Judgment G.N.Prasad, J. 1. The appellant has been convicted under Sections 467, 471/467, 468 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code. Under Sec. 467, as also under Sec. 471/467, he has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one year more. Under Section 420, he has been sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 4 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000 or in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one year more. No separate sentence has been imposed upon him under Sec. 468. The substantive sentences of imprisonment mentioned above are to run concurrently. 2. The offences are alleged to have been committed in November and December 1955. At the material time the appellant was a pleader practising in the Courts at Dumka. He was also on the panel of lawyers who used to be appointed Assistant Public Prosecutors for the purpose of conducting State cases in the criminal Courts at Dumka. 3. The substance of the prosecution case against the appellant is that in respect of his remuneration he had submitted a false bill containing particulars of cases of the Court of a magistrate, Sri J. S. Singh (P. W. 3), none of which had been conducted by him or for the conduct of none of which he had been appointed by the appointing authority who was the Deputy Commissioner of the Santhal Parganas. It is alleged that by forging such a bill in respect of his remuneration and using the same as genuine, the appellant cheated the servants of the State Government to the tune of Rs. 510. 4. The bill in question has been marked "X" for identification. The prosecution case is that the appellant had himself filled up the various columns of the bill which was prepared on a plain paper on account of non-availability of the printed form, a sample copy of which is on the record as Exhibit 13. In the said bill the appellant had mentioned particulars of as many as 34 criminal cases in which he claimed to have conducted the trial on behalf of the State in the Court of Sri J. S. Singh (P. W. 3) on various dates during the month of October 1955, the total number of such dates being 17; and the appellant had charged Rs. 30 for each days work so that the total amount of the bill was Rs. 510. In the remarks column of the bill mention had been made of the number of certain orders of the Deputy Commissioner purporting to appoint the appellant as assistant public prosecutor for the conduct of the various cases mentioned in the bill. The appellant had signed the bill under the date, 12-11-55, his signature being Exhibit 2/3. As required under the prescribed form, the appellant had appended a certificate at the foot of the bill to the effect that he had not charged any fee for appearance in the Court concerned on dates on which the Public Prosecutor or any other Assistant Public Prosecutor had charged a fee for appearance in that Court. This certificate is Exhibit 2/4. It was necessary before the submission of the bill to obtain a certificate of the trying magistrate on the reverse of the bill to the effect that the pleader concerned had attended his Court on the dates specified in the bill- The certificate containing the name of the appellant as the pleader is Exhibit 2/5; and the signature of Sri J. S. Singh (P. W. 3) below the certificate is Exhibit A. The bill had to be countersigned by the Deputy Commissioner for which purpose it had to be presented to the bill clerk of the Deputy Commissioners office. The prosecution case is that the bill containing the particulars mentioned above was personally presented by the appellant to the assistant bill clerk, Sumukar Sen Gupta (P. W. 15), on the 15th November 1955. It was checked by the bill clerk Phanibhusan Mandal (P. W. 4); and in due course, it was countersigned by the Deputy Commissioner on the 2nd December 1955. It then came back to the assistant bill clerk (P. W. 15) who made an entry (Ext. 9/1) in the bill register and put the corresponding serial number which was in of 1955-56 on the bill (vide Ext. 8/9). Thereafter, the bill was sent to the despatcher (P. W. 12). On the 6th December 1955, the despatcher (P. W. 12) handed over the bill to the appellant personally. 5. The further case of the prosecution relates to the steps taken for the encashment of the bill. 8/9). Thereafter, the bill was sent to the despatcher (P. W. 12). On the 6th December 1955, the despatcher (P. W. 12) handed over the bill to the appellant personally. 5. The further case of the prosecution relates to the steps taken for the encashment of the bill. The prosecution case is that on the 7th December 1955, the appellant personally handed over the bill in question to Kalidas Chakravarty (P. W. 17), then attached to the accounts section as the bill scrutinizing clerk. In the presence of P. W. 17, when the accountant (P. W. 19) also happened to be present, the appellant wrote an endorsement on one anna stamp affixed to the bill in the following terms: "Received payment. R. Sinha. 