This is an appeal against the order of the learned single Member of this Board dated 20.9.60 by which he has rejected the application for revision against the order of Additional Commissioner Jaipur dated 30.5.59. A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the respondent by Shri Roop Chand Sogani against the maintainability of this special appeal. The argument is that this is a case under the Rajasthan Tenancy Act (No. 3 of 1955) (hereinafter referred to as the Tenancy Act), Sec. 222 whereof lays down that "no appeal shall lie from any decree or order passed by any revenue court except as provided in this Act. The appeals provided by this Act are only under Sec. 223 against the original decrees, under Sec. 224 against the the appellate decrees and under Sec. 225 against the orders. It is being contended that as the judgment under appeal is neither an order nor a decree covered by the provisions of Sec. 223, 224 or 225 of the Act, this appeal is not permissible in terms of Sec. 222. Now Sec. 10(1) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, (No. 15 of 1956) hereinafter referred to as the Revenue Act) deals with the manner in which the jurisdiction is to be exercised by the Board of Revenue. It says "Except as otherwise provided by or under this Act or by any other law or enactment for the time being in force in the whole or any part of the State and subject to any rules made in that behalf, the jurisdiction of the Board may be exercised :— (a) by the Chairman or any other member of the Board, sitting singly, or (b) by a bench of the Board, consisting of two or more members. provided that a party aggrieved by a decision of a single member shall have the right to make a special appeal to a bench consisting of two or more members of the Board within one month from date of the decision of the single member". It is contended on behalf of the respondent that the provisions of this section apply only to cases under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act and cannot apply to the cases under the provisions of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. This is an argument obviously untenable. The constitution and the powers of the Board are dealt with by Chapter II of the Revenue Act. This is an argument obviously untenable. The constitution and the powers of the Board are dealt with by Chapter II of the Revenue Act. This subject is nowhere dealt with by the Tenancy Act. The constitution the general powers and the jurisdiction as well as the manner of exercising it will, therefore, be that laid down by the provisions in the Revenue Act. In that respect Sec. 10(1) will come into application to the cases under the Tenancy Act as well, unless specially excluded by any enactment. In this connection it cannot, however, be ignored that the provisions of Sec. 10(1) of the Revenue Act themselves are subject to the provisions not only of this Act but of other Acts or enactments in force for the time being as well as the rules made in that behalf also. What is, however, so subject to is the manner of the exercising of the jurisdiction of the Board and not the appeals that might be heard by the Board in accordance with the provisions of any enactment for the time being in force. In other words, it is only how the jurisdiction vested in the Board by any enactment for the time being in force will be exercised that will be covered by the provisions of Sec. 10(1) and no more and at the same time in the manner of the exercise of jurisdiction by the Board it would be the provisions of this section that will prevail over the provisions of any other enactment whatsoever. Now this section provides that the jurisdiction vested in the Board by any enactment may be exercised by the Chairman or any other Member of the Board singly or by a bench of the Board consisting of two or more Members. This provision is subject further to the proviso that any party aggrieved by a decision of the single Member shall have the right to make a special appeal to a Bench consisting of two or more members of the Board. This is, therefore, not a power |of hearing the appeals provided by any enactment but a power for the exercising of the jurisdiction vested in the Board itself. This is, therefore, not a power |of hearing the appeals provided by any enactment but a power for the exercising of the jurisdiction vested in the Board itself. In other words, it only lays down that the jurisdiction vested in the Board under any law shall be exercised either by the Chairman or a single Member or a Bench of the Board consisting of two or more Members and that in case the jurisdiction had been exercised by only one Member, the aggrieved party can invoke the powers of a Bench consisting of more than one Member against such an order. In view of the opinion expressed above, Sec. 226 of the Tenancy Act laying down that no appeal save as that provided by the Tenancy Act shall lie does not in any way come into conflict with the provisions of Sec. 10(1) of the Revenue Act. This is all the more so when according to rules made in this behalf as laid down in the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual Part I, paras 8 and 9 appeals are to be heard always by a Division Bench and not by a Member sitting singly. It is only the revisions as provided in para 9(ii) that can be heard by a Member sitting singly and that also when the lower courts decree or order is neither to be modified not reversed. In other words a Member sitting singly can hear a revision only to reject it and never to accept it. So being the Rules made in this behalf the Board even while hearing special appeals will never have a chance of hearing an appeal against the provisions of the Tenancy Act or any other enactment for the time being in force. What it will hear by way of appeal will be only to examine whether the" revisional jurisdiction vested in the Board has been exercised by the learned Member sitting singly correctly or not. In other words, it