ORDER : - For the route Ramgarh-Dhanbad via Gola Paterwa and Chas the petitioner Tulsi Ram Agarwalla and respondents Nos.1 and 2 and several others had filed applications for grant of a permanent permit before the Chota Nagpur Regional Transport Authority (hereinafter referred to as the Regional Transport Authority). At a meeting held on the 11th January, 1961, the Regional Transport Authority decided to grant one permit to the petitioner and the other to respondent No.2, the Marwari Motor Service. Against the order of the Regional Transport Authority respondent No.1 preferred an appeal to the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority. The appeal was allowed by the Appeal Board and the order of the Regional Transport Authority granting permit to the petitioner was set aside and it was ordered that the permit should be granted to respondent No.1, the Road Transport Company. In deciding this appeal the Appeal Board took into account an order of the Government of Bihar, dated the 5th August, 1960, issued under the provisions of section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act as it is in force in the State of Bihar. The order of the Government of Bihar is Annexure III to the application and reads as follows: "Order 31. Patna, dated the 5th August, 1960. In exercise of the powers conferred by section 43-A of the M.V. Act 1939 (IV of 1939), as in force in the State of Bihar, the Government of Bihar is pleased to direct that while considering application for stage carriage permits, the State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority shall subject to the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 47 of the said Act, give preference to persons whose applications for renewal of permits have been refused to be entertained in pursuance of clause (a) of subsection (2) of section 68-F of the aforesaid Act. Sd. K.B. Sharma, Dy. Secretary to Govt. Memo. No.A2-3027/60T-2844, dated 5.8.60 Copy forwarded to all Transport Authorities for information and guidance. Sd. K.B. Sharma. 4-8-60 Deputy Secretary to Govt." 2. The petitioner has how obtained a rule from the High Court calling upon the respondents to show Cause why the order of the Appeal Board cancelling the permit granted to the petitioner and giving it to respondent No.1 should not be set aside by grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The petitioner has how obtained a rule from the High Court calling upon the respondents to show Cause why the order of the Appeal Board cancelling the permit granted to the petitioner and giving it to respondent No.1 should not be set aside by grant of a writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. Cause has been shown on behalf of respondent No.1 and respondents Nos.3 to 5 to whom notice of the rule was ordered to be given. There is no appearance on behalf of respondent No.2, the Marwari Motor Service. 4. On behalf of the petitioner learned Counsel impeached the order of the Appeal Board dated the 15th April, 1961, on the ground that it is based upon the order of the State Government dated 5th August, 1960, which is itself ultra vires and illegal. The argument put forward by learned Counsel is that Order No.31 dated the 5th August, 1960, of the State Government is ultra vires and illegal because section 43 of the Motor Vehicles Act does not say that any preference should be given to persons whose applications for renewal of permits have been refused under clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 68-F of the Motor Vehicles Act. In this connection it is necessary to reproduce section 49 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which is to the following effect:- "43. In this connection it is necessary to reproduce section 49 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which is to the following effect:- "43. Power to State Government to control road transport- (1) A State Government, having regard to- (a) the advantages offered to the public, trade and industry by the development of motor transport, and (b) the desirability of coordinating road and rail transport, and (c) the desirability of preventing the deterioration of the road system, and (d) the desirability of preventing uneconomic competition among motor vehicles, may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, issue directions to the State Transport Authority- (i) regarding the fixing of fares and freights for stage carriages, contract Carriages and public carriers; (ii) regarding the prohibition or restriction, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the directions, of the conveying of long distance goods traffic generally, or of specified classes of goods, by private or public carriers; (iii) regarding the grant of permits for alternative routes or areas, to persons in whose cases the existing permits are cancelled for the terms thereof are modified in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 68F; (iv) regarding any other matter which may appear to the State Government necessary or expedient for giving effect to any agreement entered into with the Central Government or any other State Government or the Government of any other country relating to the regulation of motor transport generally, and in particular to its co-ordination with other means of transport and the conveying of long distance goods traffic : Provided that no such notification shall be issued unless a draft of the proposed directions is published in the Official Gazette specifying therein a date being not less than one month after such publication, on or after which the draft will be taken into consideration and any objection or suggestion which may be received has, in consultation with the State Transport Authority, been considered after giving the representatives of the interests affected an opportunity of being heard. 2. 2. The State Government shall permit, at such intervals of time as it may fix, the interests affected by any notification issued under sub-section (1) to make representations urging the Cancellation or variation of the notification on the following grounds, namely:- (a) that the railways are not giving reasonable facilities or are taking unfair advantage of the action of the State Government under this section; or (b) that conditions have change since the publication of the notification; or (c) that the special needs of a particular industry or locality require to be considered afresh. 