JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. - These are two connected special appeals which arise in the circumstances mentioned below: Har Saran Dass the appellant in Sp. A. No. 178 of 1960 and Rashid Uddin the appellant in Sp. A. No. 179 of 1960 were employed as peons in the Municipal Board of Hapur (hereinafter referred to as the Board). The permanent Executive Officer of the Board was one Sri Agarwal. Early, in April 1958, he went on medical leave for a period of three months. There was some dispute as to on what date he handed over charge. According to one version it was on the 3rd of April, 1958, that he did so while according to the other it was on 7th April, 1958. He, however, extended his leave by a further period of three months, with the result that he was away from duty from the 3rd of April, 1958, to some date of October of the same year. Sri Mittal was the President of the Board at that time. He appointed Sri Oberoi, the Tax Superintendent, to officiate as Executive Officer. Sri Oberoi took over charge on the 7th of April, 1958, and handed it over to Sri Firasat Ali on the 26th of April, 1958 on the latter's being appointed as the Executive Officer by Sri Mittal. Sri Firasat Ali went on leave from 23rd of May 1958 to the 9th of June, 1958, and once again Sri Oberoi officiated under the orders of Mr. Mittal for this period. On the 10th of June, 1958 Sri Firasat Ali again took over charge of the office of the Executive Officer. On the 11th of September, 1958, the Board by an unanimous resolution appointed Sri Firasat Ali as the officiating Executive Officer in the leave vacancy of Sri Agarwal. The State Government also in due course approved the aforesaid arrangement made by the Board. On the 15th of April, 1958, a charge sheet was handed over to Rashid Uddin accusing him of misconduct in the discharge of his duties. After an enquiry had been made into the charges against him partly by Sri Oberoi and partly by Sri Firasat Ali he was dismissed from service by an order passed by the latter on the 7th of July, 1958, with effect from the 16th of March, 1958. After an enquiry had been made into the charges against him partly by Sri Oberoi and partly by Sri Firasat Ali he was dismissed from service by an order passed by the latter on the 7th of July, 1958, with effect from the 16th of March, 1958. His appeal against the order of dismissal to the President was also dismissed on the 21st of November, 1958. Har Saran Das was also charge sheeted for misconduct on the 8th of February 1958. Sri Oberoi conducted an enquiry and dismissed him on 5th of June, 1958. His appeal to the President was also dismissed on the 12th of December, 1958. The main ground on which the two petitions giving rise to these two Special Appeals were filed was that Sri Firasat Ali and Sri Oberoi were not duly appointed Executive Officers on the dates on which they passed the dismissal orders mentioned above, and therefore the said orders are void. The submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners before the learned Single Judge was that the true import of Section 59 of the U.P. Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is that the President can make an officiating appointment on the post of the Executive Officer if the vacancy in that office is not for a period of more than two months. The contention on behalf of the respondent was that whatever may be the period of the vacancy the President has the power to make an officiating appointment not lasting more than two months. In the present case Sri Mittal had gone on three months leave which he extended to six months. Therefore, the vacancy caused by his leave of absence from the very beginning was for a period of more than two months. The learned Single Judge rejected the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners (now appellants before us) that the period of appointment was immaterial and what was relevant was the period of vacancy. Inasmuch as the learned Single Judge overruled this submission and as no other point was urged before him he dismissed both the petitions with costs on the 28th of November, 1958. 2. The question that was raised before the learned Single Judge has also been raised before us. Inasmuch as the learned Single Judge overruled this submission and as no other point was urged before him he dismissed both the petitions with costs on the 28th of November, 1958. 2. The question that was raised before the learned Single Judge has also been raised before us. In order to appreciate the submission made and to properly decide the same it is necessary to consider the provisions of Section 59 of the Act. That section reads as follows: "59 (1) During the absence on leave, or other temporary vacancy in the office of an executive officer, if the period does not exceed two months, the President may appoint a person to act as executive officer, if the period exceeds two months an appointment shall be made by the board in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 57(1). (2) Every person so appointed may exercise the powers and shall perform the duties conferred or imposed by or under this or any other enactment on the person for whom he is appointed to act. (3) All appointments made under sub-sec. (1) and the salaries and conditions of service appertaining to such appointments shall be subject to the approval of the State Government if the term of appointment exceeds two months, and the provisions of Section 58 with such modification as may be prescribed shall apply to person so appointed." We have to determine as to what do the words "if the period does not exceed two months" (italicised by us) or "if the period exceeds two months" mean in Sec. 59(1) of the Act. In other words do these words refer to the period of vacancy or to the term of appointment. In our judgment these words can have reference only to the period of vacancy. The word "period" means a course or extent of time; time of duration (see Shorter Oxford Dictionary). 