Judgment :- 1. The short point that arises for decision in this writ petition is as to whether the view taken by the learned District Judge that the Rent Control Appellate Authority, functioning under the provisions of Kerala Act 16/1959, has no power to remand a proceeding to the Bent Controller Court, is correct or not. 2. The question arises this way: The landlord, who is the respondent before me, filed an application under S.9[3] [a] [i] of the Travancore-Cochin Buildings [Lease and Rent Control] Order, 1950 for eviction of the tenant, the writ petitioner before me, on the ground that he must get possession of the building in question, as he proposes to have it reconstructed. 3. S.9 [1] of the Order is to the effect that a tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of that clause. S. 9 [3] [a] is to the effect that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession and S.9 [3] [a] [i] is to the effect that he may apply for being put in possession 'where the building is proposed to be reconstructed.' 4. The Rent Controller in this case, originally ordered eviction as evidenced by Ext. P-1 and the tenant filed an appeal before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. When the appeal was pending before the latter, Ordinance No. 3 of 1959 came into force namely, the Kerala Buildings [Lease and Rent Control] Ordinance, 1959. It was promulgated by the Governor on 16th January 1959, and was published in the State Gazette on 17th January 1959. S.11 of the Ordinance dealt with eviction of tenants. Here again, sub-section [i] of S.11 was to the effect that a tenant shall not be evicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the provisions of that section. Sub-section [4] of S.11 gave a right to a landlord to apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building under the circumstances mentioned in clauses [i] to [iv]. In particular, Cl. Sub-section [4] of S.11 gave a right to a landlord to apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building under the circumstances mentioned in clauses [i] to [iv]. In particular, Cl. [iv] of Sub-section [4] of S.11 was to the effect: "if the landlord requires bona fide to reconstruct the building urgently and if he satisfies the Court that the building is in a precarious state and that he has the plan and licence, if any required, and the ability to rebuild and if the proposal is not made as a pretext for eviction." A reading of this clause will show that the right of a landlord to get possession of a building for purposes of reconstruction is hedged in by several conditions mentioned under this sub-clause. 5. There is no controversy that the Act that followed the Ordinance namely, the Kerala Buildings [Lease and Rent Control] Act, 1959 - Act 16/1959, under the identical provision namely, S.11 [4] [iv] gives the same right to a landlord to get eviction of a building for reconstruction. But there is a slight difference in the actual wording as contained in the relevant clause in the Act. Whereas under the Ordinance there was also a condition that the landlord should satisfy the court that the building is in a precarious state, that condition or necessity has been deleted in the corresponding provision under the Act namely, clause [iv] of sub-section [4] of S.11 of Kerala Act 16/1959. 6. There is also another minor difference in that the Ordinance required the landlord to satisfy the court that the repairs are to be done urgently also. 7. When the Ordinance was passed, it is seen that the Appellate Authority understood that both parties were requesting him to send back the matter to the Rent Controller, that is, more or less remand the matter for rehearing and disposal in the light of the requirements mentioned in the Ordinance. Therefore, under Ext P-2, the Appellate Authority passed an order of remand. The landlord moved the Appellate Authority for reviewing the order of remand on the ground that he has not agreed or given his consent for the remand. Therefore, under Ext P-2, the Appellate Authority passed an order of remand. The landlord moved the Appellate Authority for reviewing the order of remand on the ground that he has not agreed or given his consent for the remand. The Appellate Authority ultimately was inclined to accept the landlord's prayer to this extent only namely, that he may not have agreed to the order of remand as such but nevertheless, the Appellate Authority finally passed an order under Ext. P-3, reminding the matter for disposal by the Rent Controller Court on its own initiative. 8. There was a revision against this order of remand passed by the Appellate Authority to the District Court at the instance of the landlord and the learned District Judge has taken the view that the Appellate Authority has no power to remand the proceedings to the Rent Controller Court and this order of the learned District Judge is evidenced by Ext. P-4. The view of the learned District Judge appears to be that the Appellate Authority functioning under the provisions of the Act, has no jurisdiction to remand the matter and the entire matter must be disposed of by that Authority and the Authority alone and in consequence, the learned judge has set aside the order of the Appellate Authority Ext P-3 remanding the proceedings to the Rent Controller Court. 