JUDGMENT S. D. Singh, J. - This special appeal has been filed against the judgment of Sharma, J. in second civil appeal No. 229 of 1956 arising out of suit No. 44 of 1953 of the Court of Munsif, Kheri. The suit was filed under Section 209 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for possession over certain plots. The plaintiff, Ram Bilas, son of Bansidhar, claimed that the plots in question formed the Sir of his predecessor-in title, that they were mortgaged with the defendants' predecessors with possession and that on the abolition of the Zamindari, he himself acquired bhumidhari rights in the plots, while the defendants ceased to retain possession over the same under Section 14 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and were, consequently, liable to be ejected as trespassers. 2. The plots in question lie in village Kharkhara. The Zamindari property to which these plots appertain belonged originally to one Umrao Singh, who sold it to Bansidhar, father of the plaintiff. Bansidhar mortgaged some of these plots on 20th November, 1913, and others on 3rd May, 1915, with possession with the predecessors-in-title of the defendants. The plaintiff, therefore, contended that the plots being the sir plots of his father, he acquired bhumidhari rights therein and that the mortgagees having ceased to retain the right to be in occupation of the plots under Secs. 6(g) (i) and 14(1) of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (to be referred to hereafter as the Act), he has become entitled to obtain possession over the plots. 3. The suit was contested by the defendants on several grounds, which it is not necessary to mention here. It was decreed by the trial Court and the decree was maintained in appeal. Even the second appeal having been dismissed by our brother, Sharma, the defendants have preferred this special appeal. 4. The fact that the plots in question, which were mortgaged with the predecessors of the defendants, were sir plots of Bansidhar was not challenged. Copies of the mortgage-deeds are Exs. 1 and 2 on record and they clearly indicate that the plots were sir plots of the mortgagor oh the date they were mortgaged. 5. 4. The fact that the plots in question, which were mortgaged with the predecessors of the defendants, were sir plots of Bansidhar was not challenged. Copies of the mortgage-deeds are Exs. 1 and 2 on record and they clearly indicate that the plots were sir plots of the mortgagor oh the date they were mortgaged. 5. What was contended on behalf of the appellants was that Section 14 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act does not apply to the facts of this case and that consequently the plaintiffs were not entitled to take advantage of Cl. (a) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 14 of the aforesaid Act. 6. The argument turns upon the interpretation of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 14. The relevant portion of Section 14 reads :- "14. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (2), a mortgagee in possession of an estate or share therein shall, with effect from the date of vesting, cease to have any right to hold or possess as such any land in such estate. (2) Where any such land was in the personal cultivation of the mortgagee on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting - (a) if it was sir or khudkashi of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage, the same shall, for purposes of Section 18 be deemed to be the sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor or his legal representative." 7. Under sub-sec. (1) a mortgagee in possession of an estate or share therein shall, with effect from the date of vesting, cease to have any right to hold or possess any land in such estate as a mortgagee. The same result flows from sub-Cl. (i) of Cl. (g) of Section 6 which reads: - "(g) (i) every mortgage with possession existing on any estate or part of an estate on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall, to the extent of the amount secured on such estate or part, be deemed, without prejudice to the rights of the State Government under Section 4, to have been substituted by a simple mortgage." 8. Under Cl. (a) of sub-sec. Under Cl. (a) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 14, if any land was in the personal cultivation of the mortgagee on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting and if that land was sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage, that land shall be deemed to be sir or khudkasht of that mortgagor for purposes of Section 18, which means that he will be come bhumidhar of that land. If the land in the possession of the mortgagee was not sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor, it will be Cl. (b) of sub-sec. (2) which will apply. But we are not concerned with the application of that clause in this case. 9. What was contended on behalf of the appellants was that the words "any such land" in sub-sec. (2) have reference to the land referred to in sub-sec. (1) of Section 14 and unless, it was urged, the land which was mortgaged by Bansidhar is covered by the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of Section 14, even sub-sec. (2) of this section would not apply and the plaintiffs-respondents would not be entitled to claim the mortgaged plots as their sir plots and consequently to claim them as their bhumidhari land. 10. The words "any such land" have reference to the words "any land in such estate" at the end of sub-sec. (1) of Section 14 and the words "such estate" in the expression "any land in such estate" necessarily refer to the expression "estate or share therein" used earlier in the same sub-section. The question ultimately to be decided, therefore, is whether the land which is in the possession of the mortgagees, is land in "an estate or share therein." 11. As sub-sec. (1) of Section 14 applies to a mortgagee in possession of only "an estate or share therein," the question is whether the appellants can be deemed to be mortgagees of an estate or share therein. The word "estate" has been defined in Cl. (8) of Section 3 of the Act as meaning an area including under one entry in any one of the registers prepared and maintained under Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 32 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901. While any such entry would constitute an estate and the provisions of sub-sec. The word "estate" has been defined in Cl. (8) of Section 3 of the Act as meaning an area including under one entry in any one of the registers prepared and maintained under Cls. (a) to (e) of Section 32 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901. While any such entry would constitute an estate and the provisions of sub-sec. (1) of Section 14 would undoubtedly apply to the same, the sub-section would also apply to the mortgage of a share in such estate and it is here where problem arises. It was contended