JUDGMENT N.U. Beg, J. - This appeal arises out of a writ petition which was directed against an order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunper, dated the 6th of January, 1960. The purpose of the writ petition was to have the said order quashed by this Court. In view of the fact that the sole argument that has been heard by us at this stage relates to the question of limitation, we propose to give in this judgment only those facts which are relevant to this particular point. It may be mentioned that all these facts are admitted by the parties before us, and are also borne out by the record of the case. The endorsement at the back of the certified copy of the order which was filed along with the writ petition shows that the application for a copy of the order sought to be impugned was given on the 9th of January, 1960, and that the copy was ready for delivery on the 13th of January, 1960. It would appear that under Ch. XXII, R. 1, sub-R. (4) of this Court, it was incumbent on the petitioner to serve a notice of the motion on certain parties mentioned therein. To comply with it a notice was served on behalf of the applicants on the Standing Counsel as required under Ch. XXII, R. 1, sub-R. 4 on the 7th of April, 1960. Thereafter, on the 18th of April, 1960 the present application was filed in the High Court. On the same day the learned Judge dismissed the said application in limine on the ground of limitation. He did not go into the merits of the case. The order passed by the learned Judge is a brief one, and runs as follows:- "This application appears to be beyond time, the last impugned order having been passed on the 6th of January, 1960. More than 90 days have elapsed since then. The petition is accordignly rejected." 2. Dissatisfied with the said order the petitioners filed this special appeal. As more or less similar orders were passed by the same learned Judge in a large number of applications, all these applications were connected. All of them have been heard by us along with this application. We, however, propose to make this appeal the leading case, and to give our reasons exhaustively in our judgment in this case. As more or less similar orders were passed by the same learned Judge in a large number of applications, all these applications were connected. All of them have been heard by us along with this application. We, however, propose to make this appeal the leading case, and to give our reasons exhaustively in our judgment in this case. Our Judgment in this case wall govern other cases in which we shall merely refer to this judgment for the reasons in support of our view in those cases. 3. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length, we are of opinion that this appeal should be allowed. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants has argued before us that the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition summarily on the ground of limitation without going into the merits of the case is an unjustifiable one. In this connection he has argued that the learned single judge should have taken into consideration the fact that the petitioner had applied for a certified copy of the judgment, and that five days were taken in obtaining the said copy. He has further invited our attention to the fact that under the rules of this Court it was incumbent on the petitioner to serve a notice of the motion on the Standing Counsel, and that 14 clear days notice was necessary in that connection. If the period spent in obtaining a certified copy of the said order, and 14 days time required for giving notice to the Standing Counsel under the Rules of this Court is taken into consideration, then the application would be admittedly within time. The learned counsel has, therefore, argued that the application should not have been dismissed summarily on the ground of limitation. The two questions, therefore, that have arisen before us are, first, whether in a case like the present a party is entitled to the exclusion of time spent in obtaining a certified copy of the order; and, secondly, whether a party is further entitled to the exclusion of 14 days time required for giving notice to the Standing Counsel under Ch. XXII, R. 1, sub-R. (4) of the High Court Rules. 4. Before, however, discussing these two questions we may make some general observations which may be helpful in the determination of the matter. XXII, R. 1, sub-R. (4) of the High Court Rules. 4. Before, however, discussing these two questions we may make some general observations which may be helpful in the determination of the matter. The present application was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, The relief provided under this Article is a purely discretionary one. Neither in the Constitution of India, nor in the Rules framed by the High Court is there any provision prescribing any period of limitation for the filing of an application under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further, even after the coming into force of the Constitution of India, there has been no amendment of the Limitation Act for the purpose of providing any period of limitation for filing such applications. It appears to us that the reason why no such provision is made in the Constitution or under any Act or even in the rules framed by the High Court in respect of this matter is obvious. The relief being a purely discretionary one, it was also left to the discretion of the High Courts to develop rules of prudence governing this aspect of the matter. As the whole matter was sought by the Legislature to be put in the realm of discretion the High Courts would, while dealing with it be guided by principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Approaching the matter from this point of view, the various High Courts have established precedents prescribing periods of limitation that should be considered reasonable, fair and proper by them,, and which should determine the matter so far as the particular High Court is concerned. In the Allahabad High Court, there has been a long standing practice established by precedents not to entertain writ petitions which are filed 90 days beyond the date of the order sought to be impugned. This practice is now so well established as to justify one in styling the said period of 90 days as the conventional period of limitation observed in this Court. The practice is founded on the consideration that such proceedings are analogous to appeals in so far as they necessitate a