9. In this writ petition, Mr. V.N. Gopalakrishnan Nair, learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner, contests the correctness of the order of the learned District Judge. According to the learned counsel, the Appellate Authority, though functioning as persona designata under the Act is constituted as the Appellate Authority and it functions as such under the provisions of the Act. The powers of the Appellate Authority are clearly mentioned in S.18 of the Act. Deciding an appeal, by sending back the case by way of remand, is according to the learned counsel, one manner of deciding the appeal even within the provisions of sub-section (3) of S.18 of the Act. 10. The learned counsel also took a fairly large contention before me to the effect than an order of remand is within the power and jurisdiction of an Appellate Authority, because the exercise of powers of appeal carries with it also the right of that authority to remand the matter when it considers necessary in the circumstances. 11. On the other hand, Mr. 11. On the other hand, Mr. A.S. Krishna Iyer, learned counsel for the respondent, has supported the view of the learned District Judge and has also contended that inasmuch as the learned Subordinate Judge, who functions as the Appellate Authority under this Act, is not functioning as a court but as a persona designata, his powers whatever may be, must be found within the four corners of this enactment itself. The learned counsel has drawn my attention to the provisions of S.18 of the Act which lays down as to what the Appellate Authority can do when disposing of an appeal. The learned counsel contested the proposition that the powers of appeal carries with it implicitly also a right to remand the proceedings to the lower court. If that is so, Mr. A.S. Krishna Iyer contended, it is absolutely unnecessary on the part of the Legislature to provide or expressly confer on the Appellate Authority a power to grant a stay as is seen from sub-section (2) of S.18 of the Act, The learned counsel also urged that in particular, sub-section (4) of S.18 clearly says that the Appellate Authority shall have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including the fixing of arrears of rent. If the Appellate Authority functions exactly in the same way as the Rent Control Court and it has got all those powers vested in the latter, it must be considered that the Legislature makes the provisions of that section self-sufficient and it is not possible to find more powers on that Authority than those are expressly conferred under S.18 of the Act. 12. Mr. A.S. Krishna Iyer has also drawn my attention to a Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court reported in Rangaswamy Naidu v. Second Judge, Small Cause Court, Madras (62 Law Weekly Short Notes p. 35) where the learned Chief Justice sitting with Mr. Justice Raghava Rao had to consider more or less the powers of an Appellate Authority under the corresponding Madras Act and has come to the conclusion that the Appellate Authority, in those circumstances has no power to order a remand. 13. On the other hand, Mr. Justice Raghava Rao had to consider more or less the powers of an Appellate Authority under the corresponding Madras Act and has come to the conclusion that the Appellate Authority, in those circumstances has no power to order a remand. 13. On the other hand, Mr. V.N. Gopalakrishnan Nair has referred me to certain decisions under the Motor Vehicles Act to the effect that notwithstanding that power of stay as such was granted even under the Act as it originally stood, courts have interpreted and understood those provisions to mean that the Appellate Authority has got power to grant stay on the ground that the power to grant stay is implicit in the powers of appeal being exercised by an appellate authority. 14. S.18 deals with appeal against orders of the Rent Controller. S.18(1)(a) provides for the Government by a notification in the Gazette conferring on officers or authorities not below the rank of a Subordinate judge the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of the Act. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S.18 gives a right to a party who feels aggrieved by an order of the Rent Court, to file an appeal to the Appellate Authority within thirty days of the order of the Rent Court. The time taken for obtaining a certified copy is also excluded in reckoning the period of limitation. Sub-section (2) of S.18 provides that on such appeal being preferred, the Appellate Authority may order stay of further proceedings in the matter pending decision on the appeal. This itself clearly, in my view, shows that the Legislature did not proceed on the basis that a power to grant stay is also implicit in the powers of appeal being exercised by an appellate authority. On the other hand, it has chosen to confer that power of stay on that Authority specifically by this sub-section. 