MODI, J.—This is a plaintiffs second appeal against a judgment and decree of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Udaipur; dated the 18th November, 1955, in a suit for rendition of accounts. 2. The material facts leading up to this appeal may shortly be stated as follows. The plaintiff is an assignee from defendant respondent No. 2 Jamal. The plaintiffs case, briefly put, was that in 1948, some 42 persons of Kankroli constituted a partnership to carry on business in controlled cloth. This partnership was admittedly dissolved some time in August, 1949. when it is said that Government control on cloth was somewhat relaxed and so it was decided that a new partnership among the ten defendants respondents be constituted in the name and style of Kapda Vyavsay Sangh, Kankroli, and cloth approximately worth Rs. 525/-which fell to the share of each of these partners as a result of the dissolution of the former firm was accepted as the capital of each of these partners in the new firm. It is then alleged that after some time it was decided that the cloth which was in stock be distributed among the ten partners of the value of Rs. 825/- each and that this be made over to each of the partners on his giving a sum of Rs. 300/- in the partnership account regard being had to the fact that the initial capital of each partner was Rs. 525/- only, and it was further decided that the account of the profit would be gone into and settled later. The plaintiffs case fur-their was that four of the partners were given their share of the cloth by defendant No. 1 Bhanwarlal who was alleged to be the managing partner of the entire business. The plaintiffs case then was that on Baisakh Vadi 4, Smt. 2007 (equal to 6th April, 1950) defendant respondent No. 2 Jamal assigned his interest in the partnership to the former for a sum of Rs. 330/- by a writing Ex. 1 which was executed by the latter in favour of the former. The plaintiffs case then was that on Baisakh Vadi 4, Smt. 2007 (equal to 6th April, 1950) defendant respondent No. 2 Jamal assigned his interest in the partnership to the former for a sum of Rs. 330/- by a writing Ex. 1 which was executed by the latter in favour of the former. The plaintiffs case further was that the partnership business was thereafter dissolved and consequently he was entitled to ask for accounts and get respondent Jamals share of the profits and as according to him he was unable to obtain his share from defendant respondent No. 1 Bhanwarlal, he brought the present suit with the prayer that he be allowed Rs. 550/- worth of cloth or the sum of Rs. 550/- in lieu thereof, and he further asked for a decree for rendition of accounts and for his share of the profits. As the plaintiff did not disclose in his plaint any dates as to the decision relating to the distribution of the cloth between the partners as also for the dissolution of the partnership, an application for further and better particulars was filed by one of the defendants and the plaintiff then gave out that the decision to distribute the cloth was arrived at some time in the month of Jeth of Smt. 2007 (corresponding to some time in May, 1950) and that the dissolution of the firm took place in the month of Asoj or Kartik of the same year, which corresponds to October or November, 1950. The plaintiff also disclosed that no document was executed between the partners in that regard. The only other thing which is necessary to mention before proceeding further is that according to the plaint defendant No. 1 Bhanwarlal was the person who maintained all the account-books and was in charge of the business. Of the ten defendants, Bhanwarlal alone resisted the suit, though Jamal also filed a separate written statement in which he admitted to have assigned his right, title and interest in the partnership to the plaintiff as alleged by the latter. The important points that he made in his defence and which deserve to be mentioned are : (1) that Bhanwarlal was not the managing partner although he was in charge of the accounts of the partnership and (2) that he was not aware whether the firm had been dissolved or not. The important points that he made in his defence and which deserve to be mentioned are : (1) that Bhanwarlal was not the managing partner although he was in charge of the accounts of the partnership and (2) that he was not aware whether the firm had been dissolved or not. So far as Bhanwarlal is concerned, he admitted that Jamal, plaintiffs assignor, was one of the partners of the firm, but pleaded that he was not aware whether the plaintiff had purchased his share or not. He denied that he was the managing partner of the firm ; but he did accept that he used to maintain all the accounts of it. This defendant also contended that the firm had not been dissolved and that money which was due from its customers had yet to be recovered and its debts had to be paid. As regards the cloth taken away by defendants Mangilal and Roshanlal, his version was that as the Government had lifted control over the sale of cloth, the prices had fallen and that it had become difficult to sell the cloth belonging to the partnership, and therefore a list or lists of the cloth which was in the stock had been made, and some of it had been taken away by some of the partners such as Mangilal and Roshanlal, to sell it at their shop, and that the price of this cloth had been debited against them, as these persons had not rendered any account of the sales made by them. His case further was that the rest of the cloth remained with him and that he went on selling it and has credited the sale proceeds of the cloth sold in the account-books of the firm and that he had also paid out of these sale proceeds the debts which the firm owed to its creditors. It was however admitted that as business had become slack and difficult, the shop in which the business of the firm used to be carried on was vacated and its Munim, Deopuri, was also discharged. It was finally contended that the plaintiff could not bring a suit for accounts of the firm without first asking for its dissolution and consequently the suit deserved to be dismissed. 