7/12." This endorsement is Exhibit 2/6. The bill was then dealt with by P. W. 17, as also by the accountant (P. W. 19), who checked it and put his initials (Ext. 8/7) on it. The requisite T.V. number was put on it by Nandlal Bose (P. W. 6), who was a clerk then attached to the payment side of the accounts department. It was then made over to another clerk, Raghunandan Prasad (P. W. 8), whose duty was to put up such bills before the treasury officer for his signature. P. W. 8, in the first instance, put up the bill before J. Prasad (P. W. 2), who was a magistrate then undergoing training under the treasury officer. P. W. 2 affixed his own initials on the bill. It was then put up before Syed Baksis-Hussain (P. W. 5), the Treasury Officer, who signed it (vide. Exhibit 8/5). The bill was then sent to the treasurer, Paritosh Biswas (P. W. 29), The latter made an entry (Ext. 20/4) in the Potdars Payment Register. Against this entry the appellant put his own signature (Ext. 2/8) in token of having received the amount of the bill. All this had happened on the same day, on the 7th December 1955. The bill was thereafter preserved in the accounts section, after affixing the seal of the treasury in token of encashment for being subsequently despatched along with other bills to the Accountant-General at Ranchi. 6. The prosecution case further is that three days later, namely, on the 10th December 1955, the appellant presented another till of Rs. The bill was thereafter preserved in the accounts section, after affixing the seal of the treasury in token of encashment for being subsequently despatched along with other bills to the Accountant-General at Ranchi. 6. The prosecution case further is that three days later, namely, on the 10th December 1955, the appellant presented another till of Rs. 480 purporting to be for cases alleged to have been conducted by him before the same trying magistrate, Sri J. S. Singh (P. W. 3). This bill purported to be for the month of November 1955. In the usual course, the bill came to the hands of the bill clerk (P.W. 4), who felt suspicious about the genuineness of the signature of the trying magistrate below the certificate on the bill. P. W. 4 went to Sri J. S. Singh (P. W. 3) for verification of his signature upon the bill. P. W. 3 told him that the signature appeared to be forged; and he also asked his bench clerk, Satyanarain Misra (P. W. 1) to verify whether the details of cases noted in the body of the bill tallied with the trial register and the diary of his Court. Upon such verification, it was found that none of the cases mentioned in the November bill was to be found either in the trial register or in the Courts diary; and the bench clerk (P. W. 1) made a report to the magistrate to this effect. The magistrate (P. W. 3) directed his bench clerk to hand over the bill to the bill clerk apparently for making further inquiries into it; but, at about 3 P. M. on the same day, while the Magistrate (P. W. 3) was still awaiting the result of further inquiries, which he had directed to be made, the appellant came to him and said that he had taken back the bill and requested the Magistrate (P. W. 3) not to proceed in the matter. 7. The magistrate (P. W. 3), however, felt all the more suspicious and asked his bench clerk to make inquiries whether there was any other bill of this kind relating to his Court. 7. The magistrate (P. W. 3), however, felt all the more suspicious and asked his bench clerk to make inquiries whether there was any other bill of this kind relating to his Court. On the same evening at about 7 P. M. the bench clerk (P. W. 1) told the magistrate at his house that there was another bill containing his signature which appeared to be forged, containing as it did particulars of cases which were not mentioned either in the trial register or in the diary of his court. In course of time the matter was reported to the Deputy Commissioner who after making some inquiries of his own ordered the matter to be placed in the hands of the police. Sri J. S. Singh (P. W. 3) accordingly drew up a written report (Ext. 6) stating all the relevant facts and handed it over to the Superintendent of Police. On the basis of this report the first information, report (Ext. 6/1) was drawn up by the officer-in-charge (P. W. 7) at 8-50 P. M. on the 13th December 1955. The police investigation thereafter followed. In the course of the investigation some specimen signature of the appellant was obtained and the opinion of the handwriting expert was sought for about some of the writings and signatures of the appellant upon the bill in question. After the investigation was complete, a chargesheet was submitted against the appellant who was in due course put on trial after the usual commitment inquiry. 8. The defence of the appellant is one of complete innocence. He denied having forged the bill or to have committed the offence of cheating. He also denied having taken payment of the amount of the bill from the accountant. In substance, the case of the appellant was that it was clerk who used to prepare such bills on his behalf and put them up for his signature. The bill in question had also been prepared in the same manner and the appellant had put his signature thereon without personally verifying about the correctness of the particulars mentioned therein. According to the appellant his clerk had also brought the bill after it had been passed for payment and thereupon he put his signature on the revenue stamp affixed on the bill and handed it over to his clerk for taking necessary steps. According to the appellant his clerk had also brought the bill after it had been passed for payment and thereupon he put his signature on the revenue stamp affixed on the bill and handed it over to his clerk for taking necessary steps. In other words, the defence case is that the appellant was not conscious either as to the non-genuine character of the bill or the fact that it had been encashed; and, as such, there was no mens rea on his part for commission of any of the offences of which he had been charged. 9. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge has found the prosecution case to be substantially true. It has been held that the body portion of the bill (Ext. 2/9) is in the writing of the appellant himself. Other writings or signatures on the bill (Exts. 2, 2/1, 2/2, 2/3, 2/4 and 2/6) and on the Potdars payment Register (Ext. 2/8) have also been found to be in the pen of the appellant. The learned Judge has accepted the prosecution case that the appellant had personally presented the bill to the assistant bill clerk (P. W. 15) and had personally received the bill from the despatcher (P. W. 12) after countersignature of the Deputy Commissioner. It has further been held that the appellant had personally received payment of Rs. 510, which was the amount of the bill from the accounts section. In token of receiving the payment the appellant had put his signature (Ext. 2/8) in the Potdars payment Register. The learned Judge has further found that all the particulars given by the appellant in the body of the bill (Ext. 2/9) were false. The reference to the appointment letters of the Deputy Commissioner in column 13 of the bill has also been found to be all false. The learned Judge has accepted the prosecution case that the appellant had neither been appointed for the conduct of tile cases mentioned in the bill in question; nor had he actually conducted any of them on behalf of the State. Upon the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge has convicted and sentenced the appellant, as mentioned already. 10. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Upon the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge has convicted and sentenced the appellant, as mentioned already. 10. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. Nageshwar Prasad contends that the convention of the appellant under Sections 467, 471/467, and 468 of the Penal Code is bad, since the bill (marked "X" for identification) cannot be held to be a forged document, inasmuch, as it bears the admitted signature (Ext. 2/3) of the appellant, and the signature (Ext. A) must be held to be the genuine signature of the magistrate (P.W. 3), (sic) as affixed by P.Ws. 4, 17 and 19, though, this has been denied by P.W. 3 and his two bench clerks (P.Ws. 1 and 25). It is, further contended that there is no satisfactory evidence in support of the prosecution case about the body portion (Ext. 2/9) of the bill being in the writing of the appellant. In this connection it is pointed out that, although P.Ws. 3 and 17 have deposed that Exhibit 2/9 is in the writing of the appellant, they did not say so before the police or the committing magistrate. The latter contention is entirely without force. Neither of these two witnesses has been shown to have borne any animus against the appellant so as to give false evidence against him without any advantage to themselves. Their evidence about Exhibit 2/9 being in the writing of the appellant cannot be rejected on the mere ground of their omission to have said so in their former statements made before the police or the committing magistrate. They have both claimed to have been familiar with the writings or signature of the appellant; and, that is by no means unnatural or improbable. Both of them, must have had numerous occasions to see the appellant writing. Admittedly, the appellant was practising as a pleader at Dumka and was also an assistant public prosecutor since 1948. He must, therefore, have appeared in the court of P.W. 3 on several occasions. P.W. 3 remembered about three or four occasions when he had seen the appellant writing. The appellant must have submitted numerous bills relating to his remuneration for work done by him in State cases, which must have passed through the hands of P.W. 17 as the bill scrutinizing clerk. Both P.Ws. 3 and 17 are, therefore, quite competent to prove Exhibit 2/9 to be in the writing of the appellant. The appellant must have submitted numerous bills relating to his remuneration for work done by him in State cases, which must have passed through the hands of P.W. 17 as the bill scrutinizing clerk. Both P.Ws. 3 and 17 are, therefore, quite competent to prove Exhibit 2/9 to be in the writing of the appellant. It may be pointed out that P.W. 17 has proved the endorsement (Ext. 2/6) also to be in the writing of the appellant; and this was admitted by the appellant to be in his writing. I, therefore, feel satisfied that P.Ws. 3 and 17 have truely deposed that Exhibit 2/9 is in the writing of the appellant. It is true, as pointed out by learned counsel, that the handwriting expert (P.W. 23) was not able to give definite opinion about Exhibit 2/9 being in the pen of the appellant. But that is quite insufficient to justify a rejection of the positive evidence of P.Ws. 3 and 17 in this regard. It must, therefore, be held that the entire body portion (Ext. 2/9) of the bill is in the writing of the appellant himself; and that there is no substance in his defence that the particulars were filled up on the bill by his clerk. Besides, Exhibits 2, 2/1, 2/2, 2/4 and 2/6, all on other portions of the bill, have been proved to be in the writing of the appellant himself. It is manifest that all the various columns of the bill were filled up by the appellant personally and it is an admitted fact that the bill was signed by him. 11. I may assume, in view of the evidence of P.Ws. 4, 17 and 19 that Exhibit A is the genuine signature of the magistrate (P.W. 3). But on the mere ground that the appellants signature (Ext. 2/3) and the magistrates signature (Ext. A) on the bill are genuine, I am unable to accept the contention that