15. This itself clearly, in my view, shows that the Legislature did not proceed on the basis that a power to grant stay is also implicit in the powers of appeal being exercised by an appellate authority. On the other hand, it has chosen to confer that power of stay on that Authority specifically by this sub-section. 15. Sub-section (3) of S.18 of the Act is as follows: "The appellate authority shall send for the records of the case from the Rent Control Court and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either directly or through the Rent Control Court, shall decide the appeal." There is an Explanation to this sub-section to the effect that the Appellate Authority may, while confirming the order of evictions passed by the Rent Control Court, grant an extension of time to the tenant for putting the landlord in possession of the building. 16. Under sub-section (3) of S.18 of the Act extracted above it will be seen that power is given to the Appellate Authority to make any further inquiries that it requires either by itself or can direct the Rent Control Court to make such further enquires and after receipt of that further materials, is to decide the appeal. What is contemplated in this sub-section is a final decision being given to the appeal one way or the other either agreeing or disagreeing with the views of the Rent Control Court. Sub-section (4) of S.18 of the Act, in my view, places the matter beyond all doubt that the Legislature does not contemplate conferring any powers of remand to an appellate authority. Sub-section (4) is to the effect: "The appellate authority shall have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including the fixing of arrears of rent." That is, the appellate authority is placed almost in the same position as the Rent Control Court. If that is so, when those powers which could be exercised by the Rent Control Court, could be exercised also by the appellate authority, there is absolutely no purpose in the appellate authority asking those powers to be exercised by the Rent Court by way of remand. 17. Apart from the wording of the various sub-sections referred to above, I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. 17. Apart from the wording of the various sub-sections referred to above, I am not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. V.N. Gopalakrishnan Nair to the effect that when powers of appeal are granted to an authority, the latter will also have powers of granting either stay or remand. It must not be forgotten that the appellate authority is functioning under this Act not as a court but as a persona designata. In my opinion, if that is so, the powers of that authority, whatever it may be, either as an appellate authority or a Rent Control authority, must be found only in the provisions creating that authority by the very statute itself, or if there are any rules governing that, they can also be considered to find out what exactly their powers are. The learned counsel has not been able to place any provision in the Act or the rules framed under the Act in support of this contention that he has raised. 18. The learned counsel Mr. V.N. Gopalakrishnan Nair, no doubt, referred me to a decision of the Patna High Court reported in Rama Sarup v. Inderdeo Narayan (AIR. 1952 Patna 458). But in the absence of any information as to the exact law that the learned judges were dealing with, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel that in all cases, irrespective of the wording of the particular section before the court, the principles laid down by the learned judges will have to be applied. 19. The learned counsel also referred me to two single judge decisions of this Court namely, of my learned brothers Mr. Justice M. S. Menon reported in T.B. Transport v. R.T. Officer (AIR. 1957 Kerala 142); and of Mr. Justice S. Velu Pillai reported in Ramakrishnan v. S.T. Appellate Tribunal (1960 KLT.136). Those cases do not deal with powers of remand by appellate authority. 20. I do not think that Mr. M.S. Menon, J. had occasion to consider directly the question as to whether an appellate authority functioning under a statute, has also got along with it the powers to grant stay. Those cases do not deal with powers of remand by appellate authority. 