JUDGMENT Mithan Lal, J. - This second appeal filed by the plaintiff arises out of a suit under Sec. 209 read with Sec. 14 (2) of the U.P.Z.A. and L. R. Act. The plots in dispute, which were sir and khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of mortgage, were mortgaged, with possession by the original owner Ram Nivas Chaudhari on 5th of February 1931 in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of defendants Nos. 1 to 6. After the death of Ram Nivas his son Mahabir succeeded to his property and thereafter he executed a deed of gift in favour of his daughter's son the present plaintiff on 2nd of June 1945. 2. The suit was contested on a variety of grounds. It has been found that the plaintiff is the daughter's son and is the donee of the property in suit. It has also been found that the property was a sir and khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of mortgage. The trial court held that the plaintiff had a right to claim possession and so the suit was decreed, but the lower appellate court came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was neither a mortgagor nor a legal representative of the original mortgagor and so he had no right to claim the property. The appeal was allowed and the suit was dismissed. It is against this finding that the present appeal has been filed. 3.. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant that the lower appellate court went wrong in holding that the plaintiff was neither a mortgagor nor a legal represent and that according to the scheme of the U.P.Z.A. and L. R. Act one of the consequences of vesting was that a possessory mortgage became a simple mortgage and a mortgagee in possession ceased to have any right to hold or possess any estate or share therein or any land situated in such estate. According to his argument the land should be deemed to be sir and khudkasht of the mortgagor which term would include not only the original mortgagor but persons deriving title from him. 4. According to his argument the land should be deemed to be sir and khudkasht of the mortgagor which term would include not only the original mortgagor but persons deriving title from him. 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand is that the intention of the Legislature was that the mortgagor who actually mortgaged the property alone should get the benefit of the provisions of the Act or the benefit should go to his legal representatives but not to his transferees. According to his submission the word `mortgagor' used in Sec. 14 and the word `legal representative' would not include any transferee such as a vendee or donee of the equity of redemption. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties in this case. As there are several other appeals involving the same point several other counsels who appeared in those cases, have also been heard. Having regard to the scheme of the Act the word `mortgagor' used in Sec. 14 must be deemed to include not only the original mortgagor but also persons deriving title from him and the reasons are as follows: (1) One of the consequences of the abolition of zamindari as given in Sec. 6(g) of the Act is that every mortgage with possession existing on any estate or part of an estate on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting shall to the extent of the amount secured on such estate or part, be deemed, without prejudice to the rights of the State Government under Sec. 4, to have been substituted by a simple mortgage. (2) Not only that every possessory mortgage existing on any estate or part of an estate was converted into a simple mortgage, but the rights of the mortgagee to possess the mortgaged property was also taken away by the provisions of Sec. 14 of that Act. Sec. 14 runs as under :- "14. Estate in possession of a mortgagee with possession :-(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-Sec. (2), a mortgagee in possession of an estate or share therein shall, with effect from the date of vesting, cease to have any right to hold or possess as such any land in such estate. Sec. 14 runs as under :- "14. Estate in possession of a mortgagee with possession :-(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-Sec. (2), a mortgagee in possession of an estate or share therein shall, with effect from the date of vesting, cease to have any right to hold or possess as such any land in such estate. (2) Where any such land was in the personal cultivation of the mortgagee on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting - (a) If it was sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage, the same shall, for purposes of Sec. 18, be deemed to be the sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor or his legal representative; (b) if it was not sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage the mortgagee shall, subject to his paying to the State Government, within six months from the date of vesting an amount equal to five times the rent calculated at hereditary rates applicable on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, be deemed, for purposes of Sec. 19, to have held such land on the date aforesaid as a hereditary tenant thereof at the said rate of rent: Provided that if the mortgagee fails to pay the amount aforesaid within the time allowed, he shall thereupon lose all rights in such land which shall be deemed to be vacant land and he shall be liable to ejectment on the suit of the Gaon Sabha (or the Collector) under Sec. 209 as if he were a person in possession thereof otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act." 6. Sub-Sec. (1) of that section relates to a mortgagee in possession of an estate or share therein and it lays down that with effect from the date of Vesting the mortgagee shall cease to I have any right to hold or possess as such, any land in such estate. Obviously the right of possession of the mortgagee either of the estate or share therein or any land in such estate was taken away and thereafter the legislature laid it down in Cl. Obviously the right of possession of the mortgagee either of the estate or share therein or any land in such estate was taken away and thereafter the legislature laid it down in Cl. (a) of Sub-Sec. (2) that where the land mortgaged was in the personal cultivation of the mortgagee on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, if it was sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of mortgage, it shall be deemed to be sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor or his legal representative. Under sub-Sec. (2), Cl. (b) a provision has been made for land which was not sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of mortgage. The requirements of sub-Sec. (2) are (1) that the land must have been in the personal cultivation of the mortgagee on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting and (2) that such land must have been sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage. If it was a case where the land was not sir or khudkasht on the date of the mortgage still it was necessary that the land must have been in the personal cultivation of the mortgagee under cl. (b) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 14. In all these appeals, which have been heard together, the land which was originally mortgaged, was either sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage and so all these cases are governed by sub-Sec. (2)(a). 