the bill is not a forged document. A document is forged, if it is a false document within the meaning of Sec. 464, Indian Penal Code. Under this section, the making of a false document is not restricted to the act of signing it. A) on the bill are genuine, I am unable to accept the contention that the bill is not a forged document. A document is forged, if it is a false document within the meaning of Sec. 464, Indian Penal Code. Under this section, the making of a false document is not restricted to the act of signing it. The section is wide enough to cover the making of a document, which really means creating or bringing it into existence, as held by Ramaswami, J. (as he then was), in The Province of Bihar V/s. Surendra Prasad, AIR 1951 Pat 86 provided the act of signing or making the document is done dishonestly or fraudulently and with the intention of causing it to be believed that the document or any part of it was made, signed, sealed or executed by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority the maker knows that it was not made, signed, sealed or executed. 12. In the instant case, the bill purported to be a bill for remuneration of the appellant for certain work which, upon the finding of the learned trial Judge, the appellant had not done at all. It was drawn up by the appellant to enable him to receive payment of a certain sum of money to which he was not entitled. It contained particulars of cases which the appellant had not conducted in the court of P.W. 3 during October 1955. In column of the bill, the appellant had made a reference to five orders of the Deputy Commissioner purporting to relate to his appointment as assistant public prosecutor for conducting the various cases on behalf of the State specified in columns 1 and 2 of the bill. In paragraph 24 of his judgment, the learned Judge has found that the orders in question related to entirely different matters which had nothing whatsoever to do with the appellants purported appointment. No material has been brought to our notice to show that there was a single order of the Deputy Commissioner appointing the appellant as assistant public prosecutor for conduct, on behalf of the State, of any of the 34 cases mentioned in the bill. No material has been brought to our notice to show that there was a single order of the Deputy Commissioner appointing the appellant as assistant public prosecutor for conduct, on behalf of the State, of any of the 34 cases mentioned in the bill. It is obvious that a reference to those orders had been made by the appellant in the bill with the intention of causing all concerned, including the magistrate (P.W. 3), to believe that the appellant had made and signed the bill with the authority of the Deputy Commissioner, though he himself must have known that no such authority was in fact in existence. The appellant must have been aware that without making reference to some order of the Deputy Commissioner, he would not be able to have his bill entertained. He had, therefore, made a false mention of orders purporting to relate to his appointment for the conduct of those 34 cases with the intention of having his bill entertained. In other words, the intention of the appellant in making and signing the bill, as aforesaid, was to cause it to be believed that he had done so by or under the authority of the Deputy Commissioner which, to his knowledge never existed. It was, therefore, a false document within the meaning of Sec. 464, which the appellant had made and signed. The bill was submitted by the appellant personally as deposed to by the assistant bill clerk (P.W 15) and received back after the counter- signature of the Deputy Commissioner, personally as deposed to by the despatcher (P.W. 12). Again it was cashed by him personally as deposed to by P.Ws. 17, 19, 27 and 29. Nothing has been shown to us why the evidence of these witnesses should not be relied upon. From all these materials it is simply clear that the appellant had made and signed the bill dishonestly and fraudulently, and had also successfully caused wrongful loss to the State and wrongful gain to himself by his acts. The fact that a document bearing even the genuine signature of the maker may be a forged document is apparent from illustration (e) appended to Sec. 464, Indian Penal Code, as also illustration (d) to Explanation I thereof. The contention of learned counsel upon the footing of genuineness of Exhibits 2/3 and A must, therefore, be overruled. 13. The fact that a document bearing even the genuine signature of the maker may be a forged document is apparent from illustration (e) appended to Sec. 464, Indian Penal Code, as also illustration (d) to Explanation I thereof. The contention of learned counsel upon the footing of genuineness of Exhibits 2/3 and A must, therefore, be overruled. 