Judgment :- 1. These revision petitions and appeals arise out of four original petitions filed in the District Court of South Malabar which were disposed of by a common judgment by the District Judge of Kozhikode. The original petitions were by office bearers of Thazhekode Producers-cum-Consumers Co-operative Society who prayed for setting aside surcharge orders passed against them by the Register of Co-operative Societies, South Malabar, under S.49 of the Madras Co-operative Societies Act, VI of 1932. The learned District Judge declined to set aside the orders and the petitioners have preferred these civil revision petitions and appeals from the order of the District Judge. C.R.P. No. 166 of 1959 is by one Unnimoyan, the petitioner in O.P. No. 40 of 1952, who was the President of the Society from its inception till he resigned his office on 24-5-1947. A.S. No. 30 of 1959 is by one Appu, the petitioner in O.P. No. 45 of 1952, who was elected as President on the resignation of the former President. Achuthan, who was the Vice President throughout, was the petitioner in O.P. No. 43 of 1952 and he has preferred A.S. No. 82 of 1959 and CRP. No. 80 of 1959 against the order of the District Judge. The petitioner in CRP. No. 96 of 1959 is one Sivasankaran, the petitioner in O.P. No. 57 of 1952, who was the secretary of the Society from 12-4-1947 to 10-12-1947. The civil revision petitions and appeals were heard together. 2. The learned Government pleader who appeared for the second respondent, the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, raised a preliminary objection that the appeals were incompetent as Act VI of 1932 does not provide for an appeal from the decision of District Judge and as the decision of the District Judge is neither a decree nor an appealable order. He also contended for the extreme position that even a revision petition is not maintainable against the order. The submission of counsel for the petitioners and the appellants is that when once the matter reaches the civil court and a decision is given, the same will be subject to appeal. Reliance was placed in support of this position on the decision of the Privy Council in Adaikappa v. Chandrasekhara (AIR. 1948 P.C.12) and of the Madras High Court in Sundaram Iyer v. Dy. Registrar, Co-op. Societies (AIR. 1957 Mad. 634). Reliance was placed in support of this position on the decision of the Privy Council in Adaikappa v. Chandrasekhara (AIR. 1948 P.C.12) and of the Madras High Court in Sundaram Iyer v. Dy. Registrar, Co-op. Societies (AIR. 1957 Mad. 634). In the former case the question arose whether an order passed under S.20,19 and 8 of the Madras Agriculturists Relief Act, IV of 1938, and S.151 and 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure as well as another order passed on a petition for amendment of the decree in accordance with S.19 of Act IV of 1938 were appealable. It was held that both the orders were appealable, the former as a decree in a suit and the latter as one passed in execution of the decree. Lord Simonds, who delivered the judgment of the Board, observed: "The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorised by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal." This observation must be understood in the context, and I venture to think that this does not mean that there is a right of appeal in every matter decided by a civil court. The proceeding before the District Judge was not a suit and the order does not fall within the definition of a decree in the Code of Civil Procedure. The question of appealability of on order of the District Judge under S.49 of Act VI of 1932 (Madras) did not arise in the latter case. Their Lordships were only disposing of a writ petition to prohibit the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies from proceeding with certain plaints filed under S.51 of Act VI of 1932 (Madras). My attention was also drawn to a decision of this court reported in 1959 KLT. 334. That was an appeal from an order dismissing a petition by a debtor for relief under Act XXXI of 1958 (Kerala). The petition was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner was not an agriculturist and that that court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. 334. That was an appeal from an order dismissing a petition by a debtor for relief under Act XXXI of 1958 (Kerala). The petition was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner was not an agriculturist and that that court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Privy Council referred to earlier and it was held that the order was appealable. An order under Act XXXI of 1958 (Kerala) for scaling down a debt covered by a decree effects a partial or complete discharge or satisfaction of the decree and hence falls within the definition of a decree in the Code of Civil Procedure and is appealable. The position here is different and the decision cited cannot apply to the facts of this case. It cannot be said that the order of the District Judge is a decree as defined by the Code of Civil Procedure. The preliminary objection must therefore be sustained. 3. I am not inclined to accept the position that even a revision will not lie under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order of the District Judge is the decision of a case by a court subordinate to the High Court and the High Court may call for the records and interfere, if the requirements of S.115 are satisfied. 4. The conclusion that an appeal is incompetent affects only one of the petitioners, namely, Appu, as all the others have invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this court. As the whole case is before me I accede to the request of counsel to treat A.S. No. 30 of 1959 as a revision petition. 