3. It was finally contended that the plaintiff could not bring a suit for accounts of the firm without first asking for its dissolution and consequently the suit deserved to be dismissed. 3. On these pleadings, the trial court framed as many as eight issues and eventually dismissed the plaintiffs suit against all the defendants except defendant respondent Jamal holding that it was incompetent as the firm Kapda Vyavsay Sangh Kankroli had not been dissolved and, therefore, the plaintiff was not entitled to bring a suit for rendition of accounts. That court, however, decreed the suit for Rs. 350/- against defendant Jamal, Aggrieved by this decision, both parties went up in appeal to the District Judge, Udaipur, who transferred them for disposal to the Senior Civil Judge, Udaipur. The latter allowed Jamals appeal mainly on the ground that the plaintiff had not asked for any relief against this defendant in his plaint, and, therefore, the trial court had exceeded its jurisdiction in granting it. As regards the plaintiffs appeal against the other defendants, the learned Senior Civil Judge was inclined to hold that although there was a cessation of the active business of the firm, that by itself did not and could not amount to its dissolution, and in that view of the matter, he upheld the trial courts conclusion and thus dismissed the plaintiffs suit in toto. It is against this judgment and decree that the plaintiff has now come up to this Court in second appeal. 4. It may be pointed out at once that the dismissal of the suit against Jamal, the plaintiffs assignor, has not been challenged before this Court. The principal question for decision in this appeal, therefore is whether the partnership in suit had been dissolved as alleged by the plaintiff. For, if it had not been dissolved, the plaintiff could not have brought a suit as an assignee for rendition of accounts of an undissolved partnership. Section 29 of the Partnership Act clearly governs this matter. This section reads as follows: — "29. For, if it had not been dissolved, the plaintiff could not have brought a suit as an assignee for rendition of accounts of an undissolved partnership. Section 29 of the Partnership Act clearly governs this matter. This section reads as follows: — "29. (1) A transfer by a partner of his interest in the firm, either absolute or by mortgage, or by the creation by him of a charge on such interest, does not entitle the transferee during the continuance of firm, to interfere in the conduct of business, or to require accounts, or to inspect the books of the firm, but entitles the transferee only to receive the share of profits of the transferring partner, and the transferee shall accept the account of profits agreed to by the partners. (2) If the firm is dissolved or if the transferring partner ceases to be a partner, the transferee is entitled as against the remaining partners to receive the share of the assets of the firm to which the transferring partner is entitied, and for the purpose of ascertaining that share, to an account as from the date of the dissolution." The principle behind this section is that when partners enter into a contract of partnership, their normal intention is that their relationship shall exist between themselves and themselves only, and, therefore, no person can be introduced into the partnership as a partner without the consent of all the existing partners. It would indeed be another matter if the partners choose to agree that it would he open to any one of them to introduce any other person into the partnership in which case such a new comer would also be a partner. But that is admittedly not the case here. There can however be no objection at law to a partner assigning his right, title and interest in a partnership to another as was done in this case. But such a person by virtue of the provisions contained in sec. But that is admittedly not the case here. There can however be no objection at law to a partner assigning his right, title and interest in a partnership to another as was done in this case. But such a person by virtue of the provisions contained in sec. 29 cannot interfere in the conduct of the business of the firm or require accounts or inspect the books of accounts of the firm during the continuance of the partnership, that is, until dissolution has been brought about, and all that the assignee is entitled during the continuance of the partnership is to receive the share of profits of the transferring partner, and the transferee must accept the amount of profits agreed to by the partners. The point that deserves to be noted is that the assignment during the continuance of a partnership does not give the assignee a right to claim accounts or to sue for dissolution. In other words, the assignor continues to remain the partner and the assignee is only entitled to receive the share of the profits due to the assignor. It is only if and when dissolution occurs that the transferee would be entitled as against the remaining partners to ask for accounts as from the date of the dissolution and to receive his share of the assets of the firm to which the transferring partner was entitled on that footing. 