JUDGMENT 1. THE only point I have been called upon to decide in this appeal by the defendants from an appellate judgment and decree of affirmance dated September 22, 1955 is if the suit by the State of West Bengal (out of which the instant appeal arises) concerning 25'xl2' "side-land" of Grand Trunk Road is bound to fail in view of the National high Ways Act, 48 of 1956, come into force on April 15, 1957 and providing by its fourth section and schedule that grand Trunk Road, now a national high way, and land appurtenant thereto vest in the Union. 2. I was seized of just this point in another litigation: appeal from appellate decree No. 956 of 1956. Delivering judgment on January 30, 1962 refused to depart from the general rule: a court of appeal in considering the correctness of the judgment under appeal will confine itself to the state of the case at the time such judgment was rendered and will not take notice of anything which has arisen subsequently. I refused, because that would have prolonged the stay of a right-less one and prolonged injustice too instead of having sub-served the ends of justice. But I did not stop there. I held further that Order 22, rules 10 and 11 of "vide notification S. R. O. 1180, New delhi-2, the 4th April, 1957 the Procedure Code would be attracted, the case being one of statutory devolution of interest, and that no question could therefore arise of the lis being defeated. On the authority of a special bench decision of the Nagpore High Court: chhote Khan v. Mohammad Obedulla khan, (I) A. I. R. 1953 Nagpore 361, Mr. Roy appearing for the appellants, contends that the court is bound to take notice of the changed legal position as a result of the National Highways Act, 48 of 1956 (hereinafter referred to, for brevity's sake, as the Act ). He contends too that the Act creates "an altogether new right", "an independent right", in favour of the Union, wipes out the rights of the State of West bengal (the plaintiff respondent hereinafter referred to as the State) and makes the pending litigation (as here)by such a right less suitor liable to be dismissed. Mr. He contends too that the Act creates "an altogether new right", "an independent right", in favour of the Union, wipes out the rights of the State of West bengal (the plaintiff respondent hereinafter referred to as the State) and makes the pending litigation (as here)by such a right less suitor liable to be dismissed. Mr. Majumdar, appearing for the State, argues on the line of what i held in the other appeal and refers in particular to the absence of any provision in the Act about pending litigation. 3. I have considered the matter afresh irrespective of my previous decision, as I assured Mr. Roy, I would. But before I proceed further, the central fact of this litigation be emphasized. The appellants are trespassers as respects the land in controversy here appurtenant to Grand Trunk Road. Their trespass dates from June, 1945 or thereabout. That is the finding come to by both the courts a finding which has not been challenged and is incapable of being challenged either. 4. VMR. Roy states his proposition too broadly when he submits that the court is bound to take cognizance of every changed legal position. That will necessarily depend on what the changed position at law is. In the Nagpore case Mr. Roy relies on a law of expropriation, the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of proprietary Rights (Estates, mahals Alienated lands) Act, 1 of 1951, fell to be construed in the context of certain pending second appeals. By section 3 (1) thereof all proprietary rights (subject to certain exceptions which do not bulk large here) in an estate, mahal etc. pass on from such proprietor and vest in the State of Madhya Pradesh free of all in cumbrances. (The date when this vesting takes place is not relevant for the present purpose. Suffice it to note that such vesting receives effect during the pendency of the second appeals). By section 7 ibid the Deputy Commissioner takes charge of all lands so vested in the State of Madhya Pradesh. By section 50 ibid the Central Provinces land Revenue Act, 1917 is overridden. More, by virtue thereof every proprietor acting as lambardar etc. ceases to act as such and a patel appointed by the Deputy Commissioner for each village performs duties a lambardar used to do before vesting. So the ouster of a lambardar becomes complete. He ceases to exist. By section 50 ibid the Central Provinces land Revenue Act, 1917 is overridden. More, by virtue thereof every proprietor acting as lambardar etc. ceases to act as such and a patel appointed by the Deputy Commissioner for each village performs duties a lambardar used to do before vesting. So the ouster of a lambardar becomes complete. He ceases to exist. In this background the suits brought by lambardars for ejectment of the transferees under section 188 (2) (b)and (d) of the Central Provinces Land revenue Act, 1917, and decreed by the lower appellate court, reach the stage of second appeals in the High Court. 5. WHEN the appeals are taken up for hearing, the law of expropriation noticed already holds the field overriding the Land Revenue Act protanto. Once it is heldand two of the three Judges constituting the special bench did hold sothat a lambardar is extinct being forbidden by the law (section 50) to act as such, the court must necessarily be bound to take notice of the changed law. A lambardar ceasing to exist and being under prohibition to act as such, his lis, pend though it may, cannot exist either. 6. THIS is what I take to be the reason of the decision of Sinha, C. J. and mudholkar, J. (as their Lordships then were) of the Nagpore High Court in chhote Khan's case supra. The dissentient judgment of. Hidayatullah, J. of the same Court (as his Lordship then was) supports the view I took on january 30, 1962if I may say so with the greatest respect. It appears to be worthy of note that a bench decision of this Court in Lalji Agarwalla Jain v. Jhingu Goala (2). 