Circumstances leading to this revision are as follows :— The applicant Shri Chetandas preferred an application for correction of entries in Khasra-girdawari for Smt. 2016 in respect of certain lands situated in village Kerwaval, Tehsil Alwar, Distt. Alwar. The application was enquired into by the S.D.O. Alwar in his capacity as Land Records Officer. The opposite party filed their reply. The evidence of the applicant was recorded on 21.6.60 and the case was adjourned for recording the evidence of the opposite party which was taken on 28.7.60. The case was further adjourned for hearing the arguments to 22.8.60. On this date the applicant and his counsel failed to put in appearance. The learned S.D.O., therefore, dismissed the application, not on merits,but in default. An appeal was preferred by the applicant against this order which was objected to preliminarily on behalf of the opposite party on the ground that no appeal is provided u/S. 75 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against an order of dismissal in default passed u/S. 63 thereof. This was conceded by the learned counsel for the applicant and he made a request that the case be heard in revision. This request was granted by the learned Division Bench hearing the case. As the learned D.B. observed, the Board has been treating appeals as revision in suitable cases. The learned Members of the D. B. thereafter felt that in the peculiar circumstances of this case the revision deserved to be accepted and the order of the learned S. D. O. set aside. But since it had been held by another D. B. of this Board, to which one of the learned Members of the D. B. hearing this case was also a party (Case No. 65/Churu/59, Ramsingh and others Vs. Adisal Singh & others, decided on 20.2.60) that when no illegality or irregularity in the exercise of the jurisdiction or excess or failure thereof had been pointed out interference in revision in an order dismissing a case in default cannot be made, the learned Members thought it proper to refer the present case for decision by a larger Bench. They were, however, quite clear that it was under the peculiar circumstances of the present case that they wanted a decision by a larger Bench and were not at all attacking the decision in the Churu case referred to above. They were, however, quite clear that it was under the peculiar circumstances of the present case that they wanted a decision by a larger Bench and were not at all attacking the decision in the Churu case referred to above. This is how this case has come before this Full Bench for hearing today. An objection was raised in this case before the learned Members hearing it originally, that the appeal having been preferred by the applicant to the Board of Revenue in their capacity as Director of Land Records, it could not be treated as a revision on the ground simpliciter that the Director of Land Records was not empowered to entertain any revision. This point is being raised by the learned counsel for the opposite party, Shri Narendra Singh Chordia, here also. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties as well as the learned Advocate General in this behalf. It is not, and cannot be, denied that the Board of Revenue as such has full powers to hear any revision against any order passed by any subordinate officer or court subject to the provisions of sec. 84 of the Act. This section provides that the Board may call for the record of any case of a judicial nature or connected with settlement in which no appeal lies to the Board if the court or officer by whom the case was decided appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it or him by law, or to have failed to exercise jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the exercise of it or his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, and may pass such orders in the case as it thinks fit. That the present case is a case of a judicial nature is undisputed. That no appeal lies under sec. 65 of the Act against an order of dismissal in default passed in any proceedings by any Revenue Officer under sec. 63 thereof is also quite clear and is not contested by the learned counsel for the opposite party. The revision will, therefore, lie to the Board in the present case ; and interference can be made with the order of the Land Records Officer below if there is a failure to exercise jurisdiction or an assumption of excess jurisdiction or any illegality or irregularity in the exercise thereof. The revision will, therefore, lie to the Board in the present case ; and interference can be made with the order of the Land Records Officer below if there is a failure to exercise jurisdiction or an assumption of excess jurisdiction or any illegality or irregularity in the exercise thereof. The learned counsel for the opposite party has urged that vide sec. 65 (2) of the Act the applicant should have moved, within 30 days of the date of dismissal of the application in default, to have the order set aside as provided therein, and that he cannot come in revision without first taking resort to that course open to him in law. The argument is that he can do it even now and if the application for setting aside the order of dismissal in default is rejected he can file an appeal against the same. On this basis it is being urged that as an appeal can lie in that case to the Board, this case will be covered by the phrase "in which no appeal lies to the Board" employed in sec. 84. In other words, it is argued that an indirect appeal will lie to the Board and, therefore, a revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised. An appeal