3. It would be noticed that the opening words in Section 59 of the Act are "during the absence on leave or other temporary vacancy." Therefore the time of duration contemplated by the word "period" in Sec. 59(1) of the Act is the one in which the Executive Officer is on leave or the one of temporary vacancy. The word "the" particularizes the time of duration. The word "the" particularizes the time of duration. As the words "if the period does not exceed two months" and if the period exceeds two months" (italicised by us) follow the words "during the absence of leave or other temporary vacancy" it is obvious that it is that duration of time which is contemplated by the word "period." A plain grammatical construction of the words mentioned above clearly points to the conclusion that the span or the duration of time which is represented by the word period used in Sec. 59(1) of the Act is the one which is created by the vacancy. In other words, "if the period does not exceed two months" mean if the period of absence on leave or vacancy does not exceed two months. Similarly, the words "if the period exceeds two months" mean that if the period of absence on leave or vacancy exceeds two months. These words cannot have reference to the term of appointment firstly because the language of Section 59 (1) of the Act cannot support such a construction and secondly because as the sub-sec. (3) of Section 59 of the Act would show for appointment the word used is 'term' and not 'period'. It is a well known principle of interpretation of statutes that if an expression is used in one sense in one part of the provision it must be deemed to be used in the same sense in other parts of the same provision See Guruswamy v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1954 SC 592. Apart from it a perusal of the various provisions of the Act reveals that in connection with appointments or for the duration for which a person is to remain in office the expression used is `term' and not `period'. Sec. 10(a) provides that the term of every Board shall be four years. Sec. 38 speaks of the term of the office of a member elected or nominated. Sec. 46 speaks of the term of the office of a President and Section 54 of a Vice-President. Nowhere in the Act for the duration of an appointment the word `period' has been used. 4. That the word `term' is used in connection with an appointment to an office is apparent from the Concise Oxford Dictionary where amongst others the following has been given against the word `term'. "term-of office expired". Nowhere in the Act for the duration of an appointment the word `period' has been used. 4. That the word `term' is used in connection with an appointment to an office is apparent from the Concise Oxford Dictionary where amongst others the following has been given against the word `term'. "term-of office expired". our brother Tandon accepted that "at first sight" the provisions of Sec. 59(1) of the Act show that the word `period' has been used in connection with the absence on leave or vacancy but he came to a contrary conclusion because of two considerations i.e. the amendment of this section in 1932 and what he considered to be the effect of Section 60 of the Act. We are unable to agree with our learned brother that either of these two considerations can make any difference in the interpretation of Sec. 59(1) of the Act as it stands today. Before the amendment of 1932 which put Sec. 59(1) in its present form that provision read as follows:- "(1) During the absence on leave or other temporary vacancy in the office of an Executive Officer the Board may appoint a person to act as Executive Officer. (2).......... (3).........." It would be noticed that there was no provision enabling the President to make any appointment in a temporary vacancy and that the Board alone was competent to do so. By virtue of the 1932 amendment the President has also in some cases been given the power to make appointments. Our brother Tandon in this connection has observed as follows: - "The purpose of Section 59 was and is to confer power for making officiating appointments. It is in this context and to this object that the provision exists, and indeed was made, to authorise the President and the Board to make officiating appointments. Previously even a short appointment in the office of the executive officer, though for a few days only, had to be made by the board. By amending Section 59 short appointments upto two months were permitted to be made by the President. Previously even a short appointment in the office of the executive officer, though for a few days only, had to be made by the board. By amending Section 59 short appointments upto two months were permitted to be made by the President. The opening words in the section i.e. `during the absence on leave or other temporary vacancy in the office of an executive officer' have merely stated the occasion or, if the expression also may be used, the contingency on the existence or occurrence of which the power to make "officiating appointments shall be exercisable." With great respect to our learned brother we cannot agree with him that that is the effect of the amendment in the provision. Our learned brother did