JUDGMENT M.C. Desai, C. J. - This is an appeal from a judgment of Tandon, J. quashing by certiorari an order of a Rent Control and Eviction Officer, exercising the powers of a District Magistrate under the Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act, directing respondent No. 3 to let out the front portion of the ground floor of a building known as "Aditya Bhavan," owned by her, to the appellant. Aditya Bhavan is a double-storeyed building; respondent No. 3 is in occupation of the upper story and she had let out the ground floor to one Dr. Hukku on monthly rent of Rs. 68-12-0. Dr. Hukku used to run a clinic in the front portion of the ground floor under the name of Hindu Muslim Pharmacy and used the back portion for accommodation of his patients. He died in February, 1954, and the clinic was inherited by his sister and heir Srimati Brij Pati Kaul respondent No. 2, who obtained possession over the entire ground floor. She commenced to reside in the back portion and reserved the front portion for use as a clinic to be run in the name of her brother. She entered into a partnership with the appellant under a deed dated October 1, 1954. Under its terms the partnership was to run a pharmacy known as "Dr. Hukku's clinic and pharmacy" in the front portion, the appellant was to attend to the pharmacy every morning and evening and make available his professional services to the patients and the partnership was to pay the entire rent of the ground floor Rs. 68-12-0 per month to respondent No. 2. The deed further provided that on the partnership being dissolved the goodwill of the partnership would be sold to the partner who offered a higher amount and that the purchaser of the goodwill would run the pharmacy in the same name and would pay rent for the front portion direct to respondent No. 3 after settling the amount with her. 2. The partnership continued in force till August 16, 1958, when respondent No. 2 served a notice upon the appellant for its dissolution. On 6-9-1958 she filed a suit for dissolution and rendition of accounts. The appellant, however, continued to be in occupation of the front portion and started his own clinic in the name "Dr. 2. The partnership continued in force till August 16, 1958, when respondent No. 2 served a notice upon the appellant for its dissolution. On 6-9-1958 she filed a suit for dissolution and rendition of accounts. The appellant, however, continued to be in occupation of the front portion and started his own clinic in the name "Dr. A. C. Das's clinic." He entered into a partnership with his own wife for running the clinic and she applied to the District Magistrate for allotment of the front portion to her, but her application was rejected on the ground of no vacancy, respondent No. 2 being in occupation of the back portion and the appellant, of the front portion. Later the appellant himself applied for the front portion to be allotted to him and on May 30, 1959, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer granted his application and on June 1, 1959, he issued an order, now quashed by Tandon, J. through his order under appeal directing respondent No. 3 to let out the front portion to the appellant and the back portion to respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2, aggrieved by this order in respect of the front portion, applied for certiorari for the quashing of it. The gist of the case set up by her was as follows :- In the suit brought by respondent No. 2 for dissolution of the partnership a receiver had been appointed by the civil court to take possession over the front portion and the effect of the impugned order was to interfere with the civil suit and to set at nought the civil court's order of appointment of a receiver. The ground floor was all the time in possession of respondent No. 2 and never fell vacant and was not likely to fall vacant. Respondent No. 2 was a tenant of the entire ground floor and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to split it into two portions and direct respondent No. 3 to let out one to one party and the other, to the appellant. The order of allotment was obtained by the appellant through misrepresentations and in collusion with respondent No. 3. The order of allotment was obtained by the appellant through misrepresentations and in collusion with respondent No. 3. Respondent No. 2 did not press before Tandon, J. the contentions that the impugned order was likely to interfere with the civil suit and was obtained by the appellant through misrepresentations and fraud, and they have not been pressed before us. The grounds on which she assailed the impugned order were mainly that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to pass it because there was no vacancy and that he could not split up the tenancy of respondent No. 2 into two parts. The learned Judge held that the tenancy rights of Dr. Hukku passed on, on his death, to his heir respondent No. 2 and consequently there was no vacancy of the accommodation on his death and that no vacancy was brought about by the deed of partnership or by the dissolution of the partnership or by the subsequent payment to respondent No. 3 of rents of the two portions of the ground floor separately by respondent No. 2 and the appellant. Merely because he found that the tenancy created in favour of Dr. Hukku had never been terminated, he held that the accommodation never fell vacant and that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. The appellant has preferred this appeal against the aforesaid order. 