Judgment :- 1. This appeal by the first defendant, is against, the concurrent decrees by the two lower courts, whereby the plaintiff respondent's claim to evict the appellant, been decreed. The property in dispute belongs to defendants 2 to 11, who had executed a registered marupat Ext. A (1) on March 4,1950. I would extract below the translation of the aforesaid documents which has been furnished to me by the appellant's learned advocate. "Marupat given executed, on the 20th of Kumbhom 1125 corresponding to the 4th March 1950, in favour of Moovakkat Mariyumma, daughter of Moideen Kutty, no occupation, Anayitukka Desom, Kannoor Kararinakam, Chirakkal Taluk, by Chemminian Anandan, son of Devaki alias Kalyani, Thiyya, employed in stone-quarrying, residing in the abovesaid Kararinaka, Kanhareri Desom. I have this day obtained from you on verumpattakudiyiruppa right for three years from today the paramba and all the improvements therein as well as the house and the well, intended for the protection of the improvements, which belong to you in jenm and which are in your possession and which are described in the schedule on a purappad (rent) of Rs. 100/- per year. You have this day given possession of the paramba and the improvements therein to me and have agreed to give possession of the house and the well, which are now in the possession of the tenant, after evicting him. On this stipulation you have this day obtained from me in cash Rs. 300/- (rupees three hundred only), in advance, being the rent for the above-mentioned three years, and have passed the receipt therefor to me. Accordingly, I am to keep possession of the paramba and the improvements from today and the house and the well from the date on which you give me vacant possession thereof, after evicting the tenant; I am to look after the improvements and do the seasonal protections by turning the soil, manuring the cocoanut trees etc.; I am also to thatch the house after I obtain possession thereof; I am to keep possession of the paramba and enjoy the usufructs of the improvements and to reside in the house; and I shall surrender the property and give direct possession of the same to you unconditionally on the expiry of the term of three years. I am also agreeable to your evicting me before the expiry of the term with damages, if I fail to do the seasonal protection at the appropriate time, or to thatch the house and thus causing damage to the improvements and the house, or if I cut trees or branches of trees, or if I hand over possession to anybody else except to you direct. As I have no higher right than Verumpatta Kudiyiruppa over these properties, I am not entitled to make any kuzhikoors (improvements) in the properties and I cannot at all prevent you from making any Kuzhikkoors. If I fail to surrender the property on the expiry of the term, you are entitled to recover from me and I am bound to give you a purappad of Rs. 115/- per year until I surrender the property or until you evict me. There is no manusham (Premium) for this deed. The total purappad for one year is Rs. 100/ Schedule Konhante Valappu parampa, the entire improvements therein, house and well 2 acres 80 cents". 2. To continue with statement of facts, the entire rent for the term of three years had been paid in advance, and on June 20, 1950, the 2nd defendant received a further sum of Rs. 115/-, being the advance rent for a year for the period subsequent to March 4, 1953. But prior to the sale, again the lessors on May 20, 1951, received a yet further sum of Rs. 115/-, being advance rent for a year after March 4, 1954. The lessors then sold the property to the plaintiff on June 6, 1952, by a deed, which is Ext. A (2). Both the documents concerning the subsequent receipts have been found by the two lower courts to be correct; and because of such receipts the tenant would not be liable to eviction earlier to March 4, 1955. The plaintiff, however, instituted the suit for eviction on July 27,1953, claiming that the period under Ext. A (1) had expired on March 3, 1953, and, he was, therefore, entitled to evict, the transaction not being protected by the Malabar Tenancy Law. The defendant took the objection that the suit was premature, and the second issue framed in the suit is whether the suit brought was premature. A (1) had expired on March 3, 1953, and, he was, therefore, entitled to evict, the transaction not being protected by the Malabar Tenancy Law. The defendant took the objection that the suit was premature, and the second issue framed in the suit is whether the suit brought was premature. The decision in the case Was given on March 18, 1955, and the trial Court held that because on the date of the judgment the plaintiff had become entitled to eviction, the tenant should be evicted. That conclusion has been sustained by the lower appellate court. The two lower courts have further held that the 1st defendant was not entitled to any statutory benefit under the Malabar Tenancy Act. Therefore, the two questions inviting adjudication in this appeal are how far the two lower courts have correctly taken note of the subsequent event and have allowed the suit, where the plaintiff had no cause of action on the day the plaint was filed in court. The other question is whether the tenant had only a bare licence to enjoy the usufructs and therefore not entitled to any statutory protection. 3. Dealing with the first question, the general legal rule appeals to be that in ejectment suits the plaintiffs should succeed on the cause of action at the date the plaint was filed. In Ramanandan Chetti v. Pulikkutty Servai (1898) ILR. 21 Madras 288 at pp. 289 & 290 the learned judges state the rule in these words: "But we cannot agree with him, as he has overlooked the elementary rule that a plaintiff who seeks possession must show that at the date of the suit he was entitled to such relief." The respondent's learned advocate has drawn my attention to a number of cases where it has been held that courts can take note of subsequent events in order to mould their relief. The result of these decisions has been summarised in Mulla's Civil Procedure Code, Twelfth Edition, page 612 in these words: "Ordinarily, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stand at the date of the institution. The result of these decisions has been summarised in Mulla's Civil Procedure Code, Twelfth Edition, page 612 in these words: "Ordinarily, the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they stand at the date of the institution. But where it is shown that the original relief claimed has, by reason of subsequent