reconsideration of the orders passed by the authorities concerned. The case of the Allahabad High Court which is regarded as the foundation of this practice in this Court is reported in Mongey v. The Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad, 1956 ALJ 334. The case of the Allahabad High Court which is regarded as the foundation of this practice in this Court is reported in Mongey v. The Board of Revenue, U.P. Allahabad, 1956 ALJ 334. In this case a Bench of this Court quoted a passage from Ferries on Extraordinary Legal Remedies in support of its view that 90 days period should be considered to be the reasonable period for filing such applications. The relevant passage runs as follows:- "So it has been held, by analogy to appeal, that the application must be made within the time for prosecuting an appeal, unless the petition discloses circumstances of a sepcial nature requiring an extension of time." 5. Relying on this passage the Bench laid down the law as follows:- "We consider that this is a correct statement of the law and in our opinion a period of 90 days, which is the period fixed for appeals to this Court from the judgments of courts below, should be taken as the period for application for the issue of a writ of certiorari, and that time can be extended only when circumstances of a special nature, which are sufficient in the opinion of the Court, are shown to exist." 6. This case no doubt lays down the period of 90 days as the basic period of limitation for filing a writ of certiorari. It is not, however, in our opinion, a warrant for the proposition that in computing the said period every factor that might have resulted in unavoidably delaying the filing of an application beyond the period of 90 days should be rigorously excluded from consideration. On the other hand, this case itself lays down that when circumstances of a special nature are made out then extension should be granted. Further, this case proceeds on the basis of analogy provided by an appeal. If the said analogy is pursued further and the exceptions relating to the basic period of limitation provided for appeals and other proceedings laid down in the Indian Limitation Act are examined, then, as the subsequent portion of our judgment indicates, the appellants would be entitled to the exclusion of the period spent in obtaining a copy of the order as well as of the period required for giving notice of motion. 7. 7. That the period of 90 days which is the conventional period of limitation established in this Court is not so rigid as to exclude consideration of other matters will also be borne out by I two other cases of this Court. The first case is reported in Mehnga Ram v. India L.A. Tribunal, AIR 1956 Allahabad 644. This is a decision by a Division Bench. In this case the order dismissing the application which was the basis of the proceedings was passed on the 23rd of April, 1956. The appeal against this order was dismission the 3rd of May, 1955 and the writ petition was filed on the 12th of September, 1955. The writ petition was, therefore, filed after a period of over four months had elapsed from the date of the last order which was sought be impugned. In spite of it the Court held that there was no such delay as to justify rejection of the petition merely on the ground of limitation. The ground on which the Court condoned the delay was that the question as to the forum where the particular writ petition should be filed was of such a difficult nature as to entail consideration of it for a fairly long period with the result that it was difficult to obtain proper legal opinion on this point within the limited period of 90 days. 8. The second case is reported in Brijpal Das v. Banaras Municipal Board, AIR 1958 Allahabad 211. In this case it was held that there was no period of limitation prescribed for the exercise of the powders under Article 226 by the High Court. But as the power itself is a discretionary one,the High Court generally would not exercise it in favour of a petitioner who has come to Court after a considerable delay. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as regards the actual period which the High Court would consider as unreasonable and decline to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution after the lapse of such a period. It will depend upon the circumstances of each case, and also on he nature of the right of the petitioner which has been affected by the impugned order. It will depend upon the circumstances of each case, and also on he nature of the right of the petitioner which has been affected by the impugned order. Where the writ petition was filed nearly five months after the impugned order of assessment was made and the petitioner possibly had still a right to challenge that order when steps would be taken to realise the taxes, it could not be said in the circumstances that the delay was so gross as to disentitle the petitioner to get relief under Article 226 (Vide Head Note A). 9. In a Full Bench case of the Travancore Cochin High Court reported in S. Mahadeva v. State, A.I.R. 1954 Tra.-Co. 469 it was held that the period available for a civil revision petition is the reasonable time within which an application under Article 226 should be presented. No hard and fast rule can, however, be fixed in that regard, and the matter should be left to the discretion of the trying Judge or Bench to accept a petition though presented beyond that period and to deal with it on the merits. (Vide Head Note A). In this case it was further held that if a party had failed to raise the plea of laches at an earlier stage, it should not be allowed to raise the said plea at a later stage. 10. In Manohar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1953 Raj. 22 which is a Bench decision by Wanchoo, C. J. as he then was and Bapna, J., it was held that the fact that the applicant had been attempting to get redress by making representations to various authorities would be a sufficient ground for condoning the delay in filing the writ petition. The remedy sought for and the relief prayed for by the petitioner could not, under such circumstances, be refused simply on the ground of delay. To the same effect is the law laid down by Wanchoo, C.J. as he then was and Bapna, J., in Firm Udairaj v. Commissioner Civil Supplies, A.I.R. 1952 Raj. 79. 11. The remedy sought for and the relief prayed for by the petitioner could not, under such circumstances, be refused simply on the ground of delay. To the same effect is the law laid down by Wanchoo, C.J. as he then was and Bapna, J., in Firm Udairaj v. Commissioner Civil Supplies, A.I.R. 1952 Raj. 79. 