7. The intention of law does not appear to be that the word `mortgagor' used in this sub-section would only mean the person who originally mortgaged the property nor does it lay down that the same person who originally mortgaged the property would be entitled to claim the benefit of Sec. 14. If it had been the intention, the Legislature would have defined the word `mortgagor' to give it a limited meaning. When the expressions `mortgagor' and `mortgagee' have not been defined, it has to be presumed that the intention of the Legislature was that then expressions should be given the same meaning as is generally understood in the common law or under the Transfer of Property Act. Under the latter Act the words `mortgagor' `mortgagee' have been deemed to Include not only the original mortgagor and mortgagee, but also persons deriving title from them. Under the latter Act the words `mortgagor' `mortgagee' have been deemed to Include not only the original mortgagor and mortgagee, but also persons deriving title from them. Even though Sec. 59-A of the Transfer of Property Act was enacted for the purposes of chapter on mortgages of that Act, yet the same definition has to be applied to these expressions which have not been defined in the Act. The only requirement given under Sec. 14 is that the land should be sir or khudkasht or not sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor on the date of the mortgage. If it is so, then the mortgagor has been given the right to claim the property from the mortgagee under Sec. 14. The two expressions `mortgagor' and `legal representatives' used in Sec. 14 appear to have been purposely used so that in cases of old mortgagee where the original mortgagor has died or in cases where the equity of redemption has been sold or gifted the benefit of Sec. 14 may go to the persons deriving title from the mortgagor. It cannot, therefore, be accepted that the word "mortgagor" used in Sec. 14 has a limited meaning and is only confined to the person who originally mortgaged the property. 8. This view is further justified by the use in Cl. (a) of sub-Sec. (2) of another expression by the Legislature and that expression is "shall be deemed to be sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor for purposes of Sec. 18." If the intention of the Legislature had been that the word `mortgagor' should only be limited to the person who originally mortgaged the property there was no question of deeming such land to be sir or khudkasht of the mortgagor because the sir rights and also the right of cultivation would revert to the mortgagor when the mortgagee ceased to have a legal right to remain in possession. It seems that as the word `sir' was given a limited meaning in the U.P. Tenancy Act and such land was not made transferable and the transferee of equity of redemption of sir land did not become a sir-holder under the law the Legislature, in order to make such land bhumidhari of the transferee of the mortgagor, deemed it to be his sir or khudkasht. The word `mortgagor' has therefore to be interpreted in a wider sense including all persons deriving title from the mortgagor. Another purpose of the Legislature appears to be that as the usufructuary mortgagee ceased to have any right of possession of the mortgaged property from the date of vesting, the possession had to be delivered back to the mortgagor. If the word `mortgagor' was interpreted to mean only the original mortgagor, then it would mean that the original mortgagor will not have a right of possession because he has transferred the equity of redemption, while the transferee will not have a right of possession because he is not a mortgagor. This could not have been the intention of law and it seems the Legislature purposely used the expression `mortgagor' so that possession of the mortgaged property may be claimed by the person who owned and possessed the equity of redemption whether as the original mortgagor or as his transferee or his legal representative. 9. Looking at the provision of law from another aspect, the title to any property cannot remain in abeyance. When the law made a provision that the mortgagee in possession of an estate or share therein shall cease to have a right to hold or possess as such, any land in such estate the right of possession of the property must remain vested in some one and that some one would be either the original mortgagor or his legal representative or his transferee who is deemed to be a mortgagor by virtue of the valid transfer. If the argument of the learned counsel for the other side is accepted it would in all cases mean that the mortgagee should continue in possession because the suits could not be filed by the original mortgagors on account of transfer. Such a position could not have been envisaged by law and since the only requirement laid down by law in case of possessory mortgages existing on the date of vesting is, that the property should have been the property of a mortgagor of the nature described in Cls. (4) and (b) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 14 on the date of the mortgage, it is not necessary for purposes of calamining possession under Sec. 209 read with Sec. 14 of the Act that the same person who originally executed the mortgage should himself claim the property in such proceedings. (4) and (b) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 14 on the date of the mortgage, it is not necessary for purposes of calamining possession under Sec. 209 read with Sec. 14 of the Act that the same person who originally executed the mortgage should himself claim the property in such proceedings. In the present case the transferee being the donee of the original mortgagor had every right to maintain the suit and the court below was wrong in dismissing the suit. 10. For all these reasons the appeal must be allowed. It is hereby alloyed with costs. The judgment and decree of the court below are set aside and the plaintiff's suit is decreed with costs throughout. 11. Leave to file a Special Appeal is granted.