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1962 DIGILAW 109 (GUJ)

FALI PHIROJSHAH CONTRACTOR v. PHIROJSHAH PESTONJI CONTRACTOR

1962-10-15

V.B.RAJU

body1962
V. B. RAJU, J. ( 1 ) IN a suit by the opponent for a declaration that Government Securities worth Rs. 2 0 0 and odd standing in the joint names of the opponent and the petitioner were of his sole ownership and that he alone had a right to operate the account of the securities and for a consequential injunction the relief sought was valued at Rs. 99. 00. The value for purposes of jurisdiction was also taken as Rs. 99/and the suit was filed in the Court of the 3rd Joint Civil Judge Junior Division Baroda. An objection was taken on the ground of jurisdiction and it was contended that the value for the purposes of jurisdiction should be Rs 2 0 0 and odd and that the Court of the Joint Civil Judge Junior Division Baroda had no jurisdiction. ( 2 ) THE learned 5th Joint Civil Judge Junior Division Baroda observed that the suit admittedly fell under sec. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act of 1870 He also observed that the Court has got powers to inquire into the matter and revise the valuation under sec. 8a of the Bombay Court fees Act of 1954 and he discussed various authorities namely Chhotalal v. Laxmidas A. I. R. 1959 Bombay 517 Bhikhandas v. Motilal A. I. R. 1958 Bom. 307 Amirchand v. Kakimali A. I. R. 1924 Lahore 364 and Rama Kalinga v. Balappa Kalinga A. I. R. 1942 Bombay 203 He observed that in the light of the above authorities the correct position of law is that in a suit falling under sec. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court-fees Act it is the value of the relief claimed as put by the plaintiff that governs the jurisdiction as the value for the purposes of court-fees placed by the plaintiff is the same under sec. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. He conceded that under sec. 8a of the Bombay Court-fees Act of 1954 the Court can revise the valuation made if it felt that the suit was wrongly valued. He also observed as follows:- The inquiry into the valuation contemplated by sec. 8 of the Suits Valuation Act. He conceded that under sec. 8a of the Bombay Court-fees Act of 1954 the Court can revise the valuation made if it felt that the suit was wrongly valued. He also observed as follows:- The inquiry into the valuation contemplated by sec. 8a is to be made where there is a standard by reference to which the valuation of the relief claimed could be arrived at and if by reference to that standard the valuation put by the plaintiff is found to be erroneous the Court can revise it. However there is no such objective standard to revise the value put by the plaintiff in a suit for declaration and injunction as in the present suit where the right claimed by the plaintiff is an abstract right. That is therefore but natural that the plaintiff would put a notional value for the relief claimed by him as it would not be possible to evaluate the relief claimed by him at any particular figure. ( 3 ) SECTION 8a of the Court Fees Act no doubt restricts the plaintiff in valuing the relief to some extent but this restriction does not in any way prevent the plaintiff from doing so where the relief claimed by him is an abstract right and the valuation of which would vary according to individual views. ( 4 ) THE learned Judge relied on Barjor v. Nariman A. I. R. 1953 Bombay 382 But that was a case before the amendment of Court Fees Act in 1954 by inserting sec. 8a. The learned Judge observed as under:-IT would appear that section 8a which has been inserted by the amendment in the Court Fees Act in the year 1954 only restricts the plaintiff from valuing the relief claimed in his own way in such cases where there is a standard by reference to which the relief claimed could be valued. It is therefore not possible to attract the provisions of that section so far as the facts of the present case are concerned. It is therefore clear that it does not affect the plaintiffs right to put his own valuation for the reliefs claimed by him in cases where there is no standard by reference to which the value of the relief claimed could be ascertained. It is therefore clear that it does not affect the plaintiffs right to put his own valuation for the reliefs claimed by him in cases where there is no standard by reference to which the value of the relief claimed could be ascertained. ( 5 ) FOR the purposes of pleaders fees the plaintiff had valued the suit at Rs. 2 0 800 and with reference to this the learned Judge observed as follows:-I would lastly refer to the authority in A. I. R. 1958 Bombay 307 on which much reliance was placed by Mr. Chimanlal for the defendant. This authority can be distinguished on point of facts also as in that matter the valuation put by the plaintiff for the purpose of court fees was Rs. 265/and that for the purposes of jurisdiction was put at Rs. 22 500 whereas in the present suit the value put by the plaintiff for the purposes of court fee is Rs. 99/and the same value has been put for the purposes of jurisdiction. It appears that the amendment in the plaint was sought merely in order to clarify the position that the pleaders fee was to be taxed on the amount of Rs. 20 800 It has been clarified by the plaintiff in the Purshis Ex. 75 