Judgment :- 1. The question referred for decision by a Division Bench in this case is whether the period allowed for depositing the printing charges on an application for copy of the judgment should be excluded in the computation of the period of limitation for an appeal under Art.156 of the Limitation Act. 2. Under Art.156 of the Limitation Act the period allowed for the institution of an appeal to the High Court is 90 days from the date of decree or order appealed from. But, S.12 of the Act provides (inter alia) as follows: "(3) Where a decree is appealed from or sought to be reviewed, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which it is founded shall also be excluded." 3. The contention in this case relates to the scope of the expression "the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment." 4. R.234 of the Civil Rules of Practice provides: "Deposit of printing charges.- The applicant shall be informed by notice of the amount payable by him for printing charges He will also be directed to pay within a week of the notice that amount in court, in default of which his application for copy shall be struck off." 5. The contention of Shri Paikaday, the learned advocate for the appellant is that, since the notice under R.234 allows him a week's time to make payment of the printing charges, the appellant is entitled to exclude that time which he has availed of in the payment of printing charges as part of 'the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment.' 6. The expression "time requisite" in S.12 of the Limitation Act has come up for consideration by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Pramatha Nath Roy v. Lee (49 I.A. 307) where their Lordships observed: "No period can be regarded as requisite under the Act, which need not have elapsed if the appellant had taken reasonable and proper steps to obtain a copy of the decree or order. Again in J.N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar (55 I.A. 161) their Lordships observed: "The word 'requisite' is a strong word; it may be regarded as meaning something more than the word 'required'. Again in J.N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyar (55 I.A. 161) their Lordships observed: "The word 'requisite' is a strong word; it may be regarded as meaning something more than the word 'required'. It means 'properly required', and it throws upon the pleader or counsel for the appellant the necessity of showing that no part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his default". The time requisite for obtaining copies is the time which an applicant takes to obtain the copies using all diligence possible on his part. The time taken by the appellant in supplying printing charges after the same was notified to him cannot be said to be time 'necessary' on his part consistent with the diligence expected of him in the matter. The applicant ought to deposit the required charges not later than the first day on which the office is open after the day on which the printing charges are notified; and if he neglects to do so he is not entitled to deduct the intervening days as part of the time 'necessary' or 'requisite' in obtaining the copy. It is really a prolongation of the time requisite for preparation of the copy caused by the neglect or indifference of the applicant. Any "delay caused by the carelessness or negligence of a party applying for a copy cannot be taken into consideration or allowed for in computing the time requisite for obtaining the copy. The requisite does not mean requisite by reason of the carelessness or negligence of the applicant; it means the time which is occupied by the officer who has got to provide that copy, in making the copy." Per Edge, C. J., in Parbati v. Bhola (ILR.12 All. 79 at 82). 7. Further, it has been the consistent practice in this Court, as well as in the High Courts of Travancore-Cochin, Travancore, Cochin and Madras, not to exclude from computation the period availed of by the party in supplying the printing charges after due notification. 79 at 82). 7. Further, it has been the consistent practice in this Court, as well as in the High Courts of Travancore-Cochin, Travancore, Cochin and Madras, not to exclude from computation the period availed of by the party in supplying the printing charges after due notification. As the Law does not take note of fractions of a day, and the day is counted from midnight to midnight, the day on which the notification was made, as also the day on which the payment was made were excluded in the computation; but where the party failed to supply the funds the next working day after the notification the period availed of was always counted as part of the time taken by the party to institute the appeal. A practice so plain and so consistently followed tantamounts to an established rule of court. Retaining the application for a week in the Copying Department awaiting payment of printing charges under R.234 of the Civil Rules of Practice is in our opinion an indulgence shown to the party, and on instruction given to the office not to dismiss the application too soon. But it does not mean that the party need pay the printing charges only at the end of the time specified in the notification beyond which the same would not be accepted. If the time taken by the party for making deposit of printing charges after notification to him is not excluded to his advantage, it is conceded that this Second Appeal would be out of time.