3. The question before us is whether the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had jurisdiction to pass an order under Sec. 7(2) directing the proprietor, respondent No. 3, to let out the front portion of the ground floor to the appellant. By sub-sec. (1) of Section 7 every landlord is required to give notice to the District Magistrate of an accommodation becoming vacant by his ceasing to occupy it, or by his tenant's vacating it, or otherwise ceasing to occupy it, or by termination of his tenancy, or by release from requisitioning, or in any other manner whatsoever. By sub-sec. (2) the District Magistrate is authorised to require a landlord to let, or not to let, to any person any accommodation which is, or has fallen, or is about to fall, vacant. By sub-sec. (2) the District Magistrate is authorised to require a landlord to let, or not to let, to any person any accommodation which is, or has fallen, or is about to fall, vacant. "Accommodation" is defined in Section 2 to mean "residential and non-residential accommodation in any building or part of a building," and to include gardens, grounds and out-houses, furniture and fittings, and "vacant" is defined to include "an accommodation about to fall vacant, an intimation whereof has been sent by the landlord or the tenant to the District Magistrate." Neither of these two definitions is a definition in the real sense. They do not explain what is meant by "accommodation" and by "vacancy," but simply lay down what is included in their (ordinary) meanings. It has been left to the court to ascertain what are their ordinary meanings. "Accommodation" as used in the Act is not synonymous with building; a whole building may be one accommodation or more accommodations. When a part of a building is an accommodation, it follows that another part of it may be another accommodation. What is meant by "accommodation" is an exclusive occupation whether in the whole of a building or in a part of it, by a person with his licensees, such as members of his family, other relations, guests and servants. If an owner of a building occupies the whole of it, the whole is an accommodation. If two owners jointly owning a building occupy separate portions of it, each portion becomes an accommodation. If an owner himself occupies part of a building and lets out the other part to a tenant, he and the tenant are each in possession of an accommodation. If a building owned by a person is let out to two different tenants, occupying different portions of it, each portion is an accommodation. If a tenant of a building sublets a portion of it, the portion retained by him in his occupation is one accommodation and the portion sublet, another accommodation. If a building consists of several shops which are let out separately, each shop is an accommodation. Thus, every portion of a building occupied by the proprietor and every portion let out to a tenant and every portion sublet to a sub-tenant is an accommodation. 4. The jurisdiction of a District Magistrate to pass an order under sub-sec. If a building consists of several shops which are let out separately, each shop is an accommodation. Thus, every portion of a building occupied by the proprietor and every portion let out to a tenant and every portion sublet to a sub-tenant is an accommodation. 4. The jurisdiction of a District Magistrate to pass an order under sub-sec. (2), which may, for the sake of convenience, be called an `allotment order' exists only in respect of an accommodation that is vacant or is about to fall vacant. An accommodation may fall vacant in different ways. Some of the ways are specified in sub-sec. (1), but it applies in all cases of vacancies, no matter how they arise. Sub-Sec. (2) is general and equally applies in all cases of vacancies, however they arise. If an accommodation is vacant within the meaning of sub-sec. (1), it is vacant within the meaning of Sub-Sec. (2). 5. When a landlord, who was occupying an accommodation stops occupying it and leaves it unoccupied or vacant, or stops occupying it and lets it out to a tenant, it is a case of its falling vacant. When he stops occupying only a portion of it, and either leaves it vacant or lets it out to a tenant, again there is a case of an accommodation falling vacant, though this time the accommodation of a portion of the previous accommodation. Any portion of a building previously in his occupation that becomes vacant by his ceasing to occupy it, whether he lets it remain vacant or lets it out to a tenant, becomes a new accommodation; now the building has two accommodations, one consisting of the portion left in his occupation and other, of the portion left vacant or let out to a tenant. When a building has several accommodations, each in the occupation of a different person, and one of them ceases to occupy it, it is only that accommodation that is said to fall vacant. When a tenant in occupation of an accommodation stops occupying it, it is a case of the accommodation falling vacant. When a building has several accommodations, each in the occupation of a different person, and one of them ceases to occupy it, it is only that accommodation that is said to fall vacant. When a tenant in occupation of an accommodation stops occupying it, it is a case of the accommodation falling vacant. If he stops occupying a portion of the accommodation, i.e. a portion of the tenement, it is the case of the portion of the accommodation falling vacant and the portion is to be treated as an accommodation within the meaning of the Act; Sec. 7 will apply to it and the District Magistrate will have jurisdiction to pass an allotment order in respect of it. The moment the occupant stops occupying the accommodation (or a portion of it), the accommodation (or the portion) is said to fall vacant