Judgment G.N.Prasad, J. 1. The question for decision in this appeal by the State of Bihar is, whether the acquittal of the respondents, who are five in number, is justified. 2. They were prosecuted for having committed an offence under Sec.33 of the Indian Forest Act (16 of 1927), the relevant clause being Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of that section, which makes it an offence to break up or clear for cultivation or any other purpose any land in any protected forest, contrary to any prohibition under Sec.30 of the Act. 3. The substance of the prosecution case is that in the morning of the 9th September, 1959, four of me respondents were found to be ploughing a portion of the land appertaining to plot No. 607 in Sulumdag within me jurisdiction of Bishrampur police station in the district of Palamau. About six acres in that plot were found to have been cultivated by the respondents. The land tell within the demarcated area of a protected forest in regard to which a notification contemplated by Sec.29 of the Forest Act had been issued by the State Government in July 1955. The accusation against the respondents, therefore, was that they had acted in contravention of a prohibition under Sec.30 of the Act, which lays down that the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette prohibit as from a date fixed by the notification, amongst other things, "the breaking up or clearing for cultivation, for building, for herding cattle or for any other purpose, of any land in any such forest". 4. At the trial it was not denied on behalf of the respondents that the disputed portion of plot. No. 607 lay within the demarcation tine of the protected forest in question. It was also not denied that they were ploughing the land, as alleged by the prosecution, on the 9th September, 1959. The defence case, however, is that the respondents were in cultivating possession of the disputed land on behalf of their maliks for some six years prior to the time of the occurrence and that their right to continue the cultivation work was not taken away by the issue of the notification under the Forest Act, referred to above. In support of their case of cultivation from previous years, the respondents adduced oral and some documentary evidence. 5. In support of their case of cultivation from previous years, the respondents adduced oral and some documentary evidence. 5. Upon a consideration of the evidence led by the parties, the learned trying magistrate has held that the prosecution has not been able to disprove the defence version of cultivation of the disputed land from previous years. Referring to the notification of July 1955, issued under Sec.29 of the Forest Act, which alone seems to have been brought to the notice of the learned trying magistrate, he has held that the act of the respondents in ploughing a portion of plot No. 607 did not constitute any offence since an act of continued cultivation of a cultivable land does not amount to breaking up or clearing the land within the meaning of Sec.33(1) (c) of the Act. The respondents having been acquitted, the State of Bihar has come up to this Court in appeal. 6. Mr. Shahi appearing in support of the appeal contends that the notification, of July 1955, must be read along with a subsequent notification issued under Sec.30 of the Act, being Notification No. C/F-19017/58, dated the 13th May, 1958, published In Part II of the Bihar Gazette dated the 16th July, 1958, in which there is a reference to the earlier notification of July 1955, which was issued under Sec.29 of the Act. It is urged that reading the two notifications together, the act of the respondents in ploughing a portion of plot No. 607 must be held to be an offence punishable under sec. 13 of the Act. 7. It is surprising that the notification of May 1953 was not, brought on the record or to the notice of the teamed trying magistrate and only the July 1955 notification was relied upon by the prosecution in the trial Court, although in terms it left intact all existing rights of individuals or communities in the protected forest land, and it was, only intended to be a measure of emergency pending further enquiries into the rights of parties affected, if any, calculated to protect the rights of the Government in me forests notified as protected forests. It was, therefore, not the fault of the trying magistrate but of the prosecutors themselves that an order of acquittal was recorded in this case. 8. It was, therefore, not the fault of the trying magistrate but of the prosecutors themselves that an order of acquittal was recorded in this case. 8. Be that as it may, we would have taken the notification of May, 1958, as additional evidence in this appeal and not allowed, the case to go by default simply due to the laches of the persons conducting the prosecution in the trial Court. But there are, in my opinion, several difficulties in the way of the prosecution even in this regard. 9. In the first place, the mere production of the Bihar Gazette containing the notification of May 1958 is not enough. It would also have to be proved that the notification, had been published in accordance with the provisions, contained in Sec.31 of the Act, which reads thus:- - "31 the Collector shall cause a translation into the fecal vernacular of every notification issued under Sec.30 to be affixed in a conspicuous place in every town and village in the neighbourhood of the forest comprised in the notification". Had this notification been brought on the record at the stage of the trial then it would have been open to the defence to plead, and, if necessary, to prove non-compliance of the provisions of Sec.31. It would, in my opinion, be prejudicial to the respondents to assume at this stage that the notification had been duly published as required by the section. 10 The other difficulty in the way of the prosecution arises from the fact that no evidence has been led on behalf of the prosecution to show that the act of ploughing in which the respondents were found to be engaged on the date of the occurrence was an act of breaking up or clearing for cultivation the land demarcated as a protected forest. On the other hand, there is evidence on the record, which has been accepted by the trying magistrate, to the effect that the ploughing was not being done on the land in question for the first time on the date of the occurrence inasmuch as the land was under cultivation since about six years from before. On the other hand, there is evidence on the record, which has been accepted by the trying magistrate, to the effect that the ploughing was not being done on the land in question for the first time on the date of the occurrence inasmuch as the land was under cultivation since about six years from before. The expression "breaking up or clearing for cultivation...." occurring in Sec.33(1) (c) as also in Clause (b) (iv) of the notification if May 1958, read in context with the other expressions occurring therein can only mean that what has been prohibited in terms of the notification under Sec.30 is reclaiming any portion of a protected forest for the purpose of cultivation, by breaking up the soils for the first time after the publication of the notification and it does not extend to the prohibition of cultivation of such land which has already been broken up or cleared and brought into cultivation from before the issue of the notification. This conclusion is supported also by the very terms in which the notification of May 1958 was issued, the notification does not take away all kinds of existing private rights in protected forests but contains only certain limited prohibitions of exercise of such rights. It could not have been intended to operate as a complete prohibition of cultivation even of lands which were already under cultivation from before. Had that been the intention then clear words would have been used to that effect. 11. The view which 1 have taken is supported by the decision of a single Judge in Deb Ram V/s. State, AIR 1952 All 33 in which Nago Wani V/s. Emperor AIR 1929 Nag 190 was followed. 12. We are not concerned in this case with the civil rights of the respondents or their masters in the land in question, and we have only to see whether an offeree under Sec.33 of the Forest Act has been proved. 13. For the reasons which I have given above, I am unable to interfere with the order of acquittal recorded by the trying Magistrate. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. Anant Singh, J. 14 I agree.