that the Court could not tax more than Rs. 9 999 by way of pleaders fee as it would amount to exercising pecuniary jurisdiction in excess of the statutory limit provided by sec 24 of the Bombay Civil Courts Act. It has been argued on behalf of the defendant that that the purshis Ex. 75 could not in any way change the averments in the plaint and that on the plaintiffs admission in the plaint itself. the suit was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court as it involved subject matter of Rs. 20 800 I am unable to accept this view and I find that the plaintiff has valued the suit correctly for the purposes of jurisdiction and pleaders fees; and that this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. ( 6 ) THE learned Judge therefore held that the valuation as made by the plaintiff was correct and he held that his Court had jurisdiction. This order is now challenged in revision. ( 6 ) THE learned Judge therefore held that the valuation as made by the plaintiff was correct and he held that his Court had jurisdiction. This order is now challenged in revision. ( 7 ) IT is difficult to agree with the lower Court that in the instant case there is no standard for putting a valuation of the subject matter of the suit. The subject matter of the suit is not a wall or an easement or an abstract thing. The subject matter of the suit is Government Securities of the value of Rs. 2 0 800 There may be cases falling under sec. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act in which there is no standard of valuation. But there may also be cases as the instant one in which there is clearly a standard of valuation. ( 8 ) SECTION 11 of the Suits Valuation Act reads as follows:- (1) Notwithstanding anything in section 578 of the Code of Civil Procedure an objection that by reason of the over-valuation or under-valuation of a suit or appeal a Court of first instance or lower appellate Court which had not jurisdiction with respect to the suit or appeal exercised jurisdiction with respect thereto shall not be entertained by an appellate Court unless (a) the objection was taken in the Court of first instance at or before the hearing at which issues first framed and recorded or in the lower appellate Court in the memorandum of appeal to that Court or (b) the appellate Court is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that the suit or appeal was over-valued or under-valued and that the overvaluation or under-valuation thereof has prejudicially affected the disposal of the suit or appeal on the merits. (2) If the objection was taken in the manner mentioned in clause (a) of subsection (1) but the appellate Court is not satisfied as to both the matters mentioned is clause (b) of that sub-section and has before it the materials necessary for the determination of the other grounds of appeal to itself it shall dispose of the appeal as if there had been no defect of jurisdiction in the Court of first instance or lower appellate Court. (3) If the objection was taken in that manner and the appellate Court is satisfied as to both those matters and has not those materials before it shall proceed to deal with the appeal under the rules applicable to the Court with respect to the hearing of appeals; but if it remands the suit or appeal or frames and refers issues for trial or requires additional evidence to be taken. it shall direct its order to a Court competent to entertain the suit or appeal. (4) The provisions of this section with respect to an appellate Court shall so far as they can be made applicable apply to a Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure or other enactment for the time being in force. (5) This section shall come into force on the first day of July 1887. Sub-sec. (4) of this section refers to a Court exercising revisional jurisdiction under sec. 622 of the Code of Civil Procedure of 1882 which corresponds to sec. 115 of the Court of Civil Procedure of 1908. The Court must therefore bear in mind the provisions of sec. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act. ( 9 ) IT is contended by the learned counsel for the opponent that sec. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act cannot be applied unless the suit has been disposed of and that after the suit has been disposed of the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 11 should be borne in mind. This contention cannot be accepted because there is nothing in sub-sec. (4) to show that the revisional jurisdiction can be exercised only after the suit has been disposed of. But if the suit has been disposed of then the conditions mentioned in cl. (b) of sub-sec. (1) should be borne in mind. These requirements need not be borne in mind if the suit or appeal has not been disposed of. The first requirement contained in clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act is obviously satisfied in this case because objection has been taken at or before the hearing at which issues were framed. The objection was admittedly taken in the written statement of the defendant itself before issues were first framed. The requirements of clause (a) of subsec. (1) of sec. 11 are therefore satisfied and clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. The objection was admittedly taken in the written statement of the defendant itself before issues