JUDGMENT : Narasimham, C.J. - This is a revision against the order of the Subordinate Judge of Puri setting aside the sale of certain properties on 15-12-1959 in Execution Case No. 388 of 1956. The material facts are as follows: The Petitioner brought a suit against the judgment-debtor and attached some property before judgment on 17-3-1954. While the said attachment was pending, the opposite parties in some other suit against the judgment debtor obtained a decree and in Execution of the same (Execution Case No. 28 of 1957) sold the very same property and purchased the same on 2-1-1959. After purchase they also obtained delivery of possession in a short time. The suit property consists of a residential house in the town of Puri not far from the houses of both parties. The Petitioner however applied to the court for sale of the very same property in execution of his own decree without mentioning the fact that that property had been sold by the same court on 2-1-1959 and purchased by the opposite party. The court also was not aware of its own previous spell and hence the Petitioner's application was allowed and the property was actually sold on 15-12-1959. Thereupon on 15-1-1960 the opposite parties filed an application before the Court for setting aside the second sale on the main ground that as the property had already been sold away by the court by its first sale dated 2-1-1959, the judgment-debtor had no interest in the property whatsoever there after and that the second sale in favour of the Petitioner was in-valid. The lower court registered Misc. Case No. 9 of 1960 and both parties led evidence as to whether there was actual delivery of possession in pursuance of the first sale. The court came to a finding of fact that there was delivery of possession soon after the first sale. 2. Much argument was advanced before the lower court regarding the maintainability of the opposite parties' application for setting aside the sale on the main ground that if they were aggrieved by the second sale, they could have applied to the court for setting aside the sale under Order 21, Rule 89 Code of Civil Procedure. 2. Much argument was advanced before the lower court regarding the maintainability of the opposite parties' application for setting aside the sale on the main ground that if they were aggrieved by the second sale, they could have applied to the court for setting aside the sale under Order 21, Rule 89 Code of Civil Procedure. On behalf of the Petitioner however it was urged that the second sale was made by the court in error inasmuch as the same court had sold the very same property on an earlier occasion and that any error committed by the court could be corrected by it in exercise of its inherent powers. The court noticed some conflict of decisions on this question, but observed that if the attention of the court had been drawn before the second sale to the fact that there was an earlier sale of the same property on 2-1-1959, it .would not have put the property to sale on the second occasion. The court therefore thought that there was a mistake committed by it which could be rectified in exercise of its inherent powers. Hence it set aside the sale. 3. The main contention of Mr. Mohapatra on behalf of the Petitioner is that as a general rule the inherent powers of a court should not be invoked where there is an alternative remedy for the aggrieved party under some express provision of the Code. According to him, the opposite parties who were claiming title to the property by virtue of the earlier sale on 2-1-1959 should have applied to the court for setting aside the second sale under Order 21, Rule 89 CPC and that when they failed to do so the court had no other option but to confirm the second sale in view of the express language used in Order 21, Rule 92(1) Code of Civil Procedure. Mr. Mohapatra even wanted to put the case somewhat higher by saying that the court had no jurisdiction to exercise inherent powers when they conflict with the express provision of the Code. In this case, according to him the express provision of the Code was Order 21, Rule 92(1) CPC which says that if no application is made under Order 21, Rule 89 CPC the court shall confirm the sale. 4. In this case, according to him the express provision of the Code was Order 21, Rule 92(1) CPC which says that if no application is made under Order 21, Rule 89 CPC the court shall confirm the sale. 4. The true scope of Section 151 CPC has been recently explained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra Vs. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, where the majority of the Judges seem to have made a slight departure from the earlier view on the subject. They have stated in para 23 as follows: The section (Section 151 Code of Civil Procedure) itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear statement, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code control the inherent powers by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court; it is a power inherent, in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it. In the earlier para 21 while discussing their own previous observation in Padam Sen and Another Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, where they had said that the inherent power should not be exercised when its exercise might be in conflict with what had been expressly provided in the Code, they further added as follow: This restriction, for practical purposes, on the exercise of those powers is not because those powers are controlled by the provisions of the Code but because it should be presumed that the procedure specifically provided by the Legislature for orders in certain circumstances is dictated by the interests of justice. 5. From the aforesaid observations it seems fairly clear that their Lordships are of the view that in exceptional circumstances, in exercise of inherent powers, a court may even act in direct conflict with the express provision of the Code though such cases may be very rare indeed and for all practical purposes such a conflict should be avoided. The question thus becomes more a question of propriety than of want of jurisdiction. Hence even if we accept the contention of Mr. The question thus becomes more a question of propriety than of want of jurisdiction. Hence even if we accept the contention of Mr. Mohapatra (we express no final opinion on the subject) that the opposite parties' remedy was by way of an application under Order 21, Rule 89 Code of Civil Procedure, we cannot, in view of the aforesaid pronouncement of the Supreme Court, hold that the exercise of inherent powers u/s 151 CPC by the lower court was without jurisdiction. In a civil revision it will obviously not be proper for the court to interfere unless there is want of jurisdiction. Moreover, as pointed out by the lower court, there was an exceptional circumstance in this case. The same court sold the same property in a short interval, namely, 2-1-1959 and 15-12- 1959 to two different persons. At the time of the second sale it was unaware of the earlier sale. The Petitioner who should have been aware of the actual delivery of possession to the opposite parties in pursuance of the earlier sale, appears to have deliberately concealed this fact from the court and obtained the second sale. Under this exceptional circumstance if the lower court thought that the second sale should be set aside in exercise of its inherent powers, we are not satisfied that this is a fit case for us to interfere in exercise of our revisional jurisdiction. The application is therefore dismissed with costs. Hearing fee Rs. 50/- (Rupees fifty only). Barman, J. 6. I agree. Final Result : Dismissed