13. It was next contended by learned counsel that the learned Judge was not right in holding that none of the cases mentioned in the bill related to the court of Sri J. S. Singh (P.W. 3) because a scrutiny of the trial register and the courts diary (Exts. 1 and 1/1) would show that some of them, namely, cases numbered 135/55, 139/55, 181/55, 183/55 and one or two others, did relate to that Court. But this contention can be of no avail to the appellant. Even if five or six out of a total of 34 cases mentioned in the bill may have related to the court of P.W. 3, no conclusion can follow that any of them had been tried in that court in the month to which the bill of the appellant related. P.W. 1 who was the bench clerk of the court from November 1955 to September 1956, has clearly stated that none of those cases was tried in the court of Sri J. S. Singh (P.W. 3), It may be, as suggested by learned counsel that P.W. 1 gave such evidence on the basis of entries in the trial register and the courts diary; but the evidence of P.W. 1 in this regard has not been shown to be incorrect. The learned Judge has recorded a clear finding that none of the cases mentioned in the bill of the appellant had been tried in the court of P.W. 3; and this finding has not been shown to us to be wrong with reference to any material on the record. Even with, respect to those five or six cases, not to speak of the remaining 28 or 29, there is, as I have said, nothing to show that the appellant has even been appointed as assistant public prosecutor for conducting any of them so as to justify his actions in making and signing the bill and receiving payment of the amount thereof by way of his remuneration from the State Treasury. I have no hesitation in holding that the appellant had resorted to commission of the offence of forgery, and having forged the bill (marked "X" for identification) for the purpose of cheating he had used the same as genuine and had by his act cheated the State Officers concerned to the tune of Rs. 510. 14. As regards the conviction of the appellant for the charge of cheating, all that Mr. Nageshwar Prasad could do was to endeavour to bring this case within the authority of Sudhdeo Jha Utpal V/s. The State of Bihar, (S) AIR 1957 SC 466 . It was urged that like the General Manager of the Express Auto Service, Ltd, who was the accused in the Utpals case, (S) AIR 1957 SC 466 it should be held that the appellant had no criminal intent, even though the other ingredients necessary to constitute the offence of cheating may have been established from the facts proved in this case; but I am unable to hold that the appellants case is at all parallel to Utpals case, (S) AIR 1957 SC 466 . That was a case where the General Manager of a big firm owning a large number of motor buses and trucks, and a number of branches, in various parts of this State employing a large number of servants, was led to sign certain certificate relating to the payment of taxes in respect of some of the vehicles and as to their road-worthiness in the ordinary course of his official business. The view taken by the Supreme Court was that the General Manager was not expected to have personal knowledge of all minute details of the business of his firm. He could not be expected to know the exact condition of each of the buses or the trucks, and there was reason to think that he had signed the certificates after they had been put up before him by some of his employees. There was also a charge of conspiracy in that case which had failed. No such consideration can possibly apply to the case of the appellant. It is impossible to lend any credence to his defence that he had no personal knowledge of the falsity of the particulars mentioned in the bill and had merely signed it after it was drawn up by his clerk. No such consideration can possibly apply to the case of the appellant. It is impossible to lend any credence to his defence that he had no personal knowledge of the falsity of the particulars mentioned in the bill and had merely signed it after it was drawn up by his clerk. Apart from the fact that it is impossible to believe that the appellant could have blindly signed such a bill without caring even to see as to what it related to and for what amount it had been made, there is clear evidence on the record, to which I have already referred, that it was the appellant personally, and not his clerk, who had taken active steps in relation to the bill at the various stages from start to finish. In my opinion, the facts and circumstances proved in this case leave no room for doubt that the appellant did have the requisite mens rea for commission of the offence of cheating as well as the other offences for which he has been convicted. 15. Having discussed all the pointes raised by learned counsel on the merits of the case, I proceed to consider his argument that this is a case which ought to be dealt with under the Probation of Offenders Act (20 of 1958), 1958. We have been referred to Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. Sec.3 cannot, however, be applied to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as in addition to the conviction under Sec. 420 of the Indian Penal Code, the appellant has also been found to be guilty of graver offences under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the Code. As regards Sec. 4, I am of the opinion that this also cannot be called in aid of the appellant considering the serious nature of the offences found to have been committed by him, in the light of the further fact that they had been committed by one who was expected to have greater sense of responsibility, being a member of the bar. A much higher degree of integrity and morality was expected from a person in the position of the appellant. He had, if nothing else, at least a duty towards his own profession to keep the fair name of the profession untarnished. A much higher degree of integrity and morality was expected from a person in the position of the appellant. He had, if nothing else, at least a duty towards his own profession to keep the fair name of the profession untarnished. By committing the offences proved against him in this case the appellant has only brought disgrace upon the noble profession which had admitted him to its fold. A serious view must be taken