11. In Muthiah Chettiar v. Income Tax Commissioner, Madras, AIR 1951 Madras 204 Rajamanner, C. J. and Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. held that though there was no period of limitation as such prescribed for applications for the issue of prerogative writs, long delay can be one of the grounds for refusing to grant an application for the issue of such writs. There may, however, be circumstances which should make the High Court take a more lenient view and entertain the application even after delay. (Vide Head note C). In this case delay was condoned on the ground that the applicant was seeking his remedy from the Central Board of Revenue under erroneous advice. 12. In Shambhu Dayal v. Pepsu, A.I.R. 1952 Pepsu 152 a Bench of the High Court consisting of Teja Singh, C. J. and Gurman Singh, J. held that the fact that the petitioner was making various representations challenging the legality and propriety of the reversion order passed against him would be a good ground for condoning the delay and overruling the preliminary objection based thereon. 13. In Markose's commentary on Judicial Control of Administrative Action in India (1956 Edition) while discussing the question of laches it is stated that there are two views found reflected in cases one, that delay by itself should not disentitle the applicant to relief, and the other, that if vigilance is deemed desirable there is no logic in not recognising this ground for dismissal of writ applications. The second view is based on the ground that if it is not recognised as, an independent ground, vigilance will not be observed by applicants in actual practice. The meaning of laches in the said book is expounded at page 473 thus:- "In equity reprehensible delay Is called laches. It is only with laches that one is concerned here. Laches is such negligence or omission to assert a right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time more or less great and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party operates as bar in a court of equity." 14. It is only with laches that one is concerned here. Laches is such negligence or omission to assert a right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time more or less great and other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party operates as bar in a court of equity." 14. The law on the point is summarised on the same page as follows:- "The other consideration is that in equity itself the doctrine of laches is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. 15. The summary of the law by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221 : 22 W.R. 492 deserves repetition:- "Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a. situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances, always important in. such cases, are the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice, in taking the one course or the other so far as relates to the remedy." 16. Apart from delay amounting to laches according to the rules stated above, the mere lapse of time, as Lord Campbell observed, in Cairncross v. Lorimer, (1860) 3 LT 130 (H.L.) : (1860) 3 Macq. 827, as evidencing acquiescence, is not to be measured by any cycle, of the heavenly bodies. "The courts in India have to develop the law by further analysis of each case and by finding out whether the facts call for a denial of relief to the applicant." 17. In paragraph 176 of Ferris book entitled "Extraordinary Legal . . . . . "The courts in India have to develop the law by further analysis of each case and by finding out whether the facts call for a denial of relief to the applicant." 17. In paragraph 176 of Ferris book entitled "Extraordinary Legal . . . . . Remedies" (1926 Edition) it is stated that:- "There is no hard and fast rule by which to determine whether the right to bring certiorari is barred by laches, as the issuance of the writ is largely a matter of sound discretion. The aggrieved party should have a reasonable time within which to make application." 18. In view of the above legal position it appears to us to be erroneous to throw out a writ petition in limine merely on the ground that a period of 90 days has elapsed since the date of the impugned order without considering the propriety, sufficiency or reasonableness of the situation, and applying ones mind to other factors that are alleged to have intervened and caused delay. The conventional period of limitation laid down by this Court is based on the principle of laches which itself is the offspring of the twin maxims of equity the first being that equity helps the vigilant, and the second being that delay defeats equity. Where the Court is of opinion that application could not be filed within the period of 90 days owing to circumstances which were beyond the control of the party concerned, or other reasons which in equity would incline the Court to condone the delay, it appears to us that there is no bar in law to the entertainment of such an application. Where, however, an application is made beyond the period of 90 days, the party making the application owes an obligation to provide an adequate explanation of the same. The material provided in this regard should be such as to satisfy the Court that the circumstances alleged therein constitute sufficient cause for condoning the delay. 19. In the present case, the two circumstances alleged are (1)that the party had applied for a certified copy of the impugned order and (2) that the party had given fourteen, days notice to the Standing Counsel as required by the rules of this Court. We shall now proceed to discuss each one of them separately. 19. In the present case, the two circumstances alleged are (1)that the party had applied for a certified copy of the impugned order and (2) that the party had given fourteen, days notice to the Standing Counsel as required by the rules of this Court. We shall now proceed to discuss each one of them separately. In the light of the observations made by us above, it is obvious that the main question on which our decision would turn would be whether in equity there are justifiable reasons for allowing the petitioner to exclude the time taken by him under both or either of these heads. 