ORDER : K.L. PANDEY, J. 1. This appeal under the Letters Patent is directed against an order of S.B. Sen J, dated 9 Nov. 1959 by which be affirmed a concurrent view of the two Courts below that a decree for ejectment in Civil suit No. 52A of 1953, which was passed on 19 January 1955, was within the exception mentioned in Section 16 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955, and could also be executed for the reason that the title of the decree holder to the demised premises was denied in the written statement filed in the suit. 2. The only ground urged in support of this appeal is that to be a ground for ejectment under Section 16 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955 (hereinafter called the Act), the denial of title had to be anterior to the filing of the suit. Reliance is placed upon the view we took in Ratanlal vs. Damodardas 1961 JLJ 5 . That case is easily distinguishable because there we were considering a reference made in a second appeal arising out of a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent and we had to consider the meaning of Section 4 (f) of the Act. 3. Here we are concerned with Section 16 of the Act which reads as follows: No decree for the eviction of a tenant from any accommodation passed before the date of commencement of this Act shall, in so far as it relates to the eviction of such tenant, be executed against him so long as this Act remains in force, except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 4:- Provided that the tenant pays to the landlord the rent payable under the decree. The Section itself does not indicate whether, in order to render a decree for eviction of a tenant passed before the commencement of the Act executable, any of the filing of the suit or before the passing of the decree of at the time of its execution. But if we read Sections 4, 16 and 17 of the Act together, the extent of the protection afforded under the provisions of the Act to a tenant is not in doubt. These provision do not abrogate the common law. But if we read Sections 4, 16 and 17 of the Act together, the extent of the protection afforded under the provisions of the Act to a tenant is not in doubt. These provision do not abrogate the common law. They merely put additional fetters on the common law right of a landlord to evict his tenant and provide against the filing of a suit (Section 4), the passing of a decree in a pending Suit filed before the commencement of the Act (Section 17) and the execution of a decree passed before such commencement (Section 16) for ejectment except one or more of the grounds mentioned in Section 4. As we indicated in Ratanlal's case (supra), the very words employed in Section 4 clearly show that the grounds must pre-exist in cases, of suits for ejecmentment filed after the commencement of the Act. In the same case, relying upon Maharaja of Jaipore vs. Rukmini Pattamadevi 46 I. A. 109, we further pointed out that even in a suit pending on the date of commencement of the Act, mere denial of title in the written statement would not work as forfeiture so as to determine the tenancy. Obviously, these considerations do not apply to a case where, before the commencement of the Act, not only the tenancy has been determined but a decree for ejectment has also been passed. In terms Section 16 lays down that no decree for the eviction...shall...be executed... except on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 4", and does not indicate that those grounds must have existed before the filing of suit in which the decree was passed. When the grounds are mentioned in connection with the execution of the decree and are calculated to remove the bar on its execution imposed by Section 16, we are of the view that the grounds must have reference to the time when the decree is sought to be executed. Any other view would, we think, be anomalous. One case of anomaly was pointed out by our brother Shrivastava J. in Sardar Raghubir Singh vs. Komalchand Miscellaneous Second Appeal No. 82/59 dated 4th July 1960. when he observed : The existence of these grounds long before execution ten years ago in the instant case seems wholly unconnected with the protection. Any other view would, we think, be anomalous. One case of anomaly was pointed out by our brother Shrivastava J. in Sardar Raghubir Singh vs. Komalchand Miscellaneous Second Appeal No. 82/59 dated 4th July 1960. when he observed : The existence of these grounds long before execution ten years ago in the instant case seems wholly unconnected with the protection. If the landlord needed the house for his residence in 1951, but has no need for it in 1960 when the decree is sought to be executed, there is no necessity to give back the house to him now. The same reasoning applies to most of the grounds mentioned in Section 4. We may also mention that, under a similar enactment, this was the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Chand Shankar vs. Bohre Sakhlal A. I. R. 1951 All 383, and Fateh Chand vs. Brij Bhushan Prakash A.I.R 1957 All 801. Under alike provision of the Madhya Bharat Sthan Niyantran Vidhan, Chaturvedi J. took the same view in Madhorao vs. Krandai 1954 M. B. L. J. 1712. 4. For the reasons we have given in the last paragraph, we are of opinion that the view taken by the learned Single Judge is correct. The result is that this appeal fails and is dismissed. The appellant shall bear his own costs and pay those of the respondents throughout. Hearing fee Rs. 50.