61. C. W. N. 607, Mr. Majumdar cites, over-rules a preliminary objection that an appeal by one whose estate vested in the State under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1 of 1954, is incompetent. The compensation the appellant will be entitled to as the result of the appeal renders such an appeal competent. Mr. Roy seeks to distinguish it because of this "economic contents", as he calls it. But 'economic contents' in the shape of compensation are very much present in the Nagpore case as well: section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Act). Be that as it may, Chhote Khan's case can hardly avail the appellants before me. Confining myself now to Mr. Mr. Roy seeks to distinguish it because of this "economic contents", as he calls it. But 'economic contents' in the shape of compensation are very much present in the Nagpore case as well: section 8 of the Madhya Pradesh Act). Be that as it may, Chhote Khan's case can hardly avail the appellants before me. Confining myself now to Mr. Roy's contention that I am bound to take notice of the Act, all I say is that even going by the majority view I am under no obligation to do so. The act and the Madhya Pradesh Act are not statutes pari materia. One simply provides that certain highways be declared national highways and that they do vest in the Union with a view to helping the Central Government "in exercising its powers with respect to the development and maintenance of the highways more effectively" vide the "statement of Objects and reasons" published in the Gazette of India, 1956, extra-ordinary, part II section 2, page 661. The other provides for abolition of proprietary or intermediate interests in land between the State of Madhya Pradesh at the top and the actual tiller of the soil at the bottom. One makes for better management of certain highways declared national highways concentrating power in one and only one agency, to wit, the Central Government. The other expropriates proprietary rights which vest in the State of Madhya pradesh "as the ultimate owner of all property situate within its boundaries", as Sinha, C. J. puts it in Chhote Khan's case at page 371 of the report (A. I. R. 1953 Nagpore 361). Thus, the outlook in one is completely different from that in the other. If I do not take notice of the legal position changed by the Act, I do not see any injustice anywhere. On the contrary, if I do notice the change and non-suit the State, as Mr. Roy asks me to do, I work out the greatest injustice by putting a premium on gate-crashing. 7. THE Madhya Pradesh Act having been construed in the manner it was by sinha, C. J. and Mudholkar, J. not taking notice of the changed law would have meant recognition of the rights of the Lambardars, though they were completely wiped out and rights they had none at the time the second appeals were heard, patels having completely ousted them at law and in fact. Thus, even on the basis of the majority decision in Chhote Khan's case (not to speak of other cases Mr. Majumdar refers tocases all of which I do not consider it necessary to review) it cannot be held that I must take notice of the Act. And there are so many authorities on this point. Lachmeshwar Prasad shukul and others v. Keshwar Lal chaudhuri and others (3) A. I. R. 1941 federal Court 5, referred to in Chhote khan's case supra is one such. Gwyer, c. J. does not deliver a judgment of his own, as his Lordship finds himself "entirely in agreement with the judgment to be delivered by brother varadachariar", but quotes a striking passage from a decision of the Supreme court of United State in Patterson v. State of Alabama (4) [1934] 294 U. S. 600, a passage "which commends itself to all three members of this Court" "we have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered. 8. SO the test is that what justice requires. Lachmeswar's case satisfied this test. Section 7 of the new Bihar money-Lenders Act of 1930, enacted during the pendency of the appeal before the Federal Court, and providing that 'no court shall pass a decree etc. applied in terms to appeals in suits brought before the commencement of the Act. Not to take notice of such a change is to flout the mandate of the law and to exercise a dispensing power making for injustice; all the more so, when "the hearing of an appeal is under the processual law in the nature of a re-hearing" in which the court of appeal is there to mould the relief to lie granted in the changed circumstances. Another such authority is K. C. Mukherjee v. Mt. Another such authority is K. C. Mukherjee v. Mt. Ramratan Kuer, (5)A. I. R. 1936 P. C. 49, where the transfer of a non-transferable occupancy holding on September 28, 1916 (tabooed under the then law) could not be struck down on November 12, 1935 when the Judicial Committee decided the appeal) only because of the supervening new law (the Bihar Tenancy Amendment Act, 1934) come into force on June 10, 1935which by its section 26 (N) provided for a legal faction making a presumption of consent by the landlord to all transfers before January 1, 1923 "absolute and irrefutable" For a court of law to keep its eves shut to such a change is to refuse to mete out justice under the law by which it is bound. So the test of what justice requires comes back again. 9. STILL another authority is Rai charon Mandal v. Biswa Nath Mandal, (6) 20 C. L. J. 107: A. I. R 1915 Calcutta 103, where failed an attempt to non suit the plaintiffs whose interests in the property claimed were sold pendent elite in execution of a decree for arrears of rents and where it was said: ". . . . . . . . . . a suit must be tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed at the date of its commencement. This is in accord with the observation of lord Kings down in Anundmoyee v. Sheeb Chunder (7) [ (1907) 7 c. L. J. 262] that in appeal the question is whether the decision of the primary court is correct on the facts as they stood when the judgment was rendered, and that no subsequent event or devolution of interest can affect that question, because to give effect to them, should justice require it, would be the office not of an appeal but of some supplementary proceeding". 