regardless of what happens subsequently. It is evident that when ceasing to occupy itself amounts to vacating the accommodation, it is a case of the accommodation falling vacant regardless of whether it is left vacant or is let out to a tenant or to a sub-tenant. Ordinarily the entry into occupation by another person whether as a tenant or as a subtenant will follow the exit from occupation of the landlord or the tenant; unless there is an exit by the landlord or the tenant, there cannot be an entry by another person. Every act of letting (or subletting) thus amounts to the landlord's (or the tenant's) vacating the accommodation by ceasing to occupy it. It is as much an act of vacating it as it would be when he simply abandons it leaving it vacant. Abandonment does not lead to the termination of tenancy rights under the Transfer of Property Act as it does under the revenue laws, but the Rent Control Act treats abandonment of a tenement by the tenant as a case of vacancy. Termination of a tenancy in any of the manners laid down in Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act is not enough to justify a District Magistrate's passing an allotment order in respect of it; the accommodation must be vacant. What is essential is that it must be vacant; termination of the tenancy is only one of the ways in which it can become vacant. What is essential is that it must be vacant; termination of the tenancy is only one of the ways in which it can become vacant. There is no restriction on a landlord's right to terminate a tenancy by notice to quit; what he cannot do under the Act is to sue the tenant except when certain circumstances exist; vide Rati Ram v. Mithan Lal., 1960 ALJ 134. If those circumstances do not exist, a landlord cannot file a suit for ejectment of a tenant even though his tenancy has been terminated and consequently the accommodation in his occupation cannot be said to be vacant. In Lachmi Narain v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1962 ALJ 213 this Court held that there is no vacancy within the meaning of Section 7 even when a landlord files a suit for the tenant's ejectment and obtains a decree but does not execute it. In Karta Chand v. Mahesh Prasad, Spl. A. No. 422 of 1960. D/d. 22.11.1961, a bench of this Court held that there can be vacancy by the tenant's ceasing to occupy the accommodation even if his tenancy is not terminated. 6. "Landlord" and "tenant" are defined in the Act to mean persons to whom, and by whom, rent is payable in respect of an accommodation. When a tenant sublets an accommodation, he becomes a landlord of his sub-tenant. A sub-tenant is included in the definition of "tennat" because rent is payable by him for the accommodation; the tenant, whose sub-tenant he is, is his landlord because rent is payable to him, see Ram Bharose v. Ajeet Kumar, AIR 1952 Allahabad 806 : 1952 ALJ 280. Therefore, Sec. 7 applies also when a sub-tenant vacates the accommodation sublet to him by ceasing to occupy it or in any other manner, and the District Magistrate gets a right to pass an allotment order in respect of it. When a sub-tenant ceases to occupy the accommodation sublet to him, the accommodation is vacant whether the tenant-in-chief has regained occupation or put in another person as a subtenant or left it vacant. When a sub-tenant ceases to occupy the accommodation sublet to him, the accommodation is vacant whether the tenant-in-chief has regained occupation or put in another person as a subtenant or left it vacant. There is, however, this important distinction between a case in which the landlord is the owner of the accommodation and a case in which the landlord is a tenant of the accommodation, and it is that in the former case the allotment order should be addressed by the District Magistrate to the owner and in the latter case to the tenant. It is the landlord who is to be required to let out the accommodation and whosoever is the landlord for the purposes of Section 7 i.e. of the accommodation that has fallen or is about to fall vacant is the person to be so ordered. When the owner of an accommodation ceases to occupy it, he is the person to be ordered. If he has let it out to a tenant and the tenant vacates it, it is again he e.g. the owner who is to be ordered. If a tenant vacates it by surrender or abandonment, it is again he who is to be ordered. But if his tenant vacates it by ceasing to occupy it without intending to abandon or surrender his tenancy rights, it may he that the latter is the person to be ordered. The Act does not repeal the Transfer of Property Act and affects the rights and liabilities of landlords and tenants only to the extent expressed in its provisions. It contains no provision laying down that a tenant loses his tenancy rights merely by ceasing to occupy the tenement. As we said earlier, a tenant remains liable to the landlord under the Transfer of Property Act even if he abandons the tenement or ceases to occupy it and though the Temporary Control of Rent and Eviction Act empowers a District Magistrate to issue an allotment order to the landlord on the tenant's vacating the tenement by ceasing to occupy it, it does not expressly terminate his tenancy rights. When the tenant by vacating the tenement indicates that he severs all connections with it, i.e. abandons his tenancy rights, there may be justification for interpreting Section 7 as empowering the District Magistrate to issue an order to the owner to let out the tenement to another person, but not when he vacates in such a manner as to suggest that he intends to keep alive his tenancy rights, as for example when he puts in another person as his representative or