Judgment N.L.Untwali, J. 1. This is an application in revision under Sec.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by two petitioners against whom the order for filing of the complaint by the Court of first instance has been upheld by the learned District Judge. 2. In order to dispose of the two points urged in support of this application, it is necessary to state the facts briefly. A money suit, being Money Suit No. 282 of 1957, was filed in the Court of the second Munsif of Siwan by the first petitioner against the Opposite party for recovery of a certain sum of money on the basis of a handnote said to have been executed by the latter on the 13th May, 1954. The defence, in short, was that he had not executed any hand-note and his further defence was that it seemed to him that a blank sheet of paper on which at one time in connection with some other matter the opposite party had given his thumb impression had been forged and fabricated into a hand-note to lay a false claim against him. The suit was dismissed and the dismissal was upheld by the appellate Court, Thereafter an enquiry under Sec. 476 of the Code of Criminal procedure was instituted. The trial Court filed a complaint against the petitioners as well as two more persons. The offences alleged to have been committed by the four persons were under Sections 193, 120-B, 463, 467 and 471 of the Penal Code. On appeal the learned District Judge took the view that the filing of a complaint against the four appellants before him under Sec.193 of the Penal Code was illegal in view of the provisions of Sec. 479-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure : A complaint for an offence under that section could be filed only by following the procedure provided in Sec. 479-A. In. that view of the matter, the learned District Judge allowed the appeal of wo of the appellants against whom a complaint had been filed for their prosecution only under Sec.193 of the Penal Code and allowed the appeal of these two petitioners in part by deleting the complaint filed against them for their trial for an offence under Sec.193 of the Penal Code. The petitioners arc being proceeded under Sections 463, 467 and 471 of the Penal Code. The petitioners arc being proceeded under Sections 463, 467 and 471 of the Penal Code. They have moved this Court in revision for quashing this complaint too. 3. Mr. Nageshwar Prasad, appearing in support of this application has urged only two points; (1) that Dharamdeo Ojha, petitioner No- 2, was not a party to the suit. He was only said to be the scribe of the handnote. That being so in view of the provisions of Sections 478 and 193 (1) (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court could not file a complaint as against him; and (2) that on the facts alleged and prima facie found, the petitioners, it could be said, have committed offences under Sec.193 as also under Sections 463 and 467. If that be so, then the Court, by ignoring the provision of Sec. 479-A could not embark upon an inquiry under Sec. 476 of the Code and file a complaint. 4. In my opinion, there is no substance in either of the two points raised before me. Sec. 476 in terms does not say that an inquiry under that provision of law can be held only if a party to the proceeding is said to have committed an offence of a kind where a complaint by the Court is necessary before cognizance can be taken. Sec.195 (1) (b) does not speak of a party and that may be one of ^he reasons that Sec. 476 does not confine the inquiry under that provision to a party to the proceeding in relation to which the offence is said to have been committed. Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Section 195 provides- "No Court shall take cognizance of any offence described in Sec. 463 or punishable under Sec. 47.1, Sec. 475 or Sec. 476 of the same Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate." It does confine the filing of the complaint by the Court, for taking cognizance of an offence under Sections 463, 471, etc., when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding. Reading the two provisions together, it has been held by a Bench of this Court in Mathur Prasad V/s. Pitambar Singh, AIR 1945 Pat 362 that a Court is not competent to start a proceeding against a person not a party to the proceeding in relation to which an offence is said to have been committed, under Sec. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code; and enquire into the alleged offence of forgery. Das, J., (as he then was), being one of the members of the Division Bench has said, however, that- "In the present case, it is not quite necessary to decide if a complaint can be made against persons, other than parties to any proceeding, when once the Court has jurisdiction to make an enquiry in respect of a person, who is a party to a proceeding. There is only one person, against whom a complaint has been made in this case, and he was not a party to the proceeding." 5. Cognizance of any offence can be taken under Sec.190 (1) (a) "upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence". The Court making an enquiry and filing a complaint under Sec. 476 read with Sec.195(1)(c) of the Code can state facts showing that persons, who were not parties to the proceeding, were parties in the commission of the offence, and upon receiving such a complaint of facts, it will be open to the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence to take cognizance of the offence said to have been committed by persons who were not parties to the Court proceedings. This position of law could not be disputed on behalf of the petitioners. Section 195 puts certain impediments in the way of the Court taking cognizance of an offence, unless the special procedure is followed. In my opinion, once that special procedure has got to be followed for filing "a complaint against a party to any proceeding in Court", the Court can make an enquiry under Sec. 476, if other persons are also said to have been parties to the commission of the offence or participants in the transaction making the offence. I do not find anything in the Code which will make the filing of the complaint against non-party persons by the Court, illegal, if it is obliged to file a complaint against a person, who was a party to the proceeding. 6. I do not find anything in the Code which will make the filing of the complaint against non-party persons by the Court, illegal, if it is obliged to file a complaint against a person, who was a party to the proceeding. 