Judgment :- 1. This revision petition raises the oft discussed question whether the jurisdiction conferred on the authorities by a special enactment confers exclusive jurisdiction on them ousting the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. The statute concerned is admitted by the parties to be Act XVI of 1959. The revision petitioner in this case, the landlord of the premises, was successful in getting an order for eviction of the counter-petitioner from the said premises pursuant to proceedings instituted under the above Act. The counter-petitioner contended before the statutory authorities that there is no letting out of any 'building' as envisaged by the statute. It was held by the revisional authority that the letting in the case was of a 'building', and reversing the decision of the appellate authority, Ext. P3, the revisional authority directed eviction. The order is Ext. P4. The suit has been filed by the counter-petitioner for a declaration that the orders of the appellate authority, Ext. P3, and that of the revisional authority, Ext. P4, are null and void and for the issue of an injunction restraining the revision petitioner from trying to get possession of the building. 2. Certain preliminary objections were raised to the maintainability of the suit and the issues 1, 3 (c) and 4 which are extracted below have been tried as preliminary issues in the case. "Issue No. 1. Whether the suit is maintainable ? "3 (c). Are the orders in R.C.P. 29 of 1957 and R.C.R.P. 4 of 1959 nullities for the reasons mentioned in para 6 of the plaint? Are they mere administrative orders and subject to judicial review by this Court? Has this court jurisdiction to review these orders? "4. Whether this suit is barred by res judicata?" 3. The court below has held in favour of the maintainability of the suit and has decided the above issues in favour of the counter-petitioner. 4. Before dealing with the point to be decided in this revision petition, it is necessary to say that there are observations in the order on the merits of the question as to whether the letting related to a 'building' or not. These observations are unnecessary for deciding issues 1, 3 (c) and 4 and I make it clear that the further proceedings in the case must be without any reference to any such observations contained in the order under revision. 5. These observations are unnecessary for deciding issues 1, 3 (c) and 4 and I make it clear that the further proceedings in the case must be without any reference to any such observations contained in the order under revision. 5. The point to be decided is whether in view of S.18 (5) the decision reached by the revisional authority by Ext. P4 is conclusive and whether it is open to the counter-petitioner to challenge that decision by way of a suit. The matter is not free from difficulty. A number of cases have been cited before me, but I consider it unnecessary to refer to all those cases. The Supreme Court in Raj Brij Raj Krishna v. Messrs. S.K. Shaw and Brothers (AIR. 1951 SC. 115) has quoted with approval a passage from the decision in The Queen v. Commissioner for Special Purposes of the Income-tax (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 313 at 319 which reads: "When an inferior court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may intrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision for otherwise there will be none. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide, without any appeal being given; there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction." In that case, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that there was no doubt that the case before it fell under the second category mentioned by Lord Esher, M.R. It appears to me that the case before me will fall under the first category mentioned by Lord Esher, M.R. Counsel for the revision petitioner urges that that view is not correct. It is contended that the Rent Control Authorities have to decide whether the letting was of a 'building' or not, that those authorities have jurisdiction to decide that question and the conclusion reached by those authorities is final. It was also urged that in view of the provision of S.18 (5) which reads: "18(5). The decision of the appellate authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in S.20." it must be taken that the authorities created by the statute have been enabled, in fact enjoined, to decide the question as well. There is no reason why the full ambit of S.18 (5) should not be taken to include the power to decide the maintainability of the application. Counsel relied particularly on two decisions, one of the Patna High Court in Baijnath Sao v. Ram Prasad reported in AIR. 1951 Patna 529 and the other of the Madras High Court in Krishnamurthy v. Parthasarathy reported in AIR. 1949 Madras 780. There are passages in these decisions which support the contention urged by counsel. Counsel relied particularly on two decisions, one of the Patna High Court in Baijnath Sao v. Ram Prasad reported in AIR. 1951 Patna 529 and the other of the Madras High Court in Krishnamurthy v. Parthasarathy reported in AIR. 1949 Madras 780. There are passages in these decisions which support the contention urged by counsel. But I do not think that these decisions have gone against the principle laid down by Lord Esher, M.R. and approved by the Supreme Court. Further, this Court in a Full Bench decision in Ukkayummakutty Amma v. Choyikutty reported in 1958 KLT. 686 observed that a tribunal constituted under the Malabar Tenancy Act, 1929 "has the jurisdiction, and the duty, to decide the collateral fact as to the existence or otherwise of the relationship of the landlord and tenant. A tribunal of limited jurisdiction has not only the power to deal with matters expressly brought within its jurisdiction by the Statute but has also the power and the obligation to adjudicate upon collateral facts without which it cannot proceed to decide the very matters for the decision of which it is called into existence by the Statute. The tribunal cannot of course clothe itself with a valid jurisdiction by an erroneous decision on the subject and any wrong assumption of jurisdiction will certainly be open to correction in appropriate proceedings by the aggrieved party." 6. It appears to me that the decision of the question as to whether there has been a letting out of a 'building' as envisaged by the statute in question is the decision of a collateral fact on the basis of which alone the authorities under the statute will get jurisdiction to deal with the applications. In that view there can be no doubt that this question is a question about the existence or non-existence of a certain fact on the proof of the existence of which alone the tribunal under the statute will get jurisdiction to deal with the application and necessarily therefore falls within the first category of cases mentioned by Lord Esher, M.R. This distinction has been approved by the Supreme Court & this Court. I hold that the order passed by the court below holding that it has jurisdiction to try the suit & to determine the further question as to whether there was any erroneous assumption of jurisdiction is correct and I therefore dismiss this revision petition. 7. The revision petitioner had obtained an order for eviction as early as 1958 and she has not been able to obtain possession so far. The complaint of the counsel for the revision petitioner that she has been kept out of the property by these proceedings is therefore well-founded. It is essential that the trial in the court below should be expedited and I direct that the case should he disposed of within three months of the receipt of the records in the court below. 8. I make no order as to costs.