as his sub-tenant. When he does rot abandon the tenancy and there is nothing to suggest that he gives up his tenancy rights, in the absence of a provision in the Act giving to his act the legal effect of loss of his tenancy rights, it should not be held that he has lost his tenancy rights and the District Magistrate should not have the power of directing the owner to let out tenement to another tenant. Instead he should treat the vacating tenant as the landlord and issue an order to him to sublet the tenement to a particular person or not to sublet it. Therefore, when a tenant wants to sub-let the accommodation, he should in-form the District Magistrate as required by Sec. 7(1) (a) and the District Magistrate would have jurisdiction under sub-sec. (2) to pass an order directing him to sublet or not to sublet. In such a case a District Magistrate would have no jurisdiction to order the owner of the accommodation to let or not to let. As the Act contains no provision divesting the tenant of his tenancy rights merely on account of his ceasing to occupy the tenement, the owner cannot be asked to let out the accommodation to another tenant. No landlord who has lawfully let out an accommodation can be compelled by District Magistrate to let it out to another person. See Krishna Chandra v. Maman, Special Appeal No. 35 of 1959. D/d. 22.12.1961 by the Lucknow Bench. 7. Sec. 7 contains a comprehensive provision applicable to an accommodation not only when the owner is the landlord but also when a tenant is the landlord and not only when the owner vacated by ceasing to occupy it but also when the tenant vacates by ceasing to occupy it. D/d. 22.12.1961 by the Lucknow Bench. 7. Sec. 7 contains a comprehensive provision applicable to an accommodation not only when the owner is the landlord but also when a tenant is the landlord and not only when the owner vacated by ceasing to occupy it but also when the tenant vacates by ceasing to occupy it. When the tenant vacates by subletting it, it may be said that the allotment order should be addressed to the landlord because his tenant has vacated the accommodation but it may also be said that it should be addressed to the tenant (as landlord qua his sub-tenant) because the accommodation has fallen vacant by his ceasing to occupy it. When he sublets, or is about to sublet, he becomes landlord within the meaning of Section 7 and an allotment order can be addressed to him. An allotment order cannot be addressed both to the owner and the tenant and clearly the legislature did not intend that both should be treated as landlords within the meaning of Sec. 7. Only one of them can be treated as the landlord and which of them is to be treated as the landlord should depend upon the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Under the Transfer of Property Act the owner cannot let out the accommodation after he has already lawfully let it out to another person; therefore, it does not permit the owner's being treated as the landlord. Clearly it is the tenant, who ceases to occupy the accommodation in order to sublet it, who is to be restricted by means of an allotment order. The District Magistrate has no power to take away his tenancy rights and, therefore, all that he can do is to restrict his right of subletting by ordering him to sublet or not to sublet. 8. When a sub-tenant vacates the accommodation by ceasing to occupy it or in any other manner, the position is exactly the same as when the tenant vacates the accommodation by ceasing to occupy it; it depends upon the sub-tenant's intention. If his intention is to abandon the sub-tenancy and sever all connections with the accommodation, his lessor, that is the tenant, is to be treated as the landlord and to be ordered to sublet or not to sublet. If his intention is to abandon the sub-tenancy and sever all connections with the accommodation, his lessor, that is the tenant, is to be treated as the landlord and to be ordered to sublet or not to sublet. If his intention is to retain his sub-tenancy rights and puts in another person as his own sub-tenant, he would then be the landlord within the meaning of Section 7 and he would be liable to be ordered by the District Magistrate to sublet further or not to sublet further. 9. We do not agree with the contention that the Act does not treat sub-letting as vacating. The basis for the contention was that the Act permits a landlord to evict the tenant for his act of subletting. The tenant certainly remains tenant when he sublets; he does not thereby lose his tenancy rights. But it is quite a different thing to say that he has not vacated the accommodation by ceasing to occupy it. As we explained just above, he is now to be treated as landlord for the purposes of Sec. 7. Just as an owner, when he ceases to occupy an accommodation, does not thereby lose his proprietary rights and can yet be ordered to let out, so also a tenant when he ceases to occupy the accommodation with an intention to sublet can be ordered to sublet to a particular person without his tenancy rights being affected at all. 10. It is well settled that a District Magistrate acting under Sec. 7(2) has jurisdiction to pass an allotment order in respect of the whole of the accommodation that has fallen, or is about to fall, vacant and has no jurisdiction whatsoever to split it up into two or more portions and pass two or more allotment orders, one in respect of each. Whatever is the accommodation that falls vacant must be dealt with in its entirety by the District Magistrate. See N. C. Agarwal v. Krishan Lal, 1960 ALJ 755 (F.B.) and Sri Krishan Lal v. The District Magistrate etc., 1957 ALJ 830. We have explained