JUDGMENT 1. THIS is a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and the question here is whether the appellate authority under the West Bengal Land Reforms Act has power and jurisdiction to direct the executing authority for restitution of properties which were delivered to the petitioner under an order passed by the trial authority which was subsequently reversed. The trial authority passed an order for ejectment; the appellate authority reversed it and sent the matter back to the trial authority for re-hearing. But in the meantime, the owner petitioner got possession of the property by execution of the order of the trial authority. That order being set aside, the opposite party bargadar claims restitution. The question is, to which authority should the opposite party apply for such restitution. 2. THE appellate authority has held that, as it is the authority which set aside the judgment and order of the trial authority, it has complete power to direct restitution. Mr. Biswas challenges this proposition. According to him, as soon as the appeal was heard the appellate authority became functus officio and the appellate authority had no further jurisdiction in the matter and having lost seisin of the matter, there was no question of exercising its inherent powers with respect to a proceeding not then pending. Mr. Biswas refers to a decision of a Bench presided over by Das Gupta, J. in (1) Bhutnath Das v. Sahadeb Chandra, reported in 66 C. W. N, page 645. The aforesaid decision supports the contention of Mr. Biswas that the appellate authority ceases to have any function after the appeal was disposed of. 3. I have been referred to section 57 of the Land Reforms Act. For our present purpose this reads as follows:- "subject to the provisions of this Act and any rules made under this Act, any officer in dealing with proceedings under this Act shall exercise the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the purposes of executing orders including an order for restoration of possession as if such orders were decrees of a Civil Court. . . . . . " 4. THEREFORE under the Land Reforms Act and subject to the provisions of that Act the authority concerned has the same powers as the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of an order for restoration. . . . . . " 4. THEREFORE under the Land Reforms Act and subject to the provisions of that Act the authority concerned has the same powers as the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of an order for restoration. Because of section 57 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, in dealing with the proceeding for restitution the authority concerned may be guided by section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure and section 144 of the Code of civil Procedure says that the application for restitution should be made before the "court of first instance." According to Mr. Biswas, "the court of first instance" means the trial court and, therefore, the application for restitution according to Mr. Biswas, should have been filed before the Land Reforms Officer who is in the position of a Trial Court. 5. THE question is, what is the meaning of the phrase "court of first instance". If section 57 of the Land Reforms Act read with section 144 of the Code be considered, then there is no scope for the appellate authority to entertain a petition under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 57 of the Land Reforms Act. I have no hesitation in holding that the appellate authority had no. power to interfere under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appellate authority has exhausted its power so far as the appeal is concerned. The order for restitution is not an order in continuation of the appeal but is consequential to the order of the appellate authority. The appellate authority had the power to set aside the order of the Trial Authority on appeal. The relief by way of restitution is the consequence of the order passed by the appellate authority. On the terms of section 144 of the Code the appellate authority is not the "court of first instance". Further the appellate authority has done no wrong by setting aside the order of the trial authority and, therefore, there was no question before the appellate authority of exercising its inherent powers in remedying any wrong done by the appellate authority. Therefore, the appellate authority has no reason to interfere under its inherent power. The wrong, if any, was committed by the executing authority which executed an order which has subsequently been found not to be correct. Therefore, the appellate authority has no reason to interfere under its inherent power. The wrong, if any, was committed by the executing authority which executed an order which has subsequently been found not to be correct. However, I shall consider that matter later on. Suffice it to say that the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to restitute either under section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with section 57 of the Land Reforms Act nor had any inherent power to direct restitution. 6. I have now to consider what is the meaning of the phrase "the Court of first instance". The phrase "court of first instance" as used in section 144 of the Code has not been understood uniformly in all the High Courts in India. In a case between (2) Kunwar Rohani v. Thakur Har Prasad Singh, reported in A. I. R. 1943, P. C. 189, the Judicial Committee observed as follows :-"restitution applies automatically on reversal of the judgment and is claimable before the Trial Court." But the point was not specifically raised as to whether the phrase "court of first instance" referred to the Trial court or the executing court. The judicial Committee proceeded on the basis that the phrase "court of first instance" would refer to the trial authority. But again the Supreme Court while considering the question of restitution in a case between (3) Lal Bhagwant Singh v. Lal Sri Risen Das, reported in 1953 S. C. R. 559, dealt with a petition for restitution filed in the executing court and the question whether the petition for restitution was properly filed before the executing Court was not considered, but the Supreme Court proceeded to consider those petitions as if they had been filed before the competent court. Therefore, it appears that in one case the Judicial Committee proceeded as if the "court of first instance" meant the trial Court. But the Supreme Court proceeded as if the "court of first instance" referred to the executing Court, but that point was not urged in either of those cases. Coming to the decisions of High Court, they have been uniform since the introduction of the Code of 1908. But the Supreme Court proceeded as if the "court of first instance" referred to the executing Court, but that point was not urged in either of those cases. Coming to the decisions of High Court, they have been uniform since the introduction of the Code of 1908. Sir George Rankin, the then Chief Justice, considered the matter in a case between (4) Hari Mohan Dalai v. Parameshwar Shaw, reported in 56 Calcutta, page 61, observed as follows :- "it is an application for relief which is consequential upon the Appellate Court's decree of reversal. But the relief is not in all cases granted by the decree of the Appellate Court taken by itself. If it is so granted, then a case arises of the character which was decided in this court in appeal from Appellate Order No. 301 of 1922, on the 27th of August, 1923. In such a case, the remedy provided by section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code is not required. All that is necessary to do is to have execution of the appellate Court's decree as it stands. His