3. If the State Government after considering any representation made to it under sub-section (2) and having heard the representatives of the interests affected and the State Transport Authority is satisfied that any notification issued under sub-section (1) ought to be cancelled or varied, it may cancel the notification or vary it in such manner as it thinks fit." Section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act was introduced by an Amending Act of the Bihar Legislature (Bihar Act 27 of 1950) which received the Presidents assent on the 21st July, 1950. The new section 43-A reads as follows:- "43-A. Power of State Government to issue orders and directions to Transport Authorities.- The State Government may issue such orders and directions as it may consider necessary, in respect of any matter relating to road transport to the State Transport Authority or a Regional Transport Authority and such Transport Authority shall give effect to all such orders and directions." It was argued by learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner that section 43-A gives uncontrolled and unregulated powers to the State Legislature and it is ultra vires of Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. We do not think there is any merit in this argument. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Raman and Raman Ltd. v. State of Madras, (1959) Supp. (2) SCR 227 at p.239 : ( AIR 1959 SC 694 at p.700) that section 43-A itself must be held to be valid, though particular orders made by the Government thereunder might be open to challenge as unconstitutional. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Raman and Raman Ltd. v. State of Madras, (1959) Supp. (2) SCR 227 at p.239 : ( AIR 1959 SC 694 at p.700) that section 43-A itself must be held to be valid, though particular orders made by the Government thereunder might be open to challenge as unconstitutional. On this point the Supreme Court approved a decision of the Madras High Court in C.S.S. Motor Service, Tenkasi v. State of Madras, ILR (1953) Mad 304 at pp.330 and 334 : ( AIR 1953 Mad 279 at p.288) with regard to the constitutional validity of section 43-A of the Madras Amendment Act which is similar in language to the Bihar Amendment Act. In the present case the question arises as to whether the order of the State Government dated the 5th August, 1960, issued under section 43-A is constitutionally valid. In our opinion the question must be answered in the affirmative. It is true that the order of the State Government extends the category of preference to operators whose applications for renewal of permits have been refused under section 68F(2) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act, though section 43 of the Motor Vehicles Act expressly states that preference may be given to persons whose permits have been cancelled or modified under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 68F of the Motor Vehicles Act. In our opinion the order of the State Government dated the 5th August, 1960, is constitutional since it implements and effectuates the policy of showing preference to operators who have acquired experience in the business of running motor vehicles. Such a policy is implicit in the whole scheme of the Motor Vehicles Act, and in this connection we may refer to section 47 (1) (e) of the statute which expressly states that in considering an application for a stage carriage permit, the Regional Transport Authority shall have regard to "the operation by the applicant of other transport services including those in respect of which applications from him for permits are pending." Reference should also be made to Section 58 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act which deals with duration and renewal of permits. The second proviso to section 58(2) of the Act expressly States that "other conditions being equal, an application for renewal shall be given preference over new application for permits". The second proviso to section 58(2) of the Act expressly States that "other conditions being equal, an application for renewal shall be given preference over new application for permits". In our opinion, the order of the State Government No.31, dated the 5th August, 1960, issued under section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act is consistent with the policy of the whole statute and must be held to be intra vires and constitutional. It follows, therefore, that the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority has not committed any error of law in taking into account the order of the State Government that preference should be given to persons whose applications for renewal have been rejected under section 68F (2) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. 5. We turn to the next contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the order of the State Government dated the 5th August 1960 is a mere administrative order and the Appeal Board has committed an error of law in taking into account that administrative order in deciding the appeal preferred by respondent No.2 against the order of the Regional Transport Authority, In support of this argument learned Counsel referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in (1959) Supp. (2) SCR 227 : ( AIR 1959 SC 694 ) where it was held by a majority of the learned Judges constituting the Bench that section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras Amendment) Act, 1948, must Be given a restricted meaning and the jurisdiction it conferred on the State Government must be confined to administrative functions, and so an order or direction made by the State Government thereunder could not have the status of law regulating the rights of parties and must partake of the character of an administrative order. We shall assume in favour of the petitioner that the order of the State Government dated the 5th August, 1960, is an administrative Order, but it does not necessarily follow that the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority was erroneous as a matter of law in taking into account the