lies to the Board directly if it can be brought straightway against an order passed by a trial court. It can be said to lie indirectly to the Board if an appeal can be preferred against the order in appeal against the order of the trial court. An appeal against an order on an application which the applicant may or may not move now cannot be treated to be an indirect appeal to the Board and a request involving a revisional jurisdiction cannot be turned down only on the ground of such a contingency which may or may not arise. It cannot also be ignored in the present circumstances that the time limit under which such an application could have been moved by the applicant expired long ago and it is doubtful whether the condonation of delay can be secured by him. In other words, no effective remedy of the type suggested by the learned counsel for the opposite party is clearly available to the applicant. In other words, no effective remedy of the type suggested by the learned counsel for the opposite party is clearly available to the applicant. In the circumstances his request to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of the Board cannot be turned down lightly in the manner suggested on behalf of the opposite party. This Board has been entertaining revisions when an effective remedy open to an applicant has been lost. This is not denied at the Bar. The request for the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of the Board in the present case cannot, therefore, be rejected only on the ground raised on behalf of the opposite party. Yet another attempt has been made on behalf of the opposite party to debar the hearing of this appeal as revision on the ground that the applicant had preferred an appeal not to the Board as Board of Revenue but to the Board of Revenue as Director of Land Records. True, the memorandum of appeal has been styled as such but, as has been supported by the learned Advocate General as well, simply because the memo has been styled as such, the jurisdiction of the Board as such for calling the records and revising orders under sec. 84 cannot be taken away. The constitution of the Bench hearing this case in the first instance as Board of Revenue could not be, and is not being, questioned. So also the constitution of the present Bench as Board of Revenue is not being questioned. As Board a Bench thereof can always call for the record of any case and revise the order of a subordinate authority in the circumstances laid in sec. 84 of the Act (which as already discussed are fulfilled in the present case). There is, therefore, no force in this contention raised on behalf of the opposite party either. A question about the constitution of the office of the Director of Land Records was also raised at a certain stage of the arguments in this case and we gave the Advocate General an opportunity of arguing the point. But all the relevant orders have not become available as yet. And as the learned Advocate General and the learned counsel for the parties have all conceded, the present case can be decided even without deciding the point of the constitution of the office of Director of Land Records. But all the relevant orders have not become available as yet. And as the learned Advocate General and the learned counsel for the parties have all conceded, the present case can be decided even without deciding the point of the constitution of the office of Director of Land Records. The revisional power of the Board as Board of Revenue can be invoked in the present case without waiting for the decision on that point. We, therefore, proceed to decide the instant case without waiting until all the relevant orders regarding the constitution of the office of the Director of Land Records are available. As has been discussed earlier in this judgment, all the evidence in the case had been recorded when it was dismissed in default. The date on which this order was passed was fixed for the hearing of the arguments only. As the learned counsel appearing in the case agree, the hearing of the arguments is not provided specifically in any procedure laid down for the hearing of a case. The Code of Civil Procedure has not specifically been made applicable for the decision of the cases under the Act. But the general principles to control the procedure can be very well examined while deciding the proceedings under the Act as well. Order 17, Rule 3 is the Rule which provides for the disposal of the cases under the Code of Civil Procedure when a party to a suit to whom time has been granted for taking any action fails to do the same. The court under the circumstances is authorised notwithstanding such default to proceed to decide the suit forthwith. Order 17, Rule 2 of the Code is the other Rule which provides for the disposal of suits when the parties or any of them fail to appear. Under this Rule 2 the mode provided by Order 9 can be followed unless the court wants to pass any other order it thinks fit. Thus the dismissal of the suit in default is one of the modes of deciding the case available to the court under Civil Procedure Code; but it is not the only one. The court is free to pass such order as it thinks fit to decide the lis forthwith under Rules 2 & 3. Thus the dismissal of the suit in default is one of the modes of deciding the case available to the court under Civil Procedure Code; but it is not the only one. The court is free to pass such order as it thinks fit to decide the lis forthwith under Rules 2 & 3. Sec. 63 of the Act provides for the hearing of cases or proceedings under the Act in the absence of the parties. it authorises the Revenue