6. The view which I have expressed finds support from the decision in Balgaunda Ramgaunda V/s. Emperor, ILR 55 Bom 461 : (AIR 1931 Bom 305), where Beaumont, C. J., relying upon an earlier Bench decision of the Bombay High Court, has observed: ".......... that if once it is ascertained in judicial proceedings that there is an offence described in Sec. 463 of the Indian Penal Code or punishable under Sections 471, 475 or 476 of that Code and such offence appears to have been committed by a party to the proceedings then under Sec. 476 the Court can inquire into the matter, and if it comes to the conclusion that other persons also, for example, witnesses, are guilty of the offence, I think that it can refer the whole case to a Magistrate for an inquiry and committal. It seems to me that the words of Sec. 476 of the old Code are wide enough to justify that conclusion. That conclusion is also directly justified by the decision of this Court in In re Devji Bhavani, ILR 18 Bom 581, in which it was held that a case could be dealt with under Sec. 476 in respect of witnesses as well as of parties." I do not find anything in the amendment brought about in the year 1923 or in the year 1955 to suggest that the view expressed by Beaumont, C. J., in the Bombay case is no longer goad law. On the other baud, I find that Reuben J., (as he then was), in Ram Prasad V/s. Maheshanand, AIR 1948 Pat 5 at p. 7, following the Bombay case, has observed : "It is true that, by reason of Sec.195, the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed under Sec. 476 arises only when the offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to the proceeding. Once the Court gets jurisdiction, however, and proceeds under Sec. 476, it is empowered to deal with one offence as a whole, and is not bound to confine its complaint only to the party, and may complain also against a person who is not a party but who has participated in the commission of the offence." The case decided by Reuben, J., on facts, however, was different, and the offence that was said to have been committed by the non-party persons was a different one arising out of different sets of facts. One behalf of the petitioners, reliance was placed upon Tulasi Ammal V/s. Danalakshmi Ammal, ILR 57 Mad 682 : (AIR 1934 Mad 816). I do not find anything in that case to suggest that the view expressed by me on the strength of the Bombay case is erroneous. In the Madras case, on the facts, it was found that intervention of the Court was unnecessary for the prosecution of the writer and the attestators of the document. No rule of law was enunciated contrary to the one enunciated by the Bombay High Court. I, therefore, hold that the first point raised on behalf of petitioner No. 2 fails. 7. In support of the second contention, learned counsel argued that on the facts of this case offences under Sec.193 were made out He also conceded that offences under Sections 467 and 47.1 read with Sec. 463 could also be said to have been made out. But then, the submission is that if on the same sets of facts two types of offences could be said to have been made out then no complaint could be filed making out an offence of the kind which did not require any sanction or special procedure to be followed in order to circumvent the necessity of sanction or following a different kind of procedure in respect of the other kind of offence. It was argued that on the fads alleged an offence under Sec.193 was made out, and, therefore, the procedure provided in Section 479-A ought to have been followed, the sixth Sub-section of which barred the procedure for an enquiry under Sec. 476. In support of this argument, reliance was placed upon Basir-ul-Haq V/s. State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293 . In support of this argument, reliance was placed upon Basir-ul-Haq V/s. State of West Bengal, AIR 1953 SC 293 . In my opinion, the facts and the points decided in the Supreme Court case are so very different that they have no application to the facts of the instant case. It is to be noticed that the offences relating to the commission of the forgery under Sec. 467 and using the forged document under Sec. 471 are graver offences than the ones provided in Sec.193 of the Penal Code. In my opinion, if the same sets of facts constitute a graver offence as also a minor offence, then the procedure relating to the graver offence is the proper one. Moreover, a Bench of this Court has laid down in Chhote Lal Sahu V/s. Uchit Mahton, AIR 1961 Pat 175 : "In our opinion the point does not arise for decision in the present case because the gist of the complaint ordered to be made by the District Judge on appeal against the petitioner is not an offence falling within the purview of Sec.193 of the Penal Code but is an offence within the purview of Section 196 of the Penal Code or Sec. 471 of the Penal Code. It should be noticed- that Sec. 479-A only applies to a case where a witness has intentionally given false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding or has intentionally fabricated false evidence for the purpose of being used in any stage of a judicial proceeding. The language used is exactly similar to the language used in Sec.193 of the Indian penal Code, and it is obvious that Sec. 479-A, Code of Criminal Procedure, therefore, applies to a case where an offence is alleged to have been committed under Sec.193 of the Indian Penal Code. The charge levelled against the petitioner in this case does not fall within the purview of Sec.19(3 of the Indian Penal Code but it falls within the purview of Sec.196 or Sec. 471 of the Penal Code. The provisions of Sec. 479-A do not apply to the present cage." In this particular case, even on the facts alleged, not only an offence under Section 471 but also an offence under Sec.196 of the Penal Code can be said to have been made out against petitioner No. 1. The provisions of Sec. 479-A do not apply to the present cage." In this particular case, even on the facts alleged, not only an offence under Section 471 but also an offence under Sec.196 of the Penal Code can be said to have been made out against petitioner No. 1. To me it appears that the procedure under Sec. 479-A could not have been followed on the facts of this case, rather, the proper procedure was one under Sec. 476. I may also observe that if the offence under Sec.193 as well as the offences under Sections 196, 467 and 471 were made out, it could not be said that following the procedure under Sec. 476 for filing a complaint On those circumstances against the petitioners for an offence under Sec.193 also was illegal, as has been held to be so by the learned District Judge. Be that however, as it may, I am not called upon to express any final opinion in that regard, but it is clear to me that the complaint, as it now stands after the order of modification passed by the District Judge, cannot be said to be illegal, even on the second ground raised on behalf of the petitioners. 8 In the result, the application fails and is dismissed.