Judgment H.Mahapatra, J. 1. The appellant is an inhabitant of village Jorgawan in the district of Saharsa, where a Gram Panchayat has been constituted under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. He brought a suit for declaration that the notices given to him by the Mukhiya of the Gram Panchayat on the 17th of November, 27th of December, 1956 and 12th of January, 1957, were against the Panchayat Raj Act and, as such, not binding upon him and that a fine of Rs. 35 Imposed upon him by the same authority was equally illegal. He asked also for a perpetual injunction against the mukhiya and members of the Executive committee of tnat rancna-yat who were the defendants, restraining them from removing his bamboo clumps from, his plot No, 2312 under khata No. 60K in that village. 2. The plaintiff-appellant had bamboo clumps on his plot No. 2312 under khata No. 60K in that village. He purchased that land from the previous owner, Ekadashi Oevi by a registered deed of sale on the 8th of March, 1954. On the 17th of November, 1956, lie received a notice from defendant 1, who is the Mukhiya of the Panchayat, to the effect that he should remove the bamboo roots from the land in question. To that the plaintiff replied saying that the Panchayat had no right to give such order in regard to the removal of bamboos. Another notice was issued to him to the same effect as before, on the 27th of December 1956; and a reply also was sent on the 31st of December, 1956. Finally, on the 11th of January, 1957, in a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Panchayat it was decided that a fine of Rs. 35 would be imposed on the plaintiff for his default in compliance with the previous notice about the removal of the bamboos. On the 18th of January, 1957, the present suit was filed for reliefs stated above. All the members of the Executive Committee were made defendants in the suit. 3. The main defence was that the suit was barred in absence of a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that the order of the Gram Panchayat asking the plaintiff for the removal of the bamboo clumps and imposing a fine in default of compliance with the notice were valid under Sec.16 of the Act. 4. The main defence was that the suit was barred in absence of a notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that the order of the Gram Panchayat asking the plaintiff for the removal of the bamboo clumps and imposing a fine in default of compliance with the notice were valid under Sec.16 of the Act. 4. The trial Court found that a notice under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code was not necessary in the case and that the bamboo clumps on the land in question had not created any nuisance or inconvenience to any person of the locality. It also held that the provision under Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.16 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 , did not refer to the bamboo clumps. As the plaintiff had no opportunity to be heard before the imposition of the fine and in the circumstances of the case, the trial Court was of the view that the impugned action of the defendants was mala fide and tainted with dishonest intention. It accordingly decreed the plaintiffs suit. 5. On appeal by the defendants, the lower appellate Court reversed the decree and dismissed the plaintiffs suit. It was of the view that the bamboo clump was included within the word "vegetation" 35 mentioned in Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.16 of the Act and that the suit was barred for want of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court did not go to examine the justifiability of the order of removal on the view that, once the Panchayat had jurisdiction to decide that matter, it was not open to the civil Court to find out whether the decision was right or wrong. Against that, the present appeal is brought to this Court. 6. Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down for a notice at least sixty days before the institution of a suit against the Government or any public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity. A Gram Panchayat or the Executive Committee is certainly not the Government, Whether the members thereof are public officers will have to be decided with reference to the definition of "public officer" in Sub-section (17) of Sec.2 of the Code. A Gram Panchayat or the Executive Committee is certainly not the Government, Whether the members thereof are public officers will have to be decided with reference to the definition of "public officer" in Sub-section (17) of Sec.2 of the Code. None of the categories given in Clauses (a) to (h) of that sub-section can apply to the Mukhia or any member of the Executive Committee. Besides, in the present suit, the plaintiffs plaint was directed against the decision arrived at by the Executive Committee. The Mukhia (defendant 1) only communicated what was decided by the Executive Committee. The resolutions of the Executive Committee were proved as Exhibits D (3) and D (4) and the notices issued on that basis were marked as Exhibits 1 and 1 (a). The notice following the resolution of the 11th of January, 1957, is not on the record. Exhibit 1 is of November 17, 1956 and Exhibit 1 (a) is of the 27th of December, 1956. The latter notice was on the basis of the resolution of the Executive Committee dated the 26th of December, 1956. So, according to the nature of the reliefs claimed in the suit, the decision and the action of the Executive Committee of the Gram Panchayat were under challenge. Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure will thus not apply to a suit of that nature. Learned Government Advocate appearing for the State of Bihar, though the State of Bihar was not a party to the suit, contended that an authority which is given the criminal jurisdiction and the power to impose a fine will be deemed to be a "public officer". He also relied upon Section 83 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, as it stood before the amendment, which provided that every member of a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, the Mukhia and the Gram Sevak, shall be deemed to be a public servant. That did not make a member of the Executive Committee a public servant. Besides, a public servant is not always a public officer within the meaning of the definition given in Sub-section [17) of Sec.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 83 in the meanwhile has besn amended and clearly states that "Every member of a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, the Mukhia, ..... Besides, a public servant is not always a public officer within the meaning of the definition given in Sub-section [17) of Sec.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 83 in the meanwhile has besn amended and clearly states that "Every member of a bench of the Gram Cutcherry, the Mukhia, ..... shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of Sec.21 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of 1860) and the provisions of Chapter X of the said Code shall apply in respect of any contempt of the lawful authority of such public servant". I am, therefore, of the view that the members of the Executive Committee including the Mukhia are not the public officers, within the meaning of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and the present suit was not barred for absence of any notice under that section, two months before the institution of the suit. 7. The imposition of fine of thirtyfive rupees was by the Executive Committee, as it appears from the resolution, Exhibit D(4). Sub-section (2) of Sec.16 of the Act (as it stood before the amendment by Bihar Act 21 of 1959) was "If a person to whom a notice has been served under Sub-section (1) fails without sufficient reason to comply with the requisition made in the notice, he shall be liable to a line which may extend to fifty rupees." Thus, tne Executive Committee cannot be said not to have any power at the relevant time to impose a fine. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that as Sub-section (2) of Sec.16 stands now, a fine can be imposed only by a bench of the Gram Cutcherry on conviction by them, but this amendment came in 1959, and, therefore, will not apply to the facts of the present case, which occurred in 1957. But the important point in this connection is whether the imposition of the fine was done properly by the executive Committee. It is fundamental that any authority which is vested with a power to impose fine, or, in other words, with criminal jurisdiction, is burdened with the obligation, whether expressly or impliedly, of observing the basic principles of a trial before arriving at a conclusion leading to an imposition of a penalty on a person. The learned Government Advocate very fairly conceded-to this. The learned Government Advocate very fairly conceded-to this. From the resolution, Exhibit D(4), of the 11th of January 1957, it appears that the Executive Committee did not feel satisfied with the reply given by the plaintiff and imposed a fine of thirtyfive rupees. Whether the plaintiff had removed the bamboo clumps or not or whether the Executive Committee had the power to ash for the removal of such bamboo clumps or whether there had really been a default which could result in the imposition of a fine, are, all matters of consideration in presence of the plaintiff. Absence of a skeleton trial vitiated the basis of the conviction and the imposition of the fine. In any view the fine of thirtyfive rupees cannot be supported, on principles of natural justice. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the notices, Exhibits 1 and 1 (a), were also illegal, improper and without jurisdiction inasmuch as the bamboo clumps could not come within the provision of Clause (c) of Sub-section (1) of Sec.16 of the Act. I shall reproduce that : "16 (I) For the improvement of sanitation, the Executive Committee shall have power to do all acts necessary for, and incidental to, the carrying out of the functions ontrusted or delegated to the Gram Panchayat, and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power or to the provisions of any other Act, the Executive Committee may require, by notice, the owner or occupier of any land or building, giving him reasonable time for compliance thereof,-- * * * * * (o) to clear off any vegetation, undergrowth, prickly-pear or scrub-jungle therefrom." In Sec.14, the compulsory duties of the Gram-Panchayat are stated; and one of them is sanitation and conservancy. The supplementary duties are given in Sec.15, in the wake of that, comes Sec.16 under which 3 person can be called upon to remove certain things from his land for the purpose of Improvement of sanitation. What he can be asked to clear are indicated in the different clauses of Sub-section (1) of Sec.16. In that background, one has to see what is meant by "vegetation". Bamboo clumps certainly do not come tinder "undergrowth, prickly pear or scrub-jungle". Whether they would be covered by the word "Vegetation"? Vegetation in a general sense may mean any plant life. In that background, one has to see what is meant by "vegetation". Bamboo clumps certainly do not come tinder "undergrowth, prickly pear or scrub-jungle". Whether they would be covered by the word "Vegetation"? Vegetation in a general sense may mean any plant life. If that meaning was in the view of the legislature, there was no need of mentioning "undergrowth, prickly pear or scrub-jungle". They would have been included in the wider meaning of "vegetation". Even valuable trees like mango, jackfruit or orange can come under that. Paddy, wheat, or pulses will not be excepted from that general meaning of vegetation. The purpose of the Bihar Gram Panchayst Raj Act was not to render the rural people poorer by destroying their valuable- crops or trees. Useless things like scrub-jungle, prickly pear, wild growths under big trees could be very well intended to be cleared to improve the sanitation. The legislature was not unaware of the prevailing sanitary conditions of the villages of our country as well as the economic condition of the people. The small measure by which the destruction of valuable trees or crops will contribute to the improvement of existing unhygienic conditions of our villages will be out-weighed by the economic loss that will ensue. It is well established that when there are more than one meaning available to a word, some may be general and others restrictive, the meaning which will be in keeping with the purpose of the enactment and other provisions of similar nature should be adopted. A meaning of a word, leading to imbalance is to be avoided. The word "vegetation" occurs in Clause (c) of Sec.16(1) along with the words "undergrowth, prickly pear or scrub-jungle". If the first word vegetation) would have come in the last, such as "or any other vegetation", there could have been no doubt that the vegetation was intended to be of the same form or nature as the preceding descriptions. Though "vegetation" occurs first its meaning will be controlled bv the other descriptions of plant life that follow it, otherwise, I there will be imbalance of cause and effect and disproportionate dissimilarity between the one and the other three kinds of plant life sought to be cleared for sanitary improvement of the surroundings. 9. Though "vegetation" occurs first its meaning will be controlled bv the other descriptions of plant life that follow it, otherwise, I there will be imbalance of cause and effect and disproportionate dissimilarity between the one and the other three kinds of plant life sought to be cleared for sanitary improvement of the surroundings. 9. Associated words when used in one context are taken in their meaning, not in divorce from each other when two or more words, which are susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from each other, that is, the more general Ms restricted to a sense analogous to the less general. The expression, for instance, "places of public resort", assumes a very different meaning when coupled with "roads and street" from that which it would have if the accompanying expression was "houses" (see, Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 11th edition, page 321). One section, Sec.179 of the Thames Conservancy Act, 1857, has a saving clause that reads as follows : "None of the powers by this. Act conferred, or anything in this Act contained, shall extend to take away, alter, or abridge any right, claim, privilege, franchise, exemption, or immunity," to which the occupiers of the land on the banks were entitled. In the case of Kearns V/s. Cordwainers Co., (1359) 23 LJPC 285, an argument was advanced that the word "right" in the saving clause included also public right such as the right of navigation. That was repelled, and the word "right" was limited by the associated words to vested rights of property and did not include the right of navigation which the occupiers enjoyed not otherwise than with the public generally. This view was accepted in the House of Lords in the case of (William) Lyon V/s. Fishmongers Co., (1876) 1 AC 662. This is a useful instance to show how a word having a general and wider meaning should be taken in a restricted sense which is indicated by the expressions with which the word is associated. This view was accepted in the House of Lords in the case of (William) Lyon V/s. Fishmongers Co., (1876) 1 AC 662. This is a useful instance to show how a word having a general and wider meaning should be taken in a restricted sense which is indicated by the expressions with which the word is associated. In the case of R. V/s. Sanders, (1843) 173 ER 748, the meaning of the word "shop" occurring, in a penal statute in the expression "dwelling, shop, warehouse, or counting-house" was held to be that kind of shop which had some analogy with a ware-house, that is, one for the sale of goods -- and not a carpenters shop or a blacksmiths shop. Such instances can be multiplied. I am thus supported in the view that "vegetation" in Clause (c) of Sec.16(1) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, is to be restricted by the associated words to plants like "undergrowth, prickly pear, or scrub-jungle". Valuable trees like mango or bamboo will not come within that meaning. 10. The notices, Exhibits 1 and 1 (a), asked the plaintiff to remove the bamboo Jhurmuths (Beet, a Hindi word meaning the root). By Jhurmuths are meant the bamboo branches. They were asked to be cut out from the root. They were not undergrowths of a bamboo chimp. The trial" Court found and that has not been upset by the Court of appeal, that the plaintiffs bamboo clump did not cause any nuisance or inconvenience in the locality and that there were many other bamboo clumps of other people in that village. The jurisdiction, of the Executive Committee can only come to be exercised for the purpose of clearance of vegetation, undergrowth, prickly pear or scrub-jungle, only if such clearance is necessary for the improvement of sanitation. The basic facts must be there to justify such action on the part of the Panchayat. In the present case, on the finding of the trial Court, that was not established; and, therefore, the notices, Exhibits 1 and 1 [a), of the 17th of November and the 27th of December, 1956, calling upon the plaintiff to remove the bamboo jhurmuth (beet), were not In accordance with law as provided in Sec.16(1) of the Act, and, therefore, they were not binding upon the plaintiff. 11. 11. The plaintiff had asked for a perpetual injunction against the defendants restraining them from removing the bamboo. We are told that the bamboos have already been cut by the Panchayat Executive Committee and removed. Learned counsel stated that some of the bamboos are still left; and an injunction can be issued in respect of them. In face of the fact that the cutting of the bamboos has already been done, rightly or wrongly, it will not be proper at this stage to allow an injunction against the defendants. I also feel that in view of what this Court has expressed about the illegality of the orders of the Executive Committee, that body will not indulge any further in cutting the bamboos from the plaintiffs land, if that has not already been done. 12. The result is that this appeal will be allowed in part. The plaintiffs suit for the declaration that the notices dated the 17th of November, and the 27th of December, 1956 and the 12th of January, 1957, were it legal and without jurisdiction and the fine of Rs. 35/- imposed upon him was illegal shall be decreed. The plain tiffs claim for injunction is refused. The decree passed by the trial Court is restored subject to this modification. The judgment and the decree passed by the lower appellate Court are set aside, Since the defendants constitute a statutory body and although the finding of the trial Court was that they acted mala fide, I am not inclined to award any costs against the defendants. The Gram Panchayat Act is now, in reality, on trial and the statutory bodies in the rural areas have just begun to function. They are likely to commit errors in their judgment and in their action. It will be some time before these bodies can begin to properly discharge their duties in accordance with the import and purpose of the Act. In that view, the parties will bear their own costs throughout this litigation. Tarkeshwar Nath, J. 13 I agree.