that the District Magistrate has jurisdiction over whatever is the accommodation that falls vacant. If a portion of an accommodation falls vacant, it itself becomes accommodation subject to his jurisdiction and he is competent to pass an order in respect of it. We have explained that the District Magistrate has jurisdiction over whatever is the accommodation that falls vacant. If a portion of an accommodation falls vacant, it itself becomes accommodation subject to his jurisdiction and he is competent to pass an order in respect of it. Whatever portion falls vacant is the accommodation within the meaning of Sec. 7. It is always open to a landlord or a tenant or a sub-tenant to vacate by ceasing to occupy a portion of his accommodation or tenement and in such a case the District Magistrate acquires jurisdiction to pass an allotment order in respect of the portion vacated. There is nothing contrary to be found in Sri Badri Prasad v. The District Magistrate, 1952 ALJ 213. What was decided there is that unless an accommodation falls vacant in its entirety no allotment order can be passed. It was a case in which an accommodation was to fall vacant in its entirety but an allotment order was passed when the occupant vacated only a portion of it. He intended to vacate the whole and, therefore, his vacating a portion of it was not to be treated as a vacancy for the purpose of the District Magistrate's passing an allotment order. The occupant did not want to split up the accommodation into two portions by vacating one. Such a case is different from a case in which an occupant splits up an accommodation into two portions intending to vacate one and to retain the other in his occupation. 11. The occupant did not want to split up the accommodation into two portions by vacating one. Such a case is different from a case in which an occupant splits up an accommodation into two portions intending to vacate one and to retain the other in his occupation. 11. Among the rules made by the State Government in exercise of the powers conferred under the Act are R. 3 laying down that the District Magistrate "shall make an allotment order within thirty days of the receipt of the intimation sent by the landlord under Sec. 7(1) (a)": R. 6 laying down that a District Magistrate may permit a landlord to occupy the accommodation that has fallen vacant if it is bona fide needed by him for his own occupation, and R. 7 laying down that "where a portion of accommodation falls vacant and the owner is in occupation of another portion thereof, the District Magistrate shall, before making the allotment order consult the owner and shall so far as possible make the allotment in accordance with the wishes of the owner." Sec. 7 does not fix the time within which the District Magistrate should pass an allotment order on receiving intimation from the landlord about the accommodation falling vacant; surely the legislature did not contemplate that the landlord should wait indefinitely For an allotment order and in the meanwhile loss of rent. It cannot be disputed that the State Government had the power to make R. 3 in order to give effect to the purposes of the Act. In the circumstances the limit of thirty days fixed under the rule cannot be said to be merely directory and must be treated as depriving the District Magistrate of any power to make suo moto an allotment order after its expiry. When no time for doing an act is fixed by a statute, the law always presumes reasonable time is robbed of its legality and force. The limit of thirty days fixed under R. 3 is by no means unreasonable and an order which would be held to be illegal on account of its having been made after reasonable time had elapsed cannot be held to be valid if it was made after the expiry of thirty days of the receipt of the intimation and no question of the rule being directory or mandatory would arise. A contrary view, however, was taken in Ram Autar v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1959 ALJ 8 and it would require reconsideration but not in this case. R. 6 is redundant; it does not confer any right upon the landlord or upon the District Magistrate and does not impose any duty upon the District Magistrate. Full discretion has already been conferred by Sec. 7(2) upon the District Magistrate to pass any kind of allotment order or to refrain from passing an allotment order. He has full jurisdiction, when he wants the landlord himself to occupy the accommodation, either to refrain from passing an allotment order or to pass an order that he should not let it to any one. R. 6 adds nothing to the power already conferred upon the District Magistrate In connection with R. 7 two things are to be noted, (1) that it comes into application when a portion of an accommodation falls vacant and (2) that, another portion of it is in occupation of the owner (and not the landlord). The owner can be in occupation of one portion of an accommodation, another of which falls when the owner was previously in occupation of the whole accommodation. Unless the owner was himself in occupation of the whole accommodation one cannot speak of a portion of the accommodation falling vacant and the other being in occupation. If before the vacancy in question there were two accommodations, one in occupation of the owner and the other in occupation of any other person, either an owner or a tenant or a sub-tenant, and one of them falls vacant, it cannot be said, to be a case of s portion of an accommodation falling vacant. There is no reference to the buildings at all in this rule and there is no justification whatsoever for assuming that it was meant to apply in a case of two accommodations