JUDGMENT 1. A decree for pre-emption was passed in favour of Antoo Lal against one Lalli and others on 16-4-41. In execution of their decree the plaintiff wanted to take possession from the defendants Chhitarmal and others (respondents in this appeal) who were tenants in the suit house but it appears that they resisted the execution proceedings. Eventually, on 18-5-55 the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining possession through the Court. The present suit was then brought for recovery of mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 50 per month against the present respondents. This suit was instituted on 5-5-58. Among other grounds it was resisted as barred by time. This objection found favour with the learned trial Judge and the suit was dismissed on that preliminary ground. The plaintiff took an appeal but it has been dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Morena. Shri Gupta learned counsel for the appellant contends that the right to sue for mesne profits arose to the plaintiff only on 18-5-55, when he obtained physical possession from the defendants. He relies on Salmond's jurisprudence (Eleventh Edition) at Page 246 where it is stated:- "Since the action for mesne profits was just founded on the doctrine of trespass by relation it followed that the action would not lie until after the plaintiff had re-entered and recovered his possession of the land. But this requirement of re-entry as a condition precedent to an action for mesne profits is now abolished to this extent only that a claim for such profits may in all cases be joined for an action of ejectment." That statement is based on English law. No law or authority of our country has been cited to show that there is any impediment to the plaintiff bringing such a suit at a time when the defendants are wrongfully occupying the plaintiff's property as trespassers. I find myself in entire agreement with the observations in Chintilapati Vs. Gauva AIR 1961 AP 432 . "A plaintiff in order to successfully recover profits due to him from a person in unlawful possession must institute his suit within the prescribed period in order to escape the bar of limitation and cannot wait till his title is declared of confirmed by the trial Court or by the highest Court of appeal." 2. In Narayanjiwangouda Vs. "A plaintiff in order to successfully recover profits due to him from a person in unlawful possession must institute his suit within the prescribed period in order to escape the bar of limitation and cannot wait till his title is declared of confirmed by the trial Court or by the highest Court of appeal." 2. In Narayanjiwangouda Vs. Pullapai AIR 1945 PC 5, the contention that since the title of the contesting parties was involved in another suit it would be quite futile to institute a suit for possession till the successful termination of the earlier suit, was negatived and the Judicial Committee observed that the institution of a suit can never be said to be for tile if it would thereby terminate the running of limitation. 3. The starting point of limitation may not always synchronise with the cause of action; it generally does, but there may be cases where the starting point dates from some specific event which may be anterior or posterior to the accrual of the cause of action. The starting point of limitation has always to be determined from the schedule of the Limitation Act which is more or less arbitrary. 4. The contention that the plaintiff could not bring a suit for mesne profits so long as he did not actually recover physical possession is untenable. 5. This brings me to the question which article applies to this suit. Shri Gupta relies on Art. 120. The trial Judge applied Art. 109; the first appellate Court, Art. 115. Let it be mentioned that the learned counsel for the appellant has categorically stated before me that the plaintiff never treated the defendants as his tenants but consistently he has treated them as trespassers. 6. Article 115 does not apply to this case because the provisions contained in that Article are general and apply to all acts ex-contractu, not specially provided for otherwise. It is impossible to say that an action against a trespasser is ex-contractu. 7. In some decisions Art. 109 has been applied to such suits. 6. Article 115 does not apply to this case because the provisions contained in that Article are general and apply to all acts ex-contractu, not specially provided for otherwise. It is impossible to say that an action against a trespasser is ex-contractu. 7. In some decisions Art. 109 has been applied to such suits. It reads thus:- "For the profits of immovable property belonging to the plaintiff which have been wrongfully received by the defendant." It has been held that this Article contemplates suits for mesne profits against trespasser and the expression "which have been wrongfully received by the defendant" must be read in the light of section 2 (12) of the Code of Civil Procedure according to which mesne profits which the person in wrongful possession of suit property actually receives but also which he might with ordinary diligence have received there from. It seems to me that, literally construed, this Article would not apply unless the defendant has actually received the profits from a third person. This is further strengthened by the wording of the third column of this Article "when the profits are received." 