of such offences committed by a member of the bar, as the appellant was. Besides, the point was not taken at the trial; and we have no material before us as to the past antecedents of the appellant. It is, therefore, impossible to deal with the appellant under the Probation of Offenders Act. The appellant should consider himself lucky that he has been sentenced to only simple imprisonment instead of rigorous imprisonment, which may well have been more appropriate. At the same time, I think that there should be some reduction in the amount of fine imposed upon the appellant. While upholding the conviction of the appellant as also the sentence imposed upon him under Sec. 420, Indian Penal Code, 1 would set aside the sentence of fine imposed upon him under Sections 467 and 471/467 of the Code, maintaining at the same time the substantive sentence of imprisonment under both these sections. 16. There is one more matter to which I wish to refer before I conclude; and that relates to the bill for November 1955 which really had led to the detection of the dishonesty and fraud of the appellant. According to Sri J. S. Singh (P.W. 3), his signature in that bill did not appear to him to be genuine and he had directed his bench clerk to hand it over to the bill clerk apparently for making necessary inquiries. P.W. 3 has deposed that his intention was to proceed against the appellant, when his bench clerk had reported to him that the bill, which was for Rs. 480, contained false entries. Later on, when the appellant had come and requested him not to proceed in the matter, saying that he had taken back the bill, P.W. 3 was surprised. The bill clerk (P.W. 4) claimed to have handed over the November bill to the appellant under the order of P.W. 3. 480, contained false entries. Later on, when the appellant had come and requested him not to proceed in the matter, saying that he had taken back the bill, P.W. 3 was surprised. The bill clerk (P.W. 4) claimed to have handed over the November bill to the appellant under the order of P.W. 3. This may not be correct; but the fact remains, and it cannot be lost sight of, that P, W. 3 himself behaved like an automaton, and himself took no action to keep the November bill under his control. What is all the more strange is that he did not even care to call the bill clerk and take him to task for having returned the bill to the appellant. This betrays lamentable carelessness and neglect of duty on the part of a public servant holding a responsible post. The appellant might as well have been prosecuted for similar offences in relation to the November bill. There does not seem to be any explanation for the softness shown by P.W. 3 in suffering the November bill to go out of his control. It certainly does no credit to him; on the contrary it has given rise to an occasion for comment that the appellant may as well have influenced P.W. 3 who otherwise was not expected to have put his signature (Ext. A) of the October bill without proper scrutiny. I must say that I should have expected a better sense of duty on the part of Sri J. S. Singh (P.W, 3) than he has shown in this case. 17. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with modification as indicated above. Anant Singh, J. 18 I entirely agree. I may, however, add though at the cost of repetition of what my learned brother has already held, that it passes ones comprehension, how could the appellant dare put up a false bill and that too in respect of as many as 34 items of cases, purporting to have been done by him during the month of October, 1955, all in the court of this very magistrate (P.W. 3) unless he had some sort of assurance of safe passage of the bill at so many stages through which it had to move before its actual encashment. The bill under the rules of the business and, in the very nature of things, would require a certificate of correctness from the magistrate before it could materialise. The appellant, therefore, must have either forged, on the bill, the signature of the magistrate or secured it in collusion with or by duping him. Unless he was adept in making perfect forgery, being a pleader himself of some standing, he would not dare do it, knowing that it had to be checked at so many stages. He may not be such an adept since the forgery in the signature of the magistrate on the subsequent bill for November was detected at the very first stage. The chance of obtaining on it the signature of the magistrate by duping him is too remote. For aught one can guess, as Mr. Nageshwar Prasad has contended, the magistrate might have knowingly lent his signature to the certificate of correctness of the bill for whatever reasons it might be; otherwise, it could not have escaped detection by the different clerks at the various stages, if it was not genuine. It was only subsequently when the falsity of the November bill came to notice that the magistrate, it is suggested, must have made some over-writings over his signature in the present bill to make it appear to be non-genuine. There, however, does not appear to be any clear over-writing in his signature, though, it is by no means, clear the ink being somewhat deep and slightly spread out, not looking quite natural. The signature, as it is, looks suspicious and should not have escaped detection in its present state on the earlier occasion and, therefore the possibility of Mr. Nageshwar Prasads contention cannot be ruled out completely. There is still another circumstance to strengthen it. The appellant had presented a similar false bill for the month of November only