JUDGMENT Krishnan, J. 1. This is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution filed by the transferee of an agricultural holding from Sukhram non-applicant numbered fourth among them, who are all brothers inter se. The order that is sought to be set aside in exercise of this Court's supervisory powers under Article 227, is the one passed by the Board of Revenue in revision upholding the order of the Additional Commissioner, Ujjain, itself supporting the Tehsildar's order for the restoration of possession to the four brothers under section 58 of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act. The Tehsildar himself who originally passed the order to the same effect, made it under section 78 of the same Act. The later section has presented certain difficulties of interpretation which are being cleared by this Court in the judgments of two other cases under Article 227, As far as this petition is concerned, we have only to see whether the Revenue Courts could under section 58 of the Act order the restoration of possession by removal of the transferee on the ground that the transfer had been effected in contravention of the provisions of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act in this case without obtaining the Collector's permission. 2. Stated thus, the question is very simple, namely: Has section 58 any application to a transfer of occupied land by an occupant to another without observing the requirements of the Act? The revenue authorities seem to have felt that section 58 can be invoked both in regard to occupied land in the possession of a cultivating tenant with a tenancy right, as well as in regard to unoccupied land in charge of the Government. However, the decisions of this Court have been to the effect that section 58 has application only to unoccupied land. It empowers the Tahsildar in exercise of his discretion to remove an occupant without legal authority. In addition, the Tahsildar is also competent to levy a penalty and in appropriate cases impose a fine as well The measure of the penalty is twice the sum equal to the revenue or rent which would have been assessed "if the land had been allotted to any other person" The word used is "may" and in appropriate cases the revenue authorities may recognize the occupant and treat him object to terms as a tenant of the land. For our consideration, the point to note is that section 58 pre-supposes that the land which has been unlawfully occupied is at that stage land that had not been al1otted. Thus, section 58 as such cannot be invoked where the land before occupation by the person sought to be removed has been allotted or occupied by a tenant. This is clear from the wording of the section and has already been held by this Court in the following rulings: Shrikrishna Vs. Kesho, Civil Revision No. 501 of 1958 decided on 25-8-1959 (SB); Dhansingh Vs. Mathu, Civil Second Appeal No. 235 of 1958 decided on 30-1-1961 (SB); Chhogalal Vs. Nandanbai, Misc. Petition No. 45 of 1958, decided on 15-1-1962 (DB). 3. Thus, the Board of Revenue committed a clear error of law in applying section 58 to the instant case which of course deals with the transfer alleged to be in contravention of the Act by a tenant. On this ground alone, and without going in to the effect of section 78 of the Act, the order of the Board has to be set aside and the transferee in possession left undisturbed. 4. The opposite party 1, 2 and 3 seeking to support the order of the Board tried in this Court to make out that the section applicable is 78 and not 58. Though the Board is emphatic that section 78 has no application and section 58 empowers it to remove the transferee it is urged by this party that the same order should be deemed to have been made under section 78. From this, that party goes on to interpret that section in a manner suitable to its contention; but before going in to that section, we have to see whether notwithstanding the position taken by the Board, section 78 does at all come into the picture. 5. We are aware of one source of confusion; section 78 has made a cross reference to section 58 when it provides that: "Any person......shall be liable to ejectment in accordance with the provisions of section 58". Obviously, the use of the words "in accordance with the provisions of section 58" occurring in section 78 (1) and section 86 (3) is unfortunate. Obviously, the use of the words "in accordance with the provisions of section 58" occurring in section 78 (1) and section 86 (3) is unfortunate. When a particular course of action open to the revenue authorities originally indicated for a particular set of circumstances is adopted for another set of circumstances, it is not strictly speaking "in accordance with" but "in the manner provided in" that section. The phrase "in accordance with" presupposes a much closer agreement between the two sets of circumstances, than where the words are "in the manner provided in", which only lays down a form of procedure for a new set of circumstances, which may be altogether different. To interpret the words "in accordance with" in the most literal manner is to make nonsense of these two provisions because one cannot act in accordance with section 58, where the circumstances are different and the land is allotted land. But one can act in the manner provided". In other words, the authority deciding whether there should be dispossession or some other equitable order and how much, if any, should be levied as compensation and so on. Thus, section 78 (1) and section 86(3) would mean that in the sets of circumstances indicated there the Tahsildar may, if he considers fit, act as if he was dealing with a trespasser on unoccupied land under section 58. Obviously, the person receiving the compensation if any, will not be the Government but the person who was occupying the land before the transfer of possession. So far the position is clear; but then are other tine points about section 78 which will have to be cleared on an appropriate occasion. 6. As far as the present opposite parties 1 to 3 are concerned, they have to show before invoking section 78 that the transferee, that is, the petitioner before us has obtained possession in contravention of the Act by virtue of a transaction which falls into one or other of the two descriptions : "(1) a bequest, gift, sale, mortgage or sub-lease: (2) an agreement purporting to be a bequest, gift, sale, mortgage or sub-lease." In the instant case, the transfer was admittedly effected in the following circumstances: The opposite party No.4 ostensibly acting on behalf of the brothers entered in to an agreement with the present petitioner to sell the land for a sum of money. We are not here concerned, nor were the revenue authorities concerned under section 78, whether the brother was exceeding his powers while he was transferring the entire holding. That would be a matter for the civil court, Here the question is, whether this agreement to sell falls in to one or other of the two categories. Obviously, it does not fall into (1). It does not also fall into (2) because the agreement does not purport to be a sale. It purports to be nothing more than an agreement to sell. No doubt, the physical results of a sale were produced, because after the agreement the would be purchaser paid the would-be vendor the consideration and the latter for his part put the former into possession. If the agreement did result in something like an equitable transfer of title, it is not because it purported to be a sale, but because of separate happenings which amounted to part performance; and part performance is not one of the categories that would attract the operation of section 78 (1). In this regard, the present case is similar to the one in Civil Revision No. 501 of 1958 (referred to above) where it was held- "Here the defendants' possession, as alleged by the plaintiff, is neither under any completed sale, nor any agreement purporting to be a sale. The possession is under an agreement to sell the land. An agreement for the sate of a property is clearly not an 'agreement purporting to be a sale of that property." 7. Apart from it, the transfer having taken place before the commencement of the Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, 1950 section 78 would in no event apply, as has been held in Chena Vs. State, 1962 RN 537 and Raghunath Vs. Ramkrishna and others, M.P. No. 35 of 1961. 8. In the result, the petition is allowed and the order of the Board confirming the order of the Commissioner is set aside. The petitioner cannot be disturbed in his possession of the lands concerned, by an order under section 58, or as for that matter, even under section 78 in the circumstances of this case. In view of the apparently conflicting decisions and the confusion that has been created in this regard, it would be fair that the parties should bear their respective costs of this proceeding.