order of the State Government in deciding to give a permit to respondent No.1 whose application for renewal of permit had been refused under section 68F (2) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. On a perusal of the order of the Appeal Board in the present case it appears that all the requirements of section 47(1) were satisfied by respondent No.1, and in addition to those requirements respondent No.1 was also entitled to preference as an operator whose application for renewal had been refused under section 68F (2-(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. In the last paragraph of the order of the Appeal Board it is said that "learned Counsel for the respondent fairly concedes that he is not in a position to say that the appellant does not fulfil the requirements of section 47(1)". It is, therefore, manifest that in deciding to give the permit to respondent No.1 the Appeal Board took into account all the considerations set out in section 47(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act in addition to the circumstance that respondent No.1 was an operator whose application for renewal of permit has been refused under section 68F (2) (a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. We have already pointed out that both section 47(1) and section 58 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act provide that preference should be given to operators with previous experience in the business of running commercial motor vehicles. It is, therefore, a highly relevant consideration in deciding the question of grant of permit for stage carriage and we are unable to accept the argument that the Appeal Board of the State Transport Authority has committed any error of law in deciding to give preference to respondent No.1 who had previous experience as against the petitioner who had no such previous experience. 6. In (1959) Supp. (2) SCR 227 : ( AIR 1959 SC 694 ) the validity of the order of the Central Road Traffic Board was challenged on the ground that it was based upon the order of the State Government under section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act which was made after the Order granting the permit to the appellant made by the Regional Transport Authority. It appears that the Regional Transport Authority had granted a permit to the appellant in that case on the basis of a previous order under section 43-A made by the State Government. It appears that the Regional Transport Authority had granted a permit to the appellant in that case on the basis of a previous order under section 43-A made by the State Government. The point for determination in the appeal before the Supreme Court was whether the order granting the permit to the appellant by the Regional Transport Authority could be set aside on the basis of another order of the State Government imposing new restrictions issued thereunder while the appeal was pending before the Central Road Traffic Board. It was decided by the majority of the Bench of the Supreme Court that there was no error of law committed by the Central Road Traffic Board, and the order of the Central Road Traffic Board cannot be set aside by grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. The gist of the reasoning in that case is that an order or direction made by the State Government under section 43-A was an order made by the State Government in its administrative jurisdiction and could not have the status of law, and, therefore, the appellant could not be said to have acquired a vested right that was defeated by a new law enforced pending the appeal, and the order of the Central Traffic Board could not be set aside merely on the ground that it had decided the appeal on the basis of an order of the State Government issued subsequent to the grant of the permit if it was otherwise in the public interest. It is manifest that the question arising for determination in the Supreme Court was entirely different from the question which has been presented for determination before us in the present case. We should, however, like to point out that in the Supreme Court case the legal validity of the order of the Central Road Traffic Board was upheld and it has nowhere been stated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the order of the Central Road Traffic Board was erroneous in law because it based its decision with regard to the grant of permit on the order of the State Government issued under section 43-A of the Motor Vehicles Act. 7. 7. It was also submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner that the order of the State Government in this case is ultra vires because it is in conflict wish section 43 of the Motor Vehicles Act. It was contended that the wide language of section 43-A of the Act must be cut down so as to include the grant to the State Government of only such powers as are expressly granted by section 43 of the Act; and since there is no direction in section 43 with regard to grant of preference to persons whose applications for renewal have been refused under section 68F (2) (a), the order of the State Government in this case must be held to be ultra vires. We do not think there is any substance in this argument. The language of S.43-A confers wide powers upon the State Government, and we see no reason why the powers conferred under that section should be cut down only to such powers as are expressly granted under section 43 of the Act. In our opinion section 43-A confers additional powers to those granted by S.43 and there is no conflict or repugnancy between S.43 and S.43-A. We have already pointed out that in the Supreme Court case, (1959) Supp. (2) SCR 227 : ( AIR 1959 SC 694 ), section 43-A has been held to be constitutionally valid, and we have already indicated the reasons why the order of the State Government dated the 5th August, 1960 in the present case, issued under section 43-A of the Bihar Amendment Act must also be held to be constitutionally valid. 8. For these reasons we hold that the petitioner has made out no case for grant of a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution. In our opinion the application fails and it is accordingly dismissed with costs to be paid to respondent No.1. Hearing fee Rs.100/-. Application dismissed.