not engage himself to consider the language of Sec. 59(1) of the Act. The mere fact that power has now been given to the President to make an appointment in a temporary vacancy in some cases and to the Board in others does not mean and cannot logically mean that the words "if the period does not exceed two months" or "if the period exceeds two months" related to the term of appointment and not to the period of vacancy. The second consideration which prevailed with our learned brother was that under the provisions of the U.P. Municipalities Act certain powers are exercisable by the Executive Officer and not otherwise and that the office of the Executive Officer cannot be left vacant for any period. He thought that inasmuch as "in most cases if not in all an interval will occur between the Executive offices proceeding on leave etc. and the appointment of a substitute by the Board in cases where the vacancy happens to be for a longer period than two months" the purpose of the Act will be advanced if it is held that even though the vacancy be for a period of more than two months, the President was competent to make an appointment for a term not exceeding two months. Again with great respect to our learned brother we do not see how in most cases "an interval will occur between the Executive Officer proceeding on leave and the appointment of a substitute by the Board". The Executive Officer can go on leave only after it has been sanctioned. Again with great respect to our learned brother we do not see how in most cases "an interval will occur between the Executive Officer proceeding on leave and the appointment of a substitute by the Board". The Executive Officer can go on leave only after it has been sanctioned. Thus invariably it would be known in advance as to from what date to what date there will be a temporary vacancy in the office of the Executive Officer and the Board can make an appointment in that vacancy. It should not be forgotten that we are considering the case of a Municipal Board where all the members reside within the city itself and thus there can be no difficulty in convening a meeting of the Board forthwith whenever an occasion for it arises. Normally, the Board would have sufficient time to assemble and pass a resolution making a temporary appointment whenever a vacancy occurs, but even in a case where there is no advance information (such a case would be more imaginary than real) there will be no difficulty in the Board making a suitable arrangement in the temporary vacancy. Under the provisions of Section 86 (2) of the Act the President may convene a meeting whenever he thinks fit and under Section 87 of the Act any business may he transacted at any meeting. Unlike Section 58 of the Act, Sec. 59 of the Act does not require the Board to act by means of a special resolution only with the result that the proviso to Section 87 of the Act would not apply. There can therefore be no practical difficulty in the work of the Board being carried on if Sec. 59(1) of the Act is interpreted to mean that the word `period' has reference to the vacancy and not to the term of the office. In a case where the Board dismisses or removes an Executive Officer there would also be no difficulty because in that case the vacancy would be permanent and can be filled by the Board alone under Section 57 of the Act. In a case where the Board dismisses or removes an Executive Officer there would also be no difficulty because in that case the vacancy would be permanent and can be filled by the Board alone under Section 57 of the Act. Even though the Executive Officer can appeal against the decision of the Board dismissing or removing him the resolution of the Board dismissing or removing him not being subject to confirmation by the Government is complete in itself and the mere fact that an appeal has been provided or one has been filed cannot have the effect of suspending the order of dismissal or removal. See S. R. Goel v. Municipal Board, Kanpur, 1959 ALJ 106. We have no doubt in our mind that the text of Sec. 59(1) is explicit; there is no ambiguity in it and the only meaning that can be given to the words used therein is that the word `period' relates to the duration of vacancy and not to the term of appointment. We are also satisfied that there is nothing in any other provision of the Act which militates against such an interpretation. 5. Having interpreted the provisions of Section 59 of the Act the question that next calls for our attention is whether the appointments of Sarvsri Firasat Ali and Oberoi made by Sri Mittal were illegal and that these gentlemen acted without authority of law. Our brother Tandon considered the appointment of Sri Firasat Ali made by Sri Mittal to be illegal on the ground that it was for more than two months but held that it had been ratified by the Board. While doing so he relied upon the following passage in Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. LXII, page 1430 para. 706: "Where the council or other legislative body of a municipality has power to make a particular appointment or employment it has power to ratify an appointment or employment made by an officer or committee without authority to act in the premises." Normally before an act can be ratified it must be done by a person on behalf of another but in his (the others) knowledge and with his authority. In the present case Sri Mittal had not made the appointment on behalf of the Board. Consequently, we cannot agree with our learned brother that the act of Sri Mittal had been ratified by the Board. In the present case Sri Mittal had not made the