20. So far as the first question, namely, the period taken in obtaining a certified copy of the order, which is sought to be challenged, is concerned, it would be relevant to refer to the provisions of Ch. XXII, R. 1, sub-R. (3) which specifies the documents which should accompany an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Sub-R. (3) of R. (1) of Ch. XXII of the High Court Rules runs as follows:- "Where objection is taken to any judgment or order of a court or an officer thereof the application shall be accompanied by a copy of such judgment or order and where there has been an appeal or revision from such judgment or order also by a copy of the judgment or order of the higher court." 21. Under the above rule which is made by this Court and which has the force of a statute so far as this Court is concerned, it is obvious that an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the petitioner would not have been maintainable in this Court unless it was accompanied by a copy of the judgment or order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation. A period of 90 days is allowed to a petitioner to enable him to make preparations for filing a writ petition in this Court, and to seek proper legal advice in respect of the judgment or order which is sought to be impugned. Before the petitioner could seek any such advice, it would be necessary for him to obtain a copy of such judgment or order. Before the petitioner could seek any such advice, it would be necessary for him to obtain a copy of such judgment or order. Apart, therefore, from the necessity arising out of the fact that the filing of a copy of such judgment or order is made necessary by the rules of this Court themselves, the necessity for obtaining a copy of such judgment or order also arises out of the fact that the securing of such copy is necessary in order to seek necessary legal advice and to make proper preparation for the filing of the application. Therefore in the absence of a copy of such judgment or order it was not possible for the petitioner to make proper preparations for filing the applications, and, even if he had made such preparations, it was not possible for him to file an application in this Court without annexing a copy of the said judgment or order to the application which was sought to be filed by him. 22. In this connection it would be relevant to refer to the provisions of the Limitation Act dealing with the exceptions to the period of limitation prescribed therein for various proceedings that are contemplated by that Act. The period of limitation laid down in the first Schedule of the Act is the statutory period of limitation. This is no doubt a fixed and an inflexible period. In spite of it, the Legislature considered that there were certain equitable considerations which should entitle a party to the exclusion of certain periods of time in the computation of the basic statutory period, it is in view of these equitable considerations that the Limitation Act has sought to engraft certain exceptions to the rigid application of the statutory rule of limitation prescribed in the first schedule of the said Act. These exceptions are scattered in various sections of Parts II, III and IV of the Act. These exceptions are scattered in various sections of Parts II, III and IV of the Act. Section 5 of the said Act is as follows:- "Any appeal or application for a review of judgment or for leave to appeal or any other application to which this section may be made applicable by or under any enactment for the time being in force may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." 23. Sections 12(2) and (3)of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 runs as follows:- "(2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be review, shall be excluded. (3) Where a decree is appealed from or sought to be reviewed, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which it is founded shall also be excluded." 24. In fixing the conventional period, this Court has treated a writ petition as analogous to an appeal, and, following the same analogy, there appears to be no reason why provisions excluding certain periods in the computation of the period of limitation for filing an appeal, should not mutatis mutandis be applied to such petitions. In interpreting Sections 12(2) and (3) of the Indian Limitation Act, the courts have held that a party would be entitled to exclude the period spent in obtaining a copy of the judgment or order sought to be impugned even though the annexation of a copy of the said judgment or order is not necessary for the purpose of filing the appeal or application referred to therein. This view of the case is based upon the ground that it is necessary to obtain a copy of the judgment or order sought to be challenged for the purpose of enabling the party to make up its mind whether it should seek any relief against the order or not. This view of the case is based upon the ground that it is necessary to obtain a copy of the judgment or order sought to be challenged for the purpose of enabling the party to make up its mind whether it should seek any relief against the order or not. So far as the Courts in India are concerned, the leading case on the above point is reported in Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T.S. Chettyarn, A.I.R. 1928 P.C. 103 : 26 ALJ 657. In this case their Lordships of the Privy Council laid down that in reckoning the time for presenting an appeal, the time required for obtaining a copy of the decree and judgment must be excluded, even though by the rules of the Court it is not necessary to file such copies with the memorandum of appeal. The same view was taken in a Full Bench case of the Allahabad High Court reported in Keshar Sugar Works v. R.C. Sharma, AIR 1951 Allahabad 122 : 1950 ALJ 946, as well as in a Division Bench case of the Allahabad High Court reported in Municipal Board v. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1959 Allahabad 500. Approaching the matter, therefore, from the equitable point of view the present case is a much stronger one for the exclusion of time taken in obtaining a copy of the impugned judgment or order, as the annexation of sucli a copy with the application is an imperative requirement under the rules framed by this Court. Under the circumstances, we are of opinion that in computing the period of limitation of 90 days which is the conventional period observed by this Court, a party should be held to be legitimately entitled to exclude the said period. 