change of circumstances, become inappropriate or that it is necessary to have the decision of the Court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties, it is incumbent upon a court of justice to take notice of events which have happened since the institution of the suit and to mould its decree according to the circumstances as they stand at the time the decree is made." 4. The decisions rest on the obvious principle that in order to do justice the court should take note of altered circumstances; but it is equally clear that a party should not be deprived of the defence by the court's long delay in adjudicating on his objections. In this case the suit was filed in 1953; and the trial court had not during 1954 decided the simple issue of whether the plaintiff had any cause of action when the suit had been filed. I am not aware of any decision, which holds that the party should be deprived of his right by delay caused through the court's inaction. It is, however, not necessary to decide this appeal on this point alone, for, I am otherwise satisfied that the plaintiff has no right to evict. 5. It is obvious that the use of the word possession means the right to exclude others from interfering with corpus of the property, and with the animus to do so for the holder's benefit. It is equally clear that the inevitable consequence of being given juristic possession is that the person is not merely permitted to do particular acts, and with such a permission becoming only a licensee. Therefore, the use of the word possession in the document is significant, and excludes the appellant's being treated as a bare licensee. It means that the appellant has not been allowed by the lease the bare permission to attend to the trees and to enjoy their fruits. Therefore, the use of the word possession in the document is significant, and excludes the appellant's being treated as a bare licensee. It means that the appellant has not been allowed by the lease the bare permission to attend to the trees and to enjoy their fruits. It further means the power to exclude others from the area, and with such a right there is no force in the argument that the appellant is a licensee or in Malabar phraseology, holder of the right under 'melpattom'. That word has been described in the Glossary of Terms in Sundara Iyer's book on Malabar and Aliyasanthana Law, at p. 453 in these words: "Melpattom: Lease of trees with no interest in land; enures for one year". The same learned author at page 290 of the same book again describes the word in these words:-"Melpattom is a lease of trees and enures for one year unless a special term is fixed". The conclusion is further strengthened from a cursory reading of the other parts of the document, which show that something more than mere lease of trees has been conferred. To begin with, the deed states what is described in the schedule to have been obtained, and that schedule shows the area of paramba with house, well, gardens and the trees, to be 2 acres and 80 cents. It follows that the whole have been leased. The next thing is that the appellant gets possession of the paramba and of the house as well after evicting the tenant. The third is that the appellant must turn the soil, manure the trees, thatch the house, keep possession of the paramba, enjoy the usufructs of the improvements and to reside in the house. It is also clear that on the expiry of the period the property has to be surrendered and possession has to be given. The document further provides for earlier eviction if the appellant failed to do the seasonal protection, thatch the house or cause damage to the improvements. I am convinced on a fair reading of the entire document, that it cannot be treated as a bare lease of the trees for purposes of enjoying the usufructs, and complete possession over the, adjoining area with the right to exclude all others, has further been conferred. 6. I am convinced on a fair reading of the entire document, that it cannot be treated as a bare lease of the trees for purposes of enjoying the usufructs, and complete possession over the, adjoining area with the right to exclude all others, has further been conferred. 6. But the appellant could not get the benefit of the Malabar Tenancy Act unless he is authorised to cultivate and the word has its special meaning under the aforesaid Act. The special meaning for the purposes of the Act has been given in S.3 (4) which reads as follows: "'cultivate', with its grammatical variations, means cultivate either solely by one's own labour or with the help of the labour of the members of one's tarwad, thavazhi, illom, kutumba, kavaru or family, or of hired labourers or both, or direct or supervise cultivation by such members or hired labourers, jointly or separately, provided that such members or hired labourers have not agreed to pay or take any fixed proportion of the produce of the land they cultivate as compensation for being allowed to cultivate it or as remuneration for cultivating it;" 7. Obviously, subjecting of land to efforts in order to get fruits from the trees, would be cultivation; and the appellant has been given that right by Ext. A (1). Therefore he cultivates under the Act. The lower appellate court relies on the last provision of the document to exclude the appellant from being a verumpattomdar; but that clause says that the appellant has no right from exceeding the right of verumpatta kudiyiruppa and has no right to effect any improvements in the properties. The first part of the clause evidently relates to the house and the exclusion of the right to improve the properties does not derogate from the right conferred earlier to enjoy the usufructs of the land by attending to the land. In these circumstances the lower appellate court has erred in holding the appellant not to be covered by the Malabar Tenancy Act. It further follows that the appellant gets fixity of tenure under S.21 of the Act and he cannot be evicted except under the circumstances mentioned therein. As the plaint does not show any grounds for eviction under, the Act, the suit has been wrongly allowed. Accordingly the second appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed with costs. It further follows that the appellant gets fixity of tenure under S.21 of the Act and he cannot be evicted except under the circumstances mentioned therein. As the plaint does not show any grounds for eviction under, the Act, the suit has been wrongly allowed. Accordingly the second appeal is allowed and the suit is dismissed with costs. The parties will bear the costs in this court. Allowed.