8. In my opinion such a suit is clearly governed by Art. 39 which provides for suits "for compensation for trespass upon immovable property." The statute runs from the "date of the trespass". The last mentioned expression necessarily means every date on which the trespass continues. The construe otherwise would render the provision nugatory and meaningless. The word "date" in the third column cannot be restricted to that date on which the trespass commenced. In a case where trespass continues for seven years, it cannot be said that a suit for compensation for the later four years would always be barred by time because the starting point is the initial date on which trespass commenced. It seems clear to me that a suit for mesne profits will be within time for the entire period or trespass which falls within three years immediately preceding the suit, but not beyond three years. 9. In the result, the plaintiff is entitled to recover mesne profits accruing to him within three years immediately preceding 5-5-58. Since admittedly the plaintiff got possession of the suit property on 18-5-55, he is entitled to mesne profits only for 14 days that is from 5-5-55 to 18-5-55 (both days inclusive). 10. Shri Gupta relies on Mst. Sukh Devi Vs. In the result, the plaintiff is entitled to recover mesne profits accruing to him within three years immediately preceding 5-5-58. Since admittedly the plaintiff got possession of the suit property on 18-5-55, he is entitled to mesne profits only for 14 days that is from 5-5-55 to 18-5-55 (both days inclusive). 10. Shri Gupta relies on Mst. Sukh Devi Vs. Laxmi Narain AIR 1947 All. 31 where a distinction has been drawn between continuing in possession of property of which the possession commences lawfully and intruding upon property which was not previously in the possession of the intruder. In that case it was held that the defendant was not a trespasser and Art. 120 of the Limitation Act applied. There the defendant was a tenant and the landlord instituted a suit to recover compensation for the use and occupation of a shop which had been rented to the defendant. The learned Judge while distinguishing the decision in Ramasami Reedy Vs. Anthulal ILR 34 Mad. 502; observed: "The difficulty in estimating the value of this decision arises from the absence of any information as to the nature of the suit for ejectment. If that was a suit for ejectment and the defendant a trespasser, then one would naturally expect the suit for compensation for the period during which that suit was pending to be a suit to which Art. 39 would apply in preference to Art. 120" Having these observations in view I think this judgment lends support to my view rather than be in conflict with it. 11. Another case relied on by the learned counsel is Pratap Singh Vs. Ramdhandas AIR 1946 All. 447. That case too does not apply here, because there the suit was to recover compensation for use and occupation from an ex-tenant, who remained in possession after the determination of the tenancy without the consent of the landlord. Here the plaintiff never accepted the defendants to be his tenants. Moreover, nether Art. 39 nor 109 was taken into consideration by the learned Judge. 12. Another case relied on is Shri Mahadeoji Vs. Baldeo Prasad AIR 1941 Nag. 181. That case is not at all in point because there the suit was for the profits of property said to have been held on trust by the defendant, and provisions which were considered were S. 10, and Article 89, 109, and 120. 12. Another case relied on is Shri Mahadeoji Vs. Baldeo Prasad AIR 1941 Nag. 181. That case is not at all in point because there the suit was for the profits of property said to have been held on trust by the defendant, and provisions which were considered were S. 10, and Article 89, 109, and 120. Article 109 was held in-applicable because the receipt of the profits was not wrongful. The defendant was placed in rightful possession as an agent or manager and he rightfully received the profits in that capacity. It was not his receipt of them that was wrongful but it was his with-holding them after receipt. But that is not the case here. In that case Article 120 was applied because no other article was found applicable. 13. Leaned counsel has also cited the decision in Hassan Ali Vs. Dora Shah AIR 1949 Nagpur 282. But this decision seems to be quite off the point. The principle there laid down is that where a tenant continues in possession after the determination of the tenancy without the consent of the landlord, he is a tenant at sufferance and not one at will; and that he is no better than a trespasser. That decision helps the appellant in so far as he says that the defendants were trespassers but does not go beyond that. 14 Lastly, reliance is placed on Alla Dad Khan Vs. Qazi 1961 JLJ 1094, but there is nothing in that decision which can help the appellant on the question of limitation. Article 120 being a residuary Article, resort can be had to it only when no specific Article is found applicable. 15. As I have held that the plaintiff's suit is within limitation to the extent of 14 days only, I should send back this case to the trial Judge for assessing the rate of mesne profits to which the plaintiff is entitled. But this course becomes unnecessary because Shri Agrawal learned counsel for the respondents expresses his willingness to pay mesne profits for those 14 days at the rate of Rs. 50 per month, the rate claimed by the plaintiff. 16. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and decree of the first appellate Court are modified. A decree shall be passed in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 24 on account of mesne profits from 5-5-55 to 18-5-55. 50 per month, the rate claimed by the plaintiff. 16. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The judgment and decree of the first appellate Court are modified. A decree shall be passed in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 24 on account of mesne profits from 5-5-55 to 18-5-55. The rest of the plaintiff's suit is dismissed as barred by time. Parties shall bear their own costs throughout.