that sub-sec. (1) would apply to a mortgage of a share in an estate, but not to a mortgage of a part of an estate. The word "share," it was urged, means a fractional share of the whole and where the property which is mortgaged is not a share or a fraction of the estate, but a specific area of land in the estate, sub-sec. (1) would not apply to the same, even, if the specific area is a part of the estate. This question has to be considered from the point of view of rights of the mortgagee as well as of the mortgagor. So far as the rights of the mortgagee are concerned, it would probably not make much of a difference, as even Cl. (g) (i) of Section 6 of the Act makes virtually the same provision. The words used in that clause are not "an estate or a share therein" but "any estate or part of an estate," Cls. (g) (i) of Section 6 would, in any case, apply even to the mortgage of specific plots in an estate, and under that clause, therefore, a mortgage with possession would stand converted into a simple mortgage, with the result that the mortgagee would lose his right to retain possession over the land. The appellants would not, therefore, be entitled to retain possession over the plots mortgaged with them. But the question for decision is not merely whether the appellants have a right to retain possession over the land, but also whether even the plaintiff-respondents have a right to get back possession from the mortgagees. This right would vest in them only if they are clothed with any status in respect of the plots in question after the abolition of Zamindari in the State. This right would vest in them only if they are clothed with any status in respect of the plots in question after the abolition of Zamindari in the State. The only right which is claimed by them is the one under Section 18 of the Act. That right they can have only if the land is deemed to have been held by them as their sir or khudkasht. It can be deemed to be their sir or khudkasht if Cl. (a) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 14 applies to them. That clause would apply only if the words "an estate or share therein" include specific plots in an estate which, it was contended on behalf of the appellants, they do not. 12. The Act clearly distinguishes between the "part of an estate" and "share in an estate." The words "share in an estate" have been used not only in Sec. 14(1) but also in Sec. 13(1). Where a Zamindar allows a mortgagee of his Zamindari property to take possession over his sir or khudkasht land and does not himself, claim ex-proprietary rights therein or allows his ex-proprietary rights to lapse or surrenders the same, the land ceased to be sir or khudkasht. The sir or khudkasht rights do not revive in favour of the Zamindar even after the mortgage is redeemed. Cl. (a) of sub-sec. (2) of Section 14 of the Act creates a fiction under which sir or khudkasht land which had that character on the date of the mortgage is to be deemed to be sir or khudkasht of the intermediary for purposes of the acquisition of bhumidhari rights. But the intermediary cannot have advantage of that fiction in law unless he brings his case within the four corners of the language used by the Legislature. That the Legislature had in mind some distinction between "a share in an estate" and "a part of an estate" is clear from the fact that while one phrase is used in Secs. 13(1) and 14(1) of the Act, the other phrase is used in Sec. 6(g) (i). The Hindi version of the Act also maintains the distinction indicating that it is a distinction deliberately made. The corresponding words in the Hindi version of Section 6 (g) (i) are "kisi bhag" while the corresponding words used in Secs. 13(1) and 14(1) of the Act, the other phrase is used in Sec. 6(g) (i). The Hindi version of the Act also maintains the distinction indicating that it is a distinction deliberately made. The corresponding words in the Hindi version of Section 6 (g) (i) are "kisi bhag" while the corresponding words used in Secs. 13(1) and 14(1) are "uske ansh." The Legislature was alive to the distinction that was thus being created in the two provisions of the Act and in order that one phrase may not be confused with the other, the word "part" has been written in the Hindi version within brackets after the word "bhag" in Section 6 (g) (i) and the word "share", after the word "ansh" in Sec. 14(1). It is, therefore, clear that Sec. 14(1) was intended to apply only to usufructuary mortgagees of estates or shares in such estates and not to mortgagees of parts of estates. That being so, the appellants lose their right to retain possession over the mortgaged plots, not under sub-sec. (1) of Section 14, but under Cl. (g) (i) of Sec. 6; and as Sec. 14(1) does not apply to the facts of the case, the plaintiff-respondents would not be entitled to rely upon Sec. 14(2) for treating the land in question as their sir or khudkasht for a claim of bhumidhari rights under Sec. 18. These plots cannot be deemed to have been sir or khudteasht land of the plaintiff-respondents and they cannot acquire bhumidhari rights in the same. It may be that in reaching this conclusion we are arriving at a result which was not, actually in the mind of the Legislature, but that is not the criterion for interpreting the language of an Act. As was pointed out by Jervis, C. J. in (1850), 20 L. J. C. P. 33 (at p. 35): - "If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead to an absurdity or manifest injustice. As was pointed out by Jervis, C. J. in (1850), 20 L. J. C. P. 33 (at p. 35): - "If the precise words used are plain and unambiguous, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it does lead to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied where their import is doubtful or absurd, but we assume the functions of legislatures when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning." The words used by the Legislature in Sec. 14(1) being clear and unambiguous, we are bound to give them their plain meaning. We are clearly of opinion, therefore, that the words "share therein" in the expression "an estate or share therein" in sub-sec. (1) of Section 14 do not mean specific plots in an estate, but a fractional portion of the estate and where what was mortgaged with the mortgagees was specific plots, Sec. 14 of the Act will not apply and the mortgagors will not be entitled to claim sir rights in the mortgaged property so as to be entitled to acquire bhumidhari rights therein under Section 18 of the Act. 13. Thus whether or not the appellants have any right to retain possession over these plots, the plaintiff-respondents have not acquired bhumidhari rights therein and were not entitled to maintain a suit for possession against the appellants. Their suit, therefore, should have been dismissed. 14. This appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs throughout. The suit of the plaintiffs for possessions over the plots in question will stand dismissed.