in a building, one in the occupation of the owner and the other falling vacant. There cannot be a portion of an accommodation falling vacant unless first just previously the entire accommodation was one accommodation. We have explained that the Act deals with accommodations in their entirely, there is no provision relating to a portion of an accommodation. There are certain provisions which deal with tenements, i.e., accommodations in the possession of tenants, such as Secs. 3 and 5. We have explained that the Act deals with accommodations in their entirely, there is no provision relating to a portion of an accommodation. There are certain provisions which deal with tenements, i.e., accommodations in the possession of tenants, such as Secs. 3 and 5. There are other sections which deal with accommodations that fall vacant, the portion itself is deemed to be accommodation within the meaning of Sec. 7. When the whole of an accommodation falls vacant, it cannot be said to be a portion of a building. R. 7 applies when a portion of an accommodation falls vacant and not when a portion of a building falls vacant. Consequently, when there exist two or more accommodations in a building and one of them falls vacant, R. 7 has ever been so interpreted as to be applicable when one shop in a building containing several shops, one of which is in the occupation of the owner, falls vacant. R. 8 applies only when a landlord desires to let out a portion of which was not let out a potion of an accommodation, any portion of which was not let out previously; it has no application in the instant case because the whole of the ground floor had been let out previously. 12. In Brij Kishore v. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer, 1954 ALJ 172 Raghubar Dayal and V. Bhargava, JJ. held that the vacancy of an accommodation referred to in Sec. 7(1) (a), as it stood when the Act was enacted, means the vacancy of the entire accommodation in the tenancy of a person and does not refer to the tenants not using, for the time being a portion of the accommodation, and that, if a tenant vacates a portion of the accommodation and lets it out to another, the latter becomes a sub-tenant and not a tenant of the owner. The provision considered by the learned Judges is different from the provision now existing in Sec. 7(1), which makes very clear that a vacancy may arise not only when a landlord ceases to occupy but also when a tenant ceases to occupy. The provision considered by the learned Judges is different from the provision now existing in Sec. 7(1), which makes very clear that a vacancy may arise not only when a landlord ceases to occupy but also when a tenant ceases to occupy. The learned Judges further observed that "the disuse by a tenant of a portion of the accommodation let to him does not amount to the tenant's vacating that portion"; vacating a portion and sub-letting it to another person cannot stand on the same footing as mere disuse. Disuse may not mean vacancy but subletting does. We may also refer to Sangam Lal Jaiswal v. Commissioner Varanasi, 1961 ALJ 36 in which Kailash Prasad, J. observed that "vacancy arises when a tenant ceases to occupy the accommodation with the intention of not coming back to it again, that mere withdrawal from the accommodation is not vacation, that, if a tenant puts in possession a licensee, a subtenant or any other representative, he cannot be said to have vacated the accommodation and that vacancy involves the idea of determination of the tenant's interest. The interpretation of the provision in the old Sec. 7.(1) is of no assistance in interpreting the existing provision. A tenant's putting a sub-tenant in occupation is as much a vacancy as an owner's putting a tenant in occupation. The proposition that there is no vacancy when the accommodation is sublet is contrary to the provision in Sec. 7(1); when a licensee is put in occupation there may be no vacancy but there undoubtedly is when it is sublet. It is not correct to say that mere withdrawal from the accommodation is not a vacancy; vacancy does arise by ceasing to occupy it. The question whether the tenant, who ceases to occupy, has an intention to return to the occupation or not is relevant not to the question whether he has vacated or not, but to the question whether he has vacated as a landlord or as a tenant. If he intends to return, that is, intends to keep his tenancy rights intact, he vacates as a landlord, whether as, if he does not intend to return at all, he vacates as a tenant. If he vacates as a landlord, the allotment order will be addressed to him, and if he vacates as a tenant, it will be addressed to his own landlord. 13. If he vacates as a landlord, the allotment order will be addressed to him, and if he vacates as a tenant, it will be addressed to his own landlord. 13. The accommodation with which we are concerned in this appeal is the front portion of the ground floor. Respondent No. 2 was the tenant of the entire ground floor; so long as she was in occupation of the whole, the whole formed one accommodation. The case of the appellant is that when she entered into a partnership with the appellant and put the partnership into possession of the front portion, it was a case of the accommodation consisting of the front portion falling vacant by her ceasing to occupy it, and it is further his case that when the partnership was dissolved the accommodation consisting of the front portion again fell vacant and it was in respect of this accommodation that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an allotment order to the appellant's favour. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer passed an allotment order in favour of respondent No. 2 in respect of the other portion of the ground floor, but we are not concerned with it in this appeal. 14. The deed of partnership entered into between respondent No. 2 and the appellant provided that the former would make available for the running of the partnership business the front portion of the ground floor and in pursuance of this, partnership the appellant started his clinic in the front portion. The partnership, though respondent no. 2 was one of the partners, was a legal entity different from her. She definitely created in favour of the partnership an interest in the front portion of her accommodation, which was not a mere interest of a licensee. She relinquished her own possession and put the partnership into possession of it, retaining possession over only had the limit of 30 days imposed by rule 3 to pay the rent to her; this confirms the distinction between it and her. Respondent No. 3 was no party to the deed of partnership and was not at all bound by the arrangement arrived at between respondent No. 2 and the appellant in respect of the partnership. Respondent No. 3 was no party to the deed of partnership and was not at all bound by the arrangement arrived at between respondent No. 2 and the appellant in respect of the partnership. Since respondent No. 2 was to receive rent from the partnership, it means that she kept alive her tenancy rights over the accommodation in dispute, namely the front portion, during the partnership. Therefore, during the, partnership the relation between her and the partnership could be only that of a tenant and sub-tenant. It follows that, when the partnership came into existence, respondent No. 2 vacated the accommodation in dispute by ceasing to occupy it and subletting it to the partnership. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer acquired jurisdiction to pass an allotment order in respect of it. Since respondent No. 2 kept alive her tenancy rights, she was to be treated as the landlord of the accommodation and an allotment order could have been issued to her requiring her to sublet or not to sublet, but because this vacancy was not reported to him and he did not he did not pass any order. 15. On the dissolution of the partnership the accommodation in dispute again falls vacant because the partnership ceased to occupy it. When it itself was dissolved it could not possibly occupy it. On this occasion intimation of the vacancy was given to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, however, refused to pass an order because of his erroneous view that there was no vacancy. Subsequently, he passed the impugned order treating order treating it as a case of vacancy. He passed the order more than 30 days of the receipt of the intimation from the appellant's wife, but, as she was neither the landlord, nor a tenant, nor a sub-tenant, the intimation given by her was not an intimation given by her was not an intimation contemplated by Section 7 (1) and the limit of 30 days imposed by rule 3 did not apply. As there was a vacancy, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was free to pass an allotment order under Section 7 (2), even though he had not received any formal intimation of the vacancy. When a vacancy arises the District Magistrate acquires jurisdiction to pass an allotment order in respect of it. As there was a vacancy, the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was free to pass an allotment order under Section 7 (2), even though he had not received any formal intimation of the vacancy. When a vacancy arises the District Magistrate acquires jurisdiction to pass an allotment order in respect of it. If the vacancy has been intimated to him by the landlord or the tenant, he must pass an allotment order within 30 days of the receipt of the intimation, if he does not, the landlord is free to occupy the accommodation himself, but, if he wants to let it out to a tenant, he must nominate the tenant and the District Magistrate is bound to allot the accommodation to him, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing he forthwith allots it to another person. If no intimation is given, he can pass the allotment order at any time. The appellant's application for an allotment order was an intimation within the meaning of Section 7 (1). Respondent No. 2 was the tenant, of the accommodation that had fallen vacant, and an intimation of it could be given by either of them. As the appellant was a partner, the intimation given by the partnership. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer had, therefore, jurisdiction to make an allotment order in respect of it. 16. There arises the question to whom the allotment order should be addressed by the Rent Control Eviction Officer. It has to be addressed to the landlord and the question is who was the landlord. The answer depends upon in what vacancy the allotment order was to be passed. We have found that vacancy arose twice, once when the accommodation in dispute was sublet by respondent no. 2 to the partnership, and later when the partnership vacated it by ceasing to occupy it. We have also found tint the Rent Control and Eviction Officer did not pass any order on the earlier vacancy and, when it was super imposed by the later vacancy, he lost all rights to pass an allotment order, which he would have passed on the happening of the earlier vacancy. Now he must pass the allotment order, treating the accommodation as having fallen vacant only on the partnership vacating it. Now he must pass the allotment order, treating the accommodation as having fallen vacant only on the partnership vacating it. We