25. There is another reason also why the present case should be considered lo be a stronger one than a case under the Limitation Act. A case under the Limitation Act is after all governed by the rigid rules of law which are inflexible. On the other hand, so far as the conventional period of limitation relating to writ petitions is concerned, it is not governed by any such rigid rules of law. The question in such a matter is drawn exclusively within the realm of equitable jurisdiction of the Court and, therefore, in considering the matter, the hands of the Courts are not tied clown by the shackles of law. The question in such a matter is drawn exclusively within the realm of equitable jurisdiction of the Court and, therefore, in considering the matter, the hands of the Courts are not tied clown by the shackles of law. It can, therefore, move more freely, and has a wider range within its reach. In such a case, therefore, there is nothing to prevent a court from taking into consideration every equitable circumstance that might have resulted in causing unavoidable delay in filing the writ petition. The principle on which the Limitation Act proceeds is the principle of public policy which is a principle of narrower application. On the other hand, the principle on which the Court in such a matter proceeds is .the principle of equity which is a principle of much wider application. In the latter case, it is open to the Court to mould the relief in this regard according to the particular circumstances of each case. 26. The inequitable consequences of not excluding the period spent in obtaining a copy of the order or judgment sought to be impugned will be apparent by taking the instance of a case in which a party, in spite of due diligence, is unable to obtain a certified copy of the said order or judgment within a period of 90 days. Supposing that the office to which an application for copy has been made issues the copy after a period of 95 or 100 days. In such a case the party would be debarred altogether from filing the writ petition, as the Rules of Court require that the filing of such a copy along with the petition is a condition precedent to the maintainability of the petition. The result would be that whenever an authority does not want that its order or judgment be challenged, it has only to instruct its office to delay the preparation of the copy beyond a period of over 90 days with the result that the order of the said authority, however erroneous, illegal or perverse would become impregnable and incapable of being challenged in the High Court by means of writ proceedings. A party would thus be thrown at the mercy of the Copying Department and would be penalised for no fault of his own. This would be a highly inequitable situation, and would be against all cannons of justice and fair play. A party would thus be thrown at the mercy of the Copying Department and would be penalised for no fault of his own. This would be a highly inequitable situation, and would be against all cannons of justice and fair play. For the above reasons, we have no hesitation in holding that a petitioner filing a writ petition should be considered entitled to exclude the period spent in obtaining a copy of the impugned judgment or order. 27. The next question that has arisen in the present case is whether the petitioner should be further entitled to exclude the period of 14 days which is the prescribed period for the service of notice upon the Standing Counsel under Ch. XXII, R. 1, sub-R. 4 of the Rules of this Court. Ch. XXII, R. 1, sub-R. 4, runs as follows:- "Where the Government or an officer or department of the Government, or a court, or a Tribunal, Board, Commission or other body appointed by the Government is an opposite-party named in the application,the applicant shall before presenting the application serve notice of motion upon the Government Advocate in Criminal matters and upon Standing Counsel, if he is authorised to receive notice on behalf of such opposite-party, in other matters along with as many copies of the application affidavit and other papers accompanying it as may he equal to the number of parties to be represented by the Government Advocate or the Standing Counsel, as the case may be, and one extra copy for the use of the Government Advocate or the Standing Counsel naming therein the day for the making of the motion. The application shall indicate that such notice of motion has been served. There shall be. at least fourteen clear days between service of notice of motion and the day named therein for the making of the motion except where the matter is one of urgency and the permission of the Court is obtained for making such motion earlier." 28. It is conceded that the above rule applies to the present case. The most important point to notice in this connection is again the fact that service of motion is a part of the mandatory requirement of the above rule which has the force of law in this Court. It is conceded that the above rule applies to the present case. The most important point to notice in this connection is again the fact that service of motion is a part of the mandatory requirement of the above rule which has the force of law in this Court. A party might have prepared his writ petition within the prescribed period of 90 days which is the conventional period of limitation. Ail the papers connected therewith might also have been obtained by it. In spite of it, according to the above mentioned rule, the party is not entitled to present his application under Article 226 of the Constitution unless and until he gives fourteen days notice of the presentation of the same to the Standing Counsel. Judging the matter from an equitable point of view, we have no doubt in our mind that a party should be entitled to the exclusion of this period provided, of course, that the required notice has actually been given before the period of 90 days counted after excluding the period spent in obtaining a copy of the impugned judgment or order has not expired. In this connection again it would be relevant to refer to two maxims of equity on which the exclusion of this period must be based. The first is Actus Guriae Neminem Gravabit" (An act of the court will prejudice no man an act of the court will hurt no man). The second is "Lex Non Cogit Ad Impossiblia" (The law does not force a man to impossibilities: The law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform). The requirement that fourteen days notice of motion shall be given to the Government Counsel under the above rule is a requirement under a rule which has the