DEBABRATA MOOKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THESE are two appeals from two decisions of Sinha, J. refusing to issue appropriate writs and orders under Article 226 of the Constitution in favour of the appellants. ( 2 ) THE questions raised in the two appeals are common and they were dealt with in two successive orders by the learned Trial Judge; there is however, one distinguishing feature in that in one case, the compensation allowed was withdrawn without protest. The appeals have, accordingly been heard together and are dealt with and disposed of by this judgment. ( 3 ) THE writ petitions out of which these appeals arise related to two contiguous premises known and numbered as 2 and 4, Creek Church Row. They are proposed to be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act for the improvement of an educational institution at 6, Creek Church Row, called the Women's Christian College. It is a teaching as well as boarding institution where woman students are educated. ( 4 ) IT at the instance of the College authorities, proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act were commenced for the improvement of the institution. The two premises proposed to be acquired being considered suitable, steps were taken to acquire them. A notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued on the 18th November, 1955, requiring the owners to prefer objections, if any, to the proposed acquisition. Objections were preferred whereafter a declaration was made under Section 6 on the 28th January, 1958. In due course, the Collector made, on the 30th January, 1959, his award under Section 11 of the Act. The award was jointly made in favour of the owners of the two premises which were proposed to be acquired. At the instance of one of the persons interested, the matter was taken on Reference to the Land Acquisition Judge. During the pendency of the Reference, notices were issued at the instance of the respondent Collector requiring the appellants to vacate the premises in question by a stated date. Applications were then made to this Court and a Rule nisi was issued in each of the two cases requiring the respondents to show cause why the proceedings should not be quashed and the authorities concerned directed to forbear from giving effect to the orders complained of whereby the proceedings were commenced. Applications were then made to this Court and a Rule nisi was issued in each of the two cases requiring the respondents to show cause why the proceedings should not be quashed and the authorities concerned directed to forbear from giving effect to the orders complained of whereby the proceedings were commenced. ( 5 ) BEFORE the learned Trial Judge, it was contended that the awards having been jointly made were bad and the proceedings thereafter were unsustainable. The learned Judge saw the force of this contention and gave a direction in one of these cases on the authorities concerned to make the award conformable to the law and complete it. The other contention raised on behalf of the appellants were all negatived; they are accordingly required to be noticed since they have been repeated before us in appeal. ( 6 ) IT was urged before the learned Judge as well as in the appeals that the proceedings had been vitiated by reason of the fact that the acquisition of the two premises was not being made for a public purpose. It was said that the College or at least its Governing Body was a registered Society and as such it was necessary that there should have been an agreement between it and the Government in terms of Section 41 of the Land Acquisition Act. This objection could not be pursued at the hearing of the applications when it was disclosed in the affidavit affirmed on behalf of the College that it was not a registered Society nor was its Governing Council a registered body. It was made plain that the acquisition of the two premises was being made on the footing that it was entirely for a public purpose and that it was not acquisition for a Company. The objection as to the validity of the proceedings on this score was then given a new twist and it was urged that there was no public purpose properly so-called behind the acquisition. In aid of that contention, it was urged that there was nothing to indicate that any substantial part of the cost of acquisition came from public revenues, a circumstance which made of the professed public purpose a mere pretence. The learned Judge considered that objection and held, on the materials disclosed, that Government had, in fact, advanced a sum of Rs. The learned Judge considered that objection and held, on the materials disclosed, that Government had, in fact, advanced a sum of Rs. 10/- towards the cost of acquisition and came to the conclusion that the proceedings could not be pronounced colourable merely because the sum advanced from public funds was an inconsiderable amount of Rs. 10/ -. The learned Judge had no doubt that proposed acquisition of the premises would advance the cause of women's education which was a pressing need in the country and deserved high priority. ( 7 ) OBJECTION was also taken to the regularity of the proceedings which had culminated in the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 of the Act. The contention was that there was nothing to indicate that the question of acquisition had been dealt with in accordance with the Standing Rules of Business. It was said that the Minister, to whom had been allocated the work of looking after acquisition proceedings, did not apply his mind to the question whether the acquisition in the present cases was justified by public necessity. This contention was overruled by the learned Judge on reference to the original records which had been brought up before the Court. He was satisfied that not only the Minister-in-charge had recorded his approval to the proposal, the matter had received Cabinet approval at a later stage. ( 8 ) THUS, the learned Judge held, in effect, that the acquisition of the premises was for a public purpose and that such purpose was not vitiated by reason merely of the fact that a token grant of Rs. 10/- had been made by the State Government out of public revenue; it was found that in accordance with the Rules of Business, the proposal had received the approval of the Minister-in-charge and had received at a later stage Cabinet sanction. In the view taken, the two Rules were discharged whereafter the present appeals were brought. ( 9 ) MR. Sinha, appearing on behalf of the appellants, has strenuously argued that the acquisition of the two premises could not properly be made since the conditions requisite for such acquisition have not been fulfilled. The complaint is that the College is a private organisation which enriches itself by fees from students and is no more than a mere profit-earning institution. Sinha, appearing on behalf of the appellants, has strenuously argued that the acquisition of the two premises could not properly be made since the conditions requisite for such acquisition have not been fulfilled. The complaint is that the College is a private organisation which enriches itself by fees from students and is no more than a mere profit-earning institution. Expansion or improvement of such institution cannot possibly be pressed within the limits of public purpose which is an essential requirement for a proceeding in acquisition under the Act. This argument has been sought to be built upon a statement appearing in the affidavit-in-opposition filed on behalf of the College. The statement is to the effect that the institution has not been registered under the Registration of Societies Act. Obviously this statement was made to counter the suggestion in the appellants' petition that the provisions of the Act had not been complied with inasmuch as the College being a 'company' within the meaning of the Act, the procedure which the Act prescribed for acquisition of property in promotion of such Company was not followed in this case. Section 3 (e) of the Act defines registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. If, therefore, the College was a registered body under the Societies Registration Act, then of course the provisions contained in Section 41 of the Act would be attracted. That section provides that if the Government is satisfied on receipt of a report under Section 5a or on the report of the officer making an enquiry under Section 40 that the purpose of the proposed acquisition is to obtain land for erection of dwelling houses for workmen employed by the Company or for the provision of amenities directly connected therewith or that the proposed acquisition is needed for the construction of a work and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public, it shall require the Company to enter into an agreement with the appropriate Government to provide to the satisfaction of such Government for matters relating to payment of cost of the acquisition, the transfer, on such payment, of the land to the Company, the terms on which the land shall be held by the company and other ancillary matters. It is clear that the appellants proceeded initially on the footing that the College being a registered body and therefore, a company within the meaning of the Act, was required to execute an agreement with the Government and the agreement was required to be published in accordance with Section 42 of the Act. This was obviously a mis-apprehension and when the position was made plain in the affidavit sworn on behalf of the College that the institution was not a registered body and, therefore, could not be called a "company" within the meaning of the Act, there was a shift in the emphasis and objection was taken on the ground that the acquisition was being made to benefit a private body which had been engaged in a profit-making undertaking. It is to be observed that this objection, that the College was a profiteering concern was not originally thought of but was later urged to strengthen the appellants' case objecting to the acquisition proceedings. When the notification was published under Section 4 of the Act, the appellants preferred their objection. In that objection nothing was even remotely suggested from which it could be inferred that the appellants objected to the acquisition on the ground that the College was a profit-making body; this objection was not taken in the petitions to this Court either. There was consequently no occasion for the College to traverse this ground and indeed the respondent College was taken by surprise when this objection was given prominence in the course of the argument before us. This aspect of the matter does not appear to have been even thought of during the hearing of the applications before the learned trial Judge. There is not only no reference to it in the original affidavits or further affidavits used by the appellants in the Court below, there is no reference whatever to this aspect of the matter in the learned Judge's order which is now under appeal. We must, therefore, say at once that we are not prepared to entertain this objection at this late stage. ( 10 ) THE proceedings were then challenged on the ground that the token grant of Rs. 10/- made by the State Government to aid the institution in acquiring the premises in question, demonstrates the utter hollowness of the alleged public purpose for which the acquisitions were said to have been undertaken. ( 10 ) THE proceedings were then challenged on the ground that the token grant of Rs. 10/- made by the State Government to aid the institution in acquiring the premises in question, demonstrates the utter hollowness of the alleged public purpose for which the acquisitions were said to have been undertaken. Section 6 of the Act says that when the appropriate Government is satisfied that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, a declaration has to be made to that effect. There is a proviso attached to it which says that no declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund - controlled or managed by a local authority. In this case, since the acquisition is not made for a Company but for a public purpose, it has to be proved that the declaration under Section 6 was preceded by some arrangement which would guarantee payment of the compensation money wholly or partly out of public revenues. The learned Trial Judge has found that a sum of money has been lent and advanced to the College presumably by the State Government. The Affidavit-in-opposition affirmed on behalf of the College shows that a sum of Rs. 98,240/- has been deposited by it with the Reserve Bank of India to meet the estimated cost of acquisition. The materials before us do not appear to be sufficient to warrant a firm conclusion as to what exactly is the amount, if any, lent and advanced by the State Government to the College in aid of the acquisition; but in the affidavit affirmed by the respondent Land Acquisition Collector, there is a statement to the effect that a token grant of Rs. 10/- has been sanctioned by the State Government towards the cost of acquisition. On behalf of the appellants, it has accordingly been argued that this token grant is only a colourable compliance with the provision contained in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Act which we have just read. The argument is that in a proceeding in acquisition, the estimated cost of which is about Rs. 98000/- and odd, the grant of a sum of Rs. 10/- is, in fact and substance, no grant at all. The argument is that in a proceeding in acquisition, the estimated cost of which is about Rs. 98000/- and odd, the grant of a sum of Rs. 10/- is, in fact and substance, no grant at all. We have been pressed to hold that this token grant demonstrates the utter hollowness of the alleged public purpose and that the amount sanctioned by the State Government being wholly out of proportion to the amount required for the acquisition, it must be taken to be no more than an attempt to save the acquisition proceedings from the mischief of non-compliance with the proviso to Section 6 (1) of the Act. The argument, it must be said, is attractive but when considered closely, it cannot possibly be accepted. A dispassionate consideration of the criticism can only lead to the conclusion that it would be extremely unsafe to pronounce an acquisition proceeding as colourable merely because the grant proposed to be made or actually made by the State Government in terms of the proviso to Section 6 (1) is an inconsiderable sum. It would be extremely difficult to draw the line and to say with any amount of definiteness what amount would be a fair and reasonable proportion of the cost of acquisition in a given case so as to draw an inference that the proceedings are colourable. In the course of the argument, Mr. Sinha suggested that the grant made by the State Government ought to bear a reasonable proportion to the total estimated cost of acquisition and suggested that it ought to be at least a quarter of the total cost. We have found no reason whatever to accept this as an invariable standard or even as a working standard. As far as we can see, the grant of a sum of money by the State Government merely means and implies that the Government associated itself with the acquisition proceedings in the view that such acquisition is intended to advance a public purpose and to benefit the public generally. Indeed, the question is not altogether res integra. As far as we can see, the grant of a sum of money by the State Government merely means and implies that the Government associated itself with the acquisition proceedings in the view that such acquisition is intended to advance a public purpose and to benefit the public generally. Indeed, the question is not altogether res integra. The identical question arose for consideration in the case of Rajendra Kumar Ruia v. Government of West Bengal, (1) AIR 1952 Cal 1573, in which My Lord the Chief Justice held that while it was open to a party before the Court to show that a particular acquisition was not bonafide and had been commenced in fraud of the Land Acquisition Act or amounted to its evasion the Courts will be astute to such act and will set it aside, if necessary, but to hold a particular act of acquisition as an evasion of the Statute merely because it has not drained the public exchequer to a substantial extent, is to state the proposition too widely and is not a proper interpretation of Section 6 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act. If public purpose is served by spending as little as possible out of the public revenue, I fail to see why the act of acquisition should not be held as good. This was therefore, the view taken by this Court of the quantum of financial assistance given by the State Government in aid of an organisation anxious to acquire lands in accordance with the Act in furtherance of a public purpose. The learned Trial Judge seems to have entertained some doubt as to whether the smallness of the contribution may not, in a fit case, be a ground for doubting the propriety of the acquisition under the Act: but he felt pressed by the authority of the decision to which reference has just been made. Indeed, that decision does not stand alone. There is another decision on the identical point rendered by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Vadlapatla Surjyanarayana v. The Province of Madras, (2) ILR 1946 Mad 153 - Sri Lionel Leach, C. J. , speaking for the Full Bench ruled in clear terms that it was "sufficient compliance with the proviso if any part of the compensation was paid out of public funds. One anna is a part of the compensation. One anna is a part of the compensation. It is true, it is a small part but it is never the less a part". In that case, the amount proposed to be paid out of the public exchequer was just one anna and even that amount was held sufficient to warrant the conclusion that there was compliance with the proviso to Section 6 (1) of the Act. Indeed. The Full Bench overruled an earlier decision of the same Court in the case of Ponnaia v. Secretary of State of India, (3) 51 MLJ 338, which had held to the contrary. There seems, therefore, to be good authority for the proposition that the smallness of the amount of contribution out of public funds will not necessarily give rise to the inference that the acquisition proceedings have been colourable. ( 11 ) IN aid of the contention that contribution of a sum of Rs. 10/- only by the State Government towards cost of acquisition was merely a device to achieve technical compliance with the law reliance was placed upon the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Luchmeswar Singh v. Chairman of the Darbhanga Municipality, (4) ILR 18 Cal 99. In that case, the question arose whether a piece of land, the property of the appellant, had been validly acquired by the Municipality of Darbhanga under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1870. The public purpose there stated was that the land was acquired for the construction of a bathing ghat or landing place in the town of Dharbhanga. At the time of the acquisition, the appellant was a minor under the care of the Court of Wards and he challenged the acquisition upon attaining majority. It appears that a nominal sum of Rupee one was suggested to be offered to the Manager of the Court of Wards as compensation and the land was eventually acquired. The Judicial Committee held that "the direction or suggestion to offer one rupee compensation was a colourable way of doing indirectly what it was seen could not be done directly, viz. , the guardian making a present to the town of the land of his ward". The Judicial Committee held that "the direction or suggestion to offer one rupee compensation was a colourable way of doing indirectly what it was seen could not be done directly, viz. , the guardian making a present to the town of the land of his ward". It was observed that the offer of one rupee compensation had not been in accordance with the duty of the Collector and that sum could not be regarded as the amount of compensation which could be determined under Section 13. Indeed, the Collector never made his award and the offer and acceptance of the rupee was accordingly held to be a colourable attempt to obtain a title under the Land Acquisition Act without paying of the land. We think this decision can be distinguished from the facts of the present case. There is no question of determining compensation in these cases; there is no violation of the statutory duty on the part of any one to do anything which the law required to be done. All that the proviso to Section 6 (1) of the Act, requires is that payment of compensation has to be made either wholly or partly out of public funds. The Legislature did not think it necessary or proper to prescribe the proportion of the payment to be made out of the public exchequer. There is thus no evasion of the statutory duty and it cannot be said in these cases that the acquisition attempted to do something indirectly which could not be done directly and was accordingly colourable. ( 12 ) MR. Sinha has fastened upon the inconsiderable sum of Rs. 10/- as the main proof what he characterized as colourable acquisition of the premises in question. He called attention to the well-known legal maxim, De Minimis Non Curat Lex and suggested that this principle applied conversely to the present case. As far as we could make out, he meant to say that the sum of Rs. 10/- paid out of pub revenues was such a small sum that we might consider it as a mere trifle. We are not sure whether the maxim, namely, that the law does not worry about trifles, lends itself to the construction which Mr. Sinha would put upon it. We do not find anything in these cases which might have any connection with the maxim except that the sum of Rs. We are not sure whether the maxim, namely, that the law does not worry about trifles, lends itself to the construction which Mr. Sinha would put upon it. We do not find anything in these cases which might have any connection with the maxim except that the sum of Rs. 10/- paid out of public revenues is said to be a trifling sum and the maxim advise Courts of Law not to concern themselves about trifles. We are not sure it Mr. Sinha wanted us completely to ignore the trifle, in this instance the sum of Rs. 10/-, and , in effect, invited us to hold that nothing had, in fact, been paid out of the public revenue. We cannot surely do that and we propose to continue to regard the maxim as merely meaning that the law disregards trifling omissions or even commissions in the absence of evidence of some kind of injury or other. The maxim appears to us to be wholly inept and consequently inapplicable to the facts of these cases. ( 13 ) INITIALLY, Mr. Sinha tried to persuade us that the acquisition proceedings had not been properly initiated nor properly continued. The criticism was that at no stage of the proceedings the Standing Rules of Business which required the matter to be brought up before the Minister-in-Charge for his personal consideration had not been obeyed. The contention was that the proceedings has issued almost automatically at the instance of interested persons out of the departmental machine without the knowledge and concurrence of the Minister-in-Charge; but later in the course of the argument this position had to be abandoned when the relevant papers were produced before us and we satisfied ourselves that at all important stages the matter had received the attention of the Minister-in-Charge. Indeed the learned trial Judge also had occasion to inspect the original records, and he found for a fact that the acquisition had received the attention of the Minister-in-Charge. We, therefore, need not pursue this matter further. ( 14 ) THE criticism about the award being joint impressed the learned trial Judge and he gave directions for correcting the award. Indeed the provisions of the Act make it incumbent upon the Collector to make separate awards. Obviously this was not done in these cases. We, therefore, need not pursue this matter further. ( 14 ) THE criticism about the award being joint impressed the learned trial Judge and he gave directions for correcting the award. Indeed the provisions of the Act make it incumbent upon the Collector to make separate awards. Obviously this was not done in these cases. In the appeals it had not been contended on behalf of the respondents that the awards as they stand are good. Thus it seems to be admitted that the awards such as they are, require to be corrected and made conformable to the requirement of the Act. ( 15 ) IT may incidentally be mentioned at this stage that so far as Appeal No. 85 of 1962 is concerned some objections were attempted to be taken on behalf of the State that it was no longer open to the appellant in that case to challenge the proceedings in view of the fact that the amount of compensation awarded had been withdrawn. There was some dispute before us at to whether the amount had actually been withdrawn; but we think this aspect of the matter is wholly immatoriao. We are not persuaded that mere withdrawal of the compensation awarded will disentitle the awardee to relief if he is found otherwise entitled to it. Right to hold property is indeed a fundamental right and it has aptly been said on behalf of the appellants that there can be no waiver of such right. Acceptance of the award cannot, in our view, be taken as amounting to such waiver as would disqualify the awardee to ask for relief and obtain it under Article 226 in an appropriate case. ( 16 ) THE substantial question debated before us is the question whether the proceedings in acquisition were really for a public purpose. We have already dealt with the criticism that the acquisition in these cases was not for a public purpose, but really intended to benefit a private organisation which was a profiteering body. But that does not dispose of the whole of the objection. It has been said that even assuming that the College is not a profit-making institution, acquisition of property for its expansion cannot be said to be a public purpose when it leads to the deprivation of property of another citizen. But that does not dispose of the whole of the objection. It has been said that even assuming that the College is not a profit-making institution, acquisition of property for its expansion cannot be said to be a public purpose when it leads to the deprivation of property of another citizen. This opens up a wide question which was already been decided on several occasions by the Supreme Court. The conditions under which expropriatory legislation may be undertaken have been reviewed more than once and we think no useful purpose will be served by attempting to notice those decisions. We have however to examine whether in this case the acquisition has been colourable orwhether the proceedings have been bonafide undertaken in aid of a public purpose as understood in the Act. On the question of absence of good faith, it must be said at once that there is no material before us which would justify an inference that the proceedings have been initiated out of improper motives to benefit a private body of men whose activities result in nothing to benefit the community at large. Besides the faint suggestion made in the course of argument that the improvement of the institution will only enure to the benefit of its promoters, there is no firm material anywhere from which a reasonable inference may be made that the proceedings were undertaken out of improper motives. We must therefore dismiss from consideration the suggestion that there was want of good faith on the part of the authorities in initiating the proceedings. In the absence of proof of bad faith, sub-section (3) of Section 6 comes into play. It says that the declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the acquisition is for a public purpose. It may be that in a given case the Court will find it necessary to enquire into the true nature of the purpose for which an acquisition is sought to be made, whether it serves a p purpose in the true sense of the terms; but that does not mean and imply that into every acquisition proceedings there must be held an inquisitorial enquiry as to whether the purpose is truly a public purpose. ( 17 ) WE have then to consider whether the projected acquisition to aid the expansion of the College is a public purpose within the meaning of the Act. ( 17 ) WE have then to consider whether the projected acquisition to aid the expansion of the College is a public purpose within the meaning of the Act. It has not been said that the women are not educated there. There is no challenge to the fact that a large number of women students are on the rolls of the College. The affidavit on behalf of College affirms that the present accommodation is extremely insufficient; it states that the institution is housed in a small building where not only classes are held but is also used for residence of women students; for want of accommodation admissions had to be refused to a large number of students every year. The need for additional accommodation has increased by reason of the introduction latterly of the three years Degree course, in addition to the existing course of study. There is no challenge to these statements and we have no manner of doubt that there is a real need for additional accommodation. The position then is that the College is a growing institution and requires expansion. The learned trial Judge has aptly observed that women's education ought, in the context of the present day conditions to receive high priority. But the position is disputed on behalf of the appellants and it has been argued that however laudable the object may appear to be, the purpose in these cases could not properly be called, public purpose within the meaning of the Act. The argument is that where the expansion of the College involves deprivation of a citizen's right, such expansion cannot be compressed within the limits of public purpose. We think this is an odd criticism which cannot be entertained at this late stage. We have only to refer in this context to some of the decisions which have authoritatively construed "public purpose" in the context of the Act. ( 18 ) THE Judicial Committee considered the question in the case of Hamabai Framjee Petit v. The Secretary of State of India in Council, (5) 19 CWN 305, in which the terms of a leas granted by the East India Company fell to be considered. One of the clauses of that lease reserved to the successors of the Company the right to resume it for public purposes. One of the clauses of that lease reserved to the successors of the Company the right to resume it for public purposes. The land was proposed to be resumed in order that buildings may be constructed for the purpose of housing employees of the Government. The question arose whether such purpose would be public purpose within the meaning of the Act. The argument that the land if made available would not benefit the public at large was repelled by the Judicial Committee which endorsed the view taken in the appeal by Batchelor J. before the Bombay High Court that; the learned Judge had said:"general definitions are, I think, rather to be avoided where the avoidance is possible and I make no attempt to define precisely the extent of the phrase "public purpose" in the lease, it is enough to say that, in my opinion the phrase, whatever else it may mean, must include a purpose, that is, an object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned. " ( 19 ) IT was thus held that the public purpose meant and included a purpose in which the general interest of the community as opposed to the particular interest of individuals was directly served. Mr. Sinha seized upon this passage in the course of his argument and attempted to persuade us to hold that while the expansion of the institution might result in conferment of educational facilities upon a Section of the community represented by women students it would not serve the public at large. We are wholly unable to accept this argument and we think it is clearly repelled by the view expressed by the Judicial Committee. The question appeared in another form in the case of the State of Bihar v. Kameswar Singh, (6) 1953 SCA 53. In that case the Supreme Court considered a number of appeals and petitions which raised the issue of the constitutional validity of three State enactments, namely, The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, The Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 and The Uttar Pradesh Zemindary Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. In that case the Supreme Court considered a number of appeals and petitions which raised the issue of the constitutional validity of three State enactments, namely, The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, The Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950 and The Uttar Pradesh Zemindary Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950. A number of questions fell to be decided in that case amongst which was the question of public purpose considered in the context of expropriatory legislation, Mahajan, J. observed:"the sovereign power to acquire property compulsorily is a power to acquire it only for a public purpose. There is no power in the sovereign to acquire private property in order to give it to private persons. Public purpose is a content of the power itself. " ( 20 ) AFTER setting out a passage from Willoughby's Constitutional Law, the learned Judge proceeded to state:-"public purpose is an essential ingredient in the very definition of the expression 'eminent domain'. . . The exercise f the power to acquire compulsorily is conditional on the existence of a public purpose. " ( 21 ) ELSEWHERE the learned Judge endorsed the view expressed in Humabai's case and quoted with approval Colley's Constitutional Limitations:-"the purpose must be public, and must have reference to the needs or convenience of the public, and no reason of general public policy will be sufficient to validate other transfers when they concern existing vested rights. " These passages have been relied upon by both sides, but we think their true meaning cannot be lost sight of in the context of the decision actually rendered in the case. The learned Judge again observed: "the property of A cannot be given to B for his own private purpose and that there is a positive element in the concept that the property taken must be for public benefit. Both these concepts are present in the acquisition of the Zemindary estate,Zemindaries are not being taken for private benefit to any particular individual or individuals but are being acquired by the State in General interest of the Community. " ( 22 ) THESE passages properly read can only meant that where a private citizen is being divested of his right to hold property, such divestment must be in pursuance of a clear purpose of public benefit. " ( 22 ) THESE passages properly read can only meant that where a private citizen is being divested of his right to hold property, such divestment must be in pursuance of a clear purpose of public benefit. Judged by this test, we have no manner of doubt that although in consequence of the proceedings the appellants stand in danger of being divested of their properties, there is a corresponding benefit to be secured to a considerable section of the community. ( 23 ) THE view expressed in Kameswar Singh's case has been substantially endorsed in the case of "the State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji and another, 7 (1954) SCA 1286. Bose, J. , who spoke for the Court, observed that there was in the case of proof of a public purpose and that purpose was the house the homeless. The question that fell to be decided was the validity of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948. It was said that the Act was invalid since it did not state in express terms the precise purpose for which property was being acquired by Government. It was held that so long as the purpose and intendment of the Act can be gathered from the statute that property was being acquired for purposes of the State or for a public purpose with the obvious intention of benefiting the community at large, the Act could not be pronounced invalid. The learned Judge observed:-"at that time the housing situation in Bombay was acute, largely due to the influx of refugees. Questions of public decency, public morals, public health and the temptation to lawlessness and crime, which such a situation brings in its train, at once arose; and the public conscience was aroused on the ground of plain humanity. A race of proprietors in the shape of rapacious landlords who thrived on the misery of those who could find no decent roof over their heads, sprang into being. Even the efficiency of the administration was threatened because Government servants could not find proper accommodation. Milder efforts to cope with the evil proved ineffective. It was necessary therefore for Government to take more drastic steps and in doing so they acted for the public weal. There was consequently a clear public purpose and an undoubted public benefit. " ( 24 ) IT was therefore public weal which was held to be the governing consideration. Milder efforts to cope with the evil proved ineffective. It was necessary therefore for Government to take more drastic steps and in doing so they acted for the public weal. There was consequently a clear public purpose and an undoubted public benefit. " ( 24 ) IT was therefore public weal which was held to be the governing consideration. Judged by this test, it must be held that where educational facilities for a large number of women students are intended to be expanded by the projected acquisition the purpose must necessarily be held to be a public purpose. In the State of Bombay v. Ali Gulshan, (8) 1956 SCA 17, the question reappeared in a slightly different form. The Court was called upon to consider whether the Government of Bombay was entitled under clause (a) of sub-section (4) Section 6 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1946, to requisition as for a public purpose certain premises for housing a number of staff of a foreign consulate. It was argued that such purpose could never be public purpose but the argument was repelled. Aiyar, J. who delivered judgment referred to the three lists, the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List and observed :-"item 42 of the Concurrent Legislative List (List III) speaks of the purpose of the Union or of a State of any other public purpose. Reading the three items together. It is fairly obvious that the categories of 'purpose' contemplated are three innumber, namely Union purpose, State purpose, and any other public purpose. Though every State purpose or Union purpose must be a public purpose, it is easy to think of cases where the purpose of the acquisition or requisition is neither the one nor the other but a public purpose. Acquisition of sites for the building of hospital or educational institutions by private benefactors will be a public purpose, though it will not strictly be a State or Union purpose. When we speak of a State purpose or a Union purpose we think of duties and obligations cast on the State or the Union to do particular things for the benefit of the public or a section of the public. Cases where the State acquires or requisitions property to facilitate the coming into existence of utilitarian institutions, on schemes having public welfare at heart, will fall within the third category above-mentioned. Cases where the State acquires or requisitions property to facilitate the coming into existence of utilitarian institutions, on schemes having public welfare at heart, will fall within the third category above-mentioned. " ( 25 ) IN the State of Bombay v. R. S. Nanji, (9) 1956 SC 308, Imam J. , endorsed the view expressed earlier and considered the effect of the previous decisions to which we have referred. The learned Judge observed that it was impossible to precisely define the expression public purpose. The facts and circumstances are required to be closely examined in each case in order to determine whether a public purpose has been established. Prima facie, Government is the best judge as to whether public purpose is served in a given case. It may not be the sole Judge and the Courts have the duty to determine the matter when the question is properly raised before it. The learned Judge proceeded to say:-"the cases of Hamabai, Bhanji Munji and Ali Gulshan are merely illustrative. In each of them primarily the person directly and vitally concerned would be the person to whom the residential accommodation would be allotted with which prima facie the general interest of the community would not be directly concerned at all. We must regard Hamabai's case as a decision to the effect that the general interest of the community was directly and vitally concerned with the efficiency of the Government servants because it would be to its benefit to have such servants and, therefore, providing living accommodation for them was a public purpose. The decision in Bhanji Munji's case must be read as one in which the general interest of the community was directly and vitally concerned with prevention of lawlessness and disease and to house the homeless in order to avoid such contingency, was a public purpose. In Ali Gulshan's case, a State purpose was served because the State Government was interested in its own trade or commerce and in the efficient discharge of his duties by a foreign consul, who would be concerned with such trade or commerce. " ( 26 ) THE question of public purpose seems to have recurred with particular insistence before the Supreme Court. It came again to be considered in the case of Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, (10) AIR 1960 SC 1203 . " ( 26 ) THE question of public purpose seems to have recurred with particular insistence before the Supreme Court. It came again to be considered in the case of Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, (10) AIR 