were first framed. The requirements of clause (a) of subsec. (1) of sec. 11 are therefore satisfied and clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 11 does not come into operation because the suit was not decided. There is therefore nothing in sec. 11 of the Suits Valuation Act to prevent the High Court from exercising revisional jurisdiction under sec. 115 Civil Procedure Code. ( 10 ) BUT the learned counsel for the opponent relies on the judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rathnavarmaraja v. Smt. Vimla A. I. R. 1961 S. C. 1299 where it is observed as under:-WHETHER proper court-fee is paid on a plaint is primarily a question between the plaintiff and the State. The jurisdiction in revision exercised by the High Court under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is strictly conditioned by clauses (a) to (c) there of. The defendant who may believe and even honestly. that proper court-fee has not been paid by the plaintiff has still no right to move the superior Courts by appeal or in revision against the order adjudging payment of court-fee payable on the plaint. Section 12 (2) of the Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act only enables the defendant to raise a contention as to the proper court-fee payable on a plaint and to assist the Court in arriving at a just decision on that question. There is no provision in the Madras Court-fees Act or any other statute which enables the defendant to move the High Court in revision against the decision of the court of first instance on the matter of court fee payable in the plaint. The anxiety of the legislature to collect court-fee due from the litigant is manifest from the detailed provisions made in Ch. III of the Madras Act but those provisions do not arm the defendant with a weapon of technicality to obstruct progress of the suit by approaching the High Court in revision against an order determining the court-fee payable. ( 11 ) IN that case there was no question of jurisdiction involved but merely a question of court-fees. III of the Madras Act but those provisions do not arm the defendant with a weapon of technicality to obstruct progress of the suit by approaching the High Court in revision against an order determining the court-fee payable. ( 11 ) IN that case there was no question of jurisdiction involved but merely a question of court-fees. But in the instant case before me the question of jurisdiction is involved and therefore the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court cited above does not govern the facts of this case. In my opinion to hold that there is no standard of valuation in the instant case is definitely erroneous and amounts to material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction. Where the subject matter of suit consists of Government Securities of the value of Rs. 2 0 800 it would be wrong to say that there is no standard of valuation of the subject matter of the suit. As I have observed earlier there may be cases where there is no standard of valuation for instance where the subject matter of the suit relates to an easement or to a construction of a wall etc. But in my opinion the subject matter of the suit in the instant case has clearly a standard of valuation. ( 12 ) IT is also contended by the learned counsel for the opponent that sec. 8a of the Bombay Court Fees Act of 1954 does not apply to the facts of the case. That section reads as follows:-IF the Court is of opinion that the subject-matter of any suit has been wrongly valued it may revise the valuation and determine the correct valuation and may hold such inquiry as it thinks fit for subs purpose. ( 13 ) IT is contended that the suit has not been wrongly valued because under sec. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act of 1870 the plaintiff has put his own valuation. It is because of the provisions of sec. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act of 1870 that sec 8a has been added by the Bombay Court Fees Act of 1954. Although under sec. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act of 1870 the plaintiff can put his own valuation that can be revised by the Court if the requirement of sec. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act of 1870 that sec 8a has been added by the Bombay Court Fees Act of 1954. Although under sec. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act of 1870 the plaintiff can put his own valuation that can be revised by the Court if the requirement of sec. 8a of the Bombay Court Fees Act of 1954 is satisfied This is clearly a case in which the Court should form the opinion that the valuation made by the plaintiff under sec. 7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act of 1870 has been wrongly made by the plaintiff. It has been valued at only Rs. 99/for the purposes of jurisdiction and for the purposes of pleaders fees the plaintiff has valued the suit at Rs. 2 0 800 I therefore reject the contention of the learned counsel for the opponent. ( 14 ) THE revision application is therefore allowed the order of the lower Court is set aside and the lower Court is directed to make a fresh inquiry under sec. 8a of the Bombay Court Fees Act of 1954 after applying the correct principles to the matter There will be no order as to costs. Application allowed. .