force of law in the Allahabad High Court, and the rule in question was framed by this Court. It is, therefore, only fair that a party, who is ready with his application within the conventional period of limitation prescribed by this Court, should not be made to suffer as a result of the action of this Court requiring him to do certain other acts before he can file it. 29. It is, therefore, only fair that a party, who is ready with his application within the conventional period of limitation prescribed by this Court, should not be made to suffer as a result of the action of this Court requiring him to do certain other acts before he can file it. 29. The inequity of the position will be evident if we contemplate a position where the Court instead of requiring fourteen days as the period of notice, prescribed a period of 95 or 100 days for such notice. It is, in fact, open to this Court to amend the above rule in this fashion. The result then would be that the party would never be able to present a petition which requires such notice within the conventional period of 90 days. The cosnequence would be that every writ petition to which sub-R. (4) of R. 1 of Ch. XXII applies, would have to be dismissed in this Court. A party would thus be debarred altogether from seeking this salutary relief at the doors of this Court, and the entire provisions of Art, 226 of the Constitution of India would stand completely nullified in such cases. 30. In this connection an argument was advanced before us on behalf of the opposite-parties that in this sub-rule the expression relating to the presentation of an application is used in a sense different from the expression relating to the service of notice of motion. It was further argued that what was really prohibited by this rule was not the presentation of the application but the making of the motion. A party could, therefore, present the application within the usual period open to him. It was only barred from making any motion in this Court in respect of it until after the expiry of fourteen days. In this connection a distinction was sought to be drawn between the presentation of the application and the notice of motion, and it was strenuously contended before us that the making of the motion refers to a case where a party seeks some action on the part of the court apart from the presentation of the application. The argument is an ingenious one and has also the appearance of plausibility. On a closer scrutiny of it, however, we are not disposed to accept it. The argument is an ingenious one and has also the appearance of plausibility. On a closer scrutiny of it, however, we are not disposed to accept it. No doubt the bare act of presentation may not be identical with the act of making the motion in every case. In the context, however, in which the words "presenting the application" are used in sub-R. (4), it appears to us that the said expression incorporates within it the idea of making the motion. This interpretation would be strongly supported by a reference to the last sentence of this very sub-rule which requires a party to name the day for the making of the motion at the time of the service of notice of motion. If the party has already presented the application, in court and has parted with the necessary papers, it is not possible for it to present the same papers again on the day named by it. It would, therefore, be unable to make the motion on that day. At any rate,the party having already parted with the necessary papers, the matter would be out of its hands. The same interpretation is supported by a reference to Ch. XI, R. 1 of this Court which lays down that "Every memorandum of appeal or objections under R. 22 or R. 26 of Or. XLI of the Code and every application shall be presented for admission in Court." The above rule indicates that every application which is presented in this Court is presented for a certain purpose, that purpose being "admission in Court." The presentation of every application, therefore, necessarily carries with it a prayer for certain action on the part of the Court. The action might not be immediate but the very physical act of presentation is at least an invitation to the Court to take the action contemplated in this rule. The presentation of the application cannot, therefore, be divorced from the purpose for which it is presented viz., "admission." The said purpose is defined in the first part of R. (1) of Ch. XI. The presentation of the application cannot, therefore, be divorced from the purpose for which it is presented viz., "admission." The said purpose is defined in the first part of R. (1) of Ch. XI. The second part of the same rule lays down that "This rule shall not apply to appeals and applications that may under these Rules be filed before the Registrar or other officer." There is, therefore, an obvious, distinction between the two kinds of presentation Vizi, presentation of an application to a Judge of this Court and the presentation of an application to the Registrar or other officer. The latter may be construed to be bare presentation: but not the former. The reason may be that the act of receiving the application was in the latter case contemplated as of a merely ministerial nature, whereas in the former case it was envisaged as one of a fully judicial nature. 31. It would also be relevant in this connection to refer to Ch. XXI I, R. 1, sub-R. (1). This provision relates, to the manner in .which writ petitions are moved in this Court. In this sub-rule it is laid down that a writ application other than a writ in the nature of a Habeas Corpus shall be "made" to the Division Bench appointed to receive such application, or in the absence, to the Judge appointed to receive applications in civil matters. The very fact that the framers of the rule made use of the word made and not the word `presented' indicates that the filing of a writ application is done for the purpose of seeking an order from the Court and not just doing the bare act of presentation. 32. It would also be relevant in this connection to refer to Halsbury's Laws of England (Simonds Edition) Vol. 11, page 23, foot-note (t) which indicates that a writ petition is to be treated as an application to show cause in a matter. 