5. The revisional jurisdiction is necessarily circumscribed by the limitations of S.115 of the. Code of Civil Procedure, that is, interference is justified only if the subordinate court appears to have (a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it, (b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested in it, or (c) acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. The Supreme Court has pointed out the distinction between an appeal and a revision in Harishankar. v. R.G. Chawdhury (1962-1-KLR. 389) as follows: "The distinction between an appeal and a revision is a real one. The Supreme Court has pointed out the distinction between an appeal and a revision in Harishankar. v. R.G. Chawdhury (1962-1-KLR. 389) as follows: "The distinction between an appeal and a revision is a real one. A right of appeal carries with it a right of rehearing on law as well as, fact, unless the statute conferring the right of appeal limits the rehearing in some way as, we find, has been done in second appeals arising under the Code of Civil Procedure. The power to hear a revision is generally given to a superior Court so that it may satisfy itself that a particular case has been decided according to law. Under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court's powers are limited to see whether in a case decided, there has been an assumption of jurisdiction where none existed, or a refusal of jurisdiction where it did, or there has been material irregularity or illegality in the exercise of that jurisdiction. The right there is confined to jurisdiction and jurisdiction alone." Before considering the points raised before me I will briefly refer to the facts of the case. The co-operative society started functioning on 12-8-1946 and it was carrying on a wholesale trade in foodgrains. Unnimoyan was the President and Achuthan the Vice President from the very commencement of business. Unnimoyan submitted a letter of resignation to the Board of Directors on 24-5-1947 and this was accepted on 30-5-1947 with the reservation that his liability, if any, disclosed at the time of audit, will not be affected by the acceptance of his resignation. The learned District Judge did not accept his statement that he handed over charge to the Vice President Achuthan on 24-5-1947 in view of the resolution passed by the Board on 30-5-1947 that the Secretary should take charge of all the records, cash, etc., and hand over the same to the Vice President. Notwithstanding the formal letter of resignation, the evidence was to the effect that till the end Unnimoyan continued to exercise more powers than a Director could. Appu who was elected when Unnimoyan resigned appears to have exercised some functions as President though he disclaimed liability on the ground that he never got effective charge. Notwithstanding the formal letter of resignation, the evidence was to the effect that till the end Unnimoyan continued to exercise more powers than a Director could. Appu who was elected when Unnimoyan resigned appears to have exercised some functions as President though he disclaimed liability on the ground that he never got effective charge. Achuthan was the Vice President from the very inception till the end, and the evidence is to the effect that he was exercising powers which did not vest in him as Vice President. Sivasankaran was the Secretary from 12-4-1947 to 10-12-1947. Periodical inspection by officers of the Co-operative Department disclosed serious defects and irregularities in the working of the society and after repeated warnings, the Collector thought fit to hold an enquiry under S.38 of the Act. Statements were called for from the petitioners and after investigation, charges were framed against them. They filed statements in answer and after hearing them it was found that they had violated practically all the bye-laws and departmental instructions regarding the conduct of the affairs of the society. Accordingly surcharge orders were made making them liable for part of the loss sustained by the Society during the years 1946-47 and 1947-48. 6. Arguments were addressed first on grounds common to all the petitioners. These were that it should be proved that loss was sustained by the society before an order of surcharge could be made, that there is no evidence of such loss, that under the rules and circulars governing such co-operative societies deficits less than 2% of the total turnover could be written off and that if that is done there would be no deficit to account for. There was yet another ground that there was no proof of breach of trust on the part of the petitioners. On the first point the learned District Judge found on evidence furnished mainly by the Audit Reports as well as reports submitted by the Taluk Supply Officer and the District Supply Officer that a loss of Rs. 2,539-6-0 was sustained in the year 1946-47 and Rs. 17,107-7-10 in the year 1947-48. This was under three heads, namely, (1) deficit in the godowns, (2) deficit in gunnies, and (3) donation to Checking Inspector and excess rent paid. These amounts do not include loss sustained in the ration shops. 2,539-6-0 was sustained in the year 1946-47 and Rs. 17,107-7-10 in the year 1947-48. This was under three heads, namely, (1) deficit in the godowns, (2) deficit in gunnies, and (3) donation to Checking Inspector and excess rent paid. These amounts do not include loss sustained in the ration shops. There is no substance in the argument that loss was not sustained by the society. If there were no deficits the sale proceeds would have been higher. Again, a sum of Rs. 4,061-8-0 was lost as a result of the disappearance of gunnies alone. It is therefore clear that the society sustained loss during the period 1946 to 1948. 7. The argument that deficiency which was less than 2% of the total turnover could be written off is equally unsustainable. Reliance was placed on a circular, Ext. A-14 dated 18-4-1951 issued by the Commissioner of Civil Supplies, Madras, to all Collectors. This reads: "The Collector of Visakhapatnam is informed that the instructions issued in Board's L. Dis. 181240/A2/5Q/CS dated 18-1-1951 are based on Para.4 of the General Circular No. E/89110/47-1/CS dated 16-9-1947 according to which shortages exceeding 5 maunds per waggon or 2 per cent of the booked weight whichever is less should be reported to the Board for sanctioning write off and this has nothing to do with the monetary limit upto which the Collectors can sanction write off as laid down in Appendix 23 Madras Financial Code, Volume II. The following further instructions are issued to make the position clear. 2. When the shortage exceeds 5 maunds per waggon or 2 per cent of the booked weight, the Board's orders should be obtained for write off whatever be the amount involved. When the amount exceeds Rs. 300/-, the Board will write off and when it is less than Rs. 300/- the Board will authorise the Collector to write off. When the shortage is below 5 maunds or 2 per cent per waggon, the Collector can write off without Boards' prior sanction if the value is less than Rs. 300/- and if it is more than Rs. 300/- the Board should be addressed for writing off". This has reference only to loss sustained when foodgrains are transported by railways. When the shortage is below 5 maunds or 2 per cent per waggon, the Collector can write off without Boards' prior sanction if the value is less than Rs. 300/- and if it is more than Rs. 300/- the Board should be addressed for writing off". This has reference only to loss sustained when foodgrains are transported by railways. So far as this case is concerned the accounts which would have shown such deficit if any were never written and stocks were never checked so that no claim to write off deficit was made. In order that Ext. A-14 should apply it should first be established that there is shortage due to the reason mentioned therein, viz., transport of goods by railway. That not having been shown, it is no defence to say that 2% of the total turnover could have been written off. 8. Before considering the special arguments advanced by each of the petitioners it is necessary to refer to some of the bye-laws and rules governing such societies. These are summarised in Para.31 of the order of the learned District Judge which is extracted below: "Rule V of the rules framed under the Co-operative Societies Act insists that certain books and registers have to be maintained. In addition to this, as the Society was dealing in rationed articles several registers have to be maintained under the Madras Food-grains Procurement Order and the Madras Rationing Order and the rules and regulations framed under those orders. Bye-law 21 (a) enjoins the Board of Directors to see that the accounts and registers prescribed by rule V of the rules framed under the Act were maintained and to place the audit reports before a general body meeting within one month of its receipt. Bye-law 21 (b) enjoins the Board to maintain such accounts and registers under the Madras Foodgrains Procurement Order and the Madras Rationing Order, the regulations framed under both and such rules, regulations and Orders as may be prescribed from time to time etc. etc. The Board of Directors cannot plead ignorance of the bye-law and the departmental instructions as there is evidence in this case that these instructions and directions have been brought to their notice. Exhibit B-1 the minutes of proceedings of Board meetings contain the bye-laws. etc. The Board of Directors cannot plead ignorance of the bye-law and the departmental instructions as there is evidence in this case that these instructions and directions have been brought to their notice. Exhibit B-1 the minutes of proceedings of Board meetings contain the bye-laws. From the minutes it is seen that it was the practice to read and record the instructions received from the Supply Department and the Collector at the meeting of the Board. Further there is evidence that officers of the Supply Department, used to attend meetings of the Board and explain the relevant rules regarding the working of the Society to the members. Exhibit B-2 is a file containing the instructions issued to this Society by the officers. The Special Deputy Registrar for Procurement issued a circular to all the Societies containing instructions for the maintenance of a daily cash book, the day book, stock register, etc. (vide pages 42 and 43 of Exhibit B-2). In this circular the Secretary was asked to write up and close the day book every day and to take the signature of the President as under the bye-law the President is the ex-officio Treasurer. A stock register should be maintained showing stock position in respect of all articles in respect of each depot or godown. The weight of each consignment should be noted in the stock register. Excesses or deficit arising out of refilling or standardisation should also have to be noted. Instructions regarding securities to be furnished by the staff including the godown keeper was given. When paddy procured by different purchasing agents are brought to a godown they have to be kept separate with identity marks so that if deficits are noticed the responsibility for such deficit can be fixed. Separate stock registers should be maintained for gunnies and furniture and other equipment. The issues to ration shops and purchasing agents should be noted separately. A consolidated stock register should be maintained in the Head Office with reference to the daily stock return to be submitted by every godown. This circular was caused to be issued as defects were noticed at the time of inspection of certain Producers-cum-Consumers Societies. In another Circular (page 10; and 108 of Exhibit B-2) clause (c) directs that books should be balanced once a month with a view to see whether the Society was running on a profit or loss. This circular was caused to be issued as defects were noticed at the time of inspection of certain Producers-cum-Consumers Societies. In another Circular (page 10; and 108 of Exhibit B-2) clause (c) directs that books should be balanced once a month with a view to see whether the Society was running on a profit or loss. Stocks on hand should be shown in the balance sheet. A copy of this balance sheet signed by the President, Secretary and all the Directors should be sent to the District Food Reorganisation Officer with copy to Deputy District Supply Officer and Special Deputy Registrar by the 5th of every month. In another