would not be an appeal as provided by the enactment under which the cases lie and therefore in no manner contrary to the provisions of the concerned enactment but only on an appeal as a special case to examine the correctness or proprieties of an order passed by a single Member. In other words, it would not be an appeal as provided by the enactment under which the cases lie and therefore in no manner contrary to the provisions of the concerned enactment but only on an appeal as a special case to examine the correctness or proprieties of an order passed by a single Member. In the present case also the appellate powers invoked to be exercised is not by way an appeal under the provisions of the Tenancy Act. Nor in any way in conflict with the provisions laid down therein or in derogation thereof or contrary to the provisions therein but only an appeal to examine whether the learned Member sitting singly has exercised the jurisdiction of revision vested in the Board properly or not. The learned counsel for the respondent has in the course of very elaborate and able arguments tried to find support for his contention in A.I.R. 1962 Supreme Court 256 the Union of India Vs. the Mohindra Supply Company, A.I.R. 1962 Bom. 229 Madhodas Vs. Vithaldas; A.I.R. 1945 Madras 184 Radhakrishan Murty Vs. Ethirajula Chetty & Co. He has also tried to compare the pronisions of Sec. 10(1) of the Revenue Act with the provisions of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance which he said were the same as in case of the Letters Patent of other High Courts. We take the analogy with the provisions of the High Court Ordinance first ; Secs. 18 and 19 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance (No. XV of) 1949 deal with the appellate powers of the Judges of the High Court. Sec. 18(1) provides for an appeal to the High Court from the judgment of one Judge of the High Court. It, however, excludes(1) a judgment passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a court subject to the superintendence of the High Court, and (2) the order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. As against it vide Sec. 10(1) of the Revenue Act read with the relevant paras of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual (Paras 8 and 9 referred to above) it is only the order made in revisional jurisdiction by a single Member of the Board against which an appeal can lie to the Division Bench of the Board consisting of more than one Member. Sec. 19 of the Ordinance provides for appeals from the civil courts of the State and from all other courts subject to the superintendence of the High Court in accordance with the law for the time being in force. Sec. 10(1) of the Revenue Act does not contain any such provision. Nor does any other section in Chapter II of the Revenue Act deal specifically with this subject. Only Sec. 8 thereof lays down that subject to the other provisions of this section or to the provisions of the Tenancy Act or any other law for the time being in force the Board shall be the highest revenue court of appeal, revision and reference in Rajasthan. The specific appellate power of the Board in various cases are laid down in the enactments under which those cases arise themselves. Now, for the cases referred to on behalf of the respondent.. They all deal with the interpretation of the provision in sec. 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 which provides in sub-sec. (1) the orders which are appealable and in sub-sec. (2) "no second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under this section but nothing in this section shall affect or take away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court." It is with reference to this provision and the cases under this Act that it has been decided whether an appeal under the Letters Patent of the High Court against the order of a single Judge can lie to a Division Bench of the same High Court. It has been decided therein that the expression "second appeal" does not mean an appeal under sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure but only further appeal" from an order passed in appeal under sec. 39 (1) of the Arbitration Act as distinguished from an appeal under sec. 100 Civil Procedure Code. It is with reference to the interpretation of the provisions of the Arbitration Act that it has been decided that no second appeal will be heard by the Division Bench of a High Court against the appellate order of a single Judge of the same High Court. 100 Civil Procedure Code. It is with reference to the interpretation of the provisions of the Arbitration Act that it has been decided that no second appeal will be heard by the Division Bench of a High Court against the appellate order of a single Judge of the same High Court. The judgments thus being confined to the interpretation of the provisions of sec.39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 vis-a-vis the power of the High Court under the Letters Patent, they cannot go to help in deciding the point for determination in the present case, viz, whether an appeal can be heard by a Division Bench of the Board against an order given in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by a single Member of the Board. The learned counsel for the respondent has also referred us to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as laid down by sec. 100 thereof. It reads "save where as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force an appeal shall lie." Similarly sec. 96 of this Code provides "save where as otherwise expressly provided in the body of this Code or by any other law for the time being in force an appeal shall lie------". Thus the right of appeal provided by the Code is subject to the provisions of any other law for the time being in force also. Vide sec. 226 of the Tenancy Act no appeal lies except as provided by that Act. Vide Sec. 74 of the Revenue Act notwithstanding any law for the time being in force no appeal lies except as provided by that Act. It means that appeals under the Revenue and Tenancy Acts have been restricted only to the provisions in those Acts alone when by the Code they are permissible even when not provided in the Code. On this basis the learned counsel for the respondent has contended, the special appeal provided by the proviso to sec. 10 (1) of the Revenue Act will be in contravention of the provisions of sec. 222 of the Tenancy Act and cannot therefore be held to be maintainable in the same manner as the Letters Patent appeal under the provisions of the Arbitration Act has been held to be not maintainable by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above. 222 of the Tenancy Act and cannot therefore be held to be maintainable in the same manner as the Letters Patent appeal under the provisions of the Arbitration Act has been held to be not maintainable by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above. We have bestowed our very earnest consideration to this argument What is prohibited by the provisions of sec. 222 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act and for that matter sec. 74 of the Revenue Act is "the appeal and not "the revision". The revision is provided by sec. 230 of the Tenancy Act as well as sec. 84 of the Revenue Act. The Board can, therefore, always revise any order passed by any revenue court subordinate to it. The revising power has been vested by virtue of sec. 10(1) read with paras 8 and 9 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual in a single Member also but not completely and only partially, e.g. only for dismissing a revision petition and not for accepting it. The power of accepting a revision petition has been kept reserved only to a Division Bench of the Board. The revising powers with which the Board has been invested vide sec. 230 of the Tenancy Act and sec. 84 of the Rajasthan Revenue Act are therefore not exercised completely so long as revision is not heard by a Division Bench of the Board. This being the case, the special appeal provided by S. 10(1) of the Revenue Act does not in any way become in contravention of the provisions of sec. 222 of the Tenancy Act or for that matter sec. 74 of the Revenue Act. It would be only whether the revising powers have been exercised correctly and properly by the learned Single Member of the Board that will be examined in such an appeal and no more. Having come to the conclusion in this behalf one way or the other the Division Bench of the Board will hear the revision again if it is found that the powers have not been exercised properly by the learned Member hearing the revision singly. The learned counsel of the parties have not been able to quote any direct ruling on the subject. Nor have we been able to find any. The learned counsel of the parties have not been able to quote any direct ruling on the subject. Nor have we been able to find any. On the basis of the reasoning alone therefore, given above we hold that the present special appeal is maintainable and the preliminary objection is hereby over-ruled. Now about the merits; the learned counsel for the appellant contends that the learned member deciding the revision had wrongly held that the suit matter lay within the jurisdiction of the revenue courts and further that he has disallowed the objection about the registration of the lease deed by a wrong reference to S. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, when vide S. 17 of the Jaipur State Raj. Act (No. V of 1944) the lease for agricultural property was also compulsorily registrable. The argument is that there was no evidence excepting the lease and that when the evidence was legally inadmissible the judgment and decrees of the lower courts will be found to have been given on no evidence whatsoever or on an illegal evidence and therefore, without jurisdiction which the learned Member deciding the revision has failed to appreciate. First, about the point of jurisdiction. The suit is about a sum described to be "Kandiya" for the use of the water of the well for irrigation, This is an item which is described by the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 as "Nab-but", This expression has been defined vide sec. 3 (47) to mean a payment in cash or kind to the owner of a well for the use of that well for irrigation. Sec. 158 of the Tenancy Act deals with the suits for arrears of irrigation dues including "Nab-but" and says that any person to whom any sum is due on account of irrigation dues or on account of "Nab-but may sue for the recovery of such dues. Vide schedule III of the Act item 20 such a suit is triable by a Tehsildar. Under the provisions of the Tenancy Act, therefore, the suit lies within the jurisdiction of revenue courts. This suit was instituted on 8.10.55 about a week earlier than the enforcement of the Tenancy Act on 15.10.55. It was pending at the time this Act was commenced. Under the provisions of the Tenancy Act, therefore, the suit lies within the jurisdiction of revenue courts. This suit was instituted on 8.10.55 about a week earlier than the enforcement of the Tenancy Act on 15.10.55. It was pending at the time this Act was commenced. It shall, therefore, be deemed to have been instituted under this Act and shall be tried heard and determined in accordance with the provisions of this Act by virtue of sec. 206 thereof. There is therefore no force in the plea of jurisdiction being raised on behalf of the appellant. Now, about the registration of the deed of lease. Sec. 17 of the Jaipur Registration Act (No. V of 1954) lays down that a lease of immovable property from year to year or of any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent when such yearly rent is not below Rs.100 is compulsorily registrable. A brief reference to the facts of the case would be useful. The respondent sued the appellant for the arrears of Kandiya "which is equivalent to "Nab-but" as explained above for 2 years with the allegation that the suit land was mortgaged by the appellant to the respondent and then taken on lease for a sum of Rs. 100/- per annum through a lease deed. It also alleged that the amount had been paid for 2 years but had been stopped thereafter. It is an admitted position that both the mortgage deed and the lease deed are unregistered. The deed of mortgage being un-registered is not a great obstacle in the prosecution of this suit for it is not a suit of redemption and even an unregistered mortgage deed can always be used for purposes collateral, e.g. to find out the transfer of possession as result thereof. For a lease deed, however as it was made compulsorily registrable by the provisions of sec. 17 of the Jaipur Act referred to above as the suit itself depended on the lease an unregistered deed of lease could not be admitted in evidence. Now the suit was instituted in the court of the Tehsildar who framed 3 issues one of which was whether the suit land and well had been leased out by the respondent to the appellant on 13.6.52 and whether he was entitled to the payment of Rs. 100/- per annum for the use of the water of the well. Now the suit was instituted in the court of the Tehsildar who framed 3 issues one of which was whether the suit land and well had been leased out by the respondent to the appellant on 13.6.52 and whether he was entitled to the payment of Rs. 100/- per annum for the use of the water of the well. A perusal of the decision of the issues by the trial court will go to show that the decision is based only on the unregistered deed resides the mortgage deed. If the lease deed is taken out of evidence for want of registration there does not remain any evidence to prove the taking on lease of disputed land and well by the appellant. The first appellate court the learned Additional Collector, Jaipur, was addressed only on the point that the lease Ex.P. II was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration. The learned Add. Collector did not decide this point and he has only observed that he has seen the lease deed and that its execution had been properly proved by the statement of the scribe and other witnesses produced on behalf of the respondent. As for the denial by the appellants to have executed this document, he has used their admission in the written statement in the lower court that they had signed some documents in favour of the respondents. This is again a decision which is based only on this unregistered lease deed. A second appeal was preferred against this order to the Additional Commissioner, Jaipur who somehow or other failed to give any decision on this point. He has decided all other points raised but this. Now about the observations of the learned Member deciding the revision that as regards the agricultural lease that the same is not compulsorily registrable under sec. 17 of the Registration Act for the reason that sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act has exempted such deed from being registered. We have looked into sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. It commences "A lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by a registered instrument. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act has exempted such deed from being registered. We have looked into sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act. It commences "A lease of immovable property from year to year or for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent can be made only by a registered instrument. "All other leases of immovable property may be made either by a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by the deed of possession." Provided that the Provinial Government may from time to time by Notification in the Official Gazette direct that leases of immovable property other than leases from year to year for any term exceeding one year or reserving a yearly rent or any class of such leases may be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without delivery of possession." Thus it would appear that sec. 17 of the Registration Act referred to by the learned Member does not help the appellants or modify the provisions of sec. 107 Transfer Property Act in any manner whatsoever, especially in view of the provisions of sec. 17 of the Jaipur Registration Act referred to above making such a lease compulsorily registrable. What has been written above goes very clearly to prove that the learned lower courts have either acted on an evidence inadmissible in law or evaded the decision of the point specifically raised before them. Before the learned Member hearing the revision, the point of acting illegally and with material irregularity inasmuch as the evidence inadmissible in law was relied upon had been specially pleaded. Somehow or other he decided it not correctly as stated above. The learned Member hearing the revision has as such committed an error in procedure affecting the decision of the case on merits. We, therefore, accept this appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Member deciding the revision and further hold that the learned lower courts had acted illegally or with material irregularity inasmuch as they decided the point whether the respondent was entitled to get Rs. 100 per annum by way of Kandiya "either on an evidence not admissible in law as discussed above or took no decision thereon and failed to consider this contention. 100 per annum by way of Kandiya "either on an evidence not admissible in law as discussed above or took no decision thereon and failed to consider this contention. The only evidence as stated by the learned trial court being that of this deed of lease and regarding the scribing and execution thereof the issue No. 2 whether the appellants were liable to raise Rs.100/- per annum by way of "Kandiya" deserve to be decided against the respondent. The learned counsel for the respondent has not been able to show as any other evidence in their favour. In result therefore the suit shall also stand dismissed.