33. Our attention was also invited by the learned counsel on behalf of the applicant to Section 26, C. P. C. which provides that "Every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed." Similarly Or. 4, R. 1 relates to the presentation of a plaint and Or. 33. Our attention was also invited by the learned counsel on behalf of the applicant to Section 26, C. P. C. which provides that "Every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or in such other manner as may be prescribed." Similarly Or. 4, R. 1 relates to the presentation of a plaint and Or. 33, R. 3 relates to the presentation of an application for permission to sue as a pauper. Reference in this connection may also be made to Ch. XV, R. 1, sub-R. (1) of the Rules of this Court which lays down that every suit is to be instituted by the presentation of a plaint to the Judge appointed to receive applications. On behalf of the appellants it is suggested that in view of the difference in the context of the expression relating to presentation in these provisions, the said expression may bear a meaning different from the one it has in Ch. XXII, R. 1(4) which relates to the presentation of writ petitions. 34. Our attention in this connection was also drawn to Or. 6, R. 1 of the Supreme Court Rules in which the making of a motion is treated as identical with the presentation of an application. The meaning of the expression "presentation of the application" would, therefore, depend upon the context in which the said expression is used bearing in mind the nature of the application which is sought to be presented and its purpose. Approaching the matter from this standpoint, in our opinion, the expression relating to the presentation of the application in Ch. XXII, R. 1, sub-R. (4) of the High Court Rules is to be interpreted as synonymous with the making of motion; or rather the former should necessarily be deemed to incorporate the latter. This interpretation would also be more conducive to convenience in so far as it would enable a party to name the day for the making of the motion. This interpretation, therefore, is to be preferred as it would facilitate the smooth working of the rule in practice and subserve the purpose which the rule was designed to achieve. 35. This interpretation would also be more conducive to convenience in so far as it would enable a party to name the day for the making of the motion. This interpretation, therefore, is to be preferred as it would facilitate the smooth working of the rule in practice and subserve the purpose which the rule was designed to achieve. 35. It may also be noted that the rule in question states that "there shall be at least fourteen clear days between service of notice of motion and the day named therein for the making of the motion." The use of the lord "clear" in this connection puts it beyond doubt that the framers of the rule intended that in computing the period the dak of service of notice was to be excluded. 36. In Maxwells Interpretation of Statutes (Ninth Edition) at page 350 the meaning of the expression "clear days" is expounded thus: "Again, when so many clear days,or so many days at least are given to do an act,or 'not less than so many days are to intervene, both the terminal days are excluded from the computation." 37. In the Rules of the High Court the method of reckoning of time in such cases is prescribed in Ch. I, R. which provides as follows:- "Where any particular number of days is prescribed by these Rules, the same shall be reckoned exclusively of the first day and inclusively of the last day, unless the last day shall happen to fall on a day on which the offices of the Court are closed, in which case the time shall be reckoned exclusively of that day also and of any succeeding day or days on which the offices of the Court continue to be closed." 38. The result, therefore is that the party presenting the application would be entitled to exclude the entire period of fourteen days, excluding the day on which the notice was served. 39. In this connection, it will be relevant to observe that the Limitation Act also contains an analogous provision entitling a party to exclude the period of notice required in cases of suits. 39. In this connection, it will be relevant to observe that the Limitation Act also contains an analogous provision entitling a party to exclude the period of notice required in cases of suits. Section 15, sub-Sec. (2) of the Limitation Act runs as follows:- "In computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit of which notice has been given in accordance with the requirements of any enactment for the time being in force, the period of such notice shall be excluded." 40. Although writ proceedings are for the purposes of fixing the conventional period of limitation treated as analogous to appeals, they are really proceedings in the exercise of original jurisdiction. The array of parties is a different one. Fresh material is imported into the case by the requirement of affidavit or affidavits which are to be filed with it. Fresh documentary evidence may also be filed. In fact R.8 of Ch. XXII of the Rules of Court expressly sanctions the production of fresh evidence by laying down as follows:- "All questions arising for determination under this Chapter shall be decided ordinarily upon affidavits but the Court may direct that such questions as it may consider necessary be decided on such other evidence and in such manner as it may deem fit and in that case it may follow such procedure and may pass such order as may appear to it to be just." 41. As original proceedings, therefore, they are in the nature of suits, and the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act can be referred to for guidance in this regard by way of analogy. As already observed the provisions of Ch. XXII, R. 1(4) have the force of an enactment so far as this Court is concerned. Applying, therefore, the analogy of Section 15(2) of the Limitation Act, the period of notice which is required under Ch. XXII, R. 1(4) to be given to the Standing Counsel should P be excluded in computing the conventional period of limitation prescribed for writ petitions. In fact, the exceptions provided in the Limitation Act are, as already observed, themselves based on equitable principles which are engrafted in the statute for the purpose of softening the rigour of the first schedule which prescribes the strict periods of limitation for proceedings mentioned therein. 42. In fact, the exceptions provided in the Limitation Act are, as already observed, themselves based on equitable principles which are engrafted in the statute for the purpose of softening the rigour of the first schedule which prescribes the strict periods of limitation for proceedings mentioned therein. 