Officer or the court concerned to hear or determine a proceeding in the absence of a party or dismiss it in default. This section also thus gives wide power to the Revenue Officer or the Court dealing with a lis pending brfore him or it to dispose of it in the manner best suited to the circumstances of the case. It may be said broadly that it. condenses into one the provisions of both Rules 2 and 3 of Order 17 of the C.P.C. The powers vested in a court, it is a well-settled principle of law, have to be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily. A case cannot but be dismissed in default if there has not been put on record upto the date me applicant makes default in appearance such material as may enable the Revenue Officer to take a decision on the basis thereof. It will, however, be quite illogical and unreasonable as well as improper to dismiss the case in default at a stage when the applicant has already put some material on record to enable the Revenue Officer to consider his claim on merits on the basis thereof. If a case is dismissed in default under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the discretionary power vested in the Revenue Officer has been exercised judicially and not arbitrarily. A failure to take into consideration such a record and dismissal of the case in default only because the applicant happens to be absent on the date fixed for arguments will certainly be not only a material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction but also in a way a failure to exercise the jurisdiction itself. It is a fundamental principle of judicial procedure that all the parties be heard before taking a decision in a case. It also means that all the evidence put by them on record be taken into consideration while deciding a case. It is a fundamental principle of judicial procedure that all the parties be heard before taking a decision in a case. It also means that all the evidence put by them on record be taken into consideration while deciding a case. If this is not so done, it will certainly amount to deciding a case not only not in accordance with judicial procedure but also against the fundamental principles thereof. A case is fixed for the hearing of the arguments only to enable the parties, after closing their evidence, to put up their case in a consolidated form before the officer or the court. If a party does not take the opportunity of doing so, it does not mean that it has made a complete default in appearance in the case to the extent that there is nothing on record on which the officer or the court hearing it can take a decision. The cases can be disposed off even in the absence of the defaulting party after hearing the other party. As laid down by the Rajasthan High Court in 1963 R.L.W. 189, Bhagiratha Vs. Samdu Khan, dismissal in default in these circumstances will amount to acting illegally or with material "regularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. The learned S.D.O acting as Land Records Officer had material in the form of evidence of the parties before him to decide the present case on merits, and in not doing so he has committed an illegality and irregularity having a material effect on the result of the proceedings before him. This is, therefore, a fit case for interference u/S. 84 of the Act. The Churu case referred to above may also be pertinently discussed here. The learned Members of the D. B. referring this case to the larger Bench have not in any way assailed the soundness of the decision on the facts thereof. Nor do we ourselves find any reason to assail the same. In that case the proceedings had been transferred from the Officer originally enquiring into the same to another Officer and the applicant had also made an application for permission to produce evidence. The Revenue Officer concerned was, therefore, faced with no alternative but to dismiss the proceedings when the applicant absented himself on the date fixed. In that case the proceedings had been transferred from the Officer originally enquiring into the same to another Officer and the applicant had also made an application for permission to produce evidence. The Revenue Officer concerned was, therefore, faced with no alternative but to dismiss the proceedings when the applicant absented himself on the date fixed. It was not found in that case that any illegality or material irregularity had been committed by the learned Revenue Officer concerned in the exercise of his jurisdiction. The case is, therefore, quite distinguishable from the present one. To conclude When the evidence of the parties has been brought on record and the case is ripe for hearing the arguments or writing the judgment, it will be acting quite contrary to the fundamental principles of justice to dismiss it only in default of appearance of the applicant. Sec. 63 of the Act does authorise a Revenue Officer to dismiss a case in default if the applicant is absent. But at the same time it also lays down that the case can be heard and determined even in the absence of the applicant. It is the latter alternative which should be invoked when the evidence has already been brought on record and the applicant is required to do nothing more. Under such a contingency the case should be decided and determined even in the absence of the applicant on the basis of the evidence on record and should not be dismissed in default. We, therefore, accept this revision, set aside the order of the learned S.D.O. and remand the case to him with the direction that he should admit it at its original number and decide it on merits on the evidence already on record.