appointment on behalf of the Board. Consequently, we cannot agree with our learned brother that the act of Sri Mittal had been ratified by the Board. Besides, the authorities on which the text of Corpus Juris Secundum quoted above is based have not been produced before us. It is not known as to what are the provisions in the American statutes relating to municipalities. For deciding whether or not there could be ratification in the present case attention has necessarily got to be confined to the enactment under consideration, i.e. the U.P. Municipalities Act. There is no provision therein under which the Board could ratify an act of the President done not on behalf of the Board but in his own right. In T. R. Bhavani Shankar Joshi v. Gordhandas Jamnadas, A.I.R. 1943 PC 66 : 1943 ALJ 364 the Courts in India on the basis of some English decisions had held that a particular act of the agent had been ratified by the principal. The Judicial Committee in that case observed as follows : "The cases upon which the learned Judges of the Division Bench proceeded were Soameo v. Spencer, 1822 (1) Dowl. and Ry. 32 : 24 R.R. 631 and Maclean v. Dunn, 1828 (4) Bing 722 : 29 R.R. 714. English cases upon the Statute of Frauds. These were considered to be in point as showing that Section 4 of that Statute did not exclude the possibility of ratification by the phrase "signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorised." The question must depend on the exact language of the enactment to be construed, and must in India be examined in the light of Secs. 196 to 200, Indian Contract Act, which contain the general law of India upon the point." For these reasons it is difficult to accept the finding of our brother Tandon that the act of Sri Mittal in respect of the appointment of Sri Firasat Ali had been ratified by the Board. 196 to 200, Indian Contract Act, which contain the general law of India upon the point." For these reasons it is difficult to accept the finding of our brother Tandon that the act of Sri Mittal in respect of the appointment of Sri Firasat Ali had been ratified by the Board. Even though that is so we are not prepared to hold that for the period beginning with the 26th of April, 1958 and ending with the assumption of charge by Sri Agarwal after the expiry of leave Sri Firasat Ali acted without jurisdiction or his functioning as the Officiating Executive Officer was illegal. We would remind ourselves that Sri Mittal had appointed Sri Firasat Ali on the 26th of April, 1958, as Officiating Executive Officer for the full period of the temporary vacancy created by Sri Agarwal's leave of absence. The State Government approved of this resolution (See annexure II on page 36 of the paper book). In view of the appointment of Sri Firasat Ali as the Officiating Executive Officer is of no consequence. There is nothing in the Municipalities Act which precludes the Board from a past date. Consequently there can be no legal justification for holding that the appointment of Sri Firasat Ali for the period beginning with the 26th of April, 1958, and ending with the assumption of charge by Sri Agarwal on return from leave was illegal and he acted during that period without authority of law. The effect of the resolution of the board dated the 11th of September, 1958, can also be considered to be an act validating the appointment of Sri Firasat Ali originally made by Sri Mittal. For the reasons mentioned above we hold that Sri Firasat Ali had jurisdiction to dismiss Rashid Uddin's appeal on the 7th of july, 1958. 6. Our brother Tandon held the appointment of Sri Oberoi to be legal on the ground that even though the vacancy was for a period of more than two months since the appointment itself was made for a lesser period. it was protected by Section 59 (1) of the Act. We have already held above that if the vacancy is for a period of more than two months, then whatever be the term of appointment, it has got to be made by the Board. it was protected by Section 59 (1) of the Act. We have already held above that if the vacancy is for a period of more than two months, then whatever be the term of appointment, it has got to be made by the Board. In other words, even if the term of appointment is less than two months but the vacancy is for more than two months but the President cannot make the appointment. We may, however, state here that so far as Sri Oberoi is concerned, his appointment as an Officiating Executive Officer was made when the vacancy itself was for less than two months. We have already held above that for the period commencing with the 26th of April, 1958 and ending on the latter was the Executive Officer. Sri Agarwal took over charge from Sri Firasat Ali, however, went on leave from the 23rd of May, 1958 to the 9th of June, 1958. It was during this vacancy that Sri Oberoi as the officiating Executive Officer. He was not made to officiate for Sri Agarwal but for Sri Firasat Ali. Consequently, we are concerned only with the vacancy had been filled up by Sri Firasat Ali which was only of 17 day's duration. Consequently, even according to our interpretation of Section 59 (1) of the Act, Mr. Mittal had the legal authority to appoint Sri Firasat Ali as the officiating Executive Officer. That being so, it must be held that he was a legally appointed Executive Officer even on the 5th June, 1958 when he dismissed Har Saran Das appellant. 7. No other point was raised either before the learned Single Judge or before us. 8. we are satisfied that there are no merits in these appeals. We, therefore, dismiss them but direct the parties to bear their own costs.