5. The basic question which thus arose and arises for decision in this appeal is whether the suit firm stood dissolved as alleged by the plaintiff or it did not. If it did, the plaintiff assignees suit would be competent, though he would be entitled to an account from the date of the dissolution and to receive his share of the profits on that basis. But if it was not so dissolved; then the plaintiffs suit must fail, because he cannot sue for dissolution or for accounts of an undissolved firm. The trial court after a fairly elaborate discussion of the entire evidence came to the conclusion that the dissolution of the suit firm had not been brought about. But if it was not so dissolved; then the plaintiffs suit must fail, because he cannot sue for dissolution or for accounts of an undissolved firm. The trial court after a fairly elaborate discussion of the entire evidence came to the conclusion that the dissolution of the suit firm had not been brought about. The learned Senior Civil Judge on appeal upheld the same finding, but his discussion of this aspect of the case was rather sketchy and superficial and consequently this Court has not felt assisted by that judgment and had to go into the entire evidence by itself in order to determine whether the finding of the trial court in this respect is well founded. 6. Now, the plaintiff apart from himself examined two more witnesses, namely, P.Ws. Roshanlal and Mannalal to prove that the firm had been dissolved in October or November, 1950, corresponding to Asoj or Kati of Smt. 2007. The evidence of these witnesses establishes the following circumstances:— (1) That the business of the firm had tended to become very slack in the later part of 1950 owing to cloth having been decontrolled and the consequent fall in prices; (2) That the employee of the firm Deopuri had been discharged; and (3) That the shop at which the business of the firm used to be carried on was vacated. These factors can be taken, to be fairly established on the evidence of the defendant Bhanwar Lal also. The plaintiffs witnesses also sought to prove that all the partners had met and assessed the stock they had with them and decided that five lists of the entire cloth in stock be made, and any two of the partners were given an opportunity to pair off together and to accept one of the lists for themselves and that accordingly P.W. Roshanlal and Gabbulal, Mangilal and Shankerlal the four persons Out of the ten had taken away their share of the cloth. And it is said that in this connection the further decision that was arrived at was that each partner should get cloth worth Rs. 625/- and he should deposit Rs. 300/- and take away the cloth of his share, and in arriving at this decision, regard was had to the fact that cloth worth Rs. 525/- had stood to the credit of each of the partners when this partnership was formed. 625/- and he should deposit Rs. 300/- and take away the cloth of his share, and in arriving at this decision, regard was had to the fact that cloth worth Rs. 525/- had stood to the credit of each of the partners when this partnership was formed. This decision is said to have been arrived at in the month of Jeth or Asad of Smt. 2007 that is in April or May, 1950, and the case of the plaintiff, roundly put, was that the partners had agreed to dissolve the firm then. 7. This evidence has been countered by the contesting defendant Bhanwarlal and his evidence is that although it was true that stock-taking was done because the prices had fallen and the sales had become slack and the whole stock was divided into five equal shares and Mangilal and Shankerlal had taken away one lot and similarly Roshanlal and Gabbulal had taken another, all this had been done with a view to expedite the sale of cloth, and not because the partners had decided to dissolve the firm. It also appears from his evidence that the three other lots comprising the remaining stock of cloth had not been removed and that he had subsequently sold this cloth obviously as a partner of the firm and entered the sale proceeds to the credit of the partnership in the books of the firm. No attempt seems to have been made to cross-examine this defendant with reference to the books which had been admittedly kept by him and that indeed is greatly to be regretted. 8. The position, therefore, on this aspect of the case is far from clear. There is no documentary evidence to prove that any meeting of the partners had taken place in April or May, 1950, as alleged by the plaintiff and his witnesses much less to show precisely what decisions had been taken at that meeting. Apart from that, if this evidence were accepted at its face value, then dissolution must have occurred in April or May, 1950. But we have it from the plaintiffs own further and better particulars which were supplied by him in reply to an application by one of the defendants that the business of the firm was dissolved in (^^vklkst dkrh ekl 2000**) corresponding to October November, 1950. But we have it from the plaintiffs own further and better particulars which were supplied by him in reply to an application by one of the defendants that the business of the firm was dissolved in (^^vklkst dkrh ekl 2000**) corresponding to October November, 1950. If that were so, then the plaintiffs case that the partners of the firm had agreed to dissolve the business in the month of Jeth of S. 2007, that is, in April May, 1950, cannot obviously be accepted as correct. This also falsifies the evidence of P.W. Roshanlal one of the partner, that dissolution had taken place in the Baisakh or Jeth of S.2007 that is corresponding to some time in April or May 1950. Questioned how he had accounted for the sum of Rs. 825/- which he had received from the partnership funds at the time of the alleged dissolution, he replied that he had credited this amount in the khata of defendant Bhanwarlal and further that the sum of Rs. 600/- which he had paid off to the creditors of the firm had also been entered by him as a debit against Bhanwarlal. The manner in which this witness states to have done the accounting is, to my mind, extremely tell-tale, and I have no hesitation in saying taat if the suggested dissolution of the firm had taken place, there was no occasion for the aforesaid credit or debit entries to the made for or against Bhanwarlal. 9. So far as the other witness Mannalal is concerned, his evidence is not much better although he has also roundly stated that the business of the firm had been closed some two or two-and-a-half years ago that is before he was examined in court on the 21st October, 1953 This witness was also unable to give the precise date on which the firm was dissolved or when the lists were made. We also have it from him that when Mangilal and Shankerlal of the one group, and Roshanlal and Gabbulal of the other, had been given away cloth allegedly falling in their share, this witness or the other partners were not consulted. We also have it from him that when Mangilal and Shankerlal of the one group, and Roshanlal and Gabbulal of the other, had been given away cloth allegedly falling in their share, this witness or the other partners were not consulted. The exact wording used by the witness in this connection may well be quoted here: ^^ekaxhyky dksBkjh o kadjyky Nhik ,d xzqi oks nwljs xzqi dk xCcwykyth oks jkskuyky ixfj;k dks Hkaojyky us diM+k fn;k gSA gesa fdlh dks kjhd ugha j[ksA** In his cross-examination, this witness was compelled to admit that there was no documentary evidence of any kind whatsoever from which it could be shown that the Kapda Vyavsay Sangh Kankroli had been dissolved. So far as the plaintiff himself is concerned, it is clear that he had entered into the contract of assignment on Baisakh Vadi 4, Smt. 2007, that is, the 6th April, 1950, when the partnership business was admittedly a going concern. According to him, the firm was dissolved later, though even he is unable to give the precise date of such dissolution. This evidence is rather unsatisfactory when we have it from the plaintiff himself that he had been present at the meeting at which the dissolution had been determined upon and according to him all the ten partners were present at that time, which again is not corroborated by P. W. Mannalal, another partner of the firm who was produced as a witness by the plaintiff himself and who said that he and atleast some of the other partners had not been consulted when Roshanlal and others had been allowed to take away cloth falling in their share. It may also be borne in mind in this connection that according to the plaintiff this meeting had taken place in May, 1960, and yet according to him, the firm was dissolved several months later, that is, in Asoj, Kati of Smt. 2007 (i. e., October, November, 1950). 10. In this state of the evidence, I find it impossible to hold that the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing by direct evidence that the suit firm had been agreed to be dissolved by its various partners before the plaintiff brought his present suit on the 3rd December, 1951. 11. 10. In this state of the evidence, I find it impossible to hold that the plaintiff has succeeded in establishing by direct evidence that the suit firm had been agreed to be dissolved by its various partners before the plaintiff brought his present suit on the 3rd December, 1951. 11. The position to which we then come is whether a finding on the question of dissolution of the firm should be returned in favour of the plaintiff on the facts which have been held to be established and are set out above. 12. At this place, I should like to briefly review the case law on this aspect of the case. In Haramohan Poddar Vs. Sudarson Poddar (1) it was held that "Neither stoppage of business nor refusal of a partner to make further advances can be treated as dissolution of the firm." In Sathappa Vs. Subrahmanyan (2), the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in effect was that even if a partnership may not exist to carry on any more business, it may well exist for the purpose of realising the assets or to pay off its debts and if so the final dissolution of the partnership cannot be said to have taken place. 13. In Baijnath Vs. Chhotelal (3) it was held that although it was true that a mere suspension of business of partnership would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that there had been a dissolution of that partnership, still the cessation of the business coupled with other circumstances might legitimately lend to the inference that the partnership had been dissolved. In this case it was pointed out that the Privy Council case referred to above could not be understood as laying down a general proposition of universal application that a partnership cannot be deemed to have been dissolved till all its outstandings have been realised. With respect, that may be so. But the circumstances upon which the finding of dissolution can be based must be of an unequivocal character and the inference of dissolution from them should be irresistible, and such a case arose in Joopoody Sarayya Vs. With respect, that may be so. But the circumstances upon which the finding of dissolution can be based must be of an unequivocal character and the inference of dissolution from them should be irresistible, and such a case arose in Joopoody Sarayya Vs. Lakshmanaswamy(4) in which their Lordships of the Privy Council pointed out that when final accounts of the partnership business which had been rendered year by year from 1863 to 1891, ceased in the latter year, and on 13th April 1891 a final account showing the division of both capital and revenue was made out, and the defendants afterwards carried on the business without any interference from the plaintiffs, a very strong presumption arose in favour of the dissolution of the partnership having occurred at the definite date of the year when the account was closed, and, further, taking these facts with the other acts and conduct of parties and the whole circumstances of the case, the inference in favour of the dissolution became substantially conclusive. 