three days after encashment of the bill in question and it was brought to the notice of the magistrate, but he did not care to take any action against the appellant. On the other hand, as Phanibhusan Mandal, (P.W. 4) has said, the November bill was returned to the appellant under the direction of the magistrate, though the magistrate has denied that it was under his direction. On the other hand, as Phanibhusan Mandal, (P.W. 4) has said, the November bill was returned to the appellant under the direction of the magistrate, though the magistrate has denied that it was under his direction. The fact, however, remains that the magistrate was approached by the appellant for they return of the November bill; and the magistrate gave no order to his office to withhold the bill for necessary action and not to return it. This conduct of the magistrate raises a strong suspicion and the matter needs deeper scrutiny at the hands of the authority concerned. It may be that the appellant was in the habit of encashing forged bills in respect of cases relating to the court of this magistrate in collusion with him. It was only after the false bill of November was returned that the bill in question was brought to book, of course, at the instance of this very magistrate but fear of his own exposure as well could have prompted him to have it unearthed, I should emphasize a thorough probe into the whole matter. 19. So far, however, as the argument of Mr. Nageshwar Prasad is concerned, that, in case, the magistrates signature on the bill is genuine, there would be no offence of forgery in the sense of making a false document, it has no force. This can, at best, only render the magistrate as an accomplice, but that would not exonerate the appellant from the charge of making a false document which is so still for another reason. It is not in controversy at all that the appellant had not conducted any of the 34 cases which he had charged for in the bill and, in order to support his false claim, he had quoted in the bill, several authorities of the Deputy Commissioner purporting to appoint him for the conduct of those cases; but all such references were false and fictitious. He had admittedly signed the bill which bore all the false references of the Deputy Commissioners authority, no matter who wrote the body of the bill, although the evidence is that he had himself written the whole of it. He had admittedly signed the bill which bore all the false references of the Deputy Commissioners authority, no matter who wrote the body of the bill, although the evidence is that he had himself written the whole of it. The mere assertion of a false claim in a document under ones own signature may not constitute forgery in the sense of making a false document, but when such a false claim is sought to be supported by false and got up references with a dishonest intention to defraud any one as it was done in this case, it would surely amount to making of a false document within the meaning of Sec. 464 of the Indian Penal Code. My learned brother has elaborately dealt with the question; and I need not dilate upon it any more. 20. The charge of cheating is well founded; and, in fact, it was not controverted. Once it is established, as it has been established, that the appellant himself signed and presented the bill before the authority concerned and appended his signature to the receipt of the payment of money under it, it will be presumed, under the rules of official business, that payment had also been received by him personally or to his order. Apart from his presumption, there is also the evidence of independent and reliable witnesses to substantiate these points. 21. There is no room for the plea of want of mens rea. The appellant had not too many State bills to sign so as to plead want of personal knowledge of the contents of the bill. There were as many as 34 items in the bill. They were all false in that he had not appeared in any one of them. AH could not have escaped his notice, when he admittedly signed the bill himself. The act was surely intentional and deliberate and, indeed, so very daring. If it was really an honest mistake as he would feign now, he should have made a clean breast of the whole thing straightway, but he did nothing of the kind. On the other hand, he behaved like an ordinary litigant by denying everything except his signature on the bill. He denied even the receipt of the money and attributed everything to his clerk whom he even did not name. He was obviously conscious all the time of his guilty conscience. 22. On the other hand, he behaved like an ordinary litigant by denying everything except his signature on the bill. He denied even the receipt of the money and attributed everything to his clerk whom he even did not name. He was obviously conscious all the time of his guilty conscience. 22. I agree with my learned brother that the appellant does not deserve to be treated under the Probation of Offenders Act. He is a pleader of some standing, coming from a rich family and, on his own words, he had also a lucrative practice. These are exactly grounds why he deserves no compassion in the matter of sentence, like the one in penury, driven to criminality by the force by adverse circumstances. He had the honour to belong to the legal profession which is so noble and, instead of upholding and maintaining its glorious tradition, he has brought an infamy to it. To set an example to others of this type, if there be any, he deserved a more severe treatment and the sentence of only simple imprisonment was uncalled for.