the Court, which passed the decree, has no inherent jurisdiction the decree is incapable of execution. "Jurisdiction" may be defined as "power of the court to hear and determine a cause, to adjudicate or exercise any judicial power in relation to it". Given such jurisdiction one shall be careful to distinguish "exercise of jurisdiction" from existence of jurisdiction, for fundamentally different are the consequences of failure to comply with statutory requirements in the assumption and in the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction, and when there is jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter, the decision of all other questions arising in a case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. The authority to decide a cause at all, and not the decision rendered therein, is what makes up jurisdiction, and when there is jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter, the decision of all other questions arising in a case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction. The distinction between cases where jurisdiction is assumed by a court where there is absolute want of it and those where the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction acts wrongly is of fundamental importance. In the former case the decision is void and a nullity, whereas in the latter case it is merely voidable and has due effect, unless set aside by appropriate proceedings. It cannot be said that whenever a decision is wrong in law or violates a rule of procedure the court must be held incompetent to deliver it. In the present case, the Appellant was a tenant, then evidently the civil court had no inherent jurisdiction to pass a decree for ejectment, and the failure of the civil court to overlook the provisions of Sections 6 and 7 of the House Rent Control Act cannot be said to be a mere irregularity in exercise of the Court?s jurisdiction. 4. The only remaining question, therefore, is whether the Appellant was a tenant. On the face of the decree, the position appears to be misleading. What has been decreed against both the judgment-debtors is ejectment, house rent up to certain period, and damages from thereafter. The decree by itself does not describe the Appellant to be a tenant, and so one has to go back to the pleading to see the real character of the suit. In the plaint, Defendant No. 1 has been clearly sued as a tenant in respect of the suit house. The decree by itself does not describe the Appellant to be a tenant, and so one has to go back to the pleading to see the real character of the suit. In the plaint, Defendant No. 1 has been clearly sued as a tenant in respect of the suit house. So far the present Appellant is concerned, his position is mentioned in para 7 of the plaint as follows: That the Defendant No. 2 (the present Appellant) who has been allowed, as it appears from the Defendant No. 1, to occupy the said premises, but without the knowledge and permission of the Plaintiff, and so he (Defendant No. 2 ) was served with a copy of the said notice (notice of ejectment addressed to Defendant No. 1 and not to Defendant No. 2) with a view to avoid future difficulty, if any, as he is unauthorisedly occupying the same as a trespasser as against the Plaintiff and this is the very reason for which he has been impleaded as a party Defendant. In para 9 of the plaint it is further mentioned. "That let it be submitted that Defendant No. 1 not having paid arrears of rent for the period commencing from 16-7-1934 till. 30-4-1957 is liable to pay a sum of Rs. 1005/- as given in the Schedule B below. Of course the payment of arrears of rent as well as damages claimed in the suit might have been a matter of agreement as between the Defendants inter se without the knowledge of the Plaintiff or without the Plaintiff being a party to such agreement if any, but the Defendant No. 1 being a tenant under the Plaintiff, he (the Plaintiff) is entitled to realise the flame from Defendant No. 1 or alternatively from both the Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 as the court be pleased to decided". The Appellant-Defendant asserts in para 3 of his written statement. "That the Plaintiff has no cause of action for this suit and specially against this Defendant with whom, as admitted in the plaint, the Plaintiff has no relationship of lessor and lessee". In para 5 of the written statement he states. The Appellant-Defendant asserts in para 3 of his written statement. "That the Plaintiff has no cause of action for this suit and specially against this Defendant with whom, as admitted in the plaint, the Plaintiff has no relationship of lessor and lessee". In para 5 of the written statement he states. "That the suit is liable to be dismissed for want of proper valuation and court fee in as much as this being a suit for ejectment of this Defendant who according to the Plaintiff is a trespasser in respect of the suit premises, advalorem court-fee is payable according to law, and this not having been done, the plaint is liable to be rejected. In para 11 of the written statement he asserts, that permission of the Plaintiff for his occupation of the suit house was neither necessary nor called for. In para 15 of the written statement the Defendant states in the following words as to what is his status in respect of the suit house. "That real facts of the case are that the suit premises was taken by Defendant No. 1 and Shrimati Nisamani Dei, the wife of this Defendant (Defendant No. 2) for the purpose of running a printing Press there as partners and after the Press was located there styled as "Jagaran Press" and subsequently renamed as "Aruna Press", this Defendant was appointed Manager of the said Press and has been running the same in his capacity as Manager. Thereafter the Defendant No. 1 having transferred his interest in the Press to Shrimati Nisamani Dei, she become the full owner of the said Press. 5. "Tenant", as defined by the House Rent Control Act, means any person by whom or on whose behalf rent is payable for any house and includes every person who from time to time derives title under a tenant. From what I have quoted above from the plaint and the written statement, neither the Plaintiff alleged that Defendant No. 2 was a tenant, nor Defendant No. 2 himself claimed to be a tenant or any title under a tenant, or his case was that the tenant of the house had a Press in the suit house and he was staying in the suit house as having been appointed as the Manager of the Press. That being the position, so far Defendant No. 2 was concerned, he did not come within the definition of a "tenant" as defined by the House Rent Control Act, and as such, so far ejecting him was concerned, Sections 6 and 7 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act did not come into play. So far Defendant No. 1 (the other judgment-debtor) is concerned no doubt he was admitted to be a tenant. But his case, he not being a party to the misc. case in which ejectment was objected to and he not being a party to the subsequent appeals, does not come up for any decision in the present appeals. 6. In the result, I find no merit in the present appeals which are accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed