ORDER : The applicant was convicted under Sections 304-A, 279, 338 and 428, I. P. Code and under Sec. 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The conviction is challenged in revision. 2. In revision four points were urged, namely (1) That Ex. 18 which is a statement made by the accused at the police station reporting the accident is not admissible in evidence. Ex. 18 is a statement made by the accused. A statement made fay a person can be admitted (1) to corroborate his evidence or (2) to contradict his evidence, or (3) as admission made by himself. In this case, it cannot be used either to corroborate or contradict the statement of the accused, because it is a statement made by the accused, who has not given evidence at the trial. An admission is defined in Sec. 17 of the Evidence Act as under : "An admission is a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, hereinafter mentioned." Then it is provided in Sec. 21 of the Evidence Act that admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the person who makes them or his representative in interest; but they cannot be proved by or on behalf of the person who makes them or by his representative in interest, except in the cases stated in that section. Ex. 18 is sought to be used as admission to prove that the accused was driving the vehicle in question at the time of the accident. The question who was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident is certainly a relevant fact. The statement would therefore be admissible as admission under Sec. 21 of the Evidence Act. 3. But it is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that a first information report cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, and for this proposition, he has placed reliance on Nisar Ali v. State of U. P., (S) AIR 1957 SC 366 . 3. But it is contended by the learned counsel for the applicant that a first information report cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, and for this proposition, he has placed reliance on Nisar Ali v. State of U. P., (S) AIR 1957 SC 366 . In this case, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed as follows : "Qudrat Ullah picked up the knife which had been dropped by the appellant, put the deceased in a rickshaw and took him to the hospital from where he went to the police station and made the first information report. An objection has been taken to the admissibility of this report as it was made by a person who was a co-accused. A first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under S. 157, Evidence Act, or to contradict it under S. 145 of that Act. It cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, nor to corroborate or contradict other witnesses." In the case before their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the appellant was one Nisar Ali and the statement of one Qudrat Ullah was under consideration. With reference to this, their Lordships observed as stated above. 4. This declaration of law made by the Supreme Court is binding upon me. The learned Government Pleader, however, contends that their Lordships of the Supreme Court did not consider the provisions of S. 21 of the Evidence Act and did not consider the question whether the statement would be admissible as admission. But in view of the provisions in Art. 141 of the Constitution of India, a declaration of law made by the Supreme Court is binding upon me, and the contention that their Lordships of the Supreme Court did not consider Sec. 21 of the Evidence Act and did not consider the question whether such a statement would be admissible in evidence cannot be countenanced. But the declaration of law made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court relates to a first information report. In the instant case, Ex. 18 is not a first information report. By Ex. 18 only information was given to the police of the accident. But the declaration of law made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court relates to a first information report. In the instant case, Ex. 18 is not a first information report. By Ex. 18 only information was given to the police of the accident. It did not state that an offence had been committed nor did it state that an offence was committed by a particular person or by an unknown person. It was merely a report of an accident, which drivers of motor vehicles are required to make to the police under Sec. 29 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, I hold that Ex. 18 is not a first information report. As Ex. 18 contains a statement that the accused was driving the motor vehicle at the time of the accident, it contains an admission and the portion of Ex. 18 which contains an admission would be relevant under Sec. 21 of the Evidence Act. The conteution of the learned counsel for the applicant is, therefore, rejected. 5. The next contention is that the cleaner who was the best witness on the point of the circumstances of the accident has not been examined. This is a matter of appreciation of evidence and will not be considered in revision. 6. The third contention is that there is no legal evidence to establish that the driver of the motor vehicle was the accused. I have already held that Ex. 18 is admissible as an admission and that would be legal evidence to establish the fact. In addition there is the evidence of Ambalal on the point. This contention is, therefore, rejected. 7. The last contention is that a copy of Ex. 18 was not given to the accused at the proper stage and was given to him only during the examination of the police officer. In fact, the statement was of the accused himself and therefore there is no prejudice causes to the accused because a copy was given to him at a late stage. 8. The revision application is, therefore, dismissed. Revision dismissed.