proceedings by the District Supply Officer (North) Calicut instructions were given for the maintenance of stock register, liability register, adjustment register, etc. this proceedings contain detailed instructions for the maintenance of the above registers. Page 190 contain a memo to the Secretary of this Society stating that he has not sent the weekly statements as required by rules and warning him that he will have to be replaced if he is not able to comply with the instructions of the Supply Department. Page 223 contain detailed instructions regarding quarterly verification of stock. Page 258 also contain instructions in this respect. It is stated that if the Directors promptly attend to this work they can know the stock position of the Society at the end of every quarter and take proper action to recover or write off the deficits. These rules and departmental instructions were not observed but deliberately disregarded resulting loss to the Society. Though the petitioners say in their evidence that all the required books and registers have been maintained the books and registers kept show that they were not properly maintained. No stock register was maintained for each godown. Registers of empties were not maintained at all. The registers which were maintained were improperly maintained." I may state here that it was not the case of the petitioners that the omissions and shortcomings referred to above are not real. 9. The third ground of a general nature is that there is no evidence of breach of trust on the part of the petitioners and that the order of surcharge should not have been made. The question as to what amounts to breach of trust in respect of a co-operative society came up for consideration in Sundara Iyer v. Dy. 9. The third ground of a general nature is that there is no evidence of breach of trust on the part of the petitioners and that the order of surcharge should not have been made. The question as to what amounts to breach of trust in respect of a co-operative society came up for consideration in Sundara Iyer v. Dy. Registrar, Co-op. Societies (AIR. 1957 Mad. 634) referred to earlier. After considering the analagous position in the Indian Companies Act, it was held that 'breach of trust' means "Every act of commission or omission which is a breach of duty, the expression breach of trust being understood in the sense of a breach of duty in the case of persons like directors who occupy fiduciary relationship to the company. If there is a breach of fiduciary obligation on the part of a person named in the section, the matter would be within S.235 of the Companies Act, and in our opinion, also within S.49 of the Co operative Societies Act, so as to enable the Registrar to make an order directing the person to repay or restore the money or property to the Society." I follow this dictum with respect. The learned District Judge has enumerated in Para.33 of the judgment the acts and omissions constituting dereliction of duty on the part of the petitioners. These are failure to maintain the prescribed registers and accounts, failure to appoint godown keepers after taking security, omission to maintain stock registers or register of empties, failure to have quarterly verification of stock, nonappointment of godown superintendent, failure to hand over charge to successive officebearers and omission to maintain refilling register. I may state that no attempt was made to show that this list of omissions in the discharge of duty -which is not exhaustive, is incorrect. If the petitioners or any of them had the duty to do any or all of these acts, their failure to do so would constitute breach of trust under, S.49. 10. At the final stage of hearing each of the petitioners was trying to throw the blame on one or more of the others. So for as Unnimoyan is concerned he was the President till he resigned. The reports of the inspecting officers show that he was taking a leading part in the conduct of affairs of the society even after he resigned office. So for as Unnimoyan is concerned he was the President till he resigned. The reports of the inspecting officers show that he was taking a leading part in the conduct of affairs of the society even after he resigned office. The bye-laws of the society contained in Ext. B-1 show that he had great responsibility in the matter. He was also the Treasurer. So far as Appu is concerned it was strongly urged that he did not get charge of the godowns or cash. However he is seen to have participated in the management to some extent by presiding over meetings and drawing money for procurement of paddy. If he did not get effectual management it is due to his own fault. He could have brought the matter to the notice of the authorities or even have resigned his office as his successor did. Achuthan, the Vice President, also took a leading part in the conduct of the society and cannot escape liability. Apart from the offices these persons held, there is the further fact that they were all Directors in whom the management of the Society vested. The fact that there are other Directors who have escaped liability is no reason for exonerating these petitioners. As regards the Secretary he had onerous duties. He was the chief executive officer & it was his duty to maintain the accounts and registers properly. The fact that he was a young man dominated by the President and Vice President is no reason for exonerating him. I am not satisfied that grounds exist for exonerating any of the petitioners. 11. I have considered the matter perhaps too elaborately, but as the evidence was placed before me, I may add that my conclusion would have been the same even if I had wider jurisdiction. 12. In the result I confirm the decision of the learned District Judge and dismiss all the revision petitions and appeals. The petitioners in each of the Civil Revision Petitions as well as the appellant in A.S. No. 30 of 1959 will pay the costs of the second respondent including advocates' fee of Rs. 50/- in each case. There will be no separate order for costs in A.S. No. 82 of 1959. Dismissed.