20. I do not think that Mr. M.S. Menon, J. had occasion to consider directly the question as to whether an appellate authority functioning under a statute, has also got along with it the powers to grant stay. No doubt, there is an observation in the judgment of the learned judge at p. 143 to the effect: "The power to stay is a necessary corollary to the power to entertain an appeal or revision." The question before the learned judge arose in a totally different way and I am not inclined to accept this as an authoritative decision on the point that arises before me. 21. Again, my learned brother Mr. Justice Velu Pillai had to consider the scope of the provisions of S.134 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act giving power of stay to appellate authority and the power of granting an injunction restraining an operator from carrying on his activities. The learned judge at page 139 observes: "I grant, that a power to restrain the operator by an order of injunction from carrying on his activities would have a different effect, but then, such power must be expressly conferred, and cannot be left to be implied; a power of stay may perhaps, apart from S.134 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, be deemed to be inherent in an appellate authority as held in T.B. Transport v. R.T. Officer (AIR. 1957 Kerala 142). This decision relied upon by the learned judge is that of Mr. Justice M.S. Menon, to which I have already adverted. I have, expressed my view that the learned judge had no occasion to directly consider this question. I am repeating this once again, because if certainly this is a decision direct on this point and I am not inclined, with respect to accept that decision, the proper course for me to adopt will be not to decide the matter, but to refer the matter to a Division Bench for the question being decided. That is why I have once again repeated that the learned judges had no occasion to consider this question directly. Therefore, if I may say so with respect, the judgment of Mr. Justice Velu Pillai relying upon that of Mr. Justice M. S. Menon, will not also carry the matter further. That is why I have once again repeated that the learned judges had no occasion to consider this question directly. Therefore, if I may say so with respect, the judgment of Mr. Justice Velu Pillai relying upon that of Mr. Justice M. S. Menon, will not also carry the matter further. But the one circumstance to be noticed is, even Mr. Justice Velu Pillai was not inclined to accept the position that by virtue of exercising appellate powers, that authority will also have the incidental power to grant an order of injunction. But the learned judge is prepared to proceed on the basis that so far as the power to stay is concerned, even apart from S.134 (1) of the Motor Vehicles Act which provides specifically for grant of stay, must be considered to be inherent and for that proposition the learned judge, as I mentioned earlier, relies upon the decision of my learned brother Mr. Justice M. S. Menon. In as much as the point that is before me did not directly arise before Mr. Justice Velu Pillai either, I do not consider those observations to be really laying down that in every case where powers of appeal are given automatically it follows that that authority has got also the power of granting stay. In fact, the question about the appellate authority having a power to grant stay cannot at all be challenged in the case before my learned brother, because S.134(1), which was inserted by the Motor Vehicles Act by the Amending Act 100/1956, did confer the power of granting stay on the appellate authority. 22. On the other hand, Mr. A. S. Krishna Iyer, learned counsel, has referred me to the Division Bench judgment of the learned Chief Justice sitting with Mr. Justice Raghava Rao - reported in Rangaswami Naidu v. Second Judge, Small Cause Court, Madras (62 Law Weekly Short Notes p. 35). Unfortunately, the full report of that case is not available, but the principles have been stated by the learned judges that an appellate authority functioning under the corresponding enactment then in force in Madras, has no power of remand in such circumstances. 23. Unfortunately, the full report of that case is not available, but the principles have been stated by the learned judges that an appellate authority functioning under the corresponding enactment then in force in Madras, has no power of remand in such circumstances. 23. With great respect, I am inclined to accept that view and applying those principles and also in view of the specific provisions contained in this enactment also and in particular, in S.18 of the Act, in my view, the order of the learned District Judge that the appellate authority has no powers to remand the matter to the Rent Control Court, is perfectly correct. 24. Mr. V.N. Gopalakrishnan Nair has brought to my notice that the learned judge has directed his client to pay costs in the District Court. As the matter cannot be considered to be completely free from doubt, the order of the learned judge regarding costs is cancelled and set aside. 25. In the result, subject to the modification regarding costs stated by me, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. Parties will bear their own costs in this Court. Dismissed.