ORDER Pandey, J. By this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioners have challenged a reversing order dated 23rd January 1961 by which, u/s 16 (5) of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act), the State Industrial Court set aside the dismissal of Dhaniram Baghel (respondent No. 3), a clerk in the employment of the petitioner-Bank, on the sole ground that it was for a misconduct committed by him more than six months prior to the date of his dismissal. Dhaniram Baghel was dismissed on 23rd August 1956 for dishonesty in that he embezzled three sums of money and misconduct himself in regard to another sum as detailed below: (i) Rs. 160 for which an entry dated 5th September 1953 was falsely made showing that it was disbursed as cost of milk. (ii) RS. 40 for which an entry dated 31st July 1954 was falsely made showing that it was advanced towards hire of ploughs. (iii) Rs. 170-8-0 for which an entry dated 9th February 1955 was falsely made to show that it was advanced to Sukhanandan Prasad; and (iv) Rs. 251 for which an entry dated 28th June 1955 was made to show that it was the recovery of an advance. That was done with a view to gaining a financial advantage. Dhaniram Baghel applied u/s 16 (2) of the Act to the Labour Commissioner for reinstatement and payment of compensation mainly on the ground that his dismissal on 23rd August 1956 was illegal because it was for misconduct said to have been committed by him more than six months before that date. The Assistant Labour Commissioner took the view that the petitioners came to know of the misconduct only on 9th April 1956, when the auditor's report for 1954-55 was received, and properly dismissed the delinquent clerk within six months from that date but, on a revision being filed by the clerk, the State Industrial Court accepted his contention, set aside the dismissal and directed that he should be reinstated and paid back wages for the whole period. It is contended before us that the view taken by the State Industrial Court is erroneous because the clerk should be regarded as having embezzled the amount on 9th April 1956 when he failed to produce or account for the amount entrusted to him or Should be deemed to have been acting dishonestly throughout the period he was in charge of the Dairy Society. The distinction between actual embezzlement by the clerk and the knowledge of suo embezzlement by his employer is, we think, obvious. In the instant case, the clerk embezzled the amounts at least on the dates on which he made the false entries. That being so, even if he had produced the amounts on 9tb April 1956 or later, he would not cease to be guilty of breach of trust. Having regard to the fact that the clerk embezzled in all a sum of Rs. 2,415-10-9, it may well be that he continued to act dishonestly throughout the time he was in charge of the Dairy Society, but here we are concerned with the charges on which he was dismissed for dishonesty. As we have shown, the last item therein referred to is of the date 28th June 1955, which is more than six months before the date of dismissal, namely, 23rd August 1956. The State Industrial Court was, therefore, right in finding that the clerk was dismissed for misconduct which he committed more than six months before his dismissal. It is next urged that, in case like the one before us, it is impossible to audit and check the accounts "every time and all the time" to be able to take timely action against the official guilty of embezzlement and the inconvenience is so great that the language of the expression "for a fault or misconduct committed by the employee more than six months prior to the date of such dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension" occurring in section 16 (3) of the Act should be so modified that the six months' limitation might commence from the date of the employer's knowledge about the fault or misconduct. According to the learned counsel, the provision is based on the principle of waiver implying that, without knowledge of the facts, there could be no waiver. According to the learned counsel, the provision is based on the principle of waiver implying that, without knowledge of the facts, there could be no waiver. In this connection, our attention was drawn to the following passage in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes: Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, lends to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustices, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. We are unable to accede to this argument for two reasons. In the first place, the "inconvenience" arises from the petitioners' own lack of vigilance. If they knew that the clerk concerned is governed by section 16 of the Act, they should have been alert and watchful to enable them to take timely action against him. They cannot be permitted to put forward their own inattention as a reason for modifying the language of the statute. Secondly, here we are concerned with a statute prescribing a period of limitation for terminating the services of delinquent industrial employees as a measure of punishment. "A law of limitation and prescription may appear to operate harshly or unjustly in particular eases, but where such a law has been adopted by the State, for reasons which justify the rule in the majority of cases, it must, if unambiguous, be applied with stringency; and no individual case to which those reasons are inapplicable can be excepted from its operation. The general good of the community requires that even a hard case should not be allowed to disturb the law. The rule must be enforced even at the risk of hardship to a particular party. The Judge cannot, on equitable grounds, enlarge the time allowed by the law, postpone its operation, or introduce exceptions not recognised by it" : U.N. Mitra on Limitation, Vol. I, 6th Edition at pages 256-7, These observations of the learned author have been quoted with approval in T. Sitharama Chetty v. C. Krishnaswami Chetty ILR 38 Mad. 374. Further, the Judicial Committee observed in AIR 1932 165 (Privy Council) at pp. 6 and 7 as follows: The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result in hardship. 374. Further, the Judicial Committee observed in AIR 1932 165 (Privy Council) at pp. 6 and 7 as follows: The fixation of periods of limitation must always be to some extent arbitrary, and may frequently result in hardship. But in construing such provisions, equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is, their Lordships think, the only safe guide. In view of these principles of construction of statutes relating to limitation, we are unable to depart from the strict grammatical meaning of the expression or to modify its language in the sense commended to us. The petition fails and is dismissed. Since Dhaniram Baghel (respondent No. 3) did not appear to contest the petition on the date of arguments, we direct the parties to bear their own costs. The security amount shall be refunded. Final Result : Dismissed