have stressed this distinction between the two vacancies because the allotment order, if passed on the earlier vacancy, might have been addressed to respondent No. 2 and not to respondent No. 3, as the impugned allotment order was. It is not open to respondent no. 2, who did not bring the earlier vacancy to the notice of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, to claim that the allotment order should be passed in that vacancy and not in the subsequent vacancy. We have found that, so long as the partnership lasted, respondent No. 2 was the landlord. On the dissolution the position underwent a change. On the terms of the partnership deed itself, she severed all connections with the accommodations on the dissolution; she relinquished all her tenancy rights in respect of it. Whoever purchased the goodwill of the partnership was to be the tenant of the accommodation, holding direct from respondent No. 3. The rent of the accommodation was to be fixed by respondent No. 3 and the purchaser. It seems that though respondent No. 3 was no party to the partnership deed, she was agreeable to the splitting up of the accommodation consisting of the ground floor into two accommodations, one consisting of the accommodation retained by respondent No. 2, and the other of the accommodation in dispute. It has been found by the learned Judge that she was agreeable to the appellant's being the tenant of the accommodation in dispute. It has been found by the learned Judge that she was agreeable to the appellant's being the tenant of the accommodation in dispute on her behalf. It is true that an accommodation let out by a landlord to a tenant cannot be split up by either of them unilaterally or by a third person, such as the District Magistrate, but it can be split up by the parties concerned. Respondent No. 2 split up the previous accommodation consisting of the entire ground floor into two accommodations by her act of subletting the front portion to the partnership this splitting up, although it could have invested the District Magistrate with jurisdiction to pass an allotment order in respect of either, was not binding upon respondent No. 3. Respondent No. 2 split up the previous accommodation consisting of the entire ground floor into two accommodations by her act of subletting the front portion to the partnership this splitting up, although it could have invested the District Magistrate with jurisdiction to pass an allotment order in respect of either, was not binding upon respondent No. 3. Respondent No. 2 being a tenant could not split up the tenement as against her landlord, respondent No. 3. But it was always open to respondent No. 3 to agree to the splitting up and, when she did so, the accommodation became two accommodations for all purposes, and that seems to be the position on the dissolution of the partnership. The position now was the same as it would have been had respondent No. 3 let out the accommodation in dispute separately from the back portion of the ground floor and it had fallen vacant by respondent No. 2's ceasing to occupy it. In other words, the landlord in relation to the vacant accommodation was respondent No. 3 and it was she who could be ordered to let it or not to let it. Respondent No. 2, who had severed all connections arising out of her contract of tenancy with respondent No. 3, could not be ordered to let or not to let this accommodation. It was not to be sublet, it was to he let, and the allotment order could have been issued only to the owner of the accommodation. For the purpose of subletting the tenant is the landlord, but for the purpose of letting the owner is the landlord. We, therefore, hold that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer rightly ordered respondent No. 3 to let out the accommodation (to the appellant). 17. R. 7 has no application at all. The accommodation that fell vacant on the dissolution of the partnership was an entire accommodation and not a portion of an accommodation existing immediately before the dissolution of the partnership. Before the partnership was formed there was one accommodation consisting of the entire ground floor, but on the formation of the partnership it was converted into two accommodations and the whole of one of the two accommodations fell vacant on the dissolution. Before the partnership was formed there was one accommodation consisting of the entire ground floor, but on the formation of the partnership it was converted into two accommodations and the whole of one of the two accommodations fell vacant on the dissolution. A portion of an accommodation fell vacant when it was vacated by respondent No. 2 and was sublet to the partnership, but the portion became an accommodation and the whole of it fell vacant again on the dissolution of the partnership was formed. Further, the owner was not in occupation of the other part of the accommodation that existed before the partnership was formed. The upper storey occupied by respondent No. 3 was an accommodation entirely different from the accommodation let out by her to respondent No. 2. Therefore, respondent No. 3 was not to be consulted at all before the allotment order was passed and she has also not made any grievance of the fact. She has not challenged the allotment order and seems to have been satisfied with it. Respondent No. 2 who challenges the allotment order, was not the owner of any accommodation and had no right to be consulted about allotment. 18. We, therefore, allow this appeal and dismiss respondent No. 2's petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The appellant will recover from respondent No. 2 his costs before us and before Tandon, J.