Lordship proceeded "that in other cases the application must be made under section 144 to the Court of first instance. That court has to determine whether the applicant is entitled to any and what benefits, by way of restitution or otherwise. . . . . . ". His Lordship thereafter preceded to apply Article 181 of the Limitation Act which does not relate to petitions for execution. His Lordship, therefore, was of opinion that the words "court of first instance" referred to the trial authority. In a Division Bench of this High Court Mitter and Roxburgh, JJ., in a case between (5) Birendra v. Surendra, reported in 44 Calcutta Weekly Notes, 438, at page 441-442, came to the same conclusion that an application for restitution is not an application for execution of the decree of the final court but is an application for relief which is consequential upon the final court's decree of reversal. Their Lordships proceeded to hold, "proceedings for restitution, in our judgment, are proceedings which are no doubt dependent upon the final result of the suit, but they are in a sense independent proceedings in the suit, for new issues which were not issues in the suit, require adjudication for giving complete or adequate relief. Their Lordships proceeded to hold, "proceedings for restitution, in our judgment, are proceedings which are no doubt dependent upon the final result of the suit, but they are in a sense independent proceedings in the suit, for new issues which were not issues in the suit, require adjudication for giving complete or adequate relief. The order for restitution is in effect a new decree, which has to be enforced by another execution. " Mr. Justice Rama Prosad Mookerjee in a case reported in (6) I. L. R. 1951 Vol. II, Calcutta, page 315, between Kiran Sashi Debi v. Chandra Bhusan Mondal, found that "an application for restitution is not an application in execution but it is an application arising out of the suit. " the result, therefore, is that though the views of other High Courts are different, the views of the Calcutta High Court have always been that such an application is not an application for execution and, therefore, the executing Court has no power to entertain it and it is the Trial Court which has that power or, in other words, the substance of the decisions is that the phrase "court of first instance" in section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure refers to the Trial Court and not to the executing Court. If, therefore, section 144 of the Code is applicable, the application is to be filed before the Trial Court. 7. BUT I find difficulty as to whether section 144 of the Code would apply. The Land Reforms Act in section 57 says that the provisions of the Code would apply but would be subject to the provisions of the Land Reforms Act itself. If we refer to the provisions of the Land Reforms Act, we find that even if the trial authority has power to direct restitution, section 20 (2) does not authorise the executing court to execute an order of that nature. We have considered that the application before the trial authority for restitution is rather an independent application and on a reference to the Land Reforms Act we would find that there is no provision in Chapter III for such an order to be passed by the Trial Authority. Further such an order cannot be executed by the executing authority. Section 20 (2) says, "any order made under this chapter. . . . . . Further such an order cannot be executed by the executing authority. Section 20 (2) says, "any order made under this chapter. . . . . . shall be executed by the officer or an authority appointed by the State Government". But an order for restitution is not an order within the meaning of Chapter III of the Land Reforms Act. Therefore, there is no provisions in law by which such an order can be passed by the Trial Authority to be executed by the executing authority. Hence, the provisions of the Land Reforms Act do not help application of sec. 144 of the Code as, it has been understood in our High Court. It is an independent enquiry and if that order requires to be enforced, section 20 (2) would not assist enforcement. I should say, because application of section 144 of the Code is subject to the provisions of the Land Reforms Act, there is no application of section 144 of the Code. 8. BUT that does not mean that the party aggrieved has no remedy. It is now well established that a court has inherent power to correct its own wrong. The executing Court executed an order of the trial authority and that order has now been found to be wrong. Therefore, the executing authority has inherent power to remedy the wrong committed by itself. The Judicial Committee in the case of (7) Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath Marwari, 49 Indian Appeals, page 351, following an earlier decision of the Judicial Committee found that "the right of a party to have restitution and the duty of the Court to give him restitution do not rest on the provision of section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which defines the procedure only in one class of cases requiring restitution. . . . . . ". Every court has an inherent power to repair the injury made to a party by its act and it is the executing court which has done the injury by executing an order of the trial authority which has subsequently been found to be wrong and in that view of the matter, the executing authority has the inherent power to remedy the wrong committed by itself. Therefore, the executing authority is the proper authority where the application for restitution should be made. Therefore, the executing authority is the proper authority where the application for restitution should be made. In another case of our High Court where a similar question arose with reference to section 87a of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act it was found that an order for restoration of possession was made by the executing Court in pursuance of an Award by the Board constituted under the bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. That order was subsequently reversed. The question was whether the party from whom possession was taken, because of the earlier order, had a right to apply for restitution. It was held that he had that right. It was further held that the executing court, which acted on the basis of the order, which was subsequently found to be wrong could restore possession to the party concerned and thereby could remedy the wrong committed by itself. The decision is reported in (8) 54 C. W. N., 896 between Naren Kumar Ghosh v. Benod Behari Dutta. Mr. Justice Rama Prasad Mookerjee held, "accordingly in the present case the duty of the Court was to place the party in the position which they would have occupied but for the acts of the court in April 1947. . . . . . " or, in other words, he found that it was the duty of the executing court, which executed an order which was subsequently found to be wrong, to remedy that wrong. I, therefore, hold that the application for restitution should be filed before the executing authority. The appellate authority has directed the executing court to proceed under section 20 (2) of the West Bengal Land reforms Act. The order of the appellate authority is set aside but the matter should nonetheless go to the executing authority and the executing authority would put the party in such possession. 9. LET a copy of this order be communicated both to the executing authority i.e. Court of the Sub. Divisional Officer, Serampore in Misc. Case 8/11 as well as to the appellate authority. The Rule is made absolute as aforesaid. In the circumstances of this case, each party will bear his costs throughout. Let the records go down as early as possible.