10. THIS, then, is the ordinary rule which admits of exceptions: ". . . . . . . . . . a Court may take notice of events which have happened since the institution of the suit and afford relief to parties on the basis of the altered conditions. 10. THIS, then, is the ordinary rule which admits of exceptions: ". . . . . . . . . . a Court may take notice of events which have happened since the institution of the suit and afford relief to parties on the basis of the altered conditions. This doctrine is of an exceptional character and is applied in cases where it is shown that the original relief claimed has, by reason of subsequent change of circumstances, become inappropriate, or, that it is necessary to base the decision of the Court on the altered circumstances in order ho shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties. " I need not cite authorities any further. They are so well-known ranging from Ram Ratan Sahu v. Mohant Sahu (8) 6 C. L. J. 74 to surinder Kumar v. Gian Chand (9)1958, S. C. A. 412. The principles laid down are the same. The cardinal rule is that a court of appeal in considering the correctness of the judgment of the court below will confine itself to the state of the case at the time such judgment was rendered. Only in exceptional cases the court of appeal will depart from this rule especially where, by so doing, it can shorten litigation and best sub-serve the ends of justice. To this may be added another class of exceptions where the supervening new law makes it incumbent upon the court of appeal to take note of what it prescribes, either by retrospective action or by other suitable directives. Can this litigation be brought under any one of the exceptions? If the Union has to sue the appellants over again, that will not shorten litigation but lengthen it all the more. And that in turn will sub-serve not the ends of justice but the ends of injustice by pampering the trespassers, the appellants are. The mandate of the Act, the new supervening law of this litigation, is silent about litigation that pends (as this one) and does not override the existing law such as Order 22, rules 10 and 11 of the Procedure Code. All it says is that from April 15, 1957 the land in controversy vests in the Union. Let it. The Act does not say that the state shall not continue a pending litigation (like the one I am, seized of) subject to other laws. All it says is that from April 15, 1957 the land in controversy vests in the Union. Let it. The Act does not say that the state shall not continue a pending litigation (like the one I am, seized of) subject to other laws. The Madhya pradesh Act says in a manner, to a jambardar: get you out making overcharge to the patel and do not act qua lambardar in any manner whatever. 11. THUS, to say, as Mr. Roy case, that the state cannot continue this litigation the result of which will bind the Union is to say something the Act does not speak about. So startling a conclusion will need clear and precise words to that end in the Act itself. Thus I find little in the Act which compels me to take notice of it and far less to mould the relief to be granted to the parties here. I therefore confine myself to the state of the case at the time the judgments under appeal were rendered and refuse to take notice of the Act which, whatever it does, does not bless the trespassers which the appellants undoubtedly are On this consideration alone, the appeal is hound to fail. I shall now assume that the conclusion I have just reached is wrong and that I am bound to take notice of the Act. What though that is so? To my thinking, the Act provides for a statutory devolution, pure and simple. Before the Act, Grand Trunk Road with land appurtenant thereto vested in the State and other local bodies. Prom April 15, 1957 all this vested in the union by operation of law. If this is not devolution, I do not know what devolution is. Chhote Khan's case (supra) (Mr. Roy relies upon) can have no manner of application here for reasons set out already. On the other hand, reference may be made to Karka somula v. Reddy Appalanaidu (10) A. I. R. 1958 Andhra Pradesh 507, (Mr. Majumder cites) where Subba Rao, C. J. (as his Lordship then was) and Chetty, j. find in the vesting provided for by the Madras Estates Abolition Act nothing but a statutory transferan assignment or devolution within the meaning of Order 22, rule 10 of the Procedure Code. New rights are created no doubt in favour of the Union, as Mr. Roy contends. New rights are created no doubt in favour of the Union, as Mr. Roy contends. But such rights are created so by statutory devolution or, say assignment which Mr. Roy will not concede. And there I differ from him, with respect. Rights do not exist in vacuo. Rights which vested in the state vested in the Union, by operation of the Act. That is how I read the act. Once it is read so, statutory devolution or assignment is there for all to see. And Order 22, rules 10 and 11 of the Procedure Code call attention. 12. IT is then within the competence of the state, the statutory assignor, is bound by the result of the appeal, even though the Union has not applied to be substituted in place of the State. Mr. Roy emphasizes the lis pendens aspect of order 22, rule 10. But the Union is without doubt, a statutory assignee pendent elite. I therefore, see no infirmity which can stand between the state and the success it has earned in both the Courts. In the result the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent has been asked for. It is allowed.