1960 SC 1203 . The Court approvingly referred to its earlier decision in Bhanji Munji's case and held that providing housing accommodation to the homeless was a public purpose. Sinha, C. J. proceeded to observe:-"in an industrial concern employing a large number of workmen, away from their homes, it is a social necessity that there should be proper housing accommodation available for such workmen. Where a large section of the community is concerned, its welfare is a matter of public concern. Similarly, if a Company is generous enough to erect a hospital or a public reading room and library or an educational institution open to the public, it cannot be doubted that the work is one of the public utility and comes within the provisions of the Act. " ( 27 ) THIS last decision of the Supreme Court appears to us to completely answer the appellants' objection that whatever the effect of the improvement or expansion of the institution, the acquisition proceeding is indefensible, it having been undertaken at the instance of a private body. This aspect of the matter was argued with some insistence and it was sought to be said that no proceeding in acquisition can properly be commenced and continued at the instance of a private organisation. We are wholly unable to accept this argument. As the Supreme Court has pointed out, it may well be that proceedings in acquisition are commenced at the instance of a private person whose munificence and charity may have supplied the nucleus of an organisation intended to benefit the community at large. There is nothing in the act which prevents an acquisition at the instance of a private agency as long as the purpose of the acquisition is a public purpose. We do not think there is any substance in the argument that the proceedings having been commenced at the instance of a private organisation they are tainted even though they might result in expansion of the institution which educates hundreds of women students. The only relevant consideration under Section 6 is whether the acquisition will further public purpose. We do not think there is any substance in the argument that the proceedings having been commenced at the instance of a private organisation they are tainted even though they might result in expansion of the institution which educates hundreds of women students. The only relevant consideration under Section 6 is whether the acquisition will further public purpose. The Act nowhere says that the acquisition has to be by a public body. The Act emphasizes that the object of the acquisition must be to benefit the public or at any rate, a section of the community. Judged by this test, we feel bound to hold that the acquisitions in this case were for a public purpose, since women students in larger numbers will be given proper educational facilities to equip themselves for life. ( 28 ) MR. Sinha relied on certain observations in a decision of this Court in the case of Amiya Prova Das Gupta v. First Land Acquisition Collector and Ors. , (11) (65 CWN 456) where Banerjee, J. , had to consider the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Requisition and Control (Temporary Provisions) Act in connection with a dancing and music school. The learned Judge held that whatever public purpose might mean, it must involve a purpose which ends at serving the general interest of the opposed to the interest of an individual or of a private body. A requisition of premises for a private dancing and music school may be for a public purpose, if it serves public interest. But it cannot be said that since the institution was a dancing and music school, a requisition for its purpose must necessarily have been for a public purpose. If the institution is a private profit-making institution, the requisition must be held to be for private purposes which cannot be said to involve any public purpose. We have seen nothing in this decision which will encourage the criticism on behalf of the appellant that even though the acquisition proceedings might result in enlargement of educational facilities benefiting a large section of the community, still the acquisition would not be for a public purpose since the proceedings were instituted at the instance of a private institution or individual. This decision does not in any way assist. Mr. This decision does not in any way assist. Mr. Sinha's contention, and must, at all events, be read subject to what the Supreme Court has declared to be the true meaning of 'public purpose'. ( 29 ) WE think therefore that the purpose, for which the proceedings were taken was a public purpose within the meaning of the Act. There is no dispute that the projected improvements will result in expansion of educational facilities for a largesection of women students. The acquisition may result in deprivation of private property; but if ever there was a case where such deprivation was justified, it was in this case since we are persuaded that the acquisition would benefit a growing educational institution. ( 30 ) THERE is, in our view, no substance in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed subject to the observations made herein below. ( 31 ) WE make no or as to costs. ( 32 ) IN Appeal No. 35 of 1962, the appellants appear to have withdrawn a part of the compensation money awarded in the case. In view of these circumstances, the learned trial Judge declined to make an order directing the Collector to make separate awards instead of a joint award and apportion the compensation money; but in the view that we have taken, namely, that the mere act of withdrawal will not disentitle the appellant to relief if they are otherwise found entitled to it, we think there must be a direction given in this case also so that the Collector might make a proper award upon condition that the appellants re-deposit the amount which they have withdrawn. The deposit back will be made within one month from date; in default thereof the order of the learned trial Judge will stand affirmed. Appeals dismissed.