42. It would also appear that the Limitation Act itself did not intend to confine the operation of these exceptions within the four corners of the law of limitation as laid down in Limitation Act. A perusal of Section 29(2) of the Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908) would indicate that unless expressly provided otherwise the provisions contained in Section 4, Sections 9 to 18 and Section 22 would also be applicable to any special or local law prescribing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application. In the present case the relevant provision with regard to the exclusion of time spent in obtaining copy of judgment or order is contained in Section 12 and with regard to the exclusion of time taken in complying with the requirement of notice is contained in Section 15. Both these sections were, therefore, specifically mentioned in Section 29 of the Limitation Act. Both of them were, therefore, intended by the framers of the Indian Limitation Act to be extended to special and local laws as well. The conventional period of limitation laid down by the Allahabad High Court with regard to writ petitions may in a sense be termed as "special law". The application of both these sections may, therefore, be attracted on this basis as well. 43. On behalf of the opposite party it was argued that the provisions of Sections 12 and 15 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to writ proceedings. Even presuming that this is so, in our opinion, it would not be irrelevant to refer to them for the purpose of determining whether the exemption claimed is justifiable on the ground of equity, justice and good conscience. In fact, we have referred to these provisions not because we are of opinion that they are strictly applicable to writ proceedings, but only as providing an anology which can be drawn upon for the purpose of determining the question whether the exclusion claimed is justifiable and reasonable from the point of equity. 44. In fact, we have referred to these provisions not because we are of opinion that they are strictly applicable to writ proceedings, but only as providing an anology which can be drawn upon for the purpose of determining the question whether the exclusion claimed is justifiable and reasonable from the point of equity. 44. So far as the position of law in India is concerned, it is summarised in para 21 of Ch. XXIX of Chaudhuris book on the Law of Writs and Fundamental Rights, Volume II(1960 Edition), under the heading of "Limitation". The relevant passage runs as follows:- "In India no time limit has been fixed by statute or rules of Court for either Prohibition, Certiorari Mandamus or Quo Warranto. These extraordinary remedies being discretionary and based on the principle of quintet the party desiring the assistance of the Court through any of these methods must apply promptly. An Application for a writ of certiorari or other writs should be filed within a reasonable time from the date of the order which the applicant seeks to be quashed. Ordinarily a period of six months may be considered reasonable, but in extraordinary circumstances the High Court may, in its discretion, excuse the delay. The exercise of powers under Article 226 by the Court irrespective of any time-lag will introduce complications and unsettle rights finally decided by authorities empowered to do so. The Allahabad, Travancore Cochin and Kerala High Courts have, however, held that the conventional period permitted for presentation of civil revision petitions may be regarded as a reasonable time for the presentation of applications for writ, orders or directions under Article 226. But there is no hard and fast rule in the matter and it would be within the discretion of the Court trying the petition to interfere in appropriate cases even if the application is presented beyond the aforesaid period." 45. Finally, it was argued on behalf of the opposite parties that the order of the learned single Judge being a discretionary one, it would not be proper to interfere with it at the stage of appeal. Learned counsel cited a large number of authorities in support of his contention in this regard. It is no doubt correct that the appellate court is reluctant to interfere with orders of a purely discretionary nature passed by the original Court. Learned counsel cited a large number of authorities in support of his contention in this regard. It is no doubt correct that the appellate court is reluctant to interfere with orders of a purely discretionary nature passed by the original Court. In the present case, however, it appears to us that the original Court did not apply its mind to the various aspects of the matter which require consideration when determining the question of limitation in the matter of writs. On behalf of the appellant the learned counsel stated before us that the learned single Judge did not allow him to argue the points as he was of opinion that both the heads on the basis of which extension of Limitation was claimed were quite foreign to the enquiry relating to a consideration of the question of limitation in the matter of writs. The order itself is a brief one, and does indicate that consideration of these matters was, in the opinion of the learned Judge, considered extraneous to the issue with which he was faced. Under these circumstances, even though the order was a discretionary nature, it appears to us that the discretion vested in the Court was not exercised on recognised judicial. and equitable principles. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the impugned order cannot be sustained and must be set aside. 46. It is conceded that if the period spent in obtaining the copy and fourteen days required for service of notice of motion on the Standing Counsel are excluded, then the petition would not be barred by the conventional rule of limitation. This appeal must, therefore, be allowed. As, however, we have not heard the appellants counsel on the merits of the matter, the case will have to be remanded for decision to a Single Judge. 47. Before closing our judgment, we feel that we must express our appreciation of the ability and efficiency with which the case was presented before us by Mr. Rama Charan Verma, the learned Counsel for the appellants. 48. We, accordingly, allow this appeal set aside the order dated the 18th April, 1960, and remand the case to a ingle Judge for decision on merits. Under the circumstances of the case, we make no order to costs.