JUDGMENT M. Madhavan Nair, J. 1. The 1st defendant in a suit for redemption is the appellant herein. 2. The suit was laid for redemption of a mortgage whose date is said to be unknown to the plaintiff. An averment is made in the plaint that the term of 12 years fixed in the mortgage deed had expired prior to 1852. The suit, having been instituted only in 1951, is prima facie barred by limitation. 3. The trial court got over the bar of limitation on the ground that in the deed of kanom dated 20-7-1921, copy of which is Ext. A6 in the case, the 1st defendant's tarwad has made unequivocal admission that they are holding this property as mortgagees under the Periyanchery tarwad of plaintiff's assignors and that therefore the mortgage must be deemed to have continued to that date so as to give a fresh start for limitation on the date of that kanom. In that view the suit was decreed by the learned Munsiff. 4. On appeal, the learned District Judge held that there is evidence to show that the mortgagees and their tenants had effected certain improvements on the property, that since compensation for those improvements had not been paid so far the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee continued and that therefore there could not be any bar of limitation for redemption. He therefore confirmed the decree of the court below. Hence this Second Appeal. 5. The only question that arisen for consideration here is whether the plaintiff's claim to redeem the suit mortgage is barred by limitation. Having unequivocally admitted that the right of redemption arose on or before 1852, it is for the plaintiff to make out an exemption from the normal rule of limitation prescribed by Article 148 of the Limitation Act. 6. As in the trial court, the plaintiff contends that Ext. A6 is an acknowledg­ment of the mortgagor's title making a fresh starting point for limitation in this suit. But, under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, an acknowledgment to be effective has necessarily to be made before the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for the suit. Admittedly Ext. A6 was beyond the sixty years' period of limitation reckoned from 1852. So, Ext. A6 is not available to the plaintiff as an acknowledgment to save the bar of limitation in this case. 7. Admittedly Ext. A6 was beyond the sixty years' period of limitation reckoned from 1852. So, Ext. A6 is not available to the plaintiff as an acknowledgment to save the bar of limitation in this case. 7. It was next contended by the learned counsel for the respondent plaintiff that as long as compensation for improvements effected by the mortgagee, either directly or through tenants, has not been paid the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee continued and therefore no question of limitation arose in this case. Reliance was placed in support of this position on the ruling reported in Govindan v De'Silva (A. I. R. 1938 Madras 581) which is said to have been followed in an unreported decision of the Madras High Court in S. A. No. 2329 of 1947 on its file. I regret that I have to differ from the dictum expressed in the above ruling. It is trite say that exclusions from the statute of repose cannot be multiplied or invented by courts on grounds of natural justice and equity. The law of limitation is imperative in its expression and any exemption therefrom has necessarily to be sought in the provisions of the Act itself, or of other statutes express on the matter. There is nothing in the Compensation for Tenants' Improvements Act to indicate that any provision therein is to be taken as an exemption to the statute on Limitation. The contention of the plaintiff that so long as he has not paid compensation for the mortgagee's improvements in the mortgaged property the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee will continue and therefore no question of limitation can arise is not warranted by any law. In substance it amounts to a plea that by his laches he is entitled to evade the law of limitation. Such a plea can hardly be countenanced by courts. The argument that so long as compensation for improve­ments remains unpaid, the mortgagee remains a mortgagee only has no merits. A mortgagee remains a mortgagee until the last moment of the sixty years' period prescribed for redemption of the property from him by the mortgagor. Once that period is over the mortgagor's right to the property becomes extinguished by force of Section 28 of the Limitation Act. That Section enacts : "28. Extinguishment of right to property. A mortgagee remains a mortgagee until the last moment of the sixty years' period prescribed for redemption of the property from him by the mortgagor. Once that period is over the mortgagor's right to the property becomes extinguished by force of Section 28 of the Limitation Act. That Section enacts : "28. Extinguishment of right to property. At the determination of the period hereby limited to any person for instituting a suit for possession of any property, his right to such property shall be extinguished." Thus, the moment the mortgagor's right of redemption becomes barred by limitation, the mortgagor's right to the property becomes extinguished. The natural result of this extinction of the mortgagor's right will be to enlarge or perfect the mortgagee's right to the property. Thereafter there is no occasion or liability for the mortgagor to pay any compensation to the mortgagee for any improvement on the property. To say that until the compensation for improve­ments is paid the right of redemption would subsist is to ignore Section 28 of the Limitation Act. I am glad to find that a Division Bench of this Court had listened to the learned counsel for the respondent on this contention in Raman Bhattathiripad v Devasena Antherjanam (1958 K. L. J. 1061) and repelled it. So, the second ground urged to save limitation has also no substance. 8. In the result, the Second Appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed as barred by limitation with costs throughout.