14. Again in Gordhandas Vs. Bhulabhai (5) it was held a dissolution of a partnership cannot necessarily be inferred from the circumstance that it is unable to pay its growing liabilities nor from the further circumstance that the business was stopped on a certain date and that dissolution must be established from circumstances leading clearly to such an inference, 15. Again in Gundayya Vs. Siddappa (6) it was held that the mere fact that after a particular date no further business was done would not amount to a dissolution of the partnership. 16. The next important case to which I would like to refer is Vazirbhai Sultanbhai Vs. Gadmal Nathmal (7). The facts of this case offer a fairly close parallel to the case before me. The proved or admitted facts in this case were these? (1) that there was no fresh business done after September/October, 1924; (2) that the shop which was rented by the partnership was closed and surrendered to the landlord at about the same time; (3) that the financial position of the firm was difficult and the plaintiff was disinclined to work and attend to the business, and (4) That the defendant was left with the work of selling the goods, which had remained, unsold, and he also attended to the recovery of outstandings. On these facts, Kania J. as he then was came to the conclusion that although there was evidence indicating clearly that the business of the partnership had stopped, there was no evidence of dissolution or intention on the part of either party to terminate the legal relation of partnership. 17. Again in Durga Prosad Vs. Anardevi Sethani (8), it was held that cessation of active business does not amount to dissolution of a firm. 18. From the foregoing review of the case law, the principle that emerges is that where dissolution by agreement is put forward as a foundation for a suit for accounts, a mere closing of the business or to carry on active business on behalf of or by the partnership or the failure of some of the members thereof to take interest in its affairs, or the mere vacating of the shop where the business was carried on or the discharge of its servants would not be enough to constitute "dissolution". For the firm may still continue its existence in order to recover its outstandings or to pay off its debts, and, if so, the jural relation between the various partners would still subsist. Therefore whether dissolution of a firm has been brought about or- not would, in the ultimate analysis depend on the intention of the parties and where there is no document in the shap of a public notice or otherwise evidencing such intention, the same will have to be gathered from the facts and circumstances of a given case and if the collective effect thereof should unequivocally and unmistakably lead to the inference of dissolution, then such a result may well be inferred. It must also be borne in mind in this connection that according to the Indian law of Partnership, mere assignment by a partner of his entire interest in the partnership to a stranger does not and cannot have the consequence of disrupting a partnership business. 19. Applying the test which has been enunciated above to the instant case, I am afraid. I find it not a little difficult to accept the submission that the firm with which we are concerned here was dissolved in 1950 as alleged by the plaintiff. The direct evidence of the dissolution by agreement which I have discussed at length above is not at all good or worthy of credence. I find it not a little difficult to accept the submission that the firm with which we are concerned here was dissolved in 1950 as alleged by the plaintiff. The direct evidence of the dissolution by agreement which I have discussed at length above is not at all good or worthy of credence. Then the circumstantial evidence to prove dissolution, which has been offered by the plaintiff, is rather weak and in any event it is not strong enough to sustain a conclusive inference of dissolution, particularly in the absence of any effective cross-examination of the defendant Bhanwarlal with reference to the account-books of the partnership which he was always willing to produce. This defendant unequivocally stated that he had been selling the goods of the partnership even after 1950 and has been crediting the sale proceeds thereof to the account of the partnership in its books. This evidence has not been shaken in any way, and I see no cogent reasons to disbelieve it. That being so, the position boils down to this that the plaintiff assignee here sues for rendition of accounts of an undissolved partnership. I may in passing also point out that the plaintiff could not and should not have sued for the recovery of a specific sum of money when he was on his own showing claiming a rendition of accounts. Be that as it may, sec. 29 of the Partnership Act, which I have set out in extenso above, effectually bars the plaintiffs action and he could not have filed a suit for accounts of an undissolved partnership or even sued for dissolution. The plaintiffs suit must, therefore, fail. I may add, however, that if and when this firm is dissolved, it would be open to the plaintiff assignee of Jamals interest in the partnership to raise his claim against the remaining partners to receive the share of the assets to which his transferor was entitled and for the purpose of ascertaining that share to an account as from the date of the dissolution. 20. The result is that this appeal fails and must be dismissed. Having regard to all the circumstances, however, I would make no order as to costs of this appeal. Leave to appeal is refused.