Judgment :- 1. This appeal is filed against the order of acquittal passed by the Additional First Class Magistrate of Ernakulam acquitting the accused who had been prosecuted for an offence under S.500 I.P.C. The appellant is a graduate belonging to the Ezhava Community and is employed as a clerk in the Cochin Harbour Administrative Office. The accused Shri Krishnan is said to be the General Secretary of an association styled as "Kerala Peruvannar Velavadi Samudayika Federation", Chullikkal, Cochin. The case against him was that he published a pamphlet in Malayalam with the caption ""CRf-fO WL•O jN-fM-pL-eV. In paragraph two of the said leaflet the appellant has been described as a ""AnM j-v-W-C"" and it was stated therein that the appellant was responsible for the pregnancy of a harijan unmarried lady by name Thankamma and that he tried to cause miscarriage when he knew that she was pregnant. On 26-8-60 a notice marked Ext. P-2 was published intimating that a protest meeting would be held in the Municipal Park Maidan at Palluruthy. At the meeting the accused read Ext. P-1 and made a defamatory speech regarding the appellant with intent to harm his reputation and lower him in the estimate of others. The fact that the accused got Exts. P-1 and P-2 printed at the Janatha Printing Works, Cochin that he got it distributed, that a meeting was held in pursuance of the notice, that he read the notice and spoke at the meeting are all amply proved by the prosecution and is admitted by the accused. It has not been seriously disputed that Exts. P-1 and P-2 are per se defamatory and the learned First Class Magistrate also has found the imputations to be defamatory. Therefore unless the accused can bring himself within any one of the exceptions to S.499 I.P.C. he would be clearly guilty of the offence under S.500 IPC. 2. The case of the accused is that he is protected by Exception 9 to S.499 IPC. The learned First Class Magistrate on a consideration of the evidence was of opinion that the publication was made in good faith for the protection of scheduled caste people and that the case would come under Exception 9 and on that ground acquitted the accused. Aggrieved with the order the appellant has filed this appeal after obtaining special leave under S.417 (3) Crl. P.C. 3. Aggrieved with the order the appellant has filed this appeal after obtaining special leave under S.417 (3) Crl. P.C. 3. The learned Magistrate found that even though Para.2 and 3 of Ext. P1 were per se defamatory the main purport of the pamphlet was not to defame Pw.1 and that the accused had no intention of harming nor had he any knowledge or reason to believe that Ext. P-1 would harm the reputation of the appellant. He placed reliance on the evidence of Pw.1 that there is no enmity between him and the accused and thought that there could not, therefore, be any intention to defame the appellant. To bring the publication of a scandalous imputation under the Penal Law it is not necessary to prove that it was done out of any ill will or malice or that the complainant had actually suffered from it. It would be sufficient to show that the accused intended or knew or had reason to believe that the imputation made by him would harm the reputation of the complainant. Every sane man is presumed to have intended the consequences which normally follow from his act and the accused can, therefore, be presumed to have known or to have reason to believe that the imputation made by him would certainly harm the complainant's reputation. 4. The learned counsel for the defence relied on Exception 9 to S.499. It reads as follows: "It is not defamation to make an imputation on the character of another, provided that the imputation be made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good," It is needless to say that the burden lies on an accused person to make out that his case comes within any of the exceptions. By virtue of S.105 of the Evidence Act the Court is bound to presume the absence of circumstances which would bring the offence within any of the special exceptions contained in S.499 of the Penal Code and the burden would rest on the accused to show that the exception applies in this case. 5. It is true that in order to bring it within exception 9 an accused person is not bound to prove that the imputation made by him is true. 5. It is true that in order to bring it within exception 9 an accused person is not bound to prove that the imputation made by him is true. It is sufficient for him to prove that he made it in good faith for the protection of any person or for public good. If he proves that on reasonable grounds, he believed the imputation to be true and in that belief he bona fide made it, he will be protected. Therefore "good faith" is of the essence of Exception 9. A reading of Exceptions 2,3 and 9 would show that the exception applies only to expressions of opinion or imputations on character and not to assertions of fact. The latter can be justified only by truth. Comment must be on actual and not on imagined conduct and even if the accused person genuinely believed the imputed conduct to be real that would be no defence. If the opinion or the imputation purports to be based on facts, then the person claiming the benefit of these exceptions must prove those facts. 6. Absence of good faith is want of due care and caution. The accused had, therefore, the duty to take due care and caution before he asserted the facts contained in the pamphlets Ext. P-1 and P-2. He has made no attempt to prove the truth of the imputations made nor had he chosen to tell the court how and why he believed it to be true. A mere petition by a lady complaining that a particular person was responsible for her pregnancy and a bare assertion of the accused that he believed the allegation to be true can hardly prove good faith. If a bare statement by the accused person that he believed that what he said was true were sufficient to prove good faith, a conviction for defamation could rarely be secured except on a plea of guilt. It is impossible to accept the plea of the accused that he published the defamatory matter not to defame the appellant, but to protest against the observance of untouchability. Even if the accused thought that the publication was necessary it was clearly a case of excessive publication which would take the case out of the privilege conferred by Exception 9 to S.499 I.P.C. 7. Even if the accused thought that the publication was necessary it was clearly a case of excessive publication which would take the case out of the privilege conferred by Exception 9 to S.499 I.P.C. 7. The learned magistrate in Para.36 of the judgment has only stated that the accused has been able to convince him that he had published Ext. P-1 in good faith for the protection of scheduled castes and therefore he is protected. No satisfactory reasons are given to justify the finding. The mere fact that the committee meeting authorised the accused to issue a publication cannot be a justification for the accused to defame the appellant. On a careful scrutiny of the evidence both oral and documentary, I feel no hesitation in finding that Ext. P-1 is per se defamatory and that there was absolutely no justification or bona fides in its publication. The accused had also no justification for making the libellous speech and he is, therefore, not protected under Exception 9 to S.499 I.P.C. The acquittal of the accused is, therefore, clearly unsustainable in law and in such a case it becomes necessary to interfere with the order as otherwise it would amount to a miscarriage of justice. 8. In the result the appeal is allowed, the order of acquittal is set aside, the accused is found guilty and